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Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries
Abstract
“Fostering Freedom Online: the Role of Internet Intermediaries” is the title of a new title in the UNESCO
Internet freedom series. With the rise of Internet intermediaries that play a mediating role on the internet
between authors of content and audiences, UNESCO took a joint initiative, with the Open Society
Foundations, the Internet Society, and Center for Global Communication Studies at the University of
Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, to examine this recent historical phenomenon and
how it impacts on freedom of expression and associated fundamental rights such as privacy.
The case study research, collaboratively delivered by 16 international researchers led by Ms Rebecca
MacKinnon and Mr Allon Bar, as well as 14 members of International Advisory Committee, covers of three
categories of intermediaries:
• Internet Service Providers (fixed line and mobile) such as Vodafone (UK, Germany, Egypt), Vivo/
Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, Kenya), Safaricom (Kenya),
• Search Engines such as Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China), Yandex (Russia) and
• Social Networking Platforms such as Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt), Twitter (USA,
Kenya), Weibo (China), iWiW (Hungary).
The research showed that internet intermediaries are heavily influenced by the legal and policy environments
of states, but they do have leeway over many areas of policy and practice affecting online expression and
privacy. The findings also highlighted the challenge where many state policies, laws, and regulations are – to
varying degrees – poorly aligned with the duty to promote and protect intermediaries’ respect for freedom of
expression. It is a resource which enables the assessment of Internet intermediaries’ decisions on freedom of
expression, by ensuring that any limitations are consistent with international standards.
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7Foreword
UNESCO, as enshrined in its Constitution, promotes the “free flow of ideas by word and 
image”, and is accordingly committed to enabling a free, open and accessible Internet 
space as part of promoting comprehensive freedom of expression online and offline. 
With the rise of Internet intermediaries that play a mediating role on the internet between 
authors of content and audiences, UNESCO is interested in how this recent historical 
phenomenon impacts on freedom of expression and associated fundamental rights 
such as privacy. This interest is linked to our draft conceptual framework of “Internet 
universality” which draws from UNESCO decisions on the Internet, and recognises that 
four core principles should inform cyber actors. These principles are that the Internet 
should be human rights-based, open, accessible for all and governed by multi-
stakeholder participation.
The full range of intermediaries includes search engines and internet-service providers 
(ISPs), hosting providers, cloud computing service through to online social networks, and 
media houses which provide for user-generated comment such as comments, blogs or 
citizen-journalism posts. These actors can enable freedom of expression in historically 
unprecedented ways, but all of them also face challenges when it comes to dealing with 
content which may transgress international standards for freedom of expression, be 
illegal in terms of national laws, be legal but merit certain restrictions because of ethical 
considerations, or be offensive in some eyes but not attracting restriction.
The decisions made by the diverse intermediaries on these pressing issues are partly 
shaped by the legal liability regime that applies to the different kinds of service or role 
provided. But there are also spaces where these actors make significant decisions within 
a given law, where they contest a number of legal measures, and where they seek the 
clarity of rule of law and one which is guided by international standards on free expression 
and privacy. 
Though these issues have been hotly debated in past years, there is still a lack of 
empirical study highlighting the global complexity of the subject. This report fills the gap 
by collecting and analyzing empirical data around practices with regard to monitoring, 
surveillance, blocking, privacy-anonymity and take-down of content, and developing 
best practice recommendations from these. 
UNESCO has been pleased to work on this research project with the Open Society 
Foundations, the Internet Society, and the Center for Global Communication Studies at 
the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication.  The result is a 
scholarly document that is based on a case study methodology. It is a resource which 
enables the assessment of Internet intermediaries decisions on freedom of expression, 
by ensuring that any limitations are consistent with international standards. 
UNESCO has succeeded in raising awareness and promoting good practice through past 
research in the UNESCO Series on Internet Freedom: Freedom of connection, freedom 
of expression: the changing legal and regulatory ecology shaping the Internet (2011) and 
Global survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2012). 
We believe the rich material in this, the third in UNESCO’s Series on Internet Freedom, will 
be of great value to all stakeholders. These are industry actors, UNESCO Member States, 
technical community, Intergovernmental organizations, private sector, civil society, and 
others both national and international.
The research also helps to inform UNESCO’s implementation of a comprehensive and 
consultative multi-stakeholder Internet study as mandated by the Organization’s 37th 
General Conference Resolution 52. The study, due in 2015, covers UNESCO’s key 
competence areas of access to information and knowledge, freedom of expression, 
privacy, and ethical dimensions of the information society, and contains possible options 
for future actions.
Rich as it is, this report only covers three intermediary types - Internet Service Providers, 
Search Engines and Social Media. It will be followed by future studies on other intermediary 
types, including data processing, web hosting providers, cloud computing services, and 
domain name registries, as well as online media with substantial user-generated content. 
UNESCO expresses its thanks to 16 international researchers led by Ms Rebecca 
MacKinnon and Mr Allon Bar, as well as 14 members of an International Advisory 
Committee, who have jointly delivered this work. UNESCO also thanks Mr Edward 
Pittman from the Open Society Foundations, Mr Nicolas Seidler from the Internet Society 
and Mr Monroe Price from the Center for Global Communication Studies at the University 
of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, for their institutions’ financial 
contributions and administrative support to the research. 
Getachew Engida 
Deputy Director-General of UNESCO
9Executive summary
Freedom of expression is a universal human right that applies equally to the internet as 
to the offline world.1
As an international intergovernmental organization with a global remit that promotes 
universal values, UNESCO is exploring a conceptual framework of internet ‘universality’ 
according to which respect for four core principles is a precondition for the Internet to 
be universal: human rights, openness, accessibility; and multistakeholder participation. 
The four can be summarized by the mnemonic R – O – A – M (Rights-based, Open, 
Accessible, Multistakeholder driven).2 This report addresses challenges for realizing the 
first principle, human rights.  The research also helps to inform UNESCO’s implementation 
of a comprehensive and consultative multi-stakeholder Internet study as mandated by 
the Organization’s 37th General Conference Resolution 52.3.
The goal of this report is to shed light on how internet intermediaries – services that 
mediate online communication and enable various forms of online expression – both 
foster and restrict freedom of expression across a range of jurisdictions, circumstances, 
technologies, and business models. 
All of the intermediaries studied in this report are operated by companies. According to 
the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, states have the primary duty 
to protect human rights, businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights, and 
both must play a role in providing remedy to those whose rights have been violated.4 
The report’s authors have applied this ‘protect, respect, and remedy’ framework to the 
policies and practices of companies representing three intermediary types (internet 
service providers, search engines, and social networking platforms) across ten countries. 
The three case studies highlight challenges and opportunities for different types of 
intermediaries in respecting and protecting online freedom of expression. 
1 United Nations Human Rights Council. 16 July 2012. The promotion, protection and enjoyment 
of human rights on the Internet. United Nations Human Rights Council (A/HRC/RES/20/8). http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/20/8  
2 UNESCO. July 2014. Internet Universality: A Means towards Building Knowledge Societies 
and the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. Draft Proposed by the Secretariat. 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/news/internet_universality_
summary_240314_en.pdf 
3 UNESCO General Conference. November 2013. 37 C/Resolution 52. Internet related issues: 
including access to information and knowledge, freedom of expression, privacy and ethical 
dimensions of the information society http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/
CI/pdf/news/37gc_resolution_internet.pdf
4 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 2011. Geneva, United Nations, p. 4. www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
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Findings
Operations of internet intermediaries are heavily influenced by the legal and policy 
environments of states. Research findings highlight the extent to which state policies, 
laws, and regulations – to varying degrees – are inadequately aligned with their duty to 
facilitate and support intermediaries’ respect for freedom of expression. At the same 
time, the three case studies also document the extent to which companies are able to 
control many aspects of their policies and practices affecting online expression.
There is currently a trend among some internet intermediaries called ‘transparency 
reporting’: the disclosure of information about government and other lawful requests 
to restrict content, hand over user data or comply with other surveillance-related 
requirements. This report uses the term “requests” to cover the broad range of 
instructions, injunctions and demands made on intermediaries. There is also a movement 
among human rights advocates from a range of countries, some companies, and some 
investors calling for greater transparency by governments about requests being made of 
companies. Regarding these transparency-related trends this report contains two over-
arching findings: 
1. To the extent that intermediaries and governments have grown more transparent 
about requests made by governments to companies, there is much more transparency 
about surveillance and user data requests (directly affecting internet users’ privacy) 
than about demands to restrict content and block communications. 
2. For those intermediaries that publish ‘transparency reports’, disclosure has been 
largely limited to government or other demands made through legal processes, and 
the companies’ handling of such demands. Few efforts have been made thus far by 
intermediaries to be more transparent about extra-legal content restrictions, as well 
as content removal and account deactivation and other actions taken to enforce 
intermediaries’ own self-regulatory terms of service.  Corporate transparency around 
collective self-regulatory efforts was also found to lag behind transparency related to 
direct government requests.  
More specific findings of the three case studies can be summarized as follows:
STUDY 1: Internet Service Providers (fixed line and mobile) - Vodafone (UK, Germany, 
Egypt), Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, Kenya), Safaricom (Kenya) 
Across jurisdictions, stakeholders interviewed for this report highlighted the importance 
of ISPs and their key role in enabling expression. At the same time, ISPs can be a single 
point of failure for expression online particularly when content or entire services are 
filtered (blocked from being accessed by the user) or networks are shut down locally 
or nationally. Because ISPs must be physically present in a country in order to provide 
service and operate, the extent to which they facilitate or restrict freedom of expression 
is most directly affected by laws, regulations, and government actions compared to the 
other intermediaries studied. Findings include:
11
• Levels of transparency on matters related to privacy and surveillance are very low. 
Respect and protection of privacy by companies and governments is an enabler of 
freedom of expression.5 Yet some companies studied do not have publicly available 
privacy policies for their core services in some countries. Data protection practices 
varied widely in tandem with whether or not countries had data protection laws. Few 
companies make an effort to be transparent about how they respond to government 
requests, or speak up for their users, even in relatively open political and media 
environments.
• Governments and companies offer even less transparency about restrictions of 
content and user expression made by and through ISPs than about policies and 
practices related to privacy and surveillance. This includes filtering and network 
shutdowns. “Self-regulatory” filtering processes suffer from questions about public 
accountability in their decision making about what content to restrict.
• With the emergence of an initiative called the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue, 
the two member companies included in this report Vodafone and (to a much more 
general degree) Telefonica have made public commitments to respect user rights, 
advocate for users with governments, and be more transparent. Because these 
commitments have just begun to be implemented, it is too early to know the concrete 
impact of these commitments on users’ freedom of expression. 
STUDY 2: Search Engines - Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China), 
Yandex (Russia) Search engines are a principal means by which internet users find 
and access information. Thus, their policies and practices affecting what content can 
or cannot be found online have major implications for freedom of expression. Of the 
companies studied, researchers found that search engines’ policies and practices related 
to content restriction and manipulation are shaped by their home jurisdictions and to 
varying degrees by other jurisdictions in which they operate. Findings include:
• Differences in ISP filtering regimes have a strong influence on how, and to what 
extent, search engines restrict their own search results. For example, due to 
substantial difference in the technical and legal characteristics of filtering in Russia 
and China, Yandex and Baidu have very different restriction practices, and Google 
has taken different approaches to the two markets (remaining in Russia as of August 
2014 but removing its operations from China since 2010).
• The stricter the intermediary liability regime in a given jurisdiction, the more likely 
content is to be removed either proactively by the company or upon request 
by authorities without challenge. Without government transparency, company 
transparency reports (Google was the only one of the three search engines studied) 
are the only way for users to ascertain the extent and nature of requests being made.
• While search engines carry out content restriction on government request, they 
also restrict or modify search results for many other commercial and self-regulatory 
5 Navi Pillay. 30 June 2014. The right to privacy in the digital age: Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (A/HRC/27/37), p. 15. www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf 
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reasons, including user personalization and enforcement of companies’ own rules 
about what content is acceptable to appear on their services.
STUDY 3: Social Networking Platforms - Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil, 
Egypt), Twitter (USA, Kenya), Weibo (China), iWiW (Hungary) Social networking 
platforms have significantly lowered the threshold for individuals to publish content that 
can reach large audiences. For the two platforms with international user bases (Facebook 
and Twitter), researchers identified tensions between the companies’ own policies and 
practices and governments’ laws and regulations. The policies and practices of the more 
domestically focused platforms more closely mirror home governments’ expectations 
and requirements. Findings include:
• Transparency reports published by Facebook and Twitter reveal the extent to 
which intermediary liability regimes affect the volume of government requests that 
companies receive to hand over user data and restrict content. The reports also 
reveal that companies have legal cause to decline a large percentage of requests 
made by many governments.
• The two companies studied that publish transparency reports define and categorize 
data in different ways, and choose to reveal or not reveal different types of information, 
making reports difficult to compare. Also, companies are much more transparent 
about how they respond to government requests than they are about the nature and 
volume of content restricted for violation of their own private rules. 
• There is significant concern amongst some human rights advocates, including for 
example those working to stop gender-based violence and online hate speech, 
about companies’ lack of communication with users about how terms of service are 
developed, interpreted and enforced. 
• Given the significant amount of personal information collected by social networking 
platforms, these intermediaries have a special responsibility to take steps to 
anticipate harms to user privacy and to take steps to mitigate them. 
• Even in countries with strict intermediary liability laws where companies face strong 
pressure from authorities to proactively restrict content and hand over user data, 
there are measures companies can take to be more transparent and demonstrate 
respect for users’ rights. These include taking maximum possible steps to inform 
users when content is restricted, and also under what circumstances their personal 
information is collected and how it is shared. 
Recommendations: 
The report recommends specific ways that intermediaries can improve respect for 
internet users’ right to freedom of expression. It also offers recommendations for states 
to support and facilitate intermediaries’ respect for users’ rights.  Key recommendations 
include:
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• Adequate legal frameworks and policies: Laws and regulations governing 
intermediaries should be consistent with international human rights norms, including 
the right to freedom of expression;
• Multistakeholder policy development: Laws, regulations and governmental 
policies, as well as corporate policies and rules, should be developed in consultation 
with all affected stakeholders;
• Transparency: Legitimacy and public trust depends on demonstrating that 
governance and enforcement actions – whether in accordance with the law or 
enforcement of intermediaries’ own terms of service – are in compliance with pre-
specified principles, rules and conditions. Transparency reporting and other actions 
to communicate with the public about company policy and practice should be 
comprehensive and sufficiently standardized so that it is possible to compare and 
analyze datasets across multiple companies.
• Privacy: Protecting internet users’ right to privacy via intermediaries is essential for 
the flourishing of freedom of expression. Data protection regimes at the national level 
are vital, as are legal frameworks and other mechanisms to ensure that government 
access to user data and company practices in handling government requests are 
based on strict principles of necessity, proportionality, and accountability in terms of 
remedial mechanisms. 
• Accountability in self-regulation: Intermediaries’ private rules and accompanying 
enforcement processes, as well as government-supported efforts by companies to 
collectively self-regulate, should be compatible with human rights norms, including 
the right to freedom of expression. They should adhere to core principles of 
accountability, transparency and due process.
• Remedy: It should be possible for people to report grievances and obtain redress 
from private intermediaries as well as from state authorities, including from national-
level human rights institutions.
• Public information and education: In order for freedom of expression to be 
protected and respected online, governments and companies have a responsibility 
to consult with stakeholders on their laws and rules and explain them clearly. They 
also have an obligation to educate users about their rights so that people can 
understand and effectively exercise them; recognize when their rights have been 
restricted, violated, or otherwise interfered with; and know where and how to report 
grievances and seek redress.
• Global accountability mechanisms: New structures such as the multistakeholder 
Global Network Initiative and the industry-organized Telecommunications Industry 
Dialogue have begun to have an impact on concrete commitments by companies 
to respect user rights and implement relevant policies and practices. Stakeholders 
concerned with protecting online freedom of expression should consider how to 
support and broaden global mechanisms that strengthen the incentives and capacity 
for intermediaries to respect internet users’ rights, particularly in the area of self-
regulation.
14
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider three recent developments and their implications for online freedom of 
expression around the world: 
On 3 April 2014, the Turkish Government lifted a two-week block on the social networking 
service Twitter, after the Constitutional Court of Turkey, the country’s highest legal body, 
ruled that the ban violated the right to freedom of expression. Although it successfully 
contested the block in court, Twitter did agree to restrict an account accusing a former 
minister of corruption by making the account inaccessible to internet users with IP 
addresses originating from Turkey. The account and its contents remained visible to 
everyone else in the world.6
On 13 May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that Google 
must respect the ‘right to be forgotten’ and enable individuals to request the removal 
from its search engine of links that were ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they were processed and in the light of the 
time that has elapsed’.7 While the long-term impact of the CJEU decision has yet to play 
out, critics expressed concern that politicians and other powerful public figures would 
abuse this right to the detriment of freedom of expression.8 
On 6 June 2014, in the period subsequent to Edward Snowden, a former contractor for 
the United States National Security Agency (NSA) releasing his first revelations about the 
US Government’s surveillance of domestic and global networks,  Vodafone, the world’s 
second-largest telecommunications company with 434 million customers worldwide,9 
released a report analysing ‘law enforcement demands received based on data gathered 
from [Vodafone’s] local licensed communications operators’ in the 29 countries in which 
it operates.’10 Most relevant from the point of view of international standards for the right 
6 Ceylan Yeginsu. 4 April 2014. Turkey Lifts Twitter Ban After Court Calls It Illegal. New York Times. www.
nytimes.com/2014/04/04/world/middleeast/turkey-lifts-ban-on-twitter.html  (Accessed 16 July 
2014.)
7 Alan Travis and Charles Arthur. 13 May 2014. EU court backs ‘right to be forgotten’: Google must 
amend results on request. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-
be-forgotten-eu-court-google-search-results (Accessed 16 July 2014.) 
8 Mark Stephens. 18 May 2014. Only the powerful will benefit from the ‘right to be forgotten’. The 
Guardian. 
 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/18/powerful-benefit-right-to-be-forgotten 
(accessed 16 July 2014.)
9 Vodafone Group Plc. 20 May 2014. Empowering everybody to be confidently connected: Annual 
Report 2014. England, Vodafone, p. 1. www.vodafone.com/content/annualreport/annual_report14/
downloads/full_annual_report_2014.pdf 
10 Vodafone Group Plc. 20 May 2014. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. www.vodafone.
com/content/sustainabilityreport/2014/index/operating_responsibly/privacy_and_security/law_
enforcement.html 
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to privacy,Vodafone revealed that in six of those countries, government authorities can 
tap directly into the company’s networks.11 
Google’s search engine, Twitter’s social network, and Vodafone’s telecommunication 
and internet services are called internet intermediaries because they mediate 
online communication and enable various forms of online expression. However, 
intermediaries can also act as chokepoints, arbiters or ‘gatekeepers’ of expression.12 
This powerful role prompted one legal scholar to write that ‘Internet intermediaries govern 
online life’.13 A recent book on the internet and human rights by one of this report’s authors 
calls them ‘sovereigns of cyberspace’.14
Yet intermediaries’ power can only be fully understood in the context of state power. 
The position of internet intermediaries in relation to states and to international human 
rights standards is complicated: Internet intermediaries often operate across a variety 
of jurisdictions, and states expect them to comply with national laws that in turn align in 
varying degrees with international human rights norms. Optimists have regarded these 
companies as a source of ‘liberation technology’ that will help unshackle the hands of 
the oppressed.15 Others have critiqued them for failing to protect user privacy rights and 
facilitating unaccountable surveillance by the private sector as well as governments.16  
Intermediaries clearly have a powerful and positive role to play in fostering rights. However 
as this report will show, in order to protect freedom of expression, they need to follow 
international standards of transparency, necessity, proportionality, legitimate purpose, 
and due process in order not to engage in violation of rights. 
1.1 Freedom of Expression Online
Freedom of expression is established under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).17 Article 19 of the UDHR reads:
11 Amy Thomson and Danielle Lepido. 6 June 2014. Vodafone Prompts Protests Over Government 
Wiretapping. Bloomberg. 
 www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-06/vodafone-says-29-governments-ask-for-access-to-its-
user-data.html (Accessed 16 July 2014); Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit. 
12 Jonathan Zittrain. Spring 2006. A History of Online Gatekeeping. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 
Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 253–98. http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v19/19HarvJLTech253.pdf 
13 Frank A. Pasquale. 2010. Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency 
in Internet Intermediaries. Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 1, p. 105. www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/v104/n1/105/LR104n1Pasquale.pdf 
14 Rebecca MacKinnon. 2012. Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet 
Freedom, New York, Basic Books, pp. 6, 115–68.
15 Larry Diamond. July 2010. Liberation technology. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 69–83. 
www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Diamond-21-3.pdf 
16 Bruce Schneier. 20 November 2013. ‘Stalker economy’ here to stay. CNN. http://edition.cnn.
com/2013/11/20/opinion/schneier-stalker-economy/index.html (Accessed 17 July 2014.) 
17 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 23 March 1976. International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.18
This right therefore covers the freedom to express and publish content as well as to have 
access to such content. As such, it provides for the right to press freedom and the right to 
information, and these apply across media platforms and national frontiers. International 
standards require that any limitations of these rights should be exceptions to the norm, 
and be based on legitimate purposes as set out in the UDHR and ICCPR. Likewise, 
limitations of any right need further to made be in terms of law, and be necessary and 
proportionate.
In 2012 the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a landmark resolution 
affirming that ‘the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online’.19 
It acknowledged the 2011 reports on ‘the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
exercised through the Internet’ by UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression Frank La Rue, which highlighted 
how freedom of expression can be fostered as well as violated through the internet.20 
La Rue warned of  ‘increased restrictions on the Internet through the use of increasingly 
sophisticated technologies to block content, monitor and identify activists and critics, 
criminalization of legitimate expression, and adoption of restrictive legislation to justify 
such measures’.21
In early June 2013, in the period before Snowden began to unveil revelations about the 
U.S. Government’s surveillance, La Rue published another privacy-related document 
examining the impact of State surveillance on freedom of expression.22 Especially relevant 
to this current report is La Rue’s discussion of the private sector’s key role in facilitating 
state surveillance, by 1) ‘hav[ing] had to respond to requirements that digital networks 
and communications infrastructure be designed to enable intrusion by the State’; (2) 
‘developing and deploying new technologies and communications tools in specific ways’; 
or even (3) ‘[being] complicit in developing technologies that enable mass or invasive 
surveillance in contravention of existing legal standards’.23 
18 United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. www.un.org/en/documents/udhr 
Emphasis added.
19 United Nations Human Rights Council. 16 July 2012. The promotion, protection and enjoyment 
of human rights on the Internet. United Nations Human Rights Council (A/HRC/RES/20/8). http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/20/8 
20 Frank La Rue. 10 August 2011. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. (United Nations General Assembly document 
A/66/290). www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/A.66.290.pdf (Accessed 17 July 2014); 
Frank La Rue. 16 May 2011. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. (A/HRC/17/27). http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.
HRC.17.27_en.pdf  
21 A/HRC/17/27. p. 7. 
22 Frank La Rue. 17 April 2013. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. (A/HRC/23/40). www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/
Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf 
23 La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, op. cit., pp. 19–20.
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La Rue also emphasized the importance of ‘private, secure, and anonymous’ 
communications, describing the ‘chilling effect’ of excluding individuals from vital social 
spheres and ‘dissuading the free expression of information and ideas’ when restrictions 
are placed on people’s ability to communicate anonymously.24 Later in 2013, La Rue’s 
‘surveillance’ report was further reinforced by a UN General Assembly resolution on the 
right to privacy in the digital age. It called on states to respect the right to privacy in digital 
communications and take measures to prevent violations, including a review of existing 
laws and practices and the establishment of oversight mechanisms.25
UNESCO follows the UN’s position on human rights, based on the UDHR, and therefore 
the position that human rights are indivisible26, recognizing thereby that particular 
actions concerning the right to privacy can impact on other rights, such as the right 
to freedom of expression, and vice versa. As stated in UNESCO’s 37 C/Resolution 52, 
“privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, which enable a society to benefit from 
investigative journalism, to strengthen good governance and the rule of law, and that 
such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference”.27 At the same 
time, privacy may also not be used to shield violations of individual rights or to block 
the media from exposing these. Public interest must enter any calculation of reconciling 
rights.
This report builds on three UNESCO-commissioned works that have underscored the 
internet as an essential component of people’s ability to exercise their right to freedom 
of expression, and written over the same time period as the developments described 
above. A 2011 UNESCO report called Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression: 
The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet provides an overview of 
the legal and regulatory contexts in which countries seek to balance the responsibility to 
protect freedom of expression with other rights, alongside other goals of the State, such 
as economic development, trade and industrial policy.28 UNESCO’s 2012 Global Survey 
on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression points out that poor privacy protection 
has a negative impact on freedom of expression.29 UNESCO’s 2014 report World Trends 
in Freedom of Expression and Media Development states that in addition to breaches 
of privacy, fear of reprisal also leads to self-censorship – by users as well as internet 
intermediaries.30
24 La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, op. cit., p. 7.
25 United Nations General Assembly. 20 November 2013. The right to privacy in the digital age. (UN 
Doc A/C.3/68/L.45/Rev.1. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.3/68/L.45/
Rev.1 
26 http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx
27 37 C/Resolution 52, Op. Cit.
28 William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law and Victoria Nash. 2011. Freedom of 
Connection, Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the 
Internet. Paris, UNESCO Publishing. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001915/191594e.
pdf  
29 Toby Mendel, Andrew Puddephatt, Ben Wagner, Dixie Hawtin and Natalia Torres. 2012. Global 
Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression. Paris, UNESCO Publishing, pp. 95–97. 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002182/218273e.pdf 
30 UNESCO. 2014. World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development. Paris, 
UNESCO Publishing. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002270/227025e.pdf 
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Resolution 52 of the 37th General Conference in 2013 mandates UNESCO to conduct 
a comprehensive and consultative multi-stakeholder study on Internet-related issues 
within the mandate of UNESCO, including access to information and knowledge, 
freedom of expression, privacy, and ethical dimensions of the information society, and 
containing possible options for future actions. The results of this Study should inform the 
Organization’s reporting on the implementation of the World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) outcomes to the 38th General Conference in 2015. This research is 
conducted as an integral component of this ongoing exploration of Internet related issues 
within UNESCO’s mandates.
1.2 Business and Human Rights
International human rights law has traditionally focused on state conduct. Its foundations 
are declarations drafted by and voted for by governments, and agreements concluded 
between states.31 Over the past several decades, however, there is growing recognition 
that businesses also have human rights responsibilities for which they should be held 
accountable.
Because most internet intermediaries are operated by private-sector companies, this 
report builds on established human rights standards for business and human rights laid 
out by the UN’s ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework. It argues that governments 
have the primary duty to protect human rights, but companies also have a responsibility 
to respect human rights; both entities must ensure access to effective remedy.32
Building on that framework, in 2011 the Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, the result of six years of research and 
consultation with companies, governments and civil society by Prof. John Ruggie, the 
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights.
The Guiding Principles begin with the duty of States to protect against human rights 
abuses by businesses operating within their territory, and to ‘set out clearly the expectation 
that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human 
rights throughout their operation.’33
The Guiding Principles outline three concrete steps for companies:34
1. Make a ‘policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights’;
31 Philip Alston. 2005.The ‘Not-a-cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime 
Accommodate Non-State Actors? Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 3-4.
32 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. September 2010. The UN ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework for Business and Human Rights. www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/
files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf 
33 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 2011. Geneva, United Nations, p. 4. www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
34 Ibid, pp. 13–28.
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2. Develop a ‘human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for how they address their impacts on human rights’;
3. Initiate ‘processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts 
they cause or to which they contribute’.
These principles apply to all companies – not just internet intermediaries. They also apply 
universally. As UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay wrote in her June 
2014 report to the General Assembly, ‘The responsibility to respect human rights applies 
throughout a company’s global operations regardless of where its users are located, and 
exists independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations’.35 
This report seeks to explain what internet intermediaries can do to maximize freedom of 
expression across a range of jurisdictions, circumstances, technologies and business 
models. 
1.3 Intermediaries 
An intermediary is ‘any entity that enables the communication of information from one 
party to another.’36 In a 2010 report, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) explains that internet intermediaries ‘bring together or facilitate 
transactions between third parties on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit 
and index content, products and services originated by third parties on the Internet or 
provide Internet-based services to third parties.’37 
It is important to note that most definitions of intermediaries explicitly exclude 
content producers, as does this report. More explicitly, the OECD excludes from the 
intermediary’s function ‘activities where service providers give access to, host, transmit 
or index content or services that they themselves originate.’38 In other words, in this 
view, publishers and other media that create and disseminate original content are not 
intermediaries. Examples of such entities include news websites that publish articles 
written and edited by staff or invited contributors, or a digital-video subscription service 
that hires or invites people to produce videos and then disseminates them to subscribers. 
35 A/HRC/27/37. p. 15; Cynthia M. Wong. 25 July 2014. A Clear-Eyed Look at Mass Surveillance. 
Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/25/clear-eyed-look-mass-surveillance 
(Accessed 3 August 2014); Nancy Scola. 16 July 2014. U.N. human rights chief: Surveillance is 
now world’s ‘dangerous habit’. Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/
wp/2014/07/16/u-n-human-rights-chief-surveillance-is-now-worlds-dangerous-habit (Accessed 3 
August 2014.)
36 Thomas F. Cotter. 2005. Some Observations on the Law and Economics of Intermediaries. Michigan 
State Law Review, Vol. 1, p. 2. (Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-14). http://ssrn.
com/abstract=822987 
37 Karine Perset/OECD. March 2010. The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries. Paris, 
Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development, p. 9. (DSTI/ICCP(2009)9/FINAL.) 
www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf The report also credits internet intermediaries 
with ‘provid[ing] the Internet’s basic infrastructure and platforms by enabling communications and 
transactions between third parties as well as applications and services’. p. 6.
38 Perset/OECD, op. cit., p. 10.
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At the same time, many entities offer hybrid services and constitute intermediaries to one 
extent or another. (This is particularly the case with traditional media organizations that 
also provide social networking or facilitate the sharing of user generated content, a type 
of hybrid intermediary not covered in this report.)  To what extent social media services, 
for instance, are primarily intermediaries or also operate a media function, is important 
in terms of expectations. The Council of Europe has adopted a broad definition of media 
using six criteria to assess when new actors count as media. These criteria include intent 
to act as media, exercise of editorial control (with an editorial policy, process and staff), 
and application of professional standards. The effect of this is to recognise that, ‘given 
media’s needs and role in society, certain general provisions may need to be interpreted 
specifically for the media (for example in respect of defamation, surveillance, stop and 
search, state secrets or corporate confidentiality)…’. The Council of Europe’s position 
also states that ‘a differentiated and graduated approach requires that each actor whose 
services are identified as media or as an intermediary or auxiliary activity benefit from both 
the appropriate form (differentiated) and the appropriate level (graduated) of protection 
and that responsibility…’.39 
Some stakeholders, however, have raised concerns that efforts by some states to define 
intermediaries as ‘media’ has resulted in stronger restriction on freedom of expression 
in a number of countries. Speaking at the 2014 Internet Governance Forum, one Google 
executive argued that in his company’s experience ‘the application of traditional media 
laws to this space’ is ‘used primarily as a way of stifling speech’.40  
At the same time, all commercially operated Internet intermediaries studied in this report 
do require users to agree to ‘terms of service’ before they are allowed to use the service. 
Sometimes such terms may restrict users’ speech that is actually protected by the law 
in some jurisdictions. (For example: Facebook and Twitter ban adult nudity and various 
forms of hate speech on their platforms in the United States even though most such 
content is not illegal in the US.) While the enforcement of such terms may resemble an 
editorial function, the legal basis for terms of service enforcement in the US and Europe 
(where internet intermediaries first emerged) is derived not from media law but from 
contract and commercial law, whereby companies have a right to require that users abide 
by terms of service in exchange for the provision of an online service operated by a 
private or commercial entity.41 
39 Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion 
of media. (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 September 2011 at the 1121st meeting of 
the Ministers’ Deputies), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1835645
40 Ross LaJeunesse, Global Head of Free Expression and International Relations, speaking on the panel 
‘Intermediaries’ role and good practice in protecting FOE’ 5 September 2014, Internet Governance 
Forum, Istanbul. For transcript and video see: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2014/index.
php/proposal/view_public/21
41 See Ed Bayley. 16 November 2009. The Clicks that Bind: Ways Users “Agree” to Online Terms 
of Service. Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://www.eff.org/wp/clicks-bind-ways-users-agree-
online-terms-service; Rustad, Michael L. and D’Angelo, Diane. 2012. The Path of Internet Law: 
An Annotated Guide to Legal Landmarks. Duke Law & Technology Review. Vol. 2011, No. 012. 
Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 11-18. Available at SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1799578; and Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski, eds. Research Handbook on EU 
Internet Law. Edward Elgar Publishing. (Cheltenham, UK: 2014) pp. 414-415.
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1.3.1 Types of Intermediaries
This report thus focuses on services and platforms that host, give access to, index, or 
facilitate the transmission and sharing of content created by others. As intermediaries’ 
importance has grown not only for freedom of expression but also for the global 
knowledge economy, a number of organizations have sought to describe or categorize 
intermediary types by their roles and technical function. These include the OECD, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and civil society organizations such 
as Global Partners, Article 19 and the Center for Democracy and Technology. The table 
below provides a comparison of the key intermediary types that these organizations have 
characterized or singled out for examination. 
Table 1: categories and key examples of Internet intermediaries 42 43 44 45 46
OECD42 Special Rapporteur 
La Rue43
Article 19344 CDT45 Global Partners46
Internet access and 
service providers
Internet service 
providers (ISPs)
Internet service 
providers (ISPs)
Access providers/ISPs 
Network operators 
and mobile 
telecommunications 
providers
Physical layer: makes 
communications 
possible
Connectivity & 
code: the language 
or protocols of the 
communication
Data processing and 
web hosting providers
Web hosting providers Domain registrars and 
registries 
Website hosting 
companies
Applications: tools to 
navigate content
Internet search 
engines and portals
Search engines Search engines Internet search 
engines and portals
E-commerce 
intermediaries
E-commerce 
platforms and online 
marketplacesInternet payment 
systems
Participative 
networking platforms
Blogging services
Online communities
Social media platforms
Social media platforms Online service 
providers
In general, any website 
that hosts user-
generated content or 
allows user-to-user 
communications
42 Perset/OECD, op. cit., p. 9.
43 “Intermediaries thus range from Internet service providers (ISPs) to search engines, and from 
blogging services to online community platforms.” p. 11.
44 Internet intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability. 2013. London, Article 19, p. 3.  www.article19.org/
data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf
45 Kevin Bankston, David Sohn and Andrew McDiarmid. December 2012. Shielding the Messengers: 
Protecting Platforms for Expression and Innovation. Washington DC, Center for Democracy and 
Technology. www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Intermediary-Liability-2012.pdf
46 Lisa Horner. 28 May 2008. A layer model for understanding the communications environment. The 
Freedom of Expression Project. www.freedomofexpression.org.uk/resources/shaping+a+public+i
nterest+communications+environment (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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As reflected in by the table above, different types of intermediaries perform different 
functions. They also have different technical architectures. For example, internet 
service providers (ISPs) connect a user’s device, whether it is a laptop, a mobile 
phone or something else, to the network of networks known as the internet. Once a 
user is connected to the internet, web hosting providers and domain registrars and 
registries, in turn, make it possible for websites to be published and to be accessed 
online. Search engines make a portion of the World Wide Web accessible by allowing 
individuals to search their database. Search engines are often an essential go-between 
between websites and internet users. Social networks connect individual internet users 
by allowing them to exchange text, photos, videos, as well as by allowing them to post 
content to their network of contacts, or to the public at large. 
Different intermediary types further entail different kinds of business models. In 
order to provide internet access to people, telecommunications and ISPs must operate 
equipment and services within the geographical jurisdictions where those people physically 
reside. This type of service requires substantial investment of resources, equipment, 
and personnel in physical jurisdictions, requiring state permission and compliance with 
local law. Thus the relationship between ISPs and states is highly dependent, with states 
maintaining a high degree of leverage over them. 
Telecommunications and internet access are not necessarily provided by the same 
actors. Internet service provision rides on the technical transmission infrastructure of 
telecommunication (wired or wireless or satellite) and which may serve as an underlying 
lever to exclude or limit access to certain ISPs or to their customers’ users. In turn, 
the ISPs may limit access at a second level independently of their relationship with the 
telecommunications infrastructure operators. The reliance of ISPs on telecommunications 
makes the network level of intermediaries particularly susceptible to regulation by states. 
By contrast, other intermediary types such as web hosting providers, domain name 
registrars and registries, search engines, and social networks do not necessarily need 
to locate staff, equipment or other physical resources in the same geographical area as 
the users they aim to serve. The open, interoperable architecture of the internet makes 
it possible for a user in Kenya or Egypt to conduct a search on Google, set up a website 
with a web hosting service, or communicate with friends on Facebook without those 
companies having staff, offices or equipment in those countries. This has the potential to 
remove web-based intermediaries – and their users – from control by states in which they 
are not headquartered or otherwise have a physical presence. 
This independence is precisely why new media - particularly social media - have been 
documented by scholars as enhancing freedom of expression in contexts where offline 
expression is subject to strong restriction by the state.47 In practice, however, a growing 
number of states are asserting jurisdiction over web-based intermediaries by exercising 
greater control over telecommunication and internet service providers as they serve as 
47 Philip N. Howard. 2010. The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information 
Technology and Political Islam, Oxford, Oxford University Press; and Manuel Castells. 2012. 
Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Cambridge, Polity.
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chokepoints for users to access the web.48 States can – and increasingly do – threaten 
to deny access by all users under their jurisdiction to a particular service if web-based 
intermediaries fail to comply with their laws.49 
Complementary to the issue of controlling intermediaries, states may also exercise 
control over users’ online expression or access to information even outside the national 
jurisdiction. By targeting intermediaries, however, states are able to avoid the scale of 
directly policing individuals. 
1.3.2 Modes of Restriction 
Depending on the type of intermediary and the service offered, intermediaries control with 
whom and how their users can communicate. They have access to information created by 
users – such as posts, tweets, comments, blogs etc. – as well as a range of information 
directly related to users – such as registration details, private messages, search and 
browsing history, transaction details, location etc. For this reason, intermediaries are key 
in facilitating and protecting the rights to free expression and privacy. They also serve as 
avenues through which governments can monitor, regulate and control individuals’ online 
activities and access to information. While the case studies will explain each mode of 
restriction in relationship to each intermediary type in greater depth, the three primary 
ways in which freedom of expression can be restricted via ISPs, search engines and 
social media can be broadly described as follows:
1. At the network-level: Telecommunications access providers and Internet service 
providers can restrict freedom of expression in three main ways: 
a. Filtering: Access is blocked to either entire websites, specific pages or specific 
keywords.50 Filtering is carried out either by the ISP, or by the network operators 
that control internet flows into a jurisdiction, or some combination of the two. 
Such blocking prevents users from receiving information but can also prevent 
users from posting information to a specific location such as in the case of 
social networks. The content still exists elsewhere on the internet, but cannot be 
accessed by users of the network on which the filter is deployed. 
b. Service shutdown: One or more services offered by one provider or all providers 
can be shut down in a given jurisdiction or geographic area, preventing users 
in the area from accessing the internet via fixed line or mobile, sending SMS 
messages etc. 
48 Chris Tuppen. 2012. Opening the Lines: A Call for Transparency from Governments and 
Telecommunications Companies. Global Network Initiative. https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/
sites/default/files/GNI_OpeningtheLines.pdf 
49 Rebecca MacKinnon. 3 February 2014. Playing Favorites. Guernica. www.guernicamag.com/
features/playing-favorites (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
50 OpenNet Initiative. About Filtering. https://opennet.net/about-filtering (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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c. Non-neutral service: Access to certain content or applications is ‘throttled’ or 
slowed down, making it more difficult for users to access them. Alternatively, 
users might be charged different rates for access to different kinds of content or 
services, or might be granted free access to specific services. 
The two other intermediary types covered by this report, search engines and social 
networks, are directly affected by these restrictions carried out at the network level. 
Importantly, filtering or the threat of filtering at the network level is a means by which 
pressure can be placed on search engines, social networks and other intermediaries 
to carry out restrictions at the platform level.
2. At the platform level: Intermediaries that operate at the platform level such as search 
engines and social networks can act to remove content completely, block it from 
view to particular categories of users (usually based on geography), or deactivate 
user accounts. These actions are carried out by the company itself or by government 
authorities who have been granted direct technical access to the platform’s core 
functions.51 The removal, blocking, or deactivation may take place at the request 
of a government, at the request of users or other third parties, or according to the 
intermediary’s own private rules and system of enforcement. (See Case Studies 2 
and 3 for examples and details.)
The restrictions described above are an enforcement tool for different kinds of public 
and private governance: They are used to enforce state regulation or to help  identify 
violations of state regulation. They can be used to enforce companies’ private terms of 
service and other rules. They are also used in some countries to enforce standards issued 
by private or quasi-governmental bodies. 
3. Privacy-related (at both network and platform levels): Internet users who believe 
that their communications and online behaviour is being monitored or exposed in a 
manner that violates their privacy rights are less likely to express themselves freely 
while using the services of internet intermediaries. Privacy can be negatively affected 
via all tiers of intermediaries in several ways:
a. Data collection and monitoring through technologies such as deep packet 
inspection, takes place at all layers of the internet and has the ability to restrict 
expression through encouraging self-censorship. 
a. Lack of security in how user data is stored or how content data is transmitted 
can result in breaches of privacy, unauthorized interception, or interception by 
government authorities without the active involvement of the company.
51 Ethan Zuckerman. April 2010. Intermediary Censorship. Ronald Deibert (ed.), Access Controlled: 
The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp. 71–
85. www.access-controlled.net/wp-content/PDFs/chapter-5.pdf; Rebecca MacKinnon. 2 February 
2009. China Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Bloggers. First Monday, Vol. 14, No. 2. 
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2378/2089 
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a. User control over personal information: Different services and platforms 
provide internet users with varying levels of control over if and how their 
information is preserved or publicly accessible. 
The following table provides a summary of the modes of restriction described above.
Table 2: Modes by which expression can be restricted via internet 
intermediaries either on request or on company initiative 
ISPs Search Engines Social Media
Network-level Restrictions • Filtering 
•  Service shutdown 
• Non-neutral service
Platform-level restrictions • Manipulation of search 
ranking
• Removal or “de-listing” 
of links to specific web 
pages or categories of 
web pages
• Removal of content from 
the platform 
• Blocking of content, 
and free expression 
opportunities, by 
restricting access of 
particular categories 
of users (including 
geographical location)
• Account limitation or 
deactivation
Privacy-related chilling 
effects
• Collection and 
retention of user data 
for commercial or 
government mandated 
purposes
• “Real name” account 
registration requirements
•  State requests for user 
data
• Real-time state 
surveillance
• Collection and retention 
of user data for 
commercial purposes
•  State requests for user 
data
• Catalogue of individuals’ 
personal individual via 
searches on their name
• Collection and retention of 
user data for commercial 
purposes
• “Real-name” identity 
requirements
• State requests for user 
data
The role that intermediaries play in protecting or restricting freedom of expression is 
further complicated by the global nature of many companies. Multinational companies, 
as well as internet services with users in multiple jurisdictions, can be subject to a global 
patchwork of legal and regulatory regimes. Some internet companies (including search 
engines and social networking platforms) have sought to address this dilemma by creating 
country specific filters – i.e. restricting access to content only in the jurisdiction where that 
content has been found illegal,52 and by developing clear company policy on handling 
government requests for content restriction as well as user data requests.53   
52 For example, Twitter filters content on a geographic basis. Dave Neal. 27 January 2012. Twitter to 
filter content geographically. The Inquirer. www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2141809/twitter-filter-
content-geographically (Accessed 17 July 2014.) 
53 Global Network Initiative. Implementation Guidelines: Freedom of Expression. http://
globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php#29 
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When a company does not have any physical offices or personnel in a particular jurisdiction, 
it is difficult for a government to compel that company to abide by its laws or respond to its 
requests for content restriction. In response, some governments have resorted to filtering 
– or threatening to filter – content or entire services when a company -fails to comply 
with their requests to remove objectionable content.54 In all this complexity, freedom of 
expression standards are often inadequately protected, respected and remedied.
1.3.3 Commitments to Freedom of Expression
In light of this increasingly complex global landscape, a number of efforts have emerged 
in recent years at the industry and governmental level to help internet intermediaries 
maximize respect for users’ privacy and freedom of expression. For example, in 2013 
the European Commission launched a ‘sector guide’ on how ICT companies in the ICT 
sector can implement the UN Guiding Principles, which were developed in consultation 
with industry, academia, civil society and governments.55 
Some intermediaries have begun to make public commitments to respect users’ rights. 
Since its launch in 2008, several internet companies have joined the Global Network 
Initiative (GNI), a multistakeholder body in which major intermediaries work together with 
participants from civil society, responsible investment, and academia to implement a set 
of core principles on freedom of expression and privacy.56 Of the intermediaries studied 
in this report, Google is a founding member of the GNI and in January 2014 passed 
the organization’s assessment process verifying that the company had satisfactorily 
implemented the GNI principles in handling government requests for content restriction 
and user data.57 Facebook joined the GNI in May 2013 but had not by August 2014 
undergone an assessment to verify whether it has implemented the GNI principles.58 
In 2012, a group of telecommunications companies, including Vodafone, formed the 
Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of Expression and Privacy in an effort 
54 For example, in Brazil, a court threatened to block Facebook from the country for not removing 
content related to a dispute between two neighbours. Giancarlo Frosio. 7 October 2013. A Brazilian 
Judge Orders Facebook off Air If It Fails to Remove a Defamatory Discussion. Stanford Law School 
Center for Internet and Society blog. http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/brazilian-judge-
orders-facebook-air-if-it-fails-remove-defamatory-discussion (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
55 The Institute for Human Rights and Business and Shift. June 2013. ICT Sector Guide on 
Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. European Commission, 
www.shiftproject.org/publication/european-commission-ict-sector-guide 
56 Global Network Initiative. Principles: Freedom of Expression. http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/
principles/index.php#18. 
57 Global Network Initiative. January 2014. Public Report on the Independent Assessment Process 
for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI%20
Assessments%20Public%20Report.pdf 
58 Evelyn M. Rusli. 22 May 2013. Facebook Joins GNI Online Privacy-and-Freedom Group. Wall 
Street Journal Digits blog. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/05/22/facebook-joins-gni-online-
privacy-and-freedom-group (Accessed 17 July 2014); Alexandra Kulikova. 24 May 2013. Facebook 
Joins the Global Network Initiative – What to think of it? The London School of Economics and 
Political Science Media Policy Project blog. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/05/24/
facebook-joins-the-global-network-initiative-what-to-think-of-it (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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to develop principles and best practices most relevant to the business model of one 
category of intermediaries.59
A growing number of internet and telecommunications companies are also publishing 
regular ‘transparency reports’, thus named for the light they shed on the volume and nature 
of requests to remove content – whether by government or other private entities – or to 
disclose user data.60 Such transparency helps users and the public at large understand 
what kinds of restrictions are being undertaken, and on whose behalf they are carried out. 
Among companies studied in this report, Facebook, Google, Twitter and Vodafone have 
published transparency reports. It is important to note, however, that significant variations 
in their scope, detail, and reporting methodology make it difficult to draw meaningful 
conclusions about one company’s respect for free expression and privacy in comparison 
to another. Scholars have called on companies to work with academics and advocates 
to establish more standardized approaches to transparency reporting. They also propose 
that full transparency involves reporting more than just numbers of government requests 
received and complied with. Transparency about companies’ policies and practices for 
handing government requests as well as private enforcement mechanisms are equally 
important.61
1.4 Methodology 
This report presents three case studies examining three intermediary types. It covers 11 
companies operating in ten countries:
CASE #1, Internet Service Providers and telecommunication services: Vodafone (UK, 
Germany, Egypt), Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, Kenya), Safaricom 
(Kenya)
CASE #2, Search Engines: Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China), 
Yandex (Russia)
CASE #3, Social Networks: Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt), Twitter 
(USA, Kenya) Weibo (China), iWiW (Hungary)
59 Peter Micek. 12 March 2013. Telecom Industry Dialogue to collaborate with GNI on freedom of 
expression, privacy rights. Access Now blog. https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2013/03/12/telco-
industry-dialogue-to-collaborate-with-gni-on-freedom-of-expression-pr (Accessed 17 July 2014); 
Sarah A. Altschuller. 25 March 2013. Telecommunications Companies Release Guiding Principles 
on Freedom of Expression and Privacy. Foley Hoag LLP Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law blog. www.csrandthelaw.com/2013/03/25/telecommunications-companies-release-guiding-
principles-on-freedom-of-expression-and-privacy (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
60 Danny Yadron. 15 May 2014. A Year After Snowden, Tech Companies Are More Transparent. Wall 
Street Journal Digits blog. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/15/a-year-after-snowden-tech-
companies-are-more-transparent (Accessed 17 July 2014); Kashmir Hill. 14 November 2013. 
Thanks, Snowden! Now All The Major Tech Companies Reveal How Often They Give Data To 
Government. Forbes. www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/11/14/silicon-valley-data-handover-
infographic (Accessed 17 July 2014.) Transparency Reports Database: Government Requests for 
User Data, https://transparency-reports.silk.co (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
61 Ryan Budish. 19 December 2013. What Transparency Reports Don’t Tell Us. The Atlantic. www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what-transparency-reports-dont-tell-us/282529 
(Accessed 16 July 2014.)
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The case studies are preceded by a description and analysis of the evolving legal and 
regulatory contexts in which internet intermediaries operate globally generally, and in 
the case study countries particularly. They are followed by general conclusions, plus 
recommendations for all stakeholders.
Africa and gender equality are the two top global priorities UNESCO’s General Conference 
(its governing body) has identified for all its programmatic activities. Therefore Chapter 2 
contains a special section on intermediary liability in Africa, Chapter 6 addresses gender 
issues involving internet intermediaries.62 
Selection of the three different intermediary types was informed by the OECD’s five-part 
classification of internet intermediaries, plus the three intermediary types singled out as 
examples in UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue’s 2011 report on the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression on the Internet. (See ‘Intermediaries: Definition and Types’ in 
the Introduction above for a full discussion.)
Companies and countries of focus for each case were selected because they collectively 
represent a range of cultural, regional, political and legal environments from which 
powerful internet intermediaries have arisen – and within which these companies operate. 
They cover a number of key markets: 
• United States, the UK, and more generally the EU, where many of the world’s largest 
internet and telecommunications companies are headquartered; 
• Brazil, Russia, India and China – these so-called ‘BRIC countries’ that represent the 
leading emerging-market economies – and are an untapped, lucrative user base for 
global companies as well as the home base for successful national companies; 
• Kenya, an African country with a relatively developed internet and telecommunications 
sector that has faced issues particularly related to hate speech;
• Egypt, where internet intermediaries are considered by participants and scholars to 
have been significant during the 2011 revolution;
• Hungary, a smaller market where an indigenous social network struggled to compete 
with global competitors. 
For every country covered by the case studies, an in-country research team was 
commissioned to complete a detailed research questionnaire containing an average of 
61 questions about the legal and political context affecting internet regulation, about 
the policies and practices of the selected companies in the selected countries, and 
also about how the combination of particular company policies and legal context affect 
internet users. Researchers were also asked to respond to several specific questions on 
gender. 
62 UNESCO. 2013. Draft Medium-Term Strategy: 2014–2021 (37 C/4). Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 
pp. 16–18. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002200/220031e.pdf 
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Researchers also conducted interviews with representatives from industry, government, 
civil society, academia and law. The questionnaires included questions about user 
perspectives in each country covered by the case studies. Researchers answered these 
questions by canvassing available academic research, media reports and relevant user 
forums. 
The questionnaires were designed in consultation with the researchers in early 2014. 
Research for the questionnaires was then carried out in March and April 2014. The results 
of these questionnaires were then analysed and distilled by the report’s authors. Based 
on this comparative analysis of the research questionnaires, an introductory chapter on 
regulation plus three case studies were drafted. The report’s authors then worked with the 
researchers to clarify and update the research through July 2014. 
It is important to note that resource and time constraints did not permit statistically 
meaningful user polling or in-depth user research through focus groups. Systematic, 
in-depth research on user perspectives at the national level on how different internet 
intermediaries shape people’s online expression in different legal and regulatory contexts 
would be an important next step. Such a further research agenda could add to information 
for all stakeholders on how intermediaries can best be governed and operated in a manner 
that supports freedom of expression. 
It is also important to keep in mind that this report only covers three intermediary types. 
The study of internet intermediaries will be further informed by future studies on other 
intermediary types, including data processing, web hosting providers, cloud computing 
services, and domain name registries, as well as online media with substantial user-
generated content.  
The next chapter will provide an overview of the legal and regulatory context shaping 
public and private regulation of the case study companies in the particular countries 
studied. 
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2. LAW AND REGULATION
Just as online platforms and services can be used for legitimate purposes including self-
expression, education, employment, and trade, they can also be used for illegitimate 
purposes such as theft or fraud, harassment, copyright infringement, defamatory speech 
and so on. The line determining a legitimate and illegitimate purpose is significantly 
influenced by political, religious, and cultural context – resulting in multiple understandings 
of legitimate and illegitimate purposes throughout the world. Recognizing this tension, 
particularly in the context of speech,  the UDHR, ICCPR and other international human 
rights instruments define limitations on the right to freedom of expression in order to 
protect other human rights. Yet as UN Special Rapporteur La Rue underscored in his 
2011 report, restrictions are only compatible with international human rights standards 
when they meet three conditions:63
• The restriction must be rule-based, provided by law and carried out in a transparent 
and predictable manner;
• The restriction must be necessary and proportionate, using the least restrictive 
means to achieve the objective;
• The restriction must be consistent with purposes cited in the ICCPR: necessary to 
protect the rights or reputation of others, national security or public order, public 
health or public morals.
It is also important to note that the UN Human Rights Committee has determined that 
‘public morals’ in the human rights context should be compatible with religious and 
ideological pluralism.64 Restrictions applied by intermediaries should be evaluated in 
terms of these international standards. Evaluation should also be responsive to diverse 
legal regimes.
Intermediaries are sometimes held criminally liable for user content that others perceive 
as violating privacy or defamation laws [see 2.2 below]. In countries where that is the 
case, companies come under pressure to conduct their own monitoring and filtering to 
avoid possible repercussions. This contributes to a process of state-sanctioned self-
regulation in which some governments may come to rely on private sector companies to 
regulate online content without public accountability or due process.65 On the other hand, 
self-regulation may sometimes serve to protect freedom of expression and respect for the 
normative limitations on restriction as per the UDHR and ICCPR.
63 A/HRC/17/27. p. 8. 
64 General Comment 34 on Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Article 
19, para. 32. www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CCPR-C-GC-34.doc; Irina Fedotova v. 
Russian Federation, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, para. 10. 
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CaseLaw/CCPR-C-106-D-1932-2010.doc 
65 UNESCO. 2014. World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development. op. cit. p. 33. 
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2.1 State Commitments and Limitations on Expression
The three case studies at the core of this report examine the operations of specific 
internet intermediaries in the context of specific legal jurisdictions: Brazil, China, Egypt, 
Germany, Hungary, India, Kenya, Russia the United Kingdom and the United States. 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the relevant legal and regulatory contexts of all 
jurisdictions and regions covered by the case studies.
While technology, business models and the scope of business carried out by internet 
intermediaries have evolved dramatically over the past two decades, the types of 
regulatory goals pursued by states remain largely unchanged, even if the methods used to 
pursue those goals have evolved along with the technology.66 Below are some examples – 
though by no means a comprehensive list – of the types of regulatory objectives pursued 
by the states in the three case studies, which in turn have a direct impact on how (and 
to what extent) intermediaries are compelled to restrict freedom of expression online. 
In many instances, there is debate about the alignment of states’ regulations to ICCPR 
standards and the implementations of these standards. While the types of limitations are 
often aligned with legitimate purpose, they often fall short in terms of the safeguards of 
necessity, proportionality and due legal process for implementation.
2.1.1 Types of Limitations
Defamation: Defamation laws seek to discourage unwarranted attacks on a person’s 
reputation. UNESCO,67 the UN Special Rapporteur,68 the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)69 and the Organization of American States have called for 
the decriminalization of defamation.70 Nevertheless, defamation remains criminalized 
in all of the countries examined in this report other than the United Kingdom and 
the United States.71 
66 Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann. December 2013. Freedom of Expression and the 
Internet. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, pp. 45–54. https://book.coe.int/eur/en/human-
rights-and-democracy/5810-freedom-of-expression-and-the-internet.html 
67 UNESCO. 2014. World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development. op. cit. pp. 
27–30. 
68 A/HRC/17/27. p. 11. 
69 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Decriminalization of defamation. www.osce.
org/fom/106287 
70 United Nations Human Rights Committee. 26 April 2012. Communication No. 1815/2008 Views 
adopted by the Committee at its 103rd session, 17 October–4 November 2011. UN Doc CCPR/
C/103/D/1815/2008/Rev.1, p. 9. www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2011.10.26_Adonis_v_
Philippines.pdf; Zsolt Bobis. 17 May 2012. Case Watch: When Telling the Truth May Come with 
A Prison Sentence. Open Society Justice Initiative Blog. www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/
case-watch-when-telling-truth-may-come-prison-sentence (Accessed 3 August 2014.)
71 Article 19. Defamation maps (last updated 2012). www.article19.org/defamation/map.html (Accessed 
30 July 2014); Yan Mei Ning. Summer 2011. Criminal Defamation in the New Media Environment 
– The Case of the People’s Republic of China. International Journal of Communications Law & 
Policy, Vol. 14, pp. 6–14. http://ijclp.net/ojs/index.php/ijclp/article/view/15/5; Kayode Oladele. 27 
August 2011. Internet Libel and the Law of Defamation: Justice Without Borders? Sahara Reporters. 
http://saharareporters.com/2011/08/27/internet-libel-and-law-defamation-justice-without-borders-
kayode-oladele (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
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National and public security: Different governments apply varying definitions, 
approaches and scope to ‘national security’ and ‘public security’. In China, Article 15 of 
the ‘Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services’,72 promulgated by 
the State Council in 2000, stipulate what have come to be known as the ‘nine forbidden 
content categories’ for Chinese online services. These categories include speech that 
‘harms the dignity or interests of the State’, or ‘disseminates rumours, disturbs social 
order or disrupts social stability’, or ‘Sabotages State religious policy or propagates 
heretical teachings or feudal superstitions’.73 Egypt restricts seditious speech as well 
as speech offensive of domestic and foreign governmental authorities.74 The Egyptian 
Parliament has been considering an anti-terrorism law that would allow for internet 
companies and platforms to be blocked from the country for ‘endangering public order’.75 
In Russia, the presidential amendment to the Law on Information (FL 398) allows the 
Prosecutor General’s Office to blacklist any website it identifies as ‘extremist propaganda’ 
with the potential to incite anti-government riots, without a court order.76 Russia also 
criminalizes the sharing of ‘extremist’ content on social networks.77 India also allows for 
the restriction of online content by the central government or authorized authorities for 
national security reasons, including: in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, 
defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, 
or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to the 
above.78 The United States prohibits incitement to ‘imminent lawless action’,79 disclosing 
classified government information80 and ‘knowingly provid[ing] material support or 
72 People’s Republic of China State Council. 25 September 2000. Measures on the Administration of 
Internet Information Service. People’s Republic of China State Council Decree No. 292. www.net.
cn/static/hosting/fa_xinxi.htm 
73 People’s Republic of China State Council. 25 September 2000. Measures. Op. cit. 
74 Arab Republic of Egypt. August 1937. Penal Code No. 58 of 1937, Articles 98F, 102, 161, 179, 181, 
185 and 186. http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf 
75 Alastair Sloan. 3 February 2014. Egypt’s draft anti-terrorism law sparks concern about censorship. 
Index on Censorship. www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/02/egypts-draft-anti-terrorism-law-
sparks-concern-censorship (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
76 Russian Duma Passes Bill On ‘Website Blacklist’ In Final Reading. 11 July 2012. Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty. www.rferl.org/content/russia-passes-internet-bill/24642146.html (Accessed 
17 July 2014); Russian Federation. 28 December 2013. Federal Law No. 398-FZ ‘On Information, 
Information Technology and Information Protection. Rossiiskaya Gazeta. (In Russian.) www.
rg.ru/2013/12/30/extrem-site-dok.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
77 Putin Signs Vaguely Worded Law Criminalizing Online ‘Extremism’. 1 July 2014. Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty. www.rferl.org/content/putin-extremism-internet-law-bill-rights/25441609.
html (Accessed 18 July 2014); Putin Signs Law Giving Prison Terms for Internet Extremism. 30 
June 2014. The Moscow Times. www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-signs-law-giving-
prison-terms-for-internet-extremism/502717.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
78 Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and IT, 
Government of India. 5 Februay 2009. Indian Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008 
– Section 69A. http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/downloads/itact2000/it_amendment_
act2008.pdf 
79 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_492 The 
Supreme Court also characterized some expression as not protectable under the First Amendment 
through doctrines as the ‘fighting words’ doctrine.
80 Legal Information Institute. 18 U.S. Code, Chapter 37 – Espionage and Censorship. Cornell 
University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-37; Georgetown Law 
Library. National Security Law Research Guide. www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/
national_security.cfm#v-statutes-and-legislative-history 
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resources to a foreign terrorist organization’.81 The United Kingdom prohibits breaches 
of official secrets,82 and expression that encourages terrorism or disseminates terrorist 
publications.83 In 2010 the UK established the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit 
(CTIRU), which reviews ‘violent extremist or terrorist’ content that the public submits 
through an anonymous online reporting tool and ‘proactively scans the web for content 
that promotes or glorifies terrorism’.84 It then works with intermediaries to remove 
infringing content.85
Hate speech: The 2010 Constitution of Kenya prohibits incitement to violence, hate 
speech, advocacy of hatred that constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others, or 
incitement to cause harm, or is based on any ground of discrimination specified in the 
Constitution.86 Article 13 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008 prohibits 
‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour’ with the intention of ‘stir[ring] up 
ethnic hatred’ (or that is likely to happen). Notably, the law only mentions ethnic hatred; 
there is no mention of religion, gender, nationality or sexual preference.87 Hungary prohibits 
expression that violates another person’s human dignity, the dignity of the Hungarian 
nation, or the dignity of any national, ethnic, or religious minority group.88 The United 
Kingdom prohibits incitement to racial and religious hatred,89 language that intentionally 
81 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, et al., 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), www.supremecourt.
gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf ; Adam Liptak. 22 June 2010. Court Affirms Ban on Aiding 
Groups Tied to Terror. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/us/politics/22scotus.
html?pagewanted=all (Accessed 30 July 2014); Adam Liptak. 11 February 2010. Right to Free 
Speech Collides With Fight Against Terror. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/
us/11law.html (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
82 UK Government. 1989. Official Secrets Act 1989. The National Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1989/6/contents 
83 UK Government. 2006. Terrorism Act 2006, Section 2: Dissemination of terrorist publications. The 
National Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/section/2 
84 Juliette Garside. 27 November 2013. Ministers will order ISPs to block terrorist and extremist websites. 
The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/27/ministers-order-isps-block-terrorist-
websites (Accessed 12 August 2014); Ines von Behr, Anaïs Reding, Charlie Edwards and Luke 
Gribbon. 2013. The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism. Cambridge, UK, RAND 
Corporation. pp. 4–6. www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/
RAND_RR453.pdf; Association of Chief Police Officers. The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. 
www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/TheCounterTerrorismInternetReferralUnit.
aspx 
85 Erin Marie Saltman. 23 May 2014. Jihad trending: Analysis of online extremism and how to counter 
it. Index on Censorship. www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/05/jihad-trending-comprehensive-
analysis-online-extremism-counter (Accessed 12 August 2014.)
86 Republic of Kenya. Article 33(2), Constitution of Kenya, www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-
of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/199-33-
freedom-of-expression; Section 5B, Kenya Information and Communication Act, op. cit.
87 Umati Project. February and March 2013. Umati: Monitoring Online Dangerous Speech. iHub 
Research and Ushahidi. www.research.ihub.co.ke/uploads/2013/april/1365508815_819_823.pdf 
(Accessed 12 August 2014.)
88 Hungarian Government. 25 April 2011. Hungarian Fundamental Law, Article IX, paragraphs 4–5. 
www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20
Hungary.pdf 
89 UK Government. 2006. Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (RRHA). www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2006/1; Q&A: Religious hatred law. 1 February 2006. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/3873323.stm (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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harasses or creates alarm, distress or fear,90 as well as harassment.91 Germany restricts 
expression that amounts to Nazi propaganda and Holocaust denial, incitement to hatred 
(insulting, maliciously maligning, defaming), material causing others to commit a crime 
and depictions of violence.92 China prohibits ethnic hate speech.93 In the United States 
hate speech is legal as long as it does not incite ‘imminent lawless action’ (see above). It 
is interesting to note that although the EU outlawed Holocaust denial in 2007,94 member 
countries have the option of not enforcing the law, which is what the UK did; in contrast 
it is illegal in Germany and Hungary.95
Election-related: In Kenya, devastating violence (in which more than 1,000 people 
died) was partly fuelled by inflammatory text messages circulated after the 2007 Kenyan 
presidential election.96 The Communications Commission of Kenya’s guidelines for the 
2013 election required all bulk political messages to be sent in English or Kiswahili, 
Kenya’s two official languages, and they had to be submitted for approval 48 hours in 
advance.97 But these regulations were limited in scope to SMS messages, and the Kenyan 
government had not implemented precautionary measures on hate speech on Facebook 
and Twitter, whose Kenyan user bases had skyrocketed since 2007. The National Cohesion 
and Integration Commission and civil society groups like Umati stepped in to monitor 
90 UK Government. 1997. Public Order Act 1986, Sections 4 and 4A. The National Archives. www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64 (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
91 UK Government. 1997. Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The National Archives. www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/40/contents (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
92 German Government. Strafgesetzbuch [German Criminal Code]. Section 130: Incitement to Hatred. 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1200 and Chapter 14: Libel and 
Slander. www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1654 (Accessed 18 July 
2014); Voluntary Self-Monitoring of Multimedia Service Providers (FSM e. V.). Illegal Content: Youth 
Protection – What must I know? www.fsm.de/youth-protection/media-content/illegal-content 
93 Article 15 of the Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services lists nine 
categories of content that are prohibited on the internet information service providers. One of these 
includes content that incites ethnic hatred or racial discrimination or damages inter-ethnic unity. State 
Council Information Office. 7 June 2012. Measures on the Administration of Internet Information 
Services (Deliberation Draft). Sina.com. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-06-07/135924552816.
shtml (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
94 European Commission. 28 November 2008. Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/racism-xenophobia/framework-decision/index_
en.htm 
95 John C. Knechtle. 2008. Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in the European Union. 
Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 36, pp. 41–66. www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/
downloads/361/knechtle.pdf ; Robert A. Kahn. June 2004. Holocaust Denial and the Law: A 
Comparative Study. New York, N.Y., Palgrave Macmillan; Dan Bilefsky. 19 April 2007. EU adopts 
measure outlawing Holocaust denial. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/world/
europe/19iht-eu.4.5359640.html (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
96 Jeffrey Gettleman. 8 February 2008. U.S. Intensifies Efforts to End Deadly Conflict in Kenya. New 
York Times. www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/world/africa/08kenya.html (Accessed 23 June 2014); 
Kenya Information and Communication Act, op cit., Section 29.
97 Lucy Purdon. November 2013. Corporate Responses to Hate Speech in the 2013 Kenyan 
Presidential Elections. Case Study: Safaricom. Institute for Human Rights and Business. (Digital 
Dangers: Identifying and Mitigating Threats in the Digital Realm.) p. 24. www.ihrb.org/pdf/DD-
Safaricom-Case-Study.pdf ; Winfred Kagwe. 22 August 2012. Kenya: CCK Draws Up Rules to Curb 
Hate Speech in Political SMS. AllAfrica. http://allafrica.com/stories/201208220319.html (Accessed 
23 July 2014.) 
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hate speech on social media.98 Brazil, where voting is compulsory,99 prohibits electoral 
‘propaganda’ up to three months prior to elections,100 while electoral candidates may 
submit requests for the removal of online content that offends ‘dignity or decorum’ or 
points out illegal propaganda. Content providers may be held liable if they do not remove 
the alleged illegal content once notified.101 Of similar intent are provisions in the United 
Kingdom that criminalize making a false statement, during an election, about a person 
standing for office.102
Child protection: Child pornography – also known as ‘child sexual abuse images’ – is illegal 
in all countries studied.103 Another category of online content related to child protection 
involves content that may be legal for adults but is deemed inappropriate for children.104 
The United Kingdom bans child sexual abuse images in addition to pornography of 
various forms.105 In Germany, service providers are prohibited from distributing content 
that is harmful to young persons, including adult content.106 In Russia, Federal Law No. 
139 (the ‘blacklist law’) allows the government to add websites to a blacklist in order 
98 Drazen Jorgic. 5 February 2013. Kenya tracks Facebook, Twitter for election ‘hate speech’. 
Reuters. www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/net-us-kenya-elections-socialmedia-
idUSBRE9140IS20130205 (Accessed 3 August 2014); Mike Pflanz. 21 March 2013. In Kenya, 
social media hate speech rises as nation awaits election ruling. The Christian Science Monitor. 
www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0321/In-Kenya-social-media-hate-speech-rises-as-
nation-awaits-election-ruling (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
99 Leticia Calderón-Chelius. 2007. Brazil: compulsory voting and renewed interest among external 
voters. Voting from Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm, International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico, pp. 128–31. 
www.idea.int/publications/voting_from_abroad/upload/chap5-brazil.pdf 
100 Federal Government of Brazil. 30 September 1997. Presidência da República Casa Civil Subchefia 
para Assuntos Jurídicos [Brazilian Electoral Law]. Palácio do Planalto, Article 73. (In Portuguese.) 
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l4737.htm (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
101 Federal Government of Brazil. 30 September 1997. Presidência da República Casa Civil Subchefia 
para Assuntos Jurídicos [Brazilian Electoral Law]. Palácio do Planalto, Articles 57-D, 57-F and 58. 
(In Portuguese.) www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l4737.htm; Luciani Gomes. 19 August 2010. 
Brazilian law way too serious, comics say. CNN. www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/08/19/
brazil.election.comics (Accessed 18 July 2014); Gabriel Elizondo. 25 August 2010. Brazilian 
elections no joke. Literally. Al Jazeera. http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/americas/brazilian-elections-
no-joke-literally (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
102 UK Government. Representation of the People Act 1983 – Section 106: False statements as to 
candidates. The National Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/section/106  
103 However, the United States provides broad immunity for intermediaries and there is no ‘affirmative 
obligation to monitor and screen Web sites for objectionable content, including even child 
pornography’ (though all US companies examined in this report participate in voluntary initiatives 
to combat child pornography). Legal Information Institute. 18 U.S. Code § 2258A – Reporting 
requirements of electronic communication service providers and remote computing service 
providers. Cornell University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2258A; Roxanne E. 
Christ, Jeanne S. Berges and Shannon C. Trevino. July 2007. Social Networking Sites: To Monitor 
or Not to Monitor Users and Their Content? Intellectual Property and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 
19, No. 7, p. 2, www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/social-networking-monitoring-content-texas-case 
104 Victoria Nash, 2013: Analyzing Freedom of Expression Online: Theoretical, empirical, and normative 
contributions, in: Dutton, W.H. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies, Oxford University 
Press, p. 411-463.
105 UK Government. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The National Archives. www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2008/4/part/5/crossheading/pornography-etc; UK Government. Protection of 
Children Act 1978. The National Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/37  
106 Federal Republic of Germany. April 2010. Kommission für jugendmedienschutz der 
landesmedienanstalten (KJM). Interstate Treaty on the protection of minors –JMStV, Section 1, 
Article 4. www.die-medienanstalten.de/fileadmin/Download/Rechtsgrundlagen/Gesetze_aktuell/_
JMStV_Stand_13_RStV_mit_Titel_english.pdf 
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to protect children from information on the internet such as pornography, drugs and 
suicide.107
Blasphemy: In India blasphemous speech, though not defined, is prohibited under 
the Information Technology Intermediaries Guidelines Rules 2011.108 The Indian Penal 
Code does not use the word ‘blasphemy’ but criminalizes ‘deliberate and malicious acts, 
intended to outrage religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious 
beliefs’.109 In Egypt, blasphemy is a criminal offence, punishable with up to five years in 
prison, for anyone who ‘makes use of religion in propagating, either by words, in writing, or 
in any other means, extreme ideas for the purpose of inciting strife, ridiculing or insulting 
a heavenly religion or a sect following it, or damaging national unity’.110
Intellectual property: In Russia, according to the new Federal Law No. 187 (‘the 
anti-piracy law’) passed in 2013, it is illegal to share content in a manner that violates 
copyright.111 In Brazil, ‘the transmission and retransmission’ of content infringing on 
intellectual property rights can be immediately discontinued or interrupted upon order 
from a competent judicial authority.112 In Germany, public distribution or duplication of 
copyrighted material without permission from the rights holder is prohibited although 
personal and private uses are permitted.113 In the United States copyright is often 
cited to impose restrictions on online expression, although trademark violations are 
occasionally cited as well.114 Details on the application of intellectual property laws to 
internet intermediaries will be covered in the ‘Intermediary Liability’ section.
107 Once a website is on the registry, content-hosting providers have 24 hours to notify the website 
owner to remove the prohibited content. The website owner is given another 24 hours to comply. 
If the website owner fails to take down the banned content, Internet service providers must restrict 
access to the website within 24 hours. Russian Federation. 28 July 2012. Federal Law No. 139-
FZ, on Amending the Federal Law on Protection of Children from Information Harmful to their 
Health and Development and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation. (In Russian.) www.
rg.ru/2012/07/30/zakon-dok.html; President of Russia. 31 July 2012. Amendments to the law on 
protecting children from information harmful to their health and development. http://eng.kremlin.
ru/acts/4246. Sergei Hovyadinov. World Intermediary Liability Map: Russia. Center for Internet and 
Society at Stanford Law School. http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/page/wilmap-russia (Accessed 4 
August 2014.)
108 Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, http://cis-india.org/internet-
governance/resources/intermediary-guidelines-rules 
109 Pranesh Prakash. 8 April 2012. Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Centre for Internet and Society. 
http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-295a-indian-penal-code (Accessed 17 
July 2014.)
110 Article 98(f) of the Penal Code, as amended by Law 147/2006. Law 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937), 
Art. 98(f). (In Arabic.) www.mohamoon-montada.com/Default.aspx?action=ArabicLaw&ID=20 
111 Russian Federation. 2 July 2013. Federal Law No. 187-FZ of July 2, 2013, on Amendments to 
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Rights in 
Information and Telecommunication Networks. World Intellectual Property Organisation. www.wipo.
int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=334516 
112 Article 102 and 105 of the Brazilian Copyright Law
113 German Government. 9 September 1965. Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte 
[Act on Copyright and Related Rights]. English translation. Article 53.  www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html 
114 Kate Tummarello. 19 December 2013. Google: US government takedown requests up 70 percent. 
The Hill. http://thehill.com/policy/technology/193661-google-us-government-takedown-requests-
up-70-percent (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
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2.1.2 Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance
Privacy and Data Protection: A 2012 report commissioned by UNESCO which covered 
many of the countries covered in this case study concluded that privacy laws or legal 
provisions that provide only weak protection can have a negative impact on freedom 
of expression.115 A significant number of human rights groups lauded the passage of 
European Parliament’s passage in March 2014 of the new General Data Protection 
Regulation,116 which places greater privacy requirements on internet intermediaries 
operating in Europe.117 Efforts elsewhere around the world vary. The United States lacks 
comprehensive consumer data protection legislation, relying instead on a patchwork 
of federal and state laws.118 While Brazil does not have a general data protection law 
or framework as of September 2014, Marco Civil da Internet includes data protection 
provisions.119 The Kenyan parliament at the time of writing was considering a data 
protection bill.120 India, at the time of writing, does not have comprehensive privacy 
legislation, though data protection standards applicable to corporate and digital 
information can be found under section 43A of the Information Technology Act 2000 and 
subsequent Rules.121 
At the same time, many actors seek to curtail the expression of some citizens to protect 
the privacy of others. This is of contemporary significance in the European Union given 
the case of Google Spain v AEPD, described in shorthand as establishing a ‘right to be 
forgotten’ throughout the EU. It will be discussed in more detail in Study 2, which focuses 
115 Mendel, et. al. op. cit. pp. 95–96. 
116 Stephen Gardner. 17 March 2014. European Parliament Votes Overwhelmingly In Favor of Data 
Protection Reform Proposal. Bloomberg BNA Privacy & Security Law Report. www.bna.com/
european-parliament-votes-n17179885695 (Accessed 28 July 2014); David Jolly. 13 March 
2014. European Union Takes Steps Toward Protecting Data. New York Times. www.nytimes.
com/2014/03/13/business/international/european-union-takes-steps-toward-protecting-data.html 
(Accessed 28 July 2014.)
117 Marc Rotenberg and David Jacobs. 2013. Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New 
Framework of the European Union. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 
605–52. www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/36_2_605_Rotenberg_Jacobs.pdf; 
Nina Haase. 11 March 2014. EU Parliament approves privacy package. Deutsche Welle. www.
dw.de/eu-parliament-approves-privacy-package/a-17488815 (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
118 Natasha Singer. An American Quilt of Privacy Laws, Incomplete. The New York Times. 30 March 
2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/in-privacy-laws-an-incomplete-american-
quilt.html (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
119 Knowledge Commons Brasil. Statement on Data Retention Provisions in Marco Civil. http://
www.knowledgecommons.in/brasil/en/marco-civil/statement-on-data-retention-provisions-in-
marco-civil/ (Accessed 17 July 2014.) and Chris Riley. Marco Civil – A groundbreaking, although 
not perfect, victory for Brazilian Internet Users. Mozilla Open Policy & Advocacy. 25 March 2014 
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2014/03/26/marco-civil-a-groundbreaking-although-not-perfect-
victory-for-brazilian-internet-users/ (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
120 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution. The Data Protection Bill, 2012. http://www.
cickenya.org/index.php/legislation/item/174-the-data-protection-bill-2012#.VC_6Z-enYbB 
121 Section 43A of the Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008, available at: http://
www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/itbill2000_0.pdf The Information Technology Reasonable Security 
Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information Rules 2011. Available at: 
http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511(1).pdf
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on search engines.122 The decision demonstrates that the individual’s desire to eliminate 
negative information about him- or herself from the internet can be in direct conflict with 
the right of others to receive and impart information.123   
Surveillance and government access to user data: The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights has called for reform of surveillance laws, and referred to the recommendations 
by global civil society for the application of the ‘necessary and proportionate’ principles 
with strong accountability, transparency, and remedy.124  However, a recent survey of 
experts in 18 countries showed that little surveillance reform has taken place around the 
world.125 In many places new laws have continued to expand government surveillance 
powers: Most recently in July 2014 the United Kingdom enacted a new law, the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, extending government surveillance powers 
beyond the UK’s borders126  by allowing government to issue warrants for the interception 
of communications to companies outside of the UK.127 Similarly, Brazil’s Marco Civil da 
Internet empowers authorities to access data stored abroad if the intermediary provides 
services to or collects data from Brazilian citizens.128 In Russia, it appears that opposition 
activists and protest groups may be monitored via domestic intermediaries: Pavel Durov, 
founder and former CEO of VKontakte, Russia’s most popular social network with 60 
million users,129 claims to have spurned a Russian security agency request for the private 
user data of belonging to members of several Ukrainian protest groups.130
Surveillance has been documented to have an impact on freedom of expression in a range 
of jurisdictions. For example, in the United States, in the wake of revelations about the 
122 Court of Justice of the European Union. Case C-434/09. 13 May 2014. Google Spain SL, Google 
Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González. EU:C:2014:317. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN 
123 Global Network Initiative. 15 May 2014. EU Court ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Threatens 
Freedom of Expression. www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/eu-court-%E2%80%98right-be-
forgotten%E2%80%99-ruling-threatens-freedom-expression (Accessed 17 July 2014.) 
124 Pillay, op. cit.; Necessary and Proportionate. 10 July 2013. International Principles on the Application 
of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance. https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text.
125 Simon Davies (ed). June 2014. A Crisis of Accountability: A global analysis of the impact 
of the Snowden revelations. Privacy Surgeon. www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/Snowden-final-report-for-publication.pdf 
126 Jemima Kiss. 15 July 2014. Academics: UK ‘Drip’ data law changes are ‘serious expansion of 
surveillance’. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/15/academics-uk-data-
law-surveillance-bill-rushed-parliament (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
127 Jemima Kiss. Op. cit.; Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 Chapter 27. Pg. 8, 
Sec.4(2). http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/27/pdfs/ukpga_20140027_en.pdf
128 Marco Civil da Internet. Article 11 section 2. http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/APPROVED-
MARCO-CIVIL-MAY-2014.pdf 
129 As of December 2013, according to comScore, Facebook was in third place with 7.8 million Russian 
users and behind Odnoklassniki, a school-based Russian social network with 54 million Russian 
users. Kathrin Hille. 26 January 2014. VKontakte stake sale strengthens Usmanov grip. Financial 
Times. www.ft.com/cms/s/0/25037bce-867c-11e3-aa31-00144feab7de.html (Accessed 1 August 
2014.)
130 Carol Matlack. 17 April 2014. The Kremlin Tried to Use VKontakte—Russia’s Facebook—to Spy 
on Ukrainians. Bloomberg Businessweek. www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-17/the-
kremlin-tried-to-use-vkontakte-russias-facebook-to-spy-on-ukrainians (Accessed 1 August 2014); 
Liga Business Inform. 18 April 2014. Большой брат: как соцсети делятся информацией 
со спецслужбами [Big brother: How social networks share information with security services]. 
Liga Business Inform. (In Russian.) http://biz.liga.net/print/all/it/stati/2732697-bolshoy-brat-kak-
sotsialnye-seti-slivayut-dannye-spetssluzhbam.htm (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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apparent scale of the NSA’s surveillance, the PEN American Center conducted a survey 
of over 520 American writers about the effects of surveillance on their work. The report 
noted that 16 per cent claimed to ‘have refrained from conducting Internet searches or 
visiting Web sites on topics that may be considered controversial or suspicious, and 
another 12 per cent have seriously considered it’.131  
The European Union faces a growing disconnect between surveillance powers sought 
by governments and what courts view as necessary and proportionate. In April 2014 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the EU Data Retention Directive was 
invalid132 and contained provisions that disproportionally interfered with ‘the private lives 
of citizens’.133 The UK Government instructed ISPs to continue to retain data despite the 
ECJ ruling.134 It then invoked ‘emergency measures’ to expedite passage of the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act,135 effectively overriding the ECJ decision by 
requiring ISPs to continue storing metadata for one year.136 Government officials were 
quoted in news reports noting that the legislation was necessary to maintain the ‘tools’ 
needed to combat terrorism and to ensure public safety. The UK has not been the only 
country in Europe to disagree with the ECJ ruling; Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, 
Greece, Romania and Sweden have also rejected it.137
2.2 Intermediary liability 
What happens when an internet user uses an intermediary service to post, share, or 
access content that infringes laws in a given country? To what extent can or should 
intermediaries be held legally responsible – or “liable” – for the activities of their users? 
This question is answered by a regulatory approach most commonly around the world as 
“intermediary liability.”
Intermediary liability provisions formalize government expectations for how an intermediary 
must handle ‘third-party’ content or communications. In some intermediary liability 
approaches, such legal provisions define circumstances under which intermediaries can 
be exempt from liability by setting forth criteria that intermediaries must follow in order to 
escape civil or even sometimes criminal penalty for users’ actions. 
131 PEN American Center. 12 November 2013. Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to 
Self-Censor. www.pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20American.pdf 
132 Danny O’Brien. Data Retention Directive Invalid, says EU’s Highest Court. 8 April 2014. https://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/data-retention-violates-human-rights-says-eus-highest-court (Accessed 
17 July 2014.)
133 Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 54/14 Luxembourg, 8 April 2014. 
Judgment in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others. 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf 
134 Pam Cowburn. DRIP: Five Arguments Against Proposed UK Data Retention Bill.  London School of 
Economics and Political Science Media Policy Project Blog. 15 July 2014. (Accessed 1 August 2014.) 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/07/15/drip-five-arguments-against-proposed-uk-
data-retention-bill/
135 Parliament passes emergency Data Retention Bill. BBC News. 17 July, 2014. 
 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-28352673 (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
136 Dave Lee. What emergency data law means for you. 10 July 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-28245589 (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
137 Cowburn, op. cit.
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2.2.1 Models of Intermediary Liability
Many governments in regions including Europe, North America, parts of South East 
Asia and Latin America, have laws specifically addressing intermediary liability. In other 
regions, particularly Africa, governments are considering legal provisions on intermediary 
liability.138 Broadly speaking, where such regimes exist, there are three models of 
intermediary liability:139 which strict liability, conditional liability and broad immunity.140 
Exact requirements and nuances of these models vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
and are defined by governments and further clarified by courts. Some intermediaries 
explicitly comply with legal mandates relating to intermediary liability by undertaking 
measures such as self-regulation via enforcement of their terms of service.
‘Blanket’ or strict liability: The intermediary is liable for third-party content even when 
it is not aware that the content is illegal (or even exists). The only way to avoid liability 
under such circumstances is to monitor, filter, and remove content proactively if it is 
likely to be infringing. Even so, monitoring and removing content does not absolve the 
intermediary of liability if any infringing content is overlooked. Blanket liability regimes do 
not distinguish between intermediaries; all intermediaries, regardless of size or function, 
are liable. China and Thailand are governed by strict liability regimes.141 For example the 
Chinese government imposes liability for unlawful content on all intermediaries. If they 
fail to sufficiently monitor user activity, take down content or report violations, they may 
face fines, criminal liability, and revocation of business or media licenses.142 In 2014 the 
leading portal, Sina.com, had part of its publishing licenses revoked due to the presence 
of pornographic material on its network.143 
‘Safe harbour’ or conditional liability: The intermediary is potentially exempt from 
liability for third-party content if certain conditions are met – such as removing content 
upon receiving notice (‘notice and takedown’), notifying the content creator of infringing 
material after receiving notice (‘notice and notice’) or disconnecting repeat infringers 
138 Elimar Vushe Gandhi. 19 May 2014. Internet Intermediaries: The dilemma of liability in Africa. 
Association for Progressive Communications News. www.apc.org/en/node/19279 (Accessed 17 
July 2014.) 
139 For more information about the different intermediary models, see Article 19, ‘Dilemma’, p. 7; Center 
for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., p. 4.
140 For more information about the different intermediary models, see Article 19, ‘Dilemma’, p. 7; Center 
for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., p. 4.
141 Center for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., pp 14-16.
142 Measures for Managing Internet Information Services, Article 20 [in Chinese], issued by the 
State Council on September 25, 2000, effective October 1, 2000. Unofficial English translation 
available at http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_aboutchina/2003-09/24/content_23369.htm. 
 See also OpenNet Initiative, Access Contested, MIT Press, 2011, http://access.opennet.net/
wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-china.pdf, pp. 279–80.
143 Glyn Moody. 30 April 2014. China’s Internet Giant Sina.com Loses Publication License 
for Publishing Pornography – 20 Articles and Four Videos. Techdirt. www.techdirt.com/
articles/20140425/09451027029/chinas-internet-giant-sinacom-loses-publication-license-
publishing-pornography-20-articles-four-videos.shtml (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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upon notice.144 If an intermediary does not meet these stipulations, they may be liable for 
damages.145 Unlike the ‘strict liability’ model, the safe harbour model does not compel 
intermediaries to proactively monitor and filter content in order to avoid liability.146 However, 
there are a wide variety of safe harbour regimes; for example, the EU E-Commerce 
Directive (ECD) establishes criteria under which different categories of intermediaries 
can seek exemption from liability,147 whereas South Africa’s Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act148 only recognizes safe harbour for the 169 member companies149 
that belong to the Internet Service Providers’ Association, South Africa’s self-regulatory 
industry group.150 
The ‘notice-and-takedown’ variety of conditional liability – such as the United States’ 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) – is criticized because it is easy to abuse; 
furthermore, it facilitates self-censorship by placing the intermediary in a quasi-judicial 
position responsible for evaluating the legality of content.151 The model is even more 
susceptible to abuse when it lacks elements of due process, such as the opportunity to 
appeal a takedown request.152 Indeed, ‘notice-and-takedown’ incentivizes intermediaries 
to remove content immediately after receiving notice, rather than investing resources to 
144 The OECD identified four ways in which intermediaries cooperate with law enforcement: (a) Notice 
and takedown; (b) Notice and notice; (c) Notice and disconnection; and (d) Filtering. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. September 2011. The Role of Internet Intermediaries 
in Advancing Public Policy Objectives. Paris, OECD Publishing, pp. 143–162. http://browse.
oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/product/9311031e.pdf 
145 Center for Democracy and Technology, op. cit.
146 Article 19, op. cit., p. 7. 
147 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 8 June 2000. Directive 2000/31/EC of 
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Communications and Transactions Act. WILMap. (Act N. 25/2002.) https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
page/wilmap-south-africa (Accessed 31 July 2014.)
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investigate the validity of the request and risk a lawsuit. Legitimate content can end up 
being censored as a consequence.153 
A 2011 study on India’s intermediary liability regime by the Centre for Internet and 
Society in Bangalore indicated a need for increased safeguards against misuse of the 
privately administered takedown regime. Specifically, the study identified a need to: 
reduce uncertainty in the criteria for administering takedowns; reduce uncertainty in 
the procedure for administering takedowns; include various elements of natural justice 
(prevention of bias and emphasis on the right to a fair hearing) in the procedure for 
administering takedowns; and replace the requirement for subjective legal determination 
by intermediaries with an objective test.154 These issues have been echoed in jurisdictions 
such as South Africa, particularly with respect to the lack of due process for users whose 
content is removed.155
Broad immunity: In this model the intermediary is exempt from liability for a range of 
third-party content without distinguishing between intermediary function and content 
type.156 For example, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in the USA shields 
intermediaries from liability for illegal behaviour by users while also protecting them from 
liability when they do remove content in compliance with private company policy.157 
Exceptions to this model include intellectual property (copyright is governed by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, trademark by the Lanham Act), and US federal criminal law.158
Given the key role that intermediaries and the laws that govern them play in online freedom 
of expression, discussions at the international level have sought to establish common 
principles and best practices. For example, in December 2011, the OECD Council 
included ‘limiting intermediary liability’ as one of 14 recommended principles for internet 
policy-making to ‘promote and protect the global free flow of information online’. These 
principles also emphasized the importance of transparency, due process, accountability 
153 For an egregious example of ‘notice and takedown’ as an instrument of taking down legal content, 
see Paul Sieminski. 21 November 2013. Striking Back Against Censorship. WordPress Hot Off 
the Press Blog. http://en.blog.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/striking-back-against-censorship 
(Accessed 17 July 2014); Corynne McSherry. 21 November 2013. WordPress.com Stands Up 
For Its Users, Goes to Court to Challenge DMCA Abuse. EFF Deeplinks Blog. https://www.eff.
org/deeplinks/2013/11/wordpresscom-stands-its-users-goes-court-challenge-dmca-abuse 
(Accessed July 2014); Mike Masnick. 21 November 2013. Wordpress Goes Legal: Sues Over Two 
Egregiously Bogus DMCA Notices That Were Designed To Censor. Techdirt. www.techdirt.com/
articles/20131121/01431725317/wordpress-goes-legal-sues-over-two-egregiously-bogus-dmca-
notices-that-were-designed-to-censor.shtml (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
154 Rishabh Dara.  2011. Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on 
the Internet. The Centre for Internet and Society, p. 2. http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/
intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf (Accessed 17 July 2014.) 
155 Comninos and Rens, op. cit.
156 Article 19, ‘Dilemma’, op. cit., p. 7. 
157 Legal Information Institute. 47 U.S. Code § 230 - Protection for private blocking and screening 
of offensive material. Cornell University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 
(Accessed 18 July 2014.)
158 Center for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., p. 4.
43
and inclusive, multistakeholder policymaking.159 An advisory council comprised of civil 
society groups endorsed the recommendation.160 
2.2.2 Intermediary Liability in the Case Study Countries 
Intermediary liability policy appears to be evolving into a legal mechanism that, in part, 
allows governments to transpose their own interpretations of limitations to freedom of 
expression onto the internet. Depending on the national, social and historical context, 
different governments emphasize the restriction of different types of content as outlined 
in section 2.1 above.161
For example, cyber cafes attract particular regulation in  India,162 while telecommunication 
companies and the potential spread of hate speech via SMS services are a strong 
concern in Kenya.163 Depending on the jurisdiction, non-compliant intermediaries may 
face criminal prosecution like imprisonment, civil penalties like fines or a revocation of 
operating licenses. Below are brief summaries of the intermediary liability regimes of 
the case study countries plus the European Union of which three of those countries are 
members.164
159 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 13 December 2011. OECD 
Council Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making. www.oecd.org/internet/
ieconomy/49258588.pdf 
160 Civil Society Information Society Advisory Council. 18 December 2011. ‘CSISAC Welcomes OECD 
Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making’. http://csisac.org/2011/12/oecd_
principles_internet_policy.php 
161 For more detailed analysis of intermediary liability regimes in these and other countries see the 
Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School’s World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap) 
project at https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/our-work/projects/world-intermediary-liability-map-wilmap 
162 India recognizes Cyber Cafes as intermediaries and has created explicit Rules for Cyber Cafes 
under the Information Technology Act 2000. Among other things, the rules require Cyber Cafes 
to (a) register all users of the facilities with photo identification, (b) record and store user browser 
history for one year, and (c) cooperate with authorities when required. Nikhil Pahwa. 2 May 2011. 
India’s CyberCafe Rules Finalized; Foundation For Harassment. MediaNama. www.medianama.
com/2011/05/223-india-cyber-cafe-law (Accessed 17 July 2014); Bhairav Acharya. 31 March 
2013. Comments on the Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011. The 
Centre for Internet and Society. http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-
it-guidelines-for-cyber-cafe-rules-2011; Department of Electronics and Information Technology, 
Ministry of Communications and IT, Government of India. 11 April 2011. Information Technology 
(Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011. GSR 315(E). http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/
GSR315E_10511(1).pdf 
163 Comninos, An Uncertain Terrain, op. cit., p. 10.
164 Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, World Intermediary Liability Map, op. cit.
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Brazil: On 23 April 2014, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff signed the Marco Civil da 
Internet into law,165 Brazil’s first law addressing intermediary liability.166 Intermediaries 
qualify for safe harbor as long as they remove third-party content after receiving a court 
order.167 Failure to comply with a court order can result in arrest, as it did in 2012 when 
the Brazilian electoral court issued warrants for the arrest of two Google executives 
for not removing a film that made negative remarks about a local mayoral candidate in 
violation of a 1965 Brazilian electoral law before the 2012 elections.168 
The Marco Civil leaves issues related to copyrighted content169 and electoral propaganda170 
to specific legislation. Cases related to violations of honour and reputation or personality 
rights may be heard by Small Claims Courts, which provides a more expedited process.171 
The one exception to the safe harbour provisions is when ‘revenge porn’ is involved; 
Article 21 of Marco Civil states that intermediaries may be secondarily liable if they do not 
remove content that depicts ‘disclosure, without consent of its participants, of photos, 
videos or other materials containing nudity or acts sexual private character, after receipt 
of notification by the participant or legal representative’.172 If a service provider has the 
contact information of the user who published the content, they must notify the users of 
the reasons and other information related to the removal.173 
China: In Chinese legal terms, the concept of internet intermediaries is encapsulated by 
the concept of ‘Internet Information Service’ as outlined in Article 2 of the Measures on 
the Administration of Internet Information Services (Measures).174 According to Article 
165 Anthony Boadle. 23 April 2014. Brazilian Congress passes Internet bill of rights. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-internet-brazil-idUSBREA3M00Y20140423 (Accessed 17 July 
2014); Daniel P. Cooper. 28 April 2014. Brazil Enacts ‘Marco Civil’ Internet Civil Rights Bill. Covington 
& Burling LLP. www.natlawreview.com/article/brazil-enacts-marco-civil-internet-civil-rights-bill 
(Accessed 17 July 2014.)
166 Anthony Boadle. 23 April 2014. Brazilian Congress passes Internet bill of rights. Reuters. (Accessed 
17 July 2014); Daniel P. Cooper. 28 April 2014. Brazil Enacts ‘Marco Civil’ Internet Civil Rights Bill. 
Covington & Burling LLP.  (Accessed 17 July 2014.); Diego Spinola. Diego Spinola. 30 April 2014. 
Brazil Leads the Efforts in Internet Governance with Its Recently Enacted ‘Marco Civil Da Internet’. 
What’s In It For Intermediary Liability? Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School. http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2014/04/brazil-leads-efforts-internet-governance-its-recently-enacted-
marco-civil-da-internet (Accessed 31 July 2014.)
167 Federative Republic of Brazil. 23 April 2014. Marco Civil da Internet, Law No. 12.965 Article 19. 
http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/APPROVED-MARCO-CIVIL-MAY-2014.pdf 
168 Sarah Laskow. 29 April 2013. Google vs Brazil. Columbia Journalism Review. www.cjr.org/
cloud_control/brazilian_takedown_requests.php?page=all (Accessed 18 July 2014); Sorcha 
Pollack. 27 September 2012. Google Executive Arrested as Brazil Bans Anti-Muslim Film. Time. 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/09/27/google-executive-arrested-as-brazil-bans-anti-muslim-film 
(Accessed 18 May 2014); Larissa G. Alfonso, Felipe Octaviano Delgado Busnello, and Diego C. 
Spinola. World Intermediary Liability Map: Brazil. Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law 
School. https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/page/wilmap-brazil (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
169 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit., Article 31.
170 Federal government of Brazil. 30 September 1997. Presidência da República Casa Civil Subchefia 
para Assuntos Jurídicos [Brazilian Electoral Law]. Palácio do Planalto, Article 57-F. (In Portuguese.) 
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9504.htm (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
171 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit. Article 19(3). 
172 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit. Articles 19 and 21; Pedro Ekman and Bia Barbosa. 27 March 2014. 
Marco Civil Aprovado: Dia Histórico para Liberdade de Expressão. Intervozes. (In Portuguese.) 
http://intervozes.org.br/marco-civil-aprovado-dia-historico-para-a-liberdade-de-expressao 
(Accessed 17 July 2014.) 
173 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit., Article 20.
174 State Council Information Office. 7 June 2012. Measures. Op. cit.
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13 of the Measures, all ‘information service providers” are required to ‘ensure that the 
information that they provide is lawful’. A revised ‘deliberation draft’ of the Measures 
was jointly released by the State Information Office and Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology in 2012, proposing a number of updated provisions specifying 
the obligations of ISPs.175 The draft which is expected to become law and which has 
therefore already begun to influence company behaviour, stipulates that once an internet 
information service discovers that the information published falls into the ‘nine forbidden 
content categories’, it shall ‘immediately stop the publication and transmission thereof, 
save the relevant records and make a report thereon to the relevant authority and the 
public security department’ (Articles 18 and 19).176 Article 25 stipulates the creation of a 
complaints system enabling any member of the public to report illegal content that they 
see on information service providers to the public security bureau and other relevant 
government departments.177
Egypt: Although Egypt does not have a specific legal regime for intermediary liability, 
there are laws that have been interpreted as affecting intermediaries. For example, Article 
147 of Egypt’s 2002 Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Law specifically includes 
‘computers, internet, information networks, communication networks’ among the entities 
that must respect copyright.178 On the one hand, Article 147’s breadth – which covers 
‘any manner of’ copyright exploitation – may hold intermediaries liable, although another 
article of the same law, Article 171(9),179 could be interpreted as a statutory safe harbour 
indemnifying internet intermediaries in Egypt.180 Scholars saw support for the latter 
position in the Egyptian State Council Administrative Court’s November 2010 decision 
to overturn the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA)’s decision to 
require mobile operators and satellite broadcast companies to monitor their users’ news 
feeds.181 The NTRA, which is empowered by the Telecommunications Regulatory Law 
to set rules for telecommunications services providers, requires telecommunications 
companies (which includes ISPs) to comply with restriction orders182 from the government 
or risk imprisonment or revocation of their operating licenses.183 The Egyptian State 
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Egyptian Gazette. 2 June 2002. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Law No. 82/2002. World 
Intellectual Property Organization, p. 47. www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/eg/eg001en.pdf 
(Accessed 18 July 2014.)
179 ‘Without prejudice to the moral rights of the author under this Law, the author may not, after the 
publication of the work, prevent third parties from…Ephemeral reproduction of a work where 
such reproduction is made in relay, during a digital transmission of the work or in the course of a 
process of reception of a digitally stored work, within the normal operation of the device used by an 
authorized person.’ Egyptian Gazette, pp. 52–53.
180 Seng and Fernandez-Diez, op. cit., pp. 24–25.
181 Yasmine Saleh. 27 November 2010. Egypt’s court overturns telecom news monitoring. Reuters. 
www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/27/us-egypt-media-court-idUSTRE6AQ12V20101127 
(Accessed 18 July 2014.)
182 National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of Egypt. February 2003. Egypt Telecommunication 
Regulation Law, Law No. 10 of 2003. University of Minnesota, p. 26 (Article 67). www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/research/Egypt/Egypt%20Telecommunication%20Regulation%20Law.pdf 
183 Egypt Telecommunication Regulation Law, op. cit., p. 31 (Article 82.)
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Council has the power to issue orders to block or remove content.184 In brief, there is no 
consensus on whether the 2002 law ‘explicitly impose[s] liability on intermediaries for 
acts of infringement by third parties or absolve[s] them’.185
Germany: In Germany, provisions addressing intermediary liability are defined in the 
Telemedia Act 2007.186 The Telemedia Act applies to all electronic information and 
communication services, excluding broadcasters and telecommunications service 
providers that consist entirely of the transmission of signals. Telecommunications Services 
are mainly regulated by the Telecommunications Act.187 The Telemedia Act established a 
tiered liability regime that factors in a user’s level of involvement in the infringement on 
the internet; individual ‘content providers’ are liable for own content they produce, share, 
post etc. on intermediary platforms. ‘Host providers’, like social networking platforms, 
are granted limited liability for third-party content, while ‘access providers’, or ISPs, 
are assigned only very limited liability for third-party content.188 In Germany, a number 
of state and non-governmental actors can issue requests for filtering, and removal of 
information.189 
Hungary: The concept of internet intermediaries was established via Act CVIII of 2001 
(‘on certain issues of electronic commerce services and information society services’), 
which implemented the EU E-Commerce Directive (ECD) of 2000.190 According to the ECD, 
intermediary service providers are not responsible for the content they transmit, as long 
as they do not select or modify the information transmitted/stored, specify the recipient 
and initiate the information (art. 8, par. 1). Furthermore, intermediary service providers are 
not liable if they have no knowledge of the unlawful nature of the transmitted information 
and if, having acquired knowledge about its unlawful nature, they act ‘expeditiously to 
remove or to disable access to the information’ (art. 11). As the original formulation of Act 
CVIII refers mostly to copyright infringements, it is unclear how newly enacted restrictions 
on media content and the modified provisions of the criminal code will impact the legal 
184 As an example of an order from a High Administrative Court includes in 2013 a ruling from the High 
Administrative Court that ordered YouTube to be blocked for a month in the country after Google 
refused to delete the film ‘Innocence of Muslims’. Joel Gulhane. 19 February 2013. Google blocks 
YouTube videos in Egypt. Daily News Egypt. www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/19/google-
blocks-youtube-video (Accessed 17 July 2014.) 
185 Seng and Fernandez-Diez, op. cit., pp. 24–25.
186 26 February 2007. Telemediengesetz (TMG) [Telemedia Act (TMA)]. Centre for German Legal 
Information (CGerLI). Part 3, Sections 7–10. (Federal Gazette I, p. 179), pp. 6–8. www.cgerli.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/interne_Dokumente/Legislation/Telemedia_Act__TMA_.pdf 
187 CGerLI, op. cit., p. 2; Telecommunications Act, §3, www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2004/
BJNR119000004.html#BJNR119000004BJNG000100000  
188 CGerLI, op. cit., pp. 6–8.
189 Government bodies include child protection authorities, Commission for Youth Protection Relating 
to Media, the Ministry of Interior and the Federal and Criminal Police Office; non-governmental 
organizations include the Association for the Voluntary Self-Monitoring of Multimedia Service 
Providers (FSM e.V.), and copyright holders and their representatives.  
190 National Media and Infocommunications Authority of Hungary. 24 December 2001. Act CVIII of 
2001 on certain issues of electronic commerce services and information society services. http://
english.nmhh.hu/dokumentum/150094/108_2001_el_comm_torv_20070502.pdf  
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situation of intermediary services.191 Additionally, according to the revised Criminal Code, 
article 77, content of criminal nature ‘disclosed through an electronic communications 
network’ can be ordered by courts to be ‘rendered irreversibly inaccessible’.192
India: Section 79 of the Information Technology Act 2000 limits the liability of intermediaries 
for third party information on their networks. Intermediaries are granted exemption from 
liability for third-party content as long as they do not initiate the transmission, specify 
its recipient, select or modify the communication and perform due diligence as defined 
by Rules under section 79.193 Among other requirements, according to the Rules, the 
intermediary must work to respond to requests for the removal of  information that is 
in contravention of the Rules within 36 hours of receiving such a request.194 This safe 
harbour does not apply if the intermediary has conspired or aided in the commission of 
the unlawful act, does not expeditiously remove or disable access to the content after 
receiving notice or has obtained actual knowledge of the infringing content.195 
Kenya: Kenyan law does not explicitly address the liability of internet intermediaries. The 
lack of comprehensive regulations around intermediary liability has caused uncertainty 
in the legal definition and recognition of an ‘intermediary’, with the closest definition 
being found in the Kenya Information Communications Act under ‘telecommunication 
operator’ or ‘licensee’.196 Internet companies such as social networks and search engines 
are not defined and therefore do not fall under this definition. Bodies that are authorized 
to request content removal include the National Cohesion and Integration Commission,197 
the Ministry of Information Communication and Technology,198 Communication Authority 
of Kenya199 and the Kenya Copyright Board.200 Because of the lack of specific regulation 
addressing intermediary liability in Kenya, intermediaries can potentially be held liable for 
illegal content under a number of different laws as mentioned above under ‘restrictions’. 
 
191 Katalin Parti and Luisa Marin. 2013. Ensuring Freedoms and Protecting Rights in the Governance 
of the Internet: A Comparative Analysis on Blocking Measures and Internet Providers’ Removal of 
Illegal Internet Content. Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 138–59. 
www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/455/392 
192 Act LXXVIII of 2013. (In Hungarian.) www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK13096.pdf 
193 Section 79(2) of the Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2005 http://deity.gov.in/sites/
upload_files/dit/files/downloads/itact2000/it_amendment_act2008.pdf 
194 Rule 3(4) of the Information Technology Intermediaries Guidelines Rules 2011. Rule 3(2) contains 
more than thirty-six types of prohibited content. For full list of prohibited content see Department of 
Electronics and Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 
Government of India. 11 April 2011. (1330 GI/11-3A) http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/
GSR314E_10511(1).pdf 
195 Section 79 (3) of the Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008, op. cit.
196 Republic of Kenya. 2012. Kenya Information and Communications Act, Section 2. National 
Council for Law Reporting. www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%20
411A#part_II 
197 Republic of Kenya. 2008. National Cohesion and Integration Act, No. 12 of 2008. National Council 
for Law Reporting, p. 17 (Section 25(2)). http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/
NationalCohesionandIntegrationAct_No12of2008.pdf 
198 Kenya Information and Communications Act, op. cit., Section 5A.
199 Kenya Information and Communications Act, op. cit., Section 5; Communications Authority of 
Kenya. What we Do. www.ca.go.ke/index.php/what-we-do (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
200 Alice Munyua, Grace Githaiga and Victor Kapiyo. 2012. Intermediary Liability in Kenya. Kenya ICT 
Action Network, p. 10. www.apc.org/en/system/files/Intermediary_Liability_in_Kenya.pdf (Accessed 
1 August 2014.)
48
Liability can also arise under common law for breach of privacy, negligence, breach 
of contract, copyright infringement, defamation, vicarious liability, etc.201 Pertaining 
specifically to ISPs and telecommunications service providers, under the Kenya 
Information Communications Act the industry regulator, the Communications Authority of 
Kenya has general powers to regulate the operations of licensees through, among others, 
the prescription of rules and conditions for licences. This includes the power to revoke 
licences for non-compliance with the rules, or the licence terms and conditions.202
Russia: In 2013 the ‘Anti-piracy law’ (Federal Law No. 187-FZ) implemented a number 
of legal revisions affecting internet intermediaries, including for the first time in Russia’s 
legal code a definition of ‘information intermediaries’.203 The law defines functions 
performed by different types of ‘information intermediaries’ – those transferring content 
through information communication networks including the internet, those providing 
opportunity to place content or information needed to receive the content, and those 
providing access to content.204 It also outlines how these actions can avoid liability for 
intellectual property right infringement, including by ‘safe harbour actions’ (depending 
on the type of intermediary), for example by: 1) not initiating transmission of content nor 
determining the receiver of the content; and 2) not modifying the content while providing 
services, save for the changes necessary by the technical process of transmission. It also 
contained more ambiguous safe harbour requirements such as prompt action to stop 
infringement upon notification by rights-holders, and knowledge standards about ‘ought 
to know’ that the content in question was unlawful.205 According to recently updated laws 
governing online content, intermediaries are required to block or take down content upon 
receiving an order from Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator responsible 
for overseeing media and internet content.206 The penalty for failure to delete or block the 
requested content is significant. Entire websites can be blocked, including the ones which 
have the similar IP addresses.207 A February 2014 amendment requires that intermediaries 
201 Republic of Kenya. 2007. Chapter 8: The Judicature Act. National Council for Law Reporting, pp. 
3–4 (Section 3). www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/GreyBook/3.%20Judicature%20Act.pdf 
202 Section 25, Kenya Information and Communication Act, op. cit.
203 Government of Russia. Article 1253.1 – On responsibility of Informational intermediaries (Civil code 
of Russian Federation Chapter 69). (In Russian.) www.zakonrf.info/gk/1253.1 (Accessed 18 July 
2014); Daria Kim. 24 July 2013. Russia Adopts Measures Against Online Video Piracy. Intellectual 
Property Watch. www.ip-watch.org/2013/07/24/russia-adopts-measures-against-online-video-
piracy (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
204 The full name of the law is ‘On Amending Separate Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation 
Concerning the Questions of Protection of Intellectual Rights in Information and Telecommunication 
Networks’. See KVG Research. December 2013. TV Market and Video on Demand in the 
Russian Federation. Strasbourg, European Audiovisual Observatory, pp. 19–22. www.obs.coe.int/
documents/205595/552774/RU+TV+and+VoD+2013+KVG+Research+EN.pdf/5fbb076c-868e-
423a-bfed-dca8b66cac43 
205 KVG Research, op. cit.
206 Igor Korolev. 17 December 2013. Госдума разрешила блокировать сайты молниеносно и без 
суда. [Russian Duma decides to block web sites without court permission]. CNews. (In Russian.) 
www.cnews.ru/news/top/index.shtml?2013/12/17/553820 (Accessed 17 July 2014); No. 292521-
6: Bill Passed Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the Information and Telecommunications 
Networks. www.copyright.ru/ru/library/zakonoproekti/pravovoe_regulirovanie_in/zakon_292521-6 
(Accessed 17 July 2014.)
207 VimpelCom (Beeline). 8 August 2012. Как и почему происходит блокировка сайтов. [How and 
why websites are blocked/published on the habrahabr website] (in Russian). Beeline telecom blog. 
http://habrahabr.ru/company/beeline/blog/149249 (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
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must comply with government demands, even if they are not accompanied by an official 
court order, if the content relates to extremism, child pornography, drugs, violence, or the 
promotion of riots or anti-government actions.208 
United Kingdom: In the UK, there is no formal definition of an internet intermediary, 
but ‘information society service provider’ is defined and would include ISPs and 
telecommunication companies amongst others, though not as clearly social networks 
and search engines.209 Consequently, there is no law in the UK specifically addressing 
the liability of internet intermediaries per se, but there are a number of laws that de 
facto address the same. For example, internet services are exempted from liability 
for defamation if they pass on to a claimant the identity of someone who has posted 
defamatory material on their site,210 and under certain situations they may benefit from 
exclusions of liability for breaches of copyright too.211 The EU’s E-Commerce Directive 
is a significant source of immunity in general,212 and the Information Society Directive 
is a source of relief in copyright claims.213 Similarly, blocking powers exist, notably for 
breaches of copyright.214 In general, courts can compel restrictions on access to material 
that is a breach of contempt of court laws, or defames, or breaches privacy. In relation 
to mobile telephony, there are other provisions of particular importance. These derive 
from the laws relating to Ofcom, the body that grants mobile telephony licenses to all 
mobile phone network providers. Ofcom has the power to revoke service provider’s 
licenses to protect national security, public safety and health. Ofcom has a duty to act in 
such a way when directed to by the government. The power and duty is contained in the 
Communications Act 2003 s 5, and the power to compel Ofcom to act suspend or restrict 
a particular network provider is contained in section 132. Other powers also exist that 
208 Roskomnadzor, Government of Russia. 31 January 2014. О вступлении в силу изменений 
в федеральный закон ‘Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите 
информации’. [Entry into force of amendments of the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information 
Technologies, and Protection of Information’]. (In Russian). Roskomnadzor website. http://rkn.gov.
ru/news/rsoc/news23647.htm (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
209 According to Regulation 2 of the ECD Regulations 2002 2013/2002, ‘Any service which is normally 
provided for remuneration, and which operates at a distance by electronic [means], … and at the 
individual request of a recipient of a service’ (relying on recital 17 of Directive 2000/31/EC, commonly 
known as the E-Commerce Directive). ‘It would cover, therefore, most commercial Internet Service 
Providers, but would not cover internet cafes, whose services are not provided at a distance.’ 
 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman. 2009. Intellectual Property Law, 3rd edn. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 158.
210 UK Government. 2013. The Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013. The National 
Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2013/9780111104620 (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
211 A source of liability in copyright for ISPs is section 16 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
1988, which provides that liability can be imposed where a person: ‘without the licence of the 
copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright’. 
UK Government. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 – Section 16: The acts restricted 
by copyright. The National Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/part/I/chapter/II/
crossheading/the-acts-restricted-by-copyright 
212 See footnote 154. Under these provisions, liability for damages or criminal sanction is provided for 
hosting, mere conduit and caching under certain circumstances. 
213 Directive 2001/29/EC, Art 5, recently considered by the Supreme Court in Public Relations 
Consultants Association Limited v Newspaper Licensing Agency [2013] UKSC 18. www.bailii.
org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/18.html 
214 Article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive, and s97A of the Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988. 
These are enforced to block websites on the basis of (inter alia) copyright breach. A recent case is 
Paramount v BSkyB [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), which also reviews the law on liability for hyperlinks. 
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could be used to infringe freedom of expression over mobile communications networks, 
including a power the government has to issue directions of a general nature to Ofcom 
or network providers.215 Prior parliamentary oversight is not required for these powers to 
be exercised. 
United States: Broadly speaking there are two models of internet intermediary liability 
in the United States. First, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 
provides ‘expansive protections against liability’ from a wide array of speech-based torts, 
such as defamation, invasion of privacy, misrepresentation and negligence.216 Section 
230 means that search engines are not liable for indexing or linking to potentially illegal 
third-party content.217 Section 230 also contains a provision that protects intermediaries 
such as social networks from liability when they voluntarily block or remove content they 
determine could be harmful or objectionable to their users. Since the CDA’s enactment in 
1996, lawsuits attempting to impose intermediary liability have generally buckled under 
legal scrutiny.218 Note that the CDA does not shield internet companies against intellectual 
property claims nor federal criminal laws. 
For intellectual property–related claims, Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) provides ‘conditional safe harbor from liability’.219 It defines four types of 
intermediaries – (a) ‘transitory digital network communications’ (i.e. ISPs), (b) Caching 
service providers, (c) content hosts and (d) ‘information location tools’ (i.e. search 
engines).220 The DMCA’s liability model is characterized as a conditional safe harbour 
because intermediaries must not have ‘actual knowledge’ of infringement, not directly 
benefit from the infringement, and have a notice-and-takedown policy (wherein infringing 
links are quickly removed from its index, as well as having a termination policy for repeat 
infringers) in order to gain legal immunity.221 This conditional model has expanded 
throughout the world via trade agreements the United States has signed with other 
countries. It has also served as a template for other countries, including China, India, and 
the European Union.222 
215 Vodafone, op. cit.; UK Government. Telecommunications Act 1984, s 94 – National Emergency 
Plans for the Telecommunications Sector. www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/62282/nep-telecomms-sector-march2010.pdf 
216 Adi Kamdar. 6 December 2012. EFF’s Guide to CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Online 
Speech. Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/
effs-guide-cda-230-most-important-law-protecting-online-speech (Accessed 2 May 2014.)
217 Eric Goldman. 27 August 2013. When Should Search Engines Ignore Court Orders To Remove 
Search Results? Forbes. www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/08/27/when-should-search-
engines-ignore-court-orders-to-remove-search-results (Accessed 12 April 2014.)
218 Electronic Frontier Foundation. CDA 230 Successes. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/successes 
(Accessed 1 May 2014.)
219 Center for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., pp. 6–13.
220 Legal Information Institute. 17 U.S. Code § 512 – Limitations on liability relating to material online 
Cornell University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512 (Accessed 27 March 
2014.)
221 Legal Information Institute. 17 U.S. Code § 512 – Limitations on liability relating to material online 
Cornell University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512 (Accessed 27 March 
2014.)
222 Daniel Seng and Ignacio Garrote Fernandez-Diez. 2012. Comparative Analysis of National Approaches 
of the Liability of the Internet Intermediaries. Geneva, World Intellectual Property Organization, p. 6. 
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf 
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European Union: Intermediary liability in the European Union is largely based on two 
directives – the E-Commerce Directive223 and certain provisions of the Information Society 
(InfoSoc) Directive are particular to claims for breach of copyright.224 The E-Commerce 
Directive provides a safe harbour, in general terms, for ‘information society services’ 
against ‘liability’, but not injunctions, for material they carry in certain circumstances.225 
An ‘information society service’ is defined as: ‘any service normally provided for 
remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing 
(including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a 
recipient of a service’.226 The conditions are, in essence, when the information society 
service is a mere conduit for information, caches it or is a host for it.227 The Information 
Society Directive applies only to claims in copyright. It provides that where there is a 
temporary act of reproduction, there is no breach of a copyright holder’s reproduction 
right – and hence provides a safe harbour against liability. ‘Temporary’ is further defined 
as: ‘transient or incidental, and an integral and essential part of a technological process 
and whose sole purpose is to enable (a) a transmission in a network between third parties 
and an intermediary, or (b) a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and 
which have no independent economic significance’.228
Both Directives have been challenged in court due to what critics consider ambiguity of 
the defences and safe harbours. For example, the application of the Information Society 
Directive defence contained in Article 5 has been the subject of eight years of litigation, 
with a Danish case being referred twice to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU),229 and a UK case reaching the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and also 
being referred to the CJEU.230 The question in this latter case – the ‘Meltwater’ litigation 
– included the rather basic issue of whether browsing breached copyright; and the Danish 
litigation – the ‘Infopaq’ cases – included the equally fundamental question of the extent 
to which additional profit made by a defendant vitiates an Article 5 defense. 
223 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 8 June 2000. Directive 2000/31/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’). EUR-Lex. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L003
1:en:HTML 
224 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 22 May 2001. Directive 2001/29/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. EUR-Lex. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32001L0029
225 Directive 2000/31/EC, op. cit., Articles 12, 13 and 14, Recital 45.
226 Directive 2000/31/EC, Recital 17, Articles 2 (a) and (b), and Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as 
amended by Directive 98/48/EC
227 Directive 2000/31/EC, op. cit., Articles 12, 13 and 14.
228 Directive 2000/31/EC, op. cit., Article 5.
229 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, (‘Infopaq I’) Case C-5/08; Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, (‘Infopaq II’) Case C-302/10. Maria Fredenslund. 
17 May 2013. Denmark: Infopaq-case finally decided after eight years. Kluwer Copyright Blog. 
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2013/05/17/denmark-infopaq-case-finally-decided-after-eight-
years (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
230 Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency [2013] UKSC 18. 
www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/18.html (Accessed 18 July 2014); Newspaper Licensing 
Agency Ltd and others v Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd (Case C-360/13)
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Ambiguities also exist in the E-Commerce Directive.231 So, for example, the protection of 
the Directive for hosts is lost when a defendant has ‘actual knowledge’ of illegal activity or 
of facts from which illegality becomes apparent, but it is not clear what constitutes ‘actual 
knowledge’.232 Indeed, the regulation does not specify what information is required in a 
notice that purports to provide a defendant with such knowledge, and hence remove 
the defense. This, conceivably, may be different when a defendant is being sued in 
copyright or defamation. Further, and also in relation to liability for hosts and caching, 
the law says that a defendant needs to act ‘expeditiously to remove or disable access 
to the information’, but does not indicate how long ‘expeditiously’ should be.233 These 
ambiguities can create a chilling effect on expression, and an interference with freedom 
of expression, as companies will be automatically tempted to take down content about 
which they have been served a notice. This is because evaluating the merits of the case 
will take time and money, and it may be more efficient, cheaper and without the risk 
of liability, as noted earlier in the explanation on the safe harbour model, to react and 
remove, rather than pause and think.234
2.2.3 Special Note: Intermediary Liability in Sub-Saharan Africa
While internet usage is growing fastest in the developing world, legal provisions related to 
intermediary liability have yet to catch up in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.235 Absence 
of intermediary liability provisions creates regulatory and procedural uncertainty.236 A 2014 
report by an international NGO with consultative status to the UN’s Economic and Social 
Council, the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), argues that the lack 
of protection for intermediaries in African countries causes intermediaries to proactively 
restrict content on their networks and platforms, resulting in the undue restriction of 
users’ freedom of expression.237 
Many African countries are in the process of crafting intermediary liability regimes, partly 
in response to approaches by international bodies and major trade and aid partners to 
protect intellectual property rights and ensure that intermediaries take action against 
copyright-infringing material on their networks and platforms.238 
Some countries, such as South Africa and Uganda, have adopted safe harbours 
modeled on those of the United States and the European Union, although they have 
231 Ashley Hurst, Partner at Olswang LLP. Interview with  Richard  Danbury. Personal interview. 
Cambridge/London, UK, 14 April 2014. This paragraph gratefully draws on Mr Hurst’s critique, but 
errors remain our own.
232 Art 14 (a)
233 Art 13 (e), Art 14 (b), recital 46
234 Ashley Hurst. 25 January 2013. ISPs and defamation law: hold fire, Robert Jay. The Guardian. 
www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jan/25/defamation-law-robert-jay (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
235 For example, it has been found that South Africa and Uganda have legal provisions explicitly 
addressing intermediary liability, but in countries such as Kenya and Nigeria, intermediary liability is 
an emerging debate and issue. Comninos, An Uncertain Terrain, op. cit., p. 4.
236 Ibid. p. 12.
237 Gandhi, op. cit.
238 Ibid. 
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been implemented quite recently and thus so far there is little ‘clarifying jurisprudence’.239 
In South Africa, Chapter XI of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
‘provides for the limitation of liability for service providers, if these providers are members 
of an industry representative body that has been recognized by the minister, and they 
have adopted that body’s code of conduct’ (emphasis added).240 
Regulatory uncertainty can stem from new laws that muddy the intent of previous 
laws. For example, Uganda’s Electronic Transactions Act of 2011 limits the liability of 
service providers for user content and, furthermore, it does ‘not require them to monitor 
stored or transmitted data including for unlawful activity’.241 However, since then, ISPs 
have been compelled to ‘install electronic surveillance and interception equipment that 
“identifies the origin, destination, termination, duration and equipment identification of 
each communication”’.242
On the other hand, Kenya and Nigeria – countries with high internet penetration rates and 
vibrant tech communities – lack intermediary liability regimes.243 Nigeria has proposed 
provisions addressing liability of telecommunication providers for subscribers’ activity. 
Such provisions are coupled with provisions addressing data retention.244 In Kenya, 
companies have begun to create policies restricting user activity and content in an effort 
to pre-empt legal action over defamatory content.245
For countries putting in place intermediary liability regimes, civil society groups concerned 
with freedom of expression such as Association for Progressive Communications have 
voiced concern that countries will ‘cherry pick’ from other countries’ regimes.246 This can 
239 Alex Comninos. October 2012. Intermediary liability in South Africa. South Africa, Association for 
Progressive Communications, p. 9. (Intermediary Liability in Africa Research Papers, No. 3). 
 www.apc.org/en/system/files/Intermediary_Liability_in_South_Africa-Comninos_06.12.12.pdf 
240 Republic of South Africa. 31 July 2002. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 
2002 (No. 25 of 2002.) www.itu.int/ITU-D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/Activities/SA/docs/
SA-1_Legislations/South%20Africa/ElecComm.PDF (Accessed 31 July 2014.); Guy Berger and 
Zikhona Masala. 22 March 2012. Mapping Digital Media: South Africa. New York, Open Society 
Foundations, p. 98. www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-
south-africa-20120416.pdf 
241 Ashnah Kalemera. 20 June 2014. Uganda: When National Security Trumps Citizens’ Internet 
Freedoms. OpenNet Africa. 
 http://opennetafrica.org/internet-freedom-in-uganda-personal-information-and-the-state 
(Accessed 11 July 2014.)
242 Ashnah Kalemera, Lillian Nalwoga and Wairagala Wakabi. Intermediary Liability in Uganda. CIPESA. 
(Intermediary Liability in Africa Research Papers, No. 5.) www.apc.org/en/system/files/Intermediary_
Liability_in_Uganda.pdf (Accessed 29 July 2014.)
243 Kenya and Nigeria have a 36.70 per cent and 37.5 per cent penetration rate, respectively, where 
an internet user is defined as an ‘individual, of any age, who can access the Internet at home, via 
any device type (computer or mobile) and connection’. Internet users in both countries have grown 
at the high annual rate 16 per cent. Interestingly, because Nigeria has such a large population 
(at 178 million people, it has the eighth-largest population of internet users worldwide – behind 
Germany and ahead of the UK. See Internet Users by Country. 2014. Internet Live Stats. www.
internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country (Accessed 15 July 2014.)
244 Gbenga Sesan. 16 May 2014. New Laws Affecting Intermediary Liability in Nigeria. APCNews. 
www.apc.org/en/node/19200 (Accessed 17 July 2014.) 
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lead to unintended consequences, they fear, because the importation of provisions is not 
always complete, and can translate into more stringent, broad or vague regulations.247 
Another concern is that countries may establish restrictive and selective regimes. Because 
monitoring by intermediaries for potential illegal content could compromise internet 
users’ right to privacy and freedom of expression, strong data protection and privacy 
laws have been identified as an important safeguard to ensure that intermediary liability 
regimes are not abused for surveillance or monitoring purposes.248 Indeed, while the lack 
of intermediary liability regimes weakens freedom of expression, the simple existence 
of an intermediary liability regime does not guarantee stronger protection either for 
intermediaries or for online freedom of expression in general. In addition, intermediaries’ 
own terms of service may be inadequately aligned to freedom of expression standards. 
Competence of the courts and the presence of entities able to advocate for online human 
rights are key to ensuring protection of intermediaries and online freedom of expression.249
2.3 Self-regulation and Co-Regulation
Laws are not the only source of online content restriction; a company’s private rules like 
its ‘terms of service’ also circumscribe freedom of expression. For example, Facebook250 
and YouTube251 do not allow pornography, but Google’s Blogger does – as long as that 
content is not accompanied by advertisements.252 Blogger also does not allow gratuitously 
bloody content such as ‘close-up images of gunshot wounds or accident scenes without 
additional context or commentary’.253 Pornography and photos of gunshot wounds are 
not illegal in the United States, where Facebook and Google are headquartered, but the 
companies has made the decision to exclude such content on the rationale this would as 
they ‘serve to enhance the service as a whole’.254
Additionally, while US law protects hate speech as long as it would not incite imminent 
violence, most US-based companies proscribe much broader categories of hate speech 
in their terms of service.255 
247 Nicolo Zingales. November 2013. Internet intermediary liability: Identifying best practices for 
Africa. South Africa, Association for Progressive Communications, p. 25. www.apc.org/en/system/
files/APCInternetIntermediaryLiability_BestPracticesAfrica_20131125.pdf 
248 Githaiga, op. cit.
249 Comninos and Rens, op. cit.
250 Facebook Community Standards. https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards 
251 YouTube. YouTube Community Guidelines. https://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines 
252 Violet Blue. 28 June 2013. Google’s Blogger to delete all ‘adult’ blogs with ads in three days. ZDNet. 
www.zdnet.com/googles-blogger-to-delete-all-adult-blogs-with-ads-in-three-days-7000017451 
(Accessed 31 July 2014.)
253 Google. Blogger Content Policy. www.blogger.com/content.g?hl=en 
254 Ibid.
255 For example, Blogger: ‘content that promotes or condones violence against individuals or groups 
based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, nationality, veteran status, or sexual 
orientation/gender identity, or whose primary purpose is inciting hatred on the basis of these core 
characteristics’; Facebook: ‘Content that attacks people based on their actual or perceived race, 
ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or disease is not allowed. 
We do, however, allow clear attempts at humor or satire’; YouTube: ‘speech which attacks or 
demeans a group based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, and 
sexual orientation/gender identity’.
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In some jurisdictions, systems to set and enforce rules for online expression combine 
elements of public and private authority, resulting in self-regulation and co-regulatory 
enforcement mechanisms. The scope and power of these mechanisms are in turn 
heavily shaped by states’ legal and regulatory contexts. Thus there is a great deal of 
fluidity and inter-linkage between public and private regulation. All of the internet 
intermediaries covered in this report engage in some degree of self-regulation and private 
enforcement. The extent and nature of self- regulation and co-regulation taking place in 
a given jurisdiction is in turn shaped by the specific constitutional, legal and regulatory 
frameworks of that jurisdiction, particularly its intermediary liability regime.
The four international rapporteurs on freedom of expression – UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression; OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media; 
Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression; 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information – have pronounced self-regulation 
to be an ‘effective tool in redressing harmful speech’ which ‘should be promoted’.256 In 
fact, as early as 2003 self- and co-regulation was viewed favourably; a Council of Europe 
declaration encouraged ‘self-regulation or co-regulation regarding content disseminated 
on the Internet’ by member states.257 If such systems are not to serve as censorship, they 
should operate in terms of criteria and processes aligned to international stand ards on 
freedom of expression.
Company self-regulation: At the level of the individual company this ranges from 
measures taken by the company to block or remove spam and viruses, to the setting 
and enforcement of ‘terms of service’, which are rules that users must agree to abide by 
in order to use the service. The case studies demonstrate that the terms of service for 
one company may be very similar to legal and regulatory requirements, whereas other 
companies prohibit content that is legal but deemed by the company to be undesirable 
or incompatible with the purpose or character of its service.
Private companies are legally allowed to draft their own terms for what constitutes 
undesirable content (for example, companies targeting children may prohibit cursing). 
However, because large internet intermediaries effectively serve as quasi-public spheres, 
some advocates have argued that these companies have a responsibility to assess the 
human rights implications of their private rules in order to minimize negative impact on 
users’ rights.258
Collective self-regulation: A group of private entities may jointly create industry codes 
of conduct or set common technical standards by which all participants agree to abide. 
256 Adeline Hulin (ed). 2013. Joint Declarations of the representatives of intergovernmental bodies to 
protect free media and expression. Vienna, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
p. 67. www.osce.org/fom/99558?download=true 
257 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. 28 May 2003. Declaration on freedom of communication 
on the Internet. (Decl-28.05.2003E.) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=37031 (Accessed 30 
October 2014.)
258 Jillian C. York. September 2010. Policing Content in the Quasi Public Sphere. OpenNet Initiative. 
https://opennet.net/policing-content-quasi-public-sphere (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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As internet scholar Christopher Marsden defines it: ‘a group of firms or individuals 
exert control over their own membership and behavior. Membership is voluntary and 
participants draw up their own rules using tools such as codes of conduct as well as 
technological solutions and standards. Members take full responsibility for monitoring 
and compliance without reference to a statutory regulatory authority’.259 
One example of such an arrangement is the ‘six strikes’ Copyright Alert System adopted 
by major US internet service providers, in which the companies have agreed to adhere to 
common practices to monitor their networks for copyright infringement and to target and 
alert users alleged to have infringed.260  Executed by the non-profit Center for Copyright 
Information261 the scheme allows service providers to adapt its basic underlying principles 
as they see fit. As a result, the implementation of the scheme reportedly varies from 
service provider to service provider: some warn users and reduce their internet speeds, 
while others block access to specific websites until the user takes courses in copyright 
and piracy awareness.262  
Co-regulation: A growing amount of self-regulation, particularly in the European Union, 
is implemented as an alternative to traditional regulatory action. Some governments 
actively encourage or even place pressure on private business to self-regulate as an 
alternative to formal legislation or regulation which is inherently less flexible and usually 
more blunt than private arrangements.263 A regulatory regime involving private regulation 
that is actively encouraged or even supported by the state through legislation, funding, 
or other means of state support or institutional participation, has come to be known as 
‘co-regulation’.264 
A global example of co-regulation is a notice-and-takedown system to combat child 
sexual abuse images established between the International Association of Internet 
Hotlines (INHOPE) and ISPs.265  Of the countries addressed in this report, Brazil, Germany, 
Hungary, Russia, the UK and the United States operate INHOPE-associated hotlines.266 
Specifically in the UK, the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), a self-regulatory body set 
up by the internet industry in 1996 in response to the threat of more direct regulation, is 
empowered to make decisions about what content should be blacklisted, while working 
259 Christopher T. Marsden. 2011. Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance, 
and Legitimacy in Cyberspace. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 54.
260 Mitch Stoltz. To Safeguard the Public Domain (and the Public Interest), Fix Copyright’s Crazy 
Penalties. EFF Deeplinks blog. 18 January 2014. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/safeguard-
public-domain-and-public-interest-fix-copyrights-crazy-penalties (Accessed April 15, 2014.)
261 Copyright System FAQs. Center for Copyright Information. http://www.copyrightinformation.org/
resources-faq/copyright-alert-system-faqs/ (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
262 Matthew Ingram. Should You Fear the ‘Six Strikes’ Anti-Piracy Rule? 27 February 2013. 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-27/should-you-fear-the-six-strikes-anti-piracy-
rule (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
263 Marsden, op. cit., p. 48.
264 Marsden, op. cit., p. 46.
265 In Germany three such hotlines are operated by the self-regulatory Association for the Voluntary 
Self-Monitoring of Multimedia Service Providers (FSM e.V.), the Association of the German Internet 
Industry eco e.V. and the joint state-regulatory body Jugendschutz. INHOPE Member Details. 
https://old.inhope.org/en/hotlines/facts.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
266 Ibid.
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closely with government departments. In 2014 the IWF was tasked by the UK Government 
to actively investigate child sex abuse images on the internet.267 In Germany, in addition 
to complying with warrants and court orders, service providers have developed Codes of 
Conduct in conjunction with a non-governmental self-regulatory body, the Voluntary Self-
Monitoring of Multimedia Service Providers (FSM).  These codes include commitments to 
ensure that content on their networks complies with statutory requirements regarding the 
protection of youth, including child sexual abuse images.268  In Brazil, the nongovernmental 
organization Safernet accepts anonymous complaints of human rights violations on 
the internet relating to child sexual abuse images (online paedophilia), in addition to 
racism, xenophobia, religious intolerance, neo-Nazism, incitement to crimes against life, 
homophobia, and incitement to cruel treatment of animals.269 Safernet investigates the 
complaint, and collaborates with the federal police and prosecutors’ office, which may 
start a criminal investigation. If there is enough evidence that a site has hosted content that 
was found to be illegal, the site will be asked to remove the illegal content and is required 
to preserve evidence of the alleged crime. The content of the users’ communications 
may only be shared if there is a court order, however, demonstrating possible privacy 
implications of such cooperations.270
Proponents of the co-regulatory model are seeking to expand it. For example in 2013 
the UK government established an Extremism Taskforce, which among other things, 
committed to working with service providers to restrict access to online extremist 
material hosted overseas, but illegal in the UK. The task force also sought to strengthen 
mechanisms for public reporting of online extremist content, and work with the internet 
industry – in a co-regulatory capacity to identify and include extremist content in ‘family 
friendly’ filters.271 According to media reports in 2013, the government was considering 
establishing a system similar to the Internet Watch Foundation, in which a government 
funded body would identify and work with service providers to block or otherwise disable 
extremist content.272  
All three of the case studies in this report examine various models of self- and co- 
regulation. Proponents of industry self-regulation argue that it is preferable to government 
regulation because such coordination is more flexible and more effective than government 
regulation, deters legal yet undesirable conduct in the context of a particular service’s 
267 Internet Watch Foundation. 2013. Internet Watch Foundation Annual & Charity Report 2013. 
Cambridge, IWF, p. 5. www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/annual-reports/annual_report_2013.pdf.pdf 
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purpose, helps consumers evaluate products and services, and can lead to more efficient 
product standards in addition to lowering the cost of production. On the other hand, critics 
warn that self-regulation’s frequent shortfalls in regard to public accountability and due 
process may fail to protect democratic values and neglect basic standards of justice.273 
For example, the European Digital Rights Initiative warned that ‘very basic questions 
need to be asked about whether we should entrust enforcement of law in a core element 
of modern democracy – electronic communications – to private companies’.274  The 
European Commission has argued that co-regulation is ill-suited for situations in which 
‘fundamental rights or major political choices’ are at stake.275
2.4 Introducing the Case Studies
With the legal and regulatory context clearly established, the next three chapters examine 
ISPs, search engines and social networks in turn – examining the extent to which 
individuals’ rights are respected when their freedom of expression depends on private 
sector internet intermediaries. 
The three case studies illustrate how an internet user’s freedom of expression hinges 
on the interplay between a company’s policies and practices, government policy, and 
geopolitics. Key questions include: To what extent do companies make concerted efforts 
to respect users’ rights in the face of government requests and legal frameworks that 
are not always consistent with international human rights norms? What is the impact of 
private terms of service on freedom of expression?276 In addition to limitations on content, 
to what extent do company data protection practices and privacy policies, combined 
with government surveillance requirements, affect whether people can freely express 
themselves?277
Clearer understanding of such outcomes by all stakeholders should in turn help foster 
freedom of expression online: helping governments formulate laws that protect online 
rights but also facilitate intermediaries’ respect for users’ rights; helping companies 
improve their policies and practices to foster freedom of expression via their services; 
and helping civil society hold governments as well as companies accountable. 
273 Konstantinos Komaitis. 29 July 2013. Voluntary Initiatives as a source of policy-making on the 
Internet. Internet Society Public Policy blog. www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/07/voluntary-
initiatives-source-policy-making-internet (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
274 Joe McNamee. January 2011. The Slide from Self-Regulation to Corporate Censorship. Brussels, 
European Digital Rights Initiative, p. 5. www.edri.org/files/EDRI_selfreg_final_20110124.pdf 
275 European Commission. 12 October 2001. European Governance: A White Paper. Official Journal 
of the European Communities.  (2001/C 287/01.) p. 17. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0428&rid=2 
276 Article 19, ‘Dilemma’, op. cit., p. 7.
277 La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, op. cit., pp. 19–20.
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3. STUDY 1: INTERNET 
SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Vodafone (UK, Germany, Egypt), Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, 
Kenya), Safaricom (Kenya)
3.1 Introduction
Internet service providers (ISPs) allow users to access and use the Internet via fixed 
line or wireless connections.278 They enable the transmission of data to and from other 
intermediaries (such as search engines, social networking platforms, web hosting 
services, cloud computing services, etc.) over their networks. 
ISPs can be state-owned, partially privatized or fully privatized.279 Many are operated 
by companies whose original business focused on traditional and mobile telephone 
services prior to expanding into internet services. Companies that act as ISPs may also 
provide other services like voice calling, web hosting, cloud computing, domain name 
registration, email, and other services. This case study focuses on the core functions of 
an ISP as a provider of internet access via wireless and fixed-line services. 
As the Guiding Principles of the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of 
Expression and Privacy point out, telecommunications can both enhance openness and 
transparency, and are pertinent to governments in protecting public safety and security.280 
ISPs play a critical role in facilitating the right to freedom of expression given that internet 
access is not only a prerequisite for online expression, but for enabling the free flow of 
information globally.281 They act as internet ‘gatekeepers’282 given their direct access to, 
and the technical ability to restrict, voice or data communication on their networks. 
278 The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediries. OECD. DSTI/ICCP(2009)9/FINAL, p.9. 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/ICCP(2009)9/
FINAL&doclanguage=en 
279 Tuppen, op. cit. p. 10.
280 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of Expression and Privacy. Guiding Principles. 
Version 1 6 March 2013. http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/sustainability/pdfs/telecom_
industry_dialogue_principles.pdf
281 Comments of The New America Foundation, Free Press, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public 
Knowledge, Reporter Without Borders, American Civil Liberties Union. Before the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. In the Matter 
of Global Free Flow of Information on the Internet. Docket No. 100921457–0457–01. 6 December 
2010. p.3.
 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/comments/100921457-0457-01/attachments/NAFetal_
FreeFlowofInfoComments.pdf 
282 Shielding the Messengers: Protecting Platforms for Expression and Innovation. Version 2. Center 
for Democracy and Technology. December 2012. p.20. https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-
Intermediary-Liability-2012.pdf 
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ISPs also have the ability to collect, store, and gain access to user’s personal data and the 
content of their communications as well as metadata such as IP addresses, call record 
details, and location.283 They can face legal mandates, and even extra-legal interference 
through informal pressures, to provide access to this information, and can also face legal 
requirements to facilitate real time monitoring and surveillance.284 For these reasons ISPs’ 
roles at the network level can affect users’ freedom of expression on other intermediaries’ 
services such as search engines and social networking platforms. 
The business models of ISPs – provision of internet access to fixed line or mobile subscribers 
– generally requires the investment of substantial physical infrastructure, equipment, and 
personnel in the jurisdictions where they themselves or the telecommunications providers 
operate.285 Thus, their policies and practices affecting freedom of expression map more 
closely to a jurisdiction’s political and legal context than that of other intermediary types 
such as search engines or social networking platforms outside of their home jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, this case study demonstrates that ISPs do have control over a range of 
company business decisions, policies and practices that affect freedom of expression 
online. 
Publicly available terms of service, Privacy Policies, and other relevant policy documents 
of the companies were analysed in the context of news items, stakeholder interviews, and 
applicable legislation of the relevant jurisdictions in order to understand the challenges 
ISPs face in respecting the right to freedom of expression. 
3.1.1 The Companies
This case study examines the following ISPs operating in Brazil, India, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Egypt, and Kenya: 
Vivo Telecommunications:286 Vivo Telecommunications, also known as Telefônica Brasil, 
was launched in 1993. With 79 million cell phone subscribers as of May 2014, Vivo is the 
largest telecommunications company in Brazil,287 and offers mobile, broadband, and cable 
services.288 For the purposes of this research, Vivo operations were studied in Brazil, with 
particular attention to the terms of service for internet services of mobile ‘post pay’ monthly 
subscribers.289 
283 Dunstan Alliston Hope. Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age. BSR.  February 2011. https://
globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/files/BSR_ICT_Human_Rights_Report.pdf
284 Ibid.
285 Telecommunication Industry Dialogue. Guiding Principles. op. cit.
286 Vivo’s website. http://www.vivo.com.br/portalweb/appmanager/env/web. 
287 Market Share das Operadoras de Celular no Brasil. Teleco. 17 June 2013. http://www.teleco.com.
br/mshare.asp (Accessed 24 June 2014.) 
288 www.vivo.com.br
289 CONTRATO DE ADESÃO AO SERVIÇO VIVO INTERNET MÓVEL PÓS PAGO (Contract for 
membership to the service Vivo Mobile Internet Postpaid). 
 http://www.vivo.com.br/consumo/groups/public/documents/documentopw/ucm_009621.pdf
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Bharti Airtel:290 Bharti Airtel is an Indian multinational telecommunications business 
founded in 1995. Airtel offers 2G, 3G and 4G wireless services, mobile commerce, 
fixed-line services, high speed DSL broadband, IPTV, DTH, enterprise services including 
national and international long-distance services to carriers in twenty countries. Airtel is 
ranked as the world’s fourth largest mobile operator with a subscriber base of over 200 
million.291 For the purposes of this research, Airtel operations were studied in India and 
Kenya.292 Airtel India’s ‘Terms and Conditions for Providing Services’293 and the ‘Online 
Privacy Policy’294 and Airtel Kenya’s ‘Terms and Conditions for the Use of Airtel Data’295 
were reviewed. 
Vodafone:296 Vodafone is a UK-based multinational telecommunications business 
founded in 1991. Vodafone is the world’s second-largest telecommunication provider 
with a subscriber base of over 411 million customers and operating businesses in 29 
countries in addition to joint ventures like Kenya’s Safaricom, which Vodafone calls its 
‘local associate operator’ (see below).297 For the purposes of this research, Vodafone 
was studied in the UK, Germany and Egypt. For Vodafone UK and Vodafone Germany, 
the ‘Terms and Conditions: General Terms’ were reviewed. Additional policy documents 
from the Vodafone Group such as the 2014 ‘Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report’ were 
reviewed.298 
Safaricom:299 Safaricom is Kenya’s largest mobile operator with 21 million subscribers.300 
According to Bloomberg Industries, Safaricom claims 67 per cent of Kenya’s mobile-
phone market, as well as 79 per cent of voice traffic and 96 per cent of text messages as 
of March 2014.301 Safaricom is 40 per cent owned by Vodafone; the Kenyan Government 
owns 35 per cent and the remaining shares were publicly floated on the Nairobi Stock 
290 www.airtel.in
291 About Bharti Airtel. Airtel India.  http://www.airtel.in/about-bharti/about-bharti-airtel Airtel crosses 
200 million mobile customer mark in India. 19 February 2014. http://www.airtel.in/about-bharti/
media-centre/bharti-airtel-news/corporate/airtel-crosses-200-million-mobile-customer-mark-in-
india;
292 For more information about Airtel Kenya, see: http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/
africarevamp/Kenya//. 
293 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. https://cloud.airtel.in/ap4saasWeb/terms-
conditionsForUserReg.html 
294 Online Privacy Policy. Airtel. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacy-policy 
295 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/
connect/africarevamp/kenya/3g/home/terms-and-conditions 
296 www.vodafone.com
297 Factsheet. Vodafone Group Plc. http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/investors/
factsheet/group_factsheet.pdf 
298 Vodafone UK. Terms and conditions: General terms. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/
terms-and-conditions/general-terms/
299 www.safaricom.co.ke
300 For more information see: http://www.safaricom.co.ke/about-us/investors-relations/investor-
dashboard/corporate-information.
301 Eric Ombok. 26 March 2014. Vodafone’s Safaricom May Withdraw Its Offer for Essar Kenya. 
Bloomberg. www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/safaricom-may-drop-bid-for-essar-kenya-
unit-over-regulator-delay.html (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
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Exchange in June 2008.302 The ‘Safaricom Post Pay Customer Terms and Conditions’ and 
‘Conditions of Use for the Safaricom Prepaid Services’ were reviewed.303 
3.2 Direct Restrictions on Freedom of Expression
In this report’s introduction (Chapter 1), the section on ‘Modes of Restriction’ lists three 
primary ways that internet intermediaries can restrict expression. Restrictions carried 
out by ISPs are ‘network-level’ restrictions because they either prevent or restrict an 
individual’s access to the internet itself or prevent or restrict access to online content, 
expression opportunities, and services that are offered by other types of intermediaries. 
As case studies 2 and 3 will demonstrate, network-level restrictions made by ISPs affect 
the nature and extent of restrictions carried out by other intermediaries such as search 
engines and social networking platforms. 
3.2.1 Network-Level Filtering
Filters are specialized software programs that can restrict access to entire websites, types 
of online services, specific pages or content within websites, or web pages containing 
specified keywords.304 State-mandated filtering is usually carried out by ISPs and can be 
required as one of the conditions of a company’s operating license in a jurisdiction. The 
state may also install centralized filtering mechanisms through internet exchange points 
that serve as gateways for internet traffic between different jurisdictions and to - and from 
- the networks operated by different ISPs. Private or local institutions such as schools 
and libraries can deploy filters on their own local networks to block access to certain 
content. Filters can also be installed at the household level – most commonly by parents 
seeking to control what content their children can access.305 This report focuses primarily 
on state-mandated filtering by ISPs as well as other filtering that ISPs might deploy to 
302 John Maina. 3 October 2007. Scramble for Safaricom: Who is Fooling Who? The African Executive. 
www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=2590&magazine=143 
(Accessed 14 August 2014); Kurt Eilhardt. 2010. Safaricom: Managing Risks in a Frontier 
Capital Market. The Fletcher School at Tufts University. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/IBGC/Lab/
StudentResearch/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/CEME/newpdfs/SafaricomFinal112010.ashx 
(Accessed 14 August 2014.)
303 Though both of these Terms and Conditions refer to mobile services, they are the core Terms and 
Conditions for services such as data bundles powered by 3G. These Terms and Conditions include 
information about subscription and allocation, but note that they are extensions of the Post Pay and 
Pre Paid Terms and Conditions. For access to Safaricom post pay Terms and Conditions see: http://
www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/standard_terms_conditions_
safaricom_postpay_service_v1_feb_2010_tracked.pdf. For access to Sarfaricom Pre Pay Terms 
and Conditions see: http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/
conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_services.pdf 
304 R. S. Rosenberg. 2011. Controlling access to the Internet: The role of filtering. Ethics and Information 
Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 35–54. www.copacommission.org/papers/rosenberg.pdf 
305 Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey. Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control. In 
Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, Jonathan Zittrain, eds. Access Denied: The Practice 
and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. (Cambridge: MIT Press) 2008. pp 6-8. Online at:
 http://access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accessdenied-chapter-2.pdf
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enforce their own rules, or to participate in collective industry self- and co-regulation (see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of private regulatory mechanisms).
Through deployment of specialized filtering technology, ISPs can filter specific keywords 
or URLs belonging to specific web pages. With very basic techniques they can also filter 
entire websites at the network level, as in the example depicted below. 
Figure 1: screenshot of browser attempting to visit a filtered file-sharing 
website in India in 2011.306
When content or a URL within a website is filtered at the network level, users can only 
reach the unfiltered part of the website. When an entire website is filtered at the network 
level, the user cannot reach any part of that website. Under the latter it is possible that 
even legal content is also rendered inaccessible.
Depending on the legal context, ISPs can receive requests, recommendations, and orders 
for filtering from the government, private third parties, and/or regulatory organizations. 
Such orders can be communicated on a case-by-case basis directly to the ISP, or in the 
form of a general ‘blacklist’. Examples from this research demonstrate that some ISPs in 
some jurisdictions take self-regulatory or co-regulatory steps - including vetting content 
on their networks by standards developed by the company, as well as collaborating with 
hotlines, regulatory, and industry bodies to identify infringing content. ISPs can also offer 
306 Online at: http://www.medianama.com/wp-content/uploads/Screen-Shot-2011-07-21-at-
10.55.41-AM.png
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individual users the option of applying filters to their home and office networks. Freedom 
of expression can be affected by the reasons for filtering, the practical implementation 
of the filtering, and the transparency by government and companies about how and why 
the filtering occurs. 
Company Policy
Case study research focused on company policies on complying with government and 
other parties’ requests and how they enforce their private terms of service. Because the 
researchers were unable to secure interviews with company representatives, the following 
relies on publicly available sources.
Compliance with government requests: Airtel India blocks websites, content, and 
specific user accounts as directed by statutory authorities or security agencies.307 
The Vodafone Group broadly clarifies in a document titled ‘An Overview of Vodafone’s 
policy on privacy, human rights, and law enforcement assistance’ that the company will 
assist law enforcement where legally required.308 Vodafone also explains in its ‘Law 
Enforcement Disclosure Report’ that the company may apply filters as mandated by 
authorized authorities and according to ‘block lists’ maintained by relevant authorities.309 
Airtel Kenya, and Safaricom do not address how they comply with government filtering 
requests in publicly available materials, although Vodafone included Safaricom, of which 
it owns a 40 per cent stake, in the ‘Law Enforcement Disclosure Report’ as ‘Vodafone’s 
local associate operator’.310 It is unclear to what extent Vodafone’s policy on privacy, 
human rights, and law enforcement assistance extends to cover Safaricom in absence 
of clarification by Safaricom. Vivo does not mention the issue of government filtering 
requests in its public materials but that has become moot since the Marco Civil da 
Internet prohibits filtering of content.311
Enforcement of private rules: As a co-regulatory step, Vodafone UK clarifies that it 
collaborates with the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) to filter content specifically related 
to child sexual abuse which is identified and communicated by the IWF in the form of a 
block list.312 (See Chapter 2 for in-depth discussion of co-regulation generally and the 
IWF specifically.) Vodafone has a license to use the IWF blacklist in territories outside of 
307 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. Section 15.5.8. op. cit.
308 Vodafone. Human Rights and Law Enforcement. 17 July 2012. http://www.vodafone.com/content/
index/about/about-us/privacy/human_rights.html. 
309 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit. p. 68. 
310 Ibid. p. 78. 
311 Isabel Costa Carvalho, Claudette M. Christian, Timothy P. Tobin and Arthur Rodrigues do Amaral. 
 Marco Civil da Internet: Brazil’s new Internet Law could broadly impact online companies’ privacy 
and data handling practices. Lexology: Association of Corporate Counsel. 7 May 2014.  
 http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2b5808f2-a0a6-469f-ba05-4b2335dfb36f 
(Accessed 14 August 2014.)
312 Human Rights – Our approach. Vodafone.  http://www.vodafone.com/content/sustainability/
operating_responsibly/human_rights.html 
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the UK.313 As a self-regulatory step, Vodafone UK and Vodafone Germany also provide 
customers with the option to activate parental controls and filter content.314 
All companies include in their Terms prohibited types of content and activities on 
their networks. Specificity varies, but most use broad terms to capture many forms 
of disallowed content. For example, Airtel India prohibits what it calls objectionable, 
obscene and pornographic messages or communications, and maintains that content 
and communications on the network must be consistent with Indian law.315 Airtel 
Kenya requires users to comply with all relevant laws and regulations and notes that 
users cannot encourage, allow or engage in the transmission of what it terms obscene 
or offensive communications, the spread of viruses, copyright infringing material, or 
defamatory material.316 Safaricom’s pre-paid terms of service hold users responsible 
for any transmitted material/communication, which is classified as illegal, defamatory, 
misleading or in breach of any persons rights.317 (These conditions do not apply to 
Safaricom’s ‘post pay’ or monthly subscriber service terms.) 
In contrast, Vodafone UK filters access to web or Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) 
sites that are known or suspected to be illegal, and places mandatory restriction and 
verification controls on content that is restricted to individuals 18 years and older.318 
Among other prohibited uses, Vodafone Germany obliges the customer to avoid violating 
third-party rights, in particular copyright and trademark rights.319 Vivo says that it prohibits 
acts that are contrary to law, moral, good customs, and customs and habits understood 
to be reasonable and acceptable online. This includes dissemination of messages that 
are racist, pornographic, paedophilic, intellectual property–infringing, or that violate the 
law.320 Vivo also prohibits customers from invading the privacy or harming other users.321
313 Vodafone Group Statement of Commitments to CEO Coalition to ‘Make the Internet a Better Place 
for Children’. January 2013. p. 8. http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/document.
cfm?doc_id=1655 
314 Vodafone Group Statement of Commitments to CEO Coalition to ‘Make the Internet a Better Place 
for Children’. op cit. p. 6. and Customer Protection: Keeping children safe. Vodafone UK. http://
www.vodafone.co.uk/our-responsibilities/protecting-our-customers/customer-protection/ 
315 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. Section 15.5.2. op. cit.
316 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. Section 5 (a) op. cit.
317 Safaricom. Conditions of Use for the Safaricom Prepaid Services. Section 6. http://www.safaricom.
co.ke/images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_
services.pdf 
318 Terms and Conditions: Content control. Vodafone. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/
terms-and-conditions/content-control/ (Accessed 25 June 2014.) “Vodafone Group Statement of 
Commitments to CEO Coalition to ‘Make the Internet a Better Place for Children,” op. cit.
319 Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen für Vodafone-Dienstleistungen (AGB). Section 6.5. Vodafone 
Germany. http://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdf 
320 CONTRATO DE ADESÃO AO SERVIÇO VIVO INTERNET MÓVEL PÓS PAGO, op. cit. section 5.1, 
(g) and (h) 
321 Ibid. Section 5.1a 
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Implementation in national context: 
ISPs filter a broad range of content types in response to government requests or in 
compliance with the law. In the countries covered by this case study, typical types of content 
filtered by ISPs based on government order or legal mandate include what are deemed 
to be copyright-infringing materials, pornography, child-abuse images, defamation, hate 
speech, election-related speech and materials sensitive to national security. (See Chapter 
2 for a discussion of how different states take different regulatory approaches to different 
content types.) Self- and co-regulatory efforts involving ISPs varied widely depending on 
national context. Case study researchers identified the following points of vulnerability for 
freedom of expression that ISPs and individuals face: 
Obstacles to challenging government filtering requests
For ISPs, loss of operating license can result in unacceptably high costs to a business, 
especially where they invest in physical facilities, install equipment and hire large 
numbers of local staff in order to provide service in a given jurisdiction. In general, 
license agreements and the law vastly limit the choices available to ISPs when it comes 
to challenging government filtering requests. This includes decisions about: 1) whether 
or not to comply with a requests; 2) the type of public notice and explanation of the 
restriction provided by the service provider; and 3) whether and when to remove filters 
on particular content. 
However, Vodafone’s Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report underscores that Vodafone 
did challenge requests that were clearly not legal despite the risk of criminal liability and 
losing operating licenses.322 None of the other companies studied for this research have 
made a similar public revelation. 
Technical capacity and clarity of laws 
In Brazil, research has shown that the most common type of restriction is carried out 
against defamatory content.323 However most restrictions are targeted at the platform 
level (search engines, social networks, web-hosting services, etc.) instead of at the ISP 
network level. In fact, with the passage of the Marco Civil da Internet in 2014, ISPs are 
now forbidden from blocking, monitoring, filtering or analyzing online content.324 Prior to 
2014, Brazilian ISPs were rarely ordered to implement filtering by the government and 
regulations did not compel them to install software enabling the targeted restriction of 
specific content or pages. Because the ISPs lacked the technical means to carry out 
targeted filtering, filtering orders meant to restrict specific defamatory material on YouTube 
and the blog-hosting platform WordPress resulted in the entire services being blocked for 
322 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit. 
323 “Ameaças na Rede. Relatóriio de violações contra blogueiros, donos ou editores de site e usuários 
na internet em 2012. Article 19, 2013. p. 13. http://artigo19.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
RELAT%C3%93RIO-BLOGS-_Vers%C3%A3o-internet.pdf
324 Isabel Costa Carvalho, et. al. op cit. 
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short periods of time in 2007 and 2008 respectively.325 Now with the prohibition of ISP 
filtering, legal liability and enforcement in Brazil targets only the platform level, which 
will be the subject of further discussion in the case study examining social networking 
services. 
In Kenya, no nationwide filtering has been reported, although in January 2013 researchers 
from the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto in Canada identified the existence of a 
technology called PacketShaper, manufactured by a US company called BlueCoat, on 
Kenyan networks. Thus, while Kenyan ISPs have not apparently used PacketShaper’s 
filtering capabilities, it appears that Kenyan authorities if not ISPs themselves possess the 
technical capability to carry out targeted filtering of content and web pages.326
Sometimes laws are only partially or unevenly enforced – or complied with to different 
degrees by different ISPs. In 2009, an Egyptian administrative court ordered the blocking 
of access to online pornography.327 Initially, the order was not complied with, and in 2012 
the Prosecutor General of Egypt ordered government ministries to enforce the ban.328 As 
of 2013, news items reported that the National Telecom Regulatory Authority of Egypt 
announced the development of filtering software to prevent pornography from being 
shared, while as of January 2013 it has been reported that ISPs had installed filtering 
software on their networks.329 In August 2013 the Administrative Court had ruled against 
the pornography ban, but meanwhile as per the media reports, the filtering software was 
already installed.330 
Extension of “family friendly” filtering to adults by default
In 2014 the UK Government reached an agreement with four major British ISPs in 
which the companies will, as a self-regulatory scheme, offer customers ‘family friendly 
network filtering services’ that are automatically switched ‘on’ at the time of purchasing 
a broadband connection. In July 2014, Ofcom, the British telecommunications regulator 
published a report explaining that it is an ‘unavoidable’ choice for users to have filters 
325 Brazil court orders ISPs to block access to Wordpress blog. OpenNet Initiative. 10 April 2008. 
 https://opennet.net/blog/2008/04/brazil-court-orders-isps-block-access-wordpress-blog and YouTube 
Does Brazil. OpenNet Initiative. 10 January 2007. https://opennet.net/blog/2007/01/youtube-does-
brazil (Accessed 9 April 2014.)
326 Appendix A: Summary Analysis of ‘Countries of Interest.’ In Morgan Marquis Boire, Jakum Dalek, 
and Sarah McCune, et. al. Planet Blue Coat:  Mapping Global Censorship and Surveillance Tools. 
Research Brief Number 13, January 2013. The CitizenLab. p. 25. https://citizenlab.org/2013/01/
appendix-a-summary-analysis-of-blue-coat-countries-of-interest/ (Accessed 9 April 2014.) and The 
Right To Privacy in Kenya. Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Report: 21st Session, Kenya. 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/file-downloads/upr_kenya.
pdf 
327 Egypt. Country report. OpenNet Initiative. 6 August 2009. https://opennet.net/research/profiles/
egypt 
328 Eva Galperin. Egyptian Prosecutor Orders Ban on Internet Porn. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 7 
November 2012. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/egyptian-prosecutor-orders-ban-internet-
porn (Accessed 10 April 2014.)
329 Egypt ready to block porn websites: Official. The Siasat Daily. 1 April 2013. http://www.siasat.com/
english/news/egypt-ready-block-porn-websites-official (Accessed 10 October 2014.)
330 Al-Sayed Gamaleddine. Egypt court rules against banning porn websites. 24 August 2013. http://
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79783/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-court-rules-against-
banning-porn-websites--.aspx (Accessed 10 April 2014.)
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turned on at the time of purchase – while existing customers can ‘opt in’ to the scheme. 
Common categories of content to be filtered include suicide, self-harm, pornography 
and file sharing. Some ISPs also include content related to: alcohol, tobacco, dating, 
games, gambling, hacking, nudity, sexual education, social networking, media streaming, 
fashion, and search engines and portals.331 In the media, the scheme has been justified 
as a means of protecting children from the harmful effects of pornography, but it has also 
been criticized in the media for having been implemented without public consultation and 
as a means for the UK Government to filter content that it does not want the public to 
access, including file sharing and extremist sites.332 
‘Collateral’ Filtering
Overbroad or inconsistently applied laws can result in the inconsistent application of 
filtering within a country as well as the filtering of entire websites instead of specific 
infringing content within those websites, contradicting the ‘necessary and proportionate’ 
principle. Overbroad filtering is also known as ‘collateral filtering’ because of the collateral 
damage it can potentially inflict upon freedom of expression.333 
In mid-2014, the NGO Open Rights Group tested the impact of Internet filters in the 
UK on nine different UK mobile and fixed line ISPs, and found that approximately one 
in five sites out of 100,000 tested are blocked by at least one of the ISPs.334 The group 
encouraged users to send in personal reports about blocked websites: A young mother, 
for example, reported that an article to information about postpartum care was blocked. 
The political blog of a Syrian commentator was reported blocked by four services 
including Vodafone.335 
In a recent ruling, the European Court of Justice held that ISPs could be required to 
filter access to websites that contribute to the infringement copyright, but that orders for 
filtering must be targeted. Specifically, the ruling stated, ‘In this respect, the measures 
adopted by the internet service provider must be strictly targeted, in the sense that they 
must serve to bring an end to a third party’s infringement of copyright or of a related right 
but without thereby affecting internet users who are using the provider’s services in order 
331 Ofcom Report on Internet safety measures - Internet Service Providers: Network level filtering 
measures. Ofcom. 22 July 2014.  http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/internet/internet-safety-2?utm_
source=updates&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=filtering-report 
332 At the time of writing, there was a campaign to introduce filtering to restrict access by children 
to pornography. For more information see: Laurie Penny. David Cameron’s internet porn filter 
is the start of censorship creep. The Guardian. 2 January 2014.  http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jan/03/david-cameron-internet-porn-filter-censorship-creep (Accessed 10 
July  2014.); Also see Warwick Ashford. UK internet porn filters a failure, says Open Rights Group. 
Computer Weekly. 3 July 2014.  http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240223883/UK-internet-
porn-filters-a-failure-says-Open-Rights-Group (Accessed 10 July 2014.) 
333 Nart Villeneuve. January 2006. The Filtering Matrix: Integrated mechanisms of information control 
and the demarcation of borders in cyberspace. First Monday. Vol. 11. No. 1-2. http://firstmonday.
org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1307/1227 
334 Pam Cowburn. ORG’s Blocked project finds almost 1 in 5 sites are blocked by filters. Open Rights 
Group. 2 July 2014 https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2014/blockedproject%20 (Accessed 10 
July 2014.) 
335 Blocked! The personal cost of filters. Open Rights Group. July 2014. https://www.blocked.org.uk/
personal-stories
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to lawfully access information. Failing that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of 
information of those users would be unjustified in the light of the objective pursued’.336 
In India, civil society, the media, and government authorities have engaged in lively debates 
about the collateral impact of filtering, which ISPs are required to carry out upon receipt 
of a court order or instructions from an authorized government body. In 2013, the Indian 
Computer Emergency Response Team – the government branch broadly responsible for 
cybercrime located in the Department of Electronics and Information Technology – and 
the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), in response to a court order issued by the 
Gwalior district court, ordered the filtering of 78 URLs containing content related to the 
Indian Institute of Planning and Management.337 Other authorities in the government’s 
Department of Electronics and the government have publicly stated that they will contest 
the court order. According to journalists the petitioner argued that unblocking any of 
the links would constitute contempt of court.338 The filters were criticized in the media 
as being overly broad and restricting legitimate speech; even a public notice issued by 
the University Grants Commission was filtered.339 Also in 2013, the DoT, in response to 
a court order from the Supreme Court of India, issued an order to ISPs for the filtering of 
39 websites that allowed users to share content - including pornographic content.340 In 
addition to file sharing and image hosting websites, the URL shortening and ad hosting 
website Ad.fly was also filtered.341 The potential for overly broad filtering in response 
to copyright laws has also been raised as a concern. For example, in 2011 Indian ISPs 
were found to filter entire file-sharing websites rather than specific URLs when acting on 
a court order to prevent piracy of a film called Singham. a 2011 film whose disparaging 
comments about Karnataka residents was exploited for violent protests.342 
336 European Court of Justice. Judgment of the Court in Case C-314/12. 27 March 2014. para 56,.
Mackinnon v Barr. Case C-123/12. 6 June 2014. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&c
id=163325.
337 The Financial Express. After Court Order, DoT blocks web links critical of IIPM. 16 February 2013. 
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/after-court-order-dot-blocks-78-web-links-critical-of-
iipm/1075073 (Accessed: 9 September 2014.)
338 Liat Clark. ISPs must block defamatory sites in India, including government’s own pages. 19 
Febuary 2013.  http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-02/19/india-government-sites-blocked 
(Accessed 26 June 2014.)
339 Shubhra Rishi. All Indian Enterprises should be Very Worried: Centre for Internet and Society. 25 
February 2013. http://www.computerworld.in/feature/%E2%80%9Call-indian-enterprises-should-
be-very-worried%E2%80%9D-centre-internet-and-society-75742013 (Accessed 26 June 2014.)
340 DNA. Govt orders Internet service providers to block 39 websites hosting obscene content. 26 
June 2013. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-govt-orders-internet-service-providers-to-block-
39-websites-hosting-obscene-content-1853550 (Accessed 26 June 2014.)
341 Softpedia. India Blocks 29 Adult Content and File Sharing Sites, Including Adf.ly. 1 July 2013. http://
news.softpedia.com/news/India-Blocks-39-Adult-Content-and-File-Sharing-Sites-Including-Adf-
ly-364750.shtml/ (Accessed: 26 June 2014.)
342 Apar Gupta. The Great Singham Filesharing Block. India Law and Technology Blog. 24 August 
2011.  http://www.iltb.net/2011/08/the-great-singham-filesharing-block/ (Accessed 26 June 
2014.); NDTV. Singham effect: File sharing sites blocked. 22 July 2011 http://www.ndtv.com/article/
india/singham-effect-file-sharing-sites-blocked-121249 (Accessed 26 June 2014.); ‘Singham’ 
Dialogue Offends Kannadigas. 23 July 2011. DNA India. www.dnaindia.com/entertainment/report-
singham-dialogue-offends-kannadigas-1568545 (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
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Transparency and Accountability of enforcement
Self-regulatory measures in the form of ‘family friendly’ filters made available by ISPs 
to users on their personal connection can risk placing the service provider (as well as 
the companies that sell filtering software to the ISPs) in the combined role of judge, jury 
and police: the ISP is responsible for determining the criteria to be included in the filter, 
implementing the filter, and addressing complaints about mis-categorized websites. The 
ISPs may in cases do this as part of their right to set private terms of reference, or in 
other cases, be acting in terms of a co-regulatory agreement made with the government. 
According to a representative from an NGO in the UK on the topic of the filters ‘The 
government is encouraging companies to put in filters. But it is not clear how real the 
choice will be to opt out and avoid these filters, nor is it clear how filtering takes place. The 
government should not be allowed to promote such wide-ranging filtering without proper 
democratic scrutiny’.343 Given the availability of software filters that parents can control 
on their own home networks, international experts such as the UN Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of expression Frank La Rue have questioned why ISPs should be legally required 
to filter content, calling government-mandated filtering ‘difficult to justify’.344 
The UK Government has also been criticized for seeking to expand the scope of self-
regulatory efforts to other forms of content. As required by the Terrorism Act 2006, ISPs 
must, on request, filter or otherwise make unavailable websites and content that promotes 
terrorism.345 In 2011, the UK Government sought the creation and implementation of a 
‘national block list’ of extremist content and promoted the filtering of internet in libraries, 
schools etc.346 According to news reports, between 2008 and 2011 the government 
implemented a pilot project in which illegal sites related to terrorism were blocked in 
schools and libraries. Critics have raised concern about lack of transparency and 
accountability throughout the process.Allegedly, sites were identified by the government’s 
Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), sent to the Crown Prosecution Services 
for vetting for compliance with the UK Terrorism Act 2006, and then shared with filtering 
software companies who then shared the filters with the libraries and schools.347
On the other hand, for certain types of content, such as hate speech, self-policing 
and self-regulation are sometimes viewed as more conducive to upholding freedom of 
expression compared to direct regulation and legal enforcement. A 2010 consultation by 
the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights concluded that it is more 
343 Phone interview conducted with Gabrielle Guillemin of Article 19 on 15 April 2014.
344 A/HRC/17/27. p.9
345 S2 and S3 of the UK Terrorism Act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents
346 The Prevent Strategy: What it means for library and information professionals. Briefing Paper. 
Chartered Institute of Library and Information Professionals. 20 January 2012. 
 http://www.cilip.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/Prevent%20strategy%20briefing%20Jan%20
2012.pdf 
347 Jane Fae. The internet censorship programme you’re not allowed to know about. politics.co.uk. 
27 March 2014. http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2014/03/27/the-internet-censorship-
programme-you-re-not-allowed-to-know (Accessed 20 July 2014.)
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effective for ISPs to restrict hate speech as measures to enforce their terms of service, 
instead of relying on the criminal justice system.348 
Nonetheless there are concerns about delegating too much enforcement to private 
intermediaries. In an interview, Markus Löning of the research institute Stiftung Neue 
Verantwortung noted that these deliberations were ‘more difficult’ for ‘certain types 
of pornography or hate speech’. Acknowledging that all ISPs may take down content 
according to their terms and conditions, he maintained that ISPs should delete illegal 
content under the aegis of and in cooperation with law enforcement. To illustrate, ‘in 
the case of Nazi propaganda…it is the service provider’s responsibility to work with 
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, which means making a decision via a third 
instance’.349
Relationship between self-regulation, state regulation and law
Sometimes measures that begin as self-regulatory schemes can later be turned into 
regulation, or legislators can seek to formalize them in the law. In Kenya, in reaction 
to the post-election violence in 2007, Safaricom developed a number of self-regulatory 
guidelines to ensure that during election periods, content on the network is ‘peaceful’. 
In 2012, Safaricom developed ‘Guidelines for Political Mobile Advertising on Safaricom’s 
Premium Rate Messaging Service’, under which anyone intending to send bulk SMS of a 
political nature would first have to submit an application to Safaricom, and the company 
would vet the content to ensure that hate speech was not included.350 These measures 
ultimately resulted in the development of regulatory guidelines by the Communications 
Authority of Kenya for the prevention of transmission of undesirable bulk political content 
via SMS.351 
In June 2014, members of the UK parliament presented an ‘Online Safety Bill’352 requiring 
ISPs to withhold ‘adult content’,353 and requiring users to prove that they are 18 years 
of age to opt in to access content.354 This would change what are now self-regulatory 
measures by ISPs into formal legal requirements to filter ‘adult content’.However, it is 
348 Joe McNamee. The Slide From ‘Self Regulation’ to Corporate Censorship. European Digital Rights. 
January 2011. p. 29 http://www.edri.org/files/EDRI_selfreg_final_20110124.pdf 
349 Markus Löning, Director of the Privacy Project at Stiftung Neue Verantwortung Berlin and former 
German Federal Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid. Interview with 
Kirsten Gollatz. Personal interview. Berlin, Germany, 7 April 2014.
350 Lucy Purdon. Corporate Responses to Hate Speech in the 2013 Kenyan Presidential Elections. 
Case Study: Safaricom. Institute for Human Rights and Business, in Digital Dangers: Identifying and 
Mitigating Threats in the Digital Realm (November 2013) p. 24. www.ihrb.org/pdf/DD-Safaricom-
Case-Study.pdf.
351 Guidelines for the Prevention of Transmission of Undesirable Bulk Political Content/Messages via 
Electronic Communications Networks. CCK. September 2012. http://216.154.209.114/regulations/
downloads/Guidelines_for_the_prevention_of_transmission_of_undesirable_bulk_political_content_
via_sms.pdf 
352 Online Safety Bill. HL Bill 19 55/3. 14 May 2013. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/
lbill/2013-2014/0019/14019.pdf 
353 Defined in the Bill as: ‘harmful and offensive materials from which persons under the age of eighteen 
are protected.’
354 Online Safety Bill (amended). HL 16 55/4. 10 June 2014. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
bills/lbill/2014-2015/0016/15016.pdf 
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important to note that this is a Private Members’ Bill, meaning that there is very little 
chance of actually becoming law.355 356 357 
BOX: Emerging Issue: ‘Upstream Filtering’
Internet service providers and the practice of ‘upstream filtering’ can hinder freedom of expression. As 
companies begin to practice filtering in one jurisdiction, other jurisdictions served by the provider can be 
affected by these practices. This is a result of the ‘passing on’ of any filter (or other technical component) 
in place on the ISP’s network. This is known as upstream filtering, and the result is that content considered 
illegal in one jurisdiction and subsequently restricted, is continued to be restricted in another jurisdiction, 
where it might not be illegal.356 For example, highlighting the importance of agreements and arrangements 
between ISPs – foreign and domestic – Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto reported in 2012 that the 
traffic peering arrangement Airtel India and Omantel led to a situation where Airtel India’s content filters 
were also effective on the Omantel network in Oman.357
3.2.2 Service Shutdowns and restriction
Governments can order network shutdowns or restrict internet services at a regional or 
national level. The restriction can affect the entire network or a specific service. Network 
shutdowns and service restrictions can be carried out for reasons related to the prevention 
of terrorism, the maintenance of public order and the prevention of public unrest. In many 
jurisdictions, ISPs must legally comply with such orders or risk legal penalty. They can 
also restrict or shut down the network or a service for the reasons of maintenance or 
technical failure. 
The shutdown of an entire network or restriction of a service in a large area is a broad 
stroke that impacts all content, and is a restriction on freedom of expression that strongly 
risks not meeting internationally recognized principles such as proportionality and 
necessity.358 Other more narrowly-targeted measures can also be taken. For example, 
a user’s service can be terminated or suspended and the user will be unable to access 
the internet or use mobile services. Governments may issue orders for such termination 
or suspension of services. ISPs may also terminate or suspend a user’s service or curtail 
access as a measure to enforce their own private policies. 
Mobile telecommunications companies also receive orders from governments requiring 
them to send messages via their networks. This can affect freedom of expression, 
especially if the messages are not sent out in the government’s name, because such 
measures ‘push’ certain information to users even if they do not restrict information.
355 Chris Davies. 16 May 2013. Private members’ bills: Which ones made it from 2012? BBC News. 
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22365004 (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
356 Chris Davies. 16 May 2013. Private members’ bills: Which ones made it from 2012? BBC News. 
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22365004 (Accessed 14 August 2014.) 
357 The Citizen Lab. Routing Gone Wild: Documenting upstream filtering in Oman via India. 12 July 
2012. https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/routing-gone-wild (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
358 A/HRC/17/27. pg.8
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Company Policies
Internet service providers generally only restrict the entire network for maintenance or 
reasons out of their control. Companies do suspend or terminate user accounts. Such 
measures appear to be in compliance with broader legal mandates, court orders, or as 
self or co-regulatory steps taken to address specific types of content or behaviour – such 
as copyright infringement. 
Compliance with government requests: ISPs examined for this case study inform 
users that their individual account or the network can be restricted in compliance 
with governmental orders. Some, such as Airtel India, state that the service can be 
disrupted and/or discontinued, suspended, etc. in response to directions, regulations, 
and notifications from the Regulator, or in compliance with any regulation or policy or 
other statutory authority.359 Safaricom will terminate access to users’ post paid services if 
required to do so by any licensing, law enforcement, or regulatory authority. 360 
In its 2014 Law Enforcement Disclosure Report, Vodafone recognized that orders for 
network shutdown are received by the company, and that this is a power that governments 
typically exercise in times of emergency.361 The report also noted that there were other 
possible types of actions, including prioritizing SIMs (designating certain ‘VIP’ phone 
numbers for priority service when the network is congested), shutting down particular 
services and ceding direct network control to governments.362 Vodafone UK does not 
explicitly mention restricting the service or network based on orders from authorized 
authorities in their general terms and conditions, though Vodafone Germany notes that 
disruption of the services could be due to orders by authorized officials.363 None of the 
companies studied in this research clarify in their terms whether they could be legally 
required to send out messages of a political nature. 
Enforcement of private rules: The circumstances and the detail regarding when the 
service or the network could be affected as per company policy differed. Airtel India,364 
Vodafone UK,365 Vodafone Germany366 and Safaricom367 note that this can take place due 
to technical error, maintenance or geographical conditions. Airtel India lists a number of 
additional instances including: combating fraud and sabotage, in times of civil disorder, 
military operation, or local emergency, if services are used in contravention of laws in 
force, and any other reason/cause found to be reasonable by the company.368 Airtel 
359 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. sections 2.1.2.6, 2.1.2.7, 2.1.2.9. op. cit.
360 Safaricom. Post Paid Terms for Use. section 16(a). http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/
Terms_and_Conditions/standard_terms_conditions_safaricom_postpay_service_v1_feb_2010_
tracked.pdf
361 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. p.68. 
362 Ibid.
363 Vodafone Germany. Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen für Vodafone-Dienstleistungen (AGB). 
section 2.2. http://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdfhttp://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.
pdfhttp://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdf 
364 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions. op. cit. section 2.1.2.6, 2.1.2.7, and 2.1.2.9. 
365 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions: General Terms. section 2.2. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/
about-this-site/terms-and-conditions/general-terms/ 
366 Vodafone Germany., op.cit. 
367 Safaricom. Safaricom Post Pay Customer Terms and Conditions. section 5. op. cit.
368 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions. op.cit. section 2.1.2. 
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Kenya broadly states that services might be terminated if Airtel is unable to continue to 
supply the services due to contractual, economical, or operational reasons.369 Vodafone 
UK notes that the service might be affected to preserve network security, when there 
is Artificially Inflated Traffic, and during Emergency Planning Measures.370 Vivo broadly 
states that the services can be affected if the authorization for the company to operate is 
withdrawn by the Government.371 
All ISPs reserve the right to terminate, suspend, or moderate the service for abuse of the 
service or breach of the company Terms and Conditions. Beyond this, Airtel India reserves 
the right to terminate or suspend accounts for the same reasons as noted above, while 
Airtel Kenya specifies that any violation of the provisions for ‘User Conduct’ will result in 
account termination.372 Safaricom, for post-pay services, reserves the right to terminate 
services if the company believes that the Service is being used in an unauthorised or illegal 
way or for criminal activities.373 Safaricom may suspend or disconnect those who use its 
services ‘in an unauthorised, unlawful, or fraudulent manner’ or if the communications are 
‘illegal, a nuisance, abusive, a hoax, menacing or indecent’. The conditions of use clearly 
state that the ‘SIM Card will at all times remain our property.374 Vodafone UK reserves 
the right to terminate services if the company reasonably believes that the equipment or 
services are being used for purposes that are abusive, a nuisance, illegal, or fraudulent.375 
Implementation in national context
ISPs are faced with difficult decisions about how to comply, and how to communicate 
with the public about their compliance. Below are some specific examples.
Nationwide shutdowns
Government orders to shut down all internet services for an entire nation are rare. During 
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the government shut down mobile and Internet networks 
for the entire country from 28 January to 2 February 2011.376 According to some experts, 
the shutdown that occurred in Egypt was unprecedented in its scope.377 Journalists 
further explain that the shutdown was possible, in part, because of the structure of Egypt’s 
369 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. op. cit. section 10. 
370 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions: General Terms. section 2.2 http://www.vodafone.co.uk/
about-this-site/terms-and-conditions/general-terms/ 
371 Vivo. Contrato De Adesao Ao Servico Vivo Internet Movel Pos Pago. section 9(e). http://www.vivo.
com.br/consumo/groups/public/documents/documentopw/ucm_009621.pdf 
372 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions. op. cit. section 5.
373 Safaricom. Safaricom Post Pay Customer Terms and Conditions. op. cit. section 16(a). 
374 Ibid. section 5.
375 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions. op. cit. section 3.3(a).
376 Christopher Roads and Geoffrey Fowler. Egypt Shuts Down Internet, Cellphone Services. 29 
January 2011. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870395660457611045337
1369740 (Accessed 20 July 2014.)
377 According to a news interview with the network security firm Renesys Corp, other countries like Iran, 
Tunisia, and China exert control over the internet – but this is via methods such as blocking particular 
websites and slowing down the internet. Egypt’s case is unique as within 20 minutes all of the 
largest service providers in Egypt were shut down. Larry Greenemeirer. How Was Egypt’s Internet 
Access Shut Off?. Scientific American. 28 January 2011 http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
egypt-internet-mubarak/ (Accessed 7 July 2014.)
75
telecom sector: most ISPs are licensees of the state telecom – making them legally bound 
to the Orders and Rules of the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority.378 Vodafone, 
one of the many ISPs that received the order, shut down its network.379 Following the 
shutdown, the Vodafone Group published a statement explaining why the company 
complied with the requests.380 
Service providers are not always clear in their terms of service that they will shut down 
the entire network, a particular service, or accounts if required to do so by legal mandate, 
though as of June 2014 Vodafone has clarified this possibility in their Law Enforcement 
Disclosure Report.381 Prior to publication of that report, Vodafone was criticized for 
complying with the 2011 governmental orders related to network and service restrictions 
in Egypt.382 In this context, human rights organizations questioned Vodafone’s compliance 
with Egyptian authorities and asked that the company develop clear standards applicable 
to all its operations for responding and addressing such requests.383 
Targeted and localized shutdowns
In 2012 the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, India, was reported in the media to have 
ordered a regional shutdown of mobile and internet service to prevent riots in response to 
the YouTube film ‘Innocence of Muslims’ for approximately a day.384 Government officials 
in Jammu and Kashmir were cited in the news as stating that all Internet services were not 
shut down in the region, and Airtel India was cited as having carried the following message: 
‘Mobile Internet access is not available on your Airtel mobile today in compliance with an 
advisory from the Jammu and Kashmir Police.’385 Note that the steps by the authorities 
to shut down service in Jammu and Kashmir came alongside an order to ISPs to block 
378 Babu Kurra. Egypt Shut Down Its Net With a Series of Phone Calls. Wired. 28 January 2011. http://
www.wired.com/2011/01/egypt-isp-shutdown/ (Accessed 7 June 2014.)
379 John Oates. Vodafone confirms Egypt lock-down. The Register. 28 January 2011. http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2011/01/28/egypt_vodafone_shuts/ (Accessed 7 June 2014.)
380 Vodafone Group Plc – Response on Issues Relating to Mobile Network Operations in Egypt. 22 
February 2011. 
 http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/vodafone-statement-re-egypt-22-
feb-2011.pdf (Accessed 7 June 2014.)
381 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. p.68.
382 Telco Hall of Shame: Vodafone. Access Blog. 29 January 2013. https://www.accessnow.org/
blog/2013/01/29/hall-of-shame-vodafone (Accessed 10 June 2014.)
383 Juliette Garside. Vodafone under fire for bowing to Egyptian pressure. The Guardian. 26 July 2011. 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jul/26/vodafone-access-egypt-shutdown (Accessed: 
7 July 2014.) 
384 Note: Jammu and Kashmir is not the only region that has ordered the blocking of the film ‘Innocence 
of Muslims’by restricting access to content or the network.
385 Pamposh Raina and Betwa Sharma. Telecom Services Blocked to Curb Protests in Kashmir. 
The New York Times. 21 September 2012. http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/telecom-
services-blocked-to-curb-protests-in-kashmir/ (Accessed 26 June 2014.)
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access to YouTube and Facebook in the region.386 This is, in an example of how shutdown 
orders are sometimes accompanied by orders for filtering.387 388 389 390 391
BOX: Bypassed legal procedure in 2005 O2 localized network shutdown 
In 2005, the City of London Police implemented a localized service restriction by ‘switching off’ parts of O2’s 
network 1km around the Aldgate Station after the terrorist bombings in London.388 The shutdown lasted 
from 12.00 pm to 4.45 pm. The request to O2 to give privileged access to its network to emergency services, 
and restrict it to others – known as ‘Access Overload Control’ (ACCOLC) – was issued by the London Police 
because they were having difficulty communicating in the Aldgate area. This was done despite the fact that 
the Gold Co-ordinating Group, which is administratively responsible for authorizing network shutdowns, 
decided not to shut down the networks and activate ACCOLC.389 According to London Assembly’s 7 July 
Review Committee report of the bombings, during the shutdown it was estimated that possibly over a million 
individuals’ communications were impacted.390 The 7 July Review Committee also found that there was 
a need to review and restructure the protocol to be followed during emergency circumstances to ensure 
authorities are provided with adequate and effective procedures to follow.391 Note that the order for restriction 
was only for O2’s network.
Government requirements for specific messaging, or restriction of messaging, in 
times of crisis. During the 2011 protests, the Egyptian Government not only shut down 
mobile and internet networks, but required ISPs including Vodafone to send political 
messages from the authorities.392 Later in a public statement Vodafone clarified that 
Vodafone had declined to send the messages in the company’s name and insisted that 
the messages clearly and accurately attribute the governmental department sending the 
message.393
In India, in 2012, in response to sectarian threats circulating in several cities in the wake of 
riots in the North Eastern state of Assam, in addition to other actions including orders for 
the blocking of content and suspension of accounts,394 the government of India placed 
a temporary nationwide restriction on SMS and data, not allowing more than five SMSs 
or MMSs and no attachments over 25 KB of data to be sent per day for a period of 
386 Riyaz Wani. J&K government blocks access to Facebook and Youtube. Tehelka. 1 October 2012. 
http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main54.asp?filename=Ws011012Jammu.asp (Accessed 26 June 
2014.)
387 Ibid.
388 7 July phone shutdown criticized. BBC News. 1 March 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/
london/4763350.stm (Accessed 29 June 2014.)
389 London Assembly. Report of the 7th July Review Committee. p.44 June 2006. http://www.london.
gov.uk/sites/default/files/archives/assembly-reports-7july-report.pdf
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid. p.47.
392 Amy Saunderson Meyer. 16 February 2011. 7 Lessons from the Egyptian Revolution. PBS: Idea 
Lab., http://www.pbs.org/idealab/2011/02/7-lessons-from-the-egyptian-revolution047/ (Accessed 
30 May 2014.)
393 Vodafone Group Plc – Response on Issues Relating to Mobile Network Operations in Egypt. 22. 
Op.cit.
394 Pranesh Prakash. Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism Edition). The Centre for 
Internet and Society. 22 August 2012. http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-
blocked-sites-riots-communalism (Accessed 7 July 2014.)
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fifteen 15 days.395 Information about the restriction was initially reported in news items 
that cited confirmation of the restriction by the press office of Ministry of Home Affairs,396 
but a public statement from government could not be located during this research. News 
portals reported that Airtel India did not appear to have implemented the restriction, while 
users sending the 6th message via Chennai, India-based company Aircel, were met with 
the following message ‘Due to Govt. directives, more than 5 SMS per day are blocked. 
Please retry tomorrow. Anticipate your co-operation’.397 Earlier, in 2010, the Government 
of India also issued a temporary ban on all bulk SMS and MMS services. This restriction 
was announced via a government press release that noted the duration of the restriction 
and the governmental departments responsible for the restriction.398 
In 2008 the Kenyan government initially considered shutting down SMS services during 
the election period, in response to the 2007 post-election violence that occurred in the 
region. As an alternative, Safaricom arranged with the Kenyan Government to have 
service providers send messages of ‘peace and calm’ to users on their own initiative and 
in the name of the company.399 
Suspension, termination or curtailment of specific user accounts. 
In Kenya, in compliance with the 2013 law requiring individuals to register SIMs with 
government identification, service providers including Safaricom400 and Airtel Kenya401, 
suspended services to unregistered subscribers. In countries across the European 
Union, courts have ordered service providers to disconnect users engaging in file sharing 
of copyright infringing material.402 In the UK, as of mid-2014, the Digital Economy Act 
2010 (DEA) required ISPs to temporarily suspend the accounts of users persistently 
downloading copyrighted material, though the lack of enabling legislation meant that 
these provisions had not been put into effect.403 In 2012, some UK ISPs challenged the 
395 Shreya Shah. India Bans Mass SMS to Counter Panic Wall Street Journal. 17 August 2012. http://
blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/08/17/indian-bans-mass-sms-to-counter-panic/ (Accessed 7 
July 2014.)
396 Ibid.
397 Indian Government Imposes 5 SMS Per Day Limit for the Next 15 Days. Tech Gadgets Web. 18 
August 2012. http://www.techgadgetsweb.com/10185/indian-government-imposes-5-sms-day-
limit-15-days (Accessed 7 July 2014.)
398 Ban on Bulk SMS and MMS Extended. Ministry of Communications & Information Technology. 24 
September 2010. http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=65982 (Accessed 7 July 2014.)
399 Alice Munyua. Kenya: Perceptions and Misconceptions: The Role of New and Traditional Media in 
Kenya’s Post Election Violence. GIS Watch and Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet). 2011. http://
www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw_-_kenya.pdf (Accessed 10 July 2014.)
400 Safaricom Limited Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 March 2013. Safaricom. p. 5. https://www.
safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Resources_Downloads/Annual_Report.pdf and Wanyama wa 
Chebusiri. Kenya’s Battle to Switch Off Fake Phones. BBC News. 5 October 2012. www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-19819965 (Accessed 10 April 2014.)
401 Kenya: mobile operators switch off 2.4 million users’ phones. IT News Africa. 15 January 2013. 
http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2013/01/kenya-mobile-operators-switch-off-2-4-million-users-
phones/ (Accessed 10 April 2014.)
402 Miguel Peguera. Spanish Court Orders an ISP to Disconnect a Copyright Infringer. 22 January 
2014. http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2014/01/spanish-court-orders-isp-disconnect-copyright-
infringer (Accessed 14 July 2014.)
403 Philip Ward. Digital Economy Act 2010: copyright. House of Commons Library. 28 June 2013. p.3. 
https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Digital_Economy_Act_2010 
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DEA’s legality in the UK Court of Appeal, which upheld the Act.404 However, in 2012 the 
codes that were intended to combat copyright infringement, drafted by Ofcom pursuant 
to the DEA, were withdrawn.405 In July 2014, as a self-regulatory step, major ISPs in the 
UK, the government, and the music industry established the ‘Voluntary Copyright Alert 
Programme’, which sends warnings to infringing users pointing out their illegal behaviour 
and providing them with legal alternatives to access content. Notably, the programme 
does not impose sanctions such as disconnection. Furthermore, the government 
indicated that the relevant DEA provisions would be shelved.406 
3.2.3 Network Neutrality
 ‘Network neutrality’ is the principle that ISPs should treat all data equally and not prioritize 
data or services for any reason – including commercial and political ones.407 Net neutrality 
is important for freedom of expression because it preserves individual’s choice and right 
to access internet content, applications, services and hardware.408 ISPs have access 
to technologies that allow them to analyse, block or slow down content and services. 
These practices can threaten network neutrality. According to Barbara van Schewick of 
Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society and David Farber of Carnegie 
Mellon University, ISPs are motivated to discriminate against selected applications for 
economic reasons, bandwidth regulation and restriction of content. They recommend 
greater transparency by companies as to how their broadband services work, what types 
of network management activities they engage in, and how such activities might affect 
consumers.409 
Across the jurisdictions studied in this research, governments and regulators are 
struggling to understand how and if network neutrality should be protected by law, and 
what responsibility companies should have in ensuring network neutrality. Brazil is the 
only country studied in this research that guarantees network neutrality by law. With the 
passage of the Marco Civil da Internet, ISPs are responsible for the transmission of data 
404 Digital Economy Act not in breach of EU laws, Court of Appeal rules. Out-Law.com. 6 March 2012. 
 http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/march1/digital-economy-act-not-in-breach-of-eu-
laws-court-of-appeal-rules/ (Accessed 10 August 2014.); R (on the application of (1) British 
Telecommunications Plc, (2) Talk Talk) v BPI Ltd and others [2012] EWCA Civ 232.
405 Digital Economy Act copyright regime shelved by UK government. Out-Law.com. Pinsent Masons. 
24 July 2014. http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/july/digital-economy-act-copyright-regime-
shelved-by-uk-government/ (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
406 Mark Jackson. Update UK ISPs Agree to Voluntary Internet Piracy Warning Letters Scheme. 
ISP Review. 19 July 2014. http://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2014/07/big-uk-isps-agree-
voluntary-internet-piracy-warning-letters-scheme.html (Accessed 27 July 2014); Digital Economy 
Act copyright regime shelved by UK government. 24 July 2014. op. cit. (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
407 Barbara van Schewick. 6 May 2014. The Case for Rebooting the Network-Neutrality Debate. The 
Atlantic. 
 http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-rebooting-the-network-
neutrality-debate/361809/ (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
408 Freedom of Expression and ICTs: Overview of International Standards. Article 19. 2013. p.14. http://
www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/37380/FoE-and-ICTs.pdf  
409 Barbara van Schewick and David Farber. February 2009. Point/counterpoint network neutrality 
nuances. Communications of the ACM. Vol. 52 No. 2. 
 http://www.thei3p.org/docs/events/WESIINetNeutrality2.pdf
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regardless of content, ensuring that any traffic discrimination or degradation must be in 
accordance with law, providing to consumers clear notice of network traffic management 
and security practices, refraining from anti-competitive practices, and refraining from 
blocking, monitoring, filtering or analysing the content of data packets except as 
established by law.410 
In the UK, Ofcom has published a statement on net neutrality that broadly exhorts 
companies to be transparent as and when internet traffic is managed, and recommending 
market-based solutions to problems that arise.411 In 2013, UK broadband providers 
developed a voluntary industry code on traffic management transparency for broadband 
services, in which they have committed to treat all traffic equally while also providing 
users with accessible information about their respective traffic management practices. 412 
In April 2014, the European Commission proposed changes to a number of regulations 
through the ‘Connected Continent Legislative Package’. Among other things, the 
proposed regulation mandates net neutrality by prohibiting discriminatory blocking 
and throttling practices, defining clear rules and principles for traffic management, and 
requiring that specialized services must provide adequate and standard quality of internet 
service.413 Though the proposed regulation originally allowed for the filtering of content 
for the purpose of implementing legal provisions, on a court order, or to prevent or 
impede serious crimes, it was later amended to permit filtering only on receipt of a court 
order.414 In reaction to the proposal, some members of industry issued a joint statement 
criticizing the proposal as being ‘restrictive, anti-innovation, and anti-consumer choice’, 
the statement also critiqued the legislative process as being rushed and not based on 
adequate technical analysis.415 
Concerns have also been raised by politicians in the UK that provisions relating to filtering 
in the regulation will have a negative impact and allow for content such as child abuse 
images to be shared.416 In 2013, the German Government also proposed a law mandating 
network neutrality in reaction to a German ISP throttling services of customers who 
410 Marco Civil da Internet. op. cit. Article 9, section (1),(2), (3). 
411 Ofcom’s approach to net neutrality. Ofcom. 24 November 2011. http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/
consultations/net-neutrality/statement/ 
412 Voluntary industry code of practice on traffic management transparency for broadband services. 
Broadband Stakeholder Group (UK).  http://www.broadbanduk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Voluntary-industry-code-of-practice-on-traffic-management-transparency-on-broadband-services-
updated-version-May-2013.pdf 
413 Connected continent legislative package. Digital Agenda for Europe. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/connected-continent-legislative-package 
414 Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single market 
for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives 
2002/20/EC, 2002/22/EC, and Regulations (EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012. Article 23 
paragraph 5. 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-
0190+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
415 Frances Robinson. Battle Lines Drawn Over Net Neutrality in Europe. Wall Street Journal Digits 
blog. 1 April 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/04/01/battle-lines-drawn-over-net-neutrality-
in-europe/ (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
416 Net neutrality law adopted by European Parliament. BBC News. 3 April 2014. 
 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26865869 (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
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exceed their monthly quotas. While the principle of net neutrality has been legally codified 
(§ 41a TKG) in Germany, it is still not entirely safeguarded through concrete provisions.417 
Despite a number of jurisdictions proposing legislation, there still exist a number of 
regulatory gaps around net neutrality. Thus, practices vary from company to company. 
For example, even though India lacks formal legal provisions, it is believed that ISPs 
generally adhere to net neutrality.418 However, in 2013 Airtel India and Google have 
received criticism for a joint venture known as ‘free zone’ that would allow Airtel India 
customers to access initial searches and email for free.419 Similar options are offered to 
users in Kenya through services like Facebook Zero, which allow subscribers to access 
text versions of the service for free through collaborations between Facebook and 
ISPs.420 In response to critics of ‘free zones’ there is a strong counter argument that these 
measures increase user choice and provide access to the internet to users who otherwise 
would not have access.421
3.3 Privacy
Service providers have access to a broad range of information about their subscribers 
including metadata, communications content, location, etc. According to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: 
‘Enterprises that provide content or Internet services, or supply the technology and 
equipment that make digital communications possible, for example, should adopt an 
explicit policy statement outlining their commitment to respect human rights throughout 
the company’s activities. They should also have in place appropriate due diligence 
policies to identify, assess, prevent and mitigate any adverse impact. Companies should 
assess whether and how their terms of service, or their policies for gathering and sharing 
customer data, may result in an adverse impact on the human rights of their users’.422 
Further the report holds that ‘even the mere possibility of communications information 
being captured creates an interference with privacy, with a potential chilling effect on 
rights, including those to free expression and association’.423 
417 Iain Morris. German minister proposes net neutrality rules to rein in Deutsche Telekom: report. 17 
June 2013. http://www.telecomengine.com/node/79864 (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
418 The Times of India. What is net neutrality and why is it important. The Times of India. 20 January 
2014. 
 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/What-is-net-neutrality-and-why-it-is-important/
articleshow/29083935.cms (Accessed 16 April 2014).
419 Sudipto Sircar. Airtel Partners With Google: Latest Network Neutrality Violation. India Law and 
Technology Blog. 3 July 2013. 
 http://www.iltb.net/2013/07/airtel-partners-with-google-latest-network-neutrality-violation/ 
(Accessed: 6 June 2014.)
420 David Talbot. 21 March 2013. Facebook and Google Create Walled Gardens for Web Newcomers 
Overseas. MIT Technology Review. www.technologyreview.com/news/512316/facebook-and-
google-create-walled-gardens-for-web-newcomers-overseas (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
421 Tasneem Akolawala. Airtel and Google join hands to provide free internet for mobile users in India. 
DNA. 26 June 2013. 
 http://www.dnaindia.com/scitech/report-airtel-and-google-join-hands-to-provide-free-internet-for-
mobile-users-in-india-1853383 (Accessed 9 September 2014.)
422 A/HRC/27/37. p.15.
423 A/HRC/27/37. p.7. 
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3.3.1 Company Policies
This section provides a breakdown of how companies covered in this case study 
articulate their policies affecting users’ privacy. It will be followed by a section analyzing 
the outcomes produced when those particular company policies interact with the policies, 
laws, and actions of specific governments. 
General privacy practices: Vodafone Group has a comprehensive privacy policy that is 
applicable to its subsidiaries in different countries,424 and has a number of supplementary 
policies that address user privacy including: the ‘Global Policy Standard on Law 
Enforcement Assistance’ and the 2014 Sustainability Report.425 Vodafone UK and Airtel 
India have comprehensive privacy policies governing their data practices and refer to 
privacy in their Terms. Vodafone UK’s privacy policy broadly addresses the collection, use, 
sharing and disclosure, security, and users rights with respect to personal information.426 
Vodafone UK’s General Terms also clarify that the company is a data controller under the 
Data Protection Act 1998 and each party to the contract is bound to comply with the legal 
duties laid out in the Act.427 Similarly, Vodafone Germany notes in its General Terms that 
the company handles users’ personal data in compliance with the statutory provisions for 
data protection including the Telecommunications Act (TKG), the German Federal Data 
Protection Act (BDSG) as well as for the application of Internet services, the Telemedia 
Act (TMG).428 
Airtel India’s ‘Online Privacy Policy’ addresses what personal information is, when 
personal information will be collected, how it will be used, when it can be disclosed 
and transferred, security procedures and practices around personal information, how 
individuals can update their personal information, and how users can submit complaints 
or feedback to the company.429 The Airtel India terms further note that the privacy of 
users’ communications are subject to relevant laws and regulations.430 On the other hand, 
Airtel Kenya does not appear to have a dedicated privacy policy, nor does Safaricom. 
This is reflective of the legal environment, as Kenya does not have a Data Protection Act. 
Despite this, Airtel Kenya touches upon privacy in its Terms for Airtel data, noting the 
circumstances under which the company will monitor, vet, edit or knowingly disclose the 
contents of emails. 431 Safaricom in its Terms of post- pay mobile services touches upon 
424 Additionally, the parent company Vodafone Group has a thorough privacy policy applying to its 
subsidiaries. See: Vodafone privacy commitments. http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/
about-us/privacy.html, and also: Privacy at the heart of Vodafone. http://www.vodafone.com/
content/dam/vodafone/about/privacy/vodafone-privacy-programme.pdf 
425 Sustainability Report 2013/14. Vodafone Group Plc. http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/
sustainability/2014/pdf/vodafone_full_report_2014.pdf
426 Vodafone UK. Understanding our privacy policy. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/our-
privacy-policy/ 
427 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions: General Terms.section 17.2. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/
about-this-site/terms-and-conditions/general-terms/ 
428 Vodafone Germany. Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen für Vodafone-Dienstleistungen (AGB). 
section 9.1. http://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdf 
429 Airtel India. Online Privacy Policy. op. cit.
430 Airtel India, Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. Section 2.1.4. op. cit.
431 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. Section 7. op. cit.
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the potential uses and circumstances for disclosure and sharing of users’ personal and 
banking information.432 
Vivo does not have a privacy policy that was publicly accessible at the time of this 
research and company representatives did not respond to requests for interviews. In 
June 2014, however, Vivo’s parent Telefonica released a Sustainability Report announcing 
that ‘the Group has a Privacy Policy approved by the Board in March 2013 which has 
to be complied with in all the countries in which we operate, and that the company had 
appointed a Chief Privacy Officer.433 The report also states that the group has established 
‘common standards of behaviour for all our companies’. This includes a commitment 
to ‘protect the confidentiality of personal information entrusted to us, whether that of 
customers, shareholders, employees or suppliers’, and ‘Inform users on how to access 
and correct the data we handle’.434 Making privacy policies of specific services publicly 
available would be consistent with that commitment, and advocacy group Access has 
called on Telefonica to release specific details of the company’s privacy policy, which its 
report implies adheres to globally consistent standards.435
Data Retention: Vodafone UK436 and Airtel India,437 which both have dedicated privacy 
policies for their services, maintain that the company retains subscriber information 
as legally required or for as long as necessary to provide customers with the service 
requested. Policies for the other companies studied were not publicly available. In 
Telefonica’s sustainability report which also applies to Vivo, the company commits to 
‘provide our stakeholders with relevant information about how we use and store their 
personal data’ although there are no publicly available details on how subsidiary brands 
such as Vivo carry out this commitment.438
Real-time surveillance and responding to government user data requests: ISPs 
can be analysed in terms of how they respond to governmental mandates for real time 
surveillance and access to user data with differing levels of clarity. For example, for its 
post-pay services, Safaricom reserves the right to hold and use information provided by 
the user for carrying out legal, governmental, or regulatory requirement in connection with 
a legal proceeding or in respect of crime or fraud prevention, detection or prosecution. The 
company can also monitor or record voice or data services in order to prevent or detect 
crime.439 In the terms for Safaricom’s pre-paid services, the company reserves the right to 
disclose, receive and record any details of the use of the services including, though not 
432 Safaricom. Post Paid Terms for Use. section 11. op. cit. 
433 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. http://www.rcysostenibilidad.telefonica.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/Informe_Sostenibilidad2013_ENG3jul.pdf p. 126. 
434 Ibid. p. 120.
435 Peter Micek and Ana Monteiro. Telefónica reports progress on privacy and free expression principles. 
26 June 2014. Access blog. https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/06/26/telefonica-reports-
progress-on-privacy-and-free-expression-principles  (Accessed 18 July, 2014.)
436 Vodafone UK. Understanding our privacy policy. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/our-
privacy-policy/ 
437 Airtel India. Privacy Policy: Security Practices and Procedures. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacy-
policy/security+practices+and+procedures?contentIDR=9346516c-c1a1-4bd7-bce0-6945236dc
eaa&useDefaultText=0&useDefaultDesc=0
438 Telefonica 2013 Corporate Sustainability Report. op. cit. p. 120.
439 Safaricom. Post Pay Terms and Conditions. Section 11.3 (a) and (b), op.cit.
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limited to calls, emails, SMSs, data, personal information or documents obtained from the 
user for the purposes of fraud prevention and law enforcement, reasonable commercial or 
business purposes, in compliance with legal, governmental or regulatory requirement and 
for use by lawyers in connection with any legal proceedings.440 This standard does not 
clarify to the user if and how the company complies with real time surveillance requests or 
if the company provides access to historical data collected and stored by the company. 
On the other hand, as noted above, Airtel India broadly references that the privacy of 
communications is subject to compliance with relevant laws and licenses, which would 
include legal provisions pertaining to surveillance,441 while noting specific instances that 
they will share information with law enforcement or government agencies in their Online 
Privacy Policy.442 Airtel Kenya discloses email content if it is legally required.443 
Of all the companies studied, the Vodafone Group was the only ISP that published a 
comprehensive policy on responding to demands from authorized authorities. Vodafone’s 
policy is known as the ‘Global Policy Standard on Law Enforcement Assistance’ and 
includes information about its process for evaluating and responding to requests for user 
data from law enforcement. The policy specifies that Vodafone is bound to the laws of 
the jurisdiction in which it operates, and that the company engages with governments 
to protect user rights to the extent possible.444 Furthermore, Vodafone’s 2014 Law 
Enforcement Disclosure Report sheds light on the complex situation that ISPs face 
when complying with requests from authorized authorities – pointing to the challenges of 
evolving technology, opaque law, and secrecy requirements. Vodafone also clarifies in the 
report that the company collaborates with authorized authorities in three ways: response 
to legal requests, voluntarily in clear emergency situations (such as a kidnapping) and 
proactively to protect the Vodafone network.445 
Telefonica’s Sustainability Report, which by extension is applicable to its subsidiary 
company Vivo, states, ‘Telefonica has formal processes for handling data requests 
from local or governmental authorities. These processes are the responsibility of the 
departments of the General Secretary and Security in each Group company’.446 The 
company also reports that in 2012 it carried out a human rights impact assessment with 
the assistance of the non-profit consultancy Business for Social Responsibility (bsr.org). 
Its report further states that ‘the exercise carried out allowed us to identify privacy and 
freedom of expression as high-risk aspects for the sector; in search of a global solution 
440 Ibid.
441 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. op. cit. Section 2.1.4.
442 Airtel India. Privacy Policy. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacy-policy/disclosure+and+transfer?conte
ntIDR=745792ad-d6af-4684-85d4-d85773e77356&useDefaultText=0&useDefaultDesc=0 
443 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. Section 7. op. cit. 
444 Note: The policy states that Vodafone may be bound to follow laws that are overly restrictive, and 
thus Vodafone’s actions may consequently be overly-restrictive. However, Vodafone does indicate 
that it engages in advocacy with governments to bring about changes in restrictive laws. See: 
Vodafone. Human Rights and Law Enforcement. op. cit.
445 Vodafone. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit. 
446 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. op. cit.  p. 126
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we helped to create the [Telecommunications Industry] Dialogue Group on Freedom of 
Expression and Privacy’.447
Identification practices: The ISPs studied in this research comply with legal requirements 
for the registration of subscribers via government-issued identification. For example, 
Airtel India,448 Airtel Kenya449 and Safaricom450 require users to submit government-issued 
identification. Even when ISPs are not legally required to collect government identification 
from subscribers, many do verify provided information at the time of signing service 
contracts. In Brazil, users are required to register with their real names before purchasing 
a mobile phone or subscribing to a private internet connection.451 In Germany, although 
paragraph 111 of the Telecommunications Act requires suppliers of SIM cards to verify 
a customer’s identity from customers, this is not rigorously enforced in practice and 
suppliers do not check on the accuracy of the information provided upon activation so it 
remains possible for people to obtain SIM cards anonymously.452 
3.3.2 Implementation in national context
Below is an examination of how the company policies described above play out in specific 
national contexts. 
Compliance with government requests and legal mandates 
Vodafone’s Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report does more than any other ISP to shed 
light on the challenges companies face in respecting users’ privacy. The report describes 
the range of legal requirements that the company faces around the world – including 
requirements that directly violate user privacy – such as the requirement to provide 
authorities in a number of jurisdictions with a direct line of access into the company 
network. In a strong move towards protecting user privacy, Vodafone has called on 
governments to amend legislation that allows government agencies and authorities to 
gain direct access to an ISP’s infrastructure, and to take steps to discourage agencies 
from seeking direct access without legal authorization.453
447 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. op. cit. p. 126
448 According to the Department of Telecommunications Revised Guidelines on Verification of  New 
Mobile Subscriber for post paid and pre paid, users must submit a passport sized photograph, 
proof of identity, and proof of address. This information must be verified by Airtel. Airtel notes that it 
will carry out verification of subscriber information in Section 1.4 of Airtel India. Terms and Conditions 
for Providing Services. op. cit. 
449 Airtel Kenya. Customer Registration page. http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/africarevamp/
Kenya/home/customer-care/Customer-registration/ 
450 Safaricom. Subscriber SIM Registration Form. http://www.safaricom.co.ke/about-us/subscriber-
registration/subscriber-registration.html 
451 Freedom House. Freedom on the Net - Brazil – 2013. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-net/2013/brazil 
452 L. Sobiraj. Datenschutz: Die Crux mit den anonymen Prepaid-Karten [Data Protection: the crux with 
anonymous prepaid cards]. 18 August 2013. teltarif.de. http://www.teltarif.de/anonyme-sim-karte-
prepaid-discounter/news/52201.html (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
453 Vodafone. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op.cit. p. 65.
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Government monitoring and centralization 
At the time of writing India was considering implementing a Centralized Monitoring 
System, a surveillance scheme that would automate and centralize the process of 
interception and allow authorized security agencies to bypass ISPs to access and 
intercept communications directly.454 Company privacy policies in context 
Only some of the companies investigated in this case study publish privacy policies 
applicable to dedicated services offered locally (as opposed to website privacy policies, 
or general group-level policies published by the group headquarters as opposed to by the 
local subsidiary), or clearly and comprehensively explain what data they collect of users, 
how long they use it for, and what they do with it. 
In Kenya, where there is no data protection legislation, ISPs were not found to have 
published comprehensive privacy policies for access by local users of their local services, 
and only briefly mentioned the possible instances of disclosure of user data in terms 
of service. Brazil also lacks a data protection or data retention law. According to the 
National Council of Justice,455 in 2011 more than 18,000 telephone lines were monitored 
with judicial authorization. Besides telephone lines, 204 e-mail accounts and 673 lines 
using voice over IP were also monitored.
Also, despite legal mandates in many jurisdictions defining the time periods for which 
data must be retained, the companies studied do not specify in their terms of service 
or privacy policies (or at least those accessible to researchers) the exact time period for 
which they retain data. 
Limitations on anonymous Internet use via both broadband and mobile data 
In most of the countries investigated, legal requirements oblige users to sign up for 
services by presenting government-issued identification. This requirement typically 
applies to both post-pay and pre-paid services. These identification requirements are 
distinct from ISPs requiring personal information from the user for the carrying out of 
commercial transactions such as billing. Some jurisdictions legally obligate ISPs to verify 
this information before providing services to the user. This heavily reduces the space 
for anonymous online participation, as users’ online behaviour may not only be tracked 
but also linked to their actual identity without the protections to privacy of international 
standards covering legitimate limitations of rights.
454 Human Rights Watch. India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights. 7 June 2013.  http://www.
hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/india-new-monitoring-system-threatens-rights (Accessed 26 June 
2014.)
455 The National Council of Justice is a body composed by members of the Judiciary, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, lawyers and members of civil society tasked with overseeing judicial malpractices 
and improving the management of the Judiciary. 
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3.4 Transparency
In a 2012 report “Opening the Lines: A call for transparency from Governments and 
Telecommunications companies” the Global Network Initiative recommends that ISPs 
and governments be transparent about the following: applicable laws and operating 
licenses, government requests for user metadata and content, government requests for 
filtering and government requests for text messages sent via the ISP’s network without 
attribution.456 
Transparency of laws, policies, practices, decisions, rationales, and outcomes related to 
privacy and restrictions on freedom of expression allow users to make informed choices 
about their own actions and speech online. Transparency is therefore important to internet 
users’ ability to exercise their rights to privacy and freedom of expression.
3.4.1 Company Practices 
The practice and scope of company and government transparency about surveillance 
practices, filtering and service restrictions vary across jurisdictions. In none of the countries 
studied are ISPs legally required to be transparent about their policy or practice regarding 
filtering, service restrictions, or surveillance measures. Below are some examples of ISPs’ 
varying levels of transparency around specific types of restriction:
Commitment to notify users of restrictions based on government orders: None of 
the companies commit to provide individual or public notice of filtering based on orders 
from authorized authorities. Vodafone’s 2014 Law Enforcement Disclosure Report does 
note that the company complies with filtering requests from authorized authorities.457
Commitment to notify users of restrictions based on self-regulatory steps: Almost all 
of the companies commit to notify the public of restrictions resulting from self-regulation. 
The exception is Vodafone UK, which notes in its Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report 
that the company filters child sexual abuse images on a wide and voluntary basis,458 and 
notes in its terms of service that it will notify the customer of intention to suspend the 
service when reasonable. The Vodafone Group is also transparent about its collaboration 
with the IWF.459 This could indicate that, beyond cooperation with self-regulatory 
bodies and internet hotlines, ISPs carry out few restrictions at their own initiative. In the 
Conditions of Use for PrePaid Services, Safaricom broadly states that the company will 
try to communicate with users through advertisement, newspaper, SMS, website or other 
suitable means.460 
456 Tuppen. op. cit. p. 20
457 Vodafone. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit. p. 68.
458 Vodafone. Child safety online – our approach. 
 http://www.vodafone.com/content/sustainabilityreport/2014/index/operating_responsibly/child_
safety_online.html
459 Vodafone. How to… report online child sexual abuse content to the IWF. 
 http://www.vodafone.com/content/parents/howto-guides/internet_watch_foundation_helpline.html 
460 Safaricom. Terms and Conditions PrePaid Mobile. section 8.  http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/
Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_services.pdf 
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Transparency about surveillance and user data requests: Other than Vodafone, none 
of the companies studied in this research publish information regarding the surveillance 
and user data requests that they receive and comply with. In January 2014, Vodafone 
challenged the UK government to permit it to disclose some information regarding 
governmental requests for wiretaps and user data.461 
Neither Vivo nor its parent Telefonica, a Telecommunications Industry Dialogue member 
alongside Vodafone, has published data or general information about the nature and 
volume of government data requests or surveillance requirements. ‘Transparency’ is stated 
as an important value throughout Telefonica’s 2013 Sustainability Report, but specifics 
are given only in relation to supply chain management and environmental sustainability.462
3.4.2 Implementation in national context
For ISPs and telecommunications services, the ability to be transparent with customers 
and users about practices affecting freedom of expression is heavily dependent on 
whether the government itself is transparent, and also whether legal frameworks allow 
meaningful levels of transparency on the part of companies. 
Government transparency about restriction requests
In the jurisdictions covered by this case study, there is little government transparency 
about the nature and volume of official requests made to ISPs for filtering or service 
restrictions. Governments do not offer ‘blacklist’ overviews or official statistics about the 
number and type of restriction orders they issue. Sometimes governments acknowledge 
restrictions or respond to allegations of restriction in the media, or to queries from other 
branches of the government, although such instances are not standard or consistent. 
For example Egypt’s National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (NTRA) issued 
a press release in response to accusations in the media that it had ordered telecom 
companies to block or bar political words in their SMS services. In the press release the 
NTRA claimed this was untrue.463 In India, news media reported in 2012 that in response 
to a question raised in Parliament, the Minister for Communication and IT noted that the 
Indian Government had asked social networking sites to block 1,299 URLs for various 
reasons including maintenance of public order.464 
461 Juliette Garside. Vodafone takes a stand on privacy with plan to disclose wiretapping demands. The 
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/15/vodafone-aims-to-disclose-wiretap-
demands (Accessed 13 July 2014.)
462 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. op. cit. 
463 NTRA Has Not & Will Never Interfere in the SMS Content. National Telecommunication Regulatory 
Authority. www.tra.gov.eg/english/News_NewsDetails.asp?ID=216 
464 Government asks social networking sites to block 1,299 URLs. The Economic Times. 12 February 
2014.  http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-12/news/47270235_1_362-urls-62-
urls-312-urls (Accessed 13 July 2014.)
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Corporate transparency about restrictions in context
Some other intermediary types (such as Google, Facebook and Twitter examined in the 
next two case studies) offer ‘transparency reports’ with the number of content restriction 
requests received from governments and courts, the percentage complied with, and 
other data related to the company’s handling of restrictions requested by authorized 
authorities. In general, ISPs covered by this case research are not transparent about 
the extent to which they carry out filtering, their policies on filtering, or explanations 
about the legal requirements for filtering. 
Legal obstacles: One obstacle to greater transparency about filtering by ISPs is that 
in some jurisdictions ISPs are legally prohibited from publicizing filtering orders that 
they receive, as well as other information relating to content or service restrictions. For 
example, in India, ISPs are prohibited from disclosing details of governmental blocking 
orders by law,465 while in the UK, ISPs are prohibited from publishing blocking orders 
relating to surveillance and terrorism, though not to copyright.466
General transparency: While Vodafone’s Law Enforcement Disclosure Report recognized 
content and service restriction practices, it does not offer comprehensive information 
about scope of requests nor about the rate of compliance. Airtel India and Vodafone 
recognize in their terms of service that they comply with legal mandates for filtering, but 
few disclose all the actors – including government, law enforcement, commercial filtering 
companies and self-regulatory organizations – that are involved in filtering schemes and 
decisions. This makes it difficult to verify the legitimacy and justification of filtering actions.
Specific transparency: When a user tries to access a filtered website, some companies 
do display some form of explanation. For example, Airtel India and Vodafone UK display a 
notification screen when filtering takes place based on orders from authorized authorities 
or (in Vodafone’s case) in accordance with co-regulatory mechanisms.467 An example 
of a notice from Airtel India reads: ‘This website/URL has been blocked until further 
notice either pursuant to Court orders or on the Directions issued by the Department of 
Telecommunications.’468 Vodafone offers the following message for age-restricted mobile 
content: 
465 According to Rule 16 of the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking for 
Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, blocking requests and complaints must be kept 
confidential. For more information see: http://dispur.nic.in/itact/it-procedure-safeguards-blocking-
access-rules-2009.pdf. 
466 See, inter alia, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. s 97A Copyright Designs and Patents 
Act 1988, s3, Terrorism Act 2006, and s 21D Terrorism Act 2000.
467 See screenshot below.
468 For example, according to news items “Airtel users are shown a message  ”This website/URL 
has been blocked until further notice either pursuant to Court orders or on the Directions issued 
by the Department of Telecommunications”. For more information see: http://www.medianama.
com/2014/02/223-uploaded-net-blocked-again/. 
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Figure 2: Vodafone mobile ‘restricted access’ notice469
Government transparency about surveillance and user data requests
As noted in the Vodafone Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report, the German and UK 
governments provide official annual statistics about the number of interception and 
user data requests they issue. For example, in 2012, Germany requested Internet traffic 
data in 18,026 cases470 and intercepted 23,687 telecommunications.471 Similarly, the UK 
government authorized 2,760 interception warrants and 514,608 notices for communication 
data in 2013, according to the annual report of the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner.472 Additionally, the audit conducted by the UK Commissioner found 
errors in the implementation of interception orders including: interception of incorrect 
communications addresses; interception and requests for stored communications made 
without lawful authority; inadequate discharge of legislative powers; failure to take steps 
to cancel erroneous interception; and telephone numbers attributed to the wrong target.473 
469 Screentshot published by the Tor Project: https://blog.torproject.org/files/www.torproject.org-
vodafone.png
470 Bundesamt für Justiz [Federal Office of Justice]. Übersicht Verkehrsdatenerhebung (Maßnahmen 
nach § 100g StPO) für 2012 [Summary of traffic data collection for 2012, first and extended orders] 
1 August 2013. 
 https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Uebersicht_
Verkehrsdaten_2012.pdf  
471 Bundesamt für Justiz [Federal Office of Justice]. Übersicht Telekommunikationsüberwachung 
(Maßnahmen nach §100a StPO) für 2012 [Summary of telecommunication surveillance for 2012, 
first and extended orders]. 24 October 2013. https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/
Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Uebersicht_TKUE_2012.pdf 
472 Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony May. 2013 Annual Report of the Interception Communications Commisioner. p. 9. 
 http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20
Accessible%20Version.pdf 
473 Ibid. p. 16.
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The other jurisdictions studied in this report have not published official information about 
surveillance and user data requests made to ISPs.
Corporate transparency about surveillance and user data in context 
Legal constraints on what can be disclosed: Though the German government publishes 
statistics regarding interception and access to communications data, Vodafone stated 
confirmed in its Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report that it was not allowed to publish 
statistics about the lawful interception or user data requests received from German 
authorities. The report also explains that, given legal constraints, it would be difficult to 
explain a number of factors necessary to understand the meaning of these numbers. For 
example, such statistics would present only a partial view of law enforcement demands 
as they would not include automated access systems that allow rapid and large-scale 
interrogation of a central database of customer records.474
The revelations by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden pointed to apparent 
widespread data harvesting taking place by US and UK governments from a number 
of ISPs, including Vodafone UK. News reports in late 2013 claimed that some ISPs had 
gone well beyond what was required by law to assist intelligence agencies in their mass 
collection of communication.475 Other reports associated Vodafone with this cooperation 
– codenamed ‘Tempora’ according to leaked documents.476 Reports also asserted that 
Vodafone, among other companies, had given GCHQ unlimited access to its network of 
undersea cables.477 Similar allegations have been made in the Egyptian media against 
Vodafone Egypt – accusing the company, along with other multinational ISPs operating 
in Egypt, of colluding with the Egyptian Government and allowing access to private 
communication data.478 With regards to Egypt, Vodafone has denied these claims, and 
in its June 2014 Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report notes that the company may not 
disclose whether or not there are lawful intercept capabilities employed in Egypt.479 With 
regards to the UK allegations, Vodafone also put out a statement in which it said that it 
did not recognize any of the UK intelligence agency programmes identified in the media, 
and that it never went beyond its legal obligations to collaborate with any security or 
intelligence agency by opening up its networks to any form of mass observation.480 At 
its 2014 Annual General Meeting Vodafone also stated that the company would submit 
474 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Germany. June 
2014. 
 http://www.vodafone.com/content/sustainabilityreport/2014/index/operating_responsibly/privacy_
and_security/law_enforcement/country_by_country.html 
475 James Ball. Leaked memos reveal GCHQ efforts to keep mass surveillance secret. The Guardian. 
25 October 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-
surveillance-secret-snowden (Accessed 28 June 2014.)
476 James Ball, Luke Harding, and Juliette Garside. BT and Vodafone among telecoms companies 
passing details to GCHQ. 2 August 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/02/
telecoms-bt-vodafone-cables-gchq (Accessed 28 June 2014.)
477 Ibid.
478 Juliette Garside. Vodafone under fire for bowing to Egyptian pressure. 26 July 2011. 
 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jul/26/vodafone-access-egypt-shutdown (Accessed 
28 June 2014.)
479 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Egypt. op. cit. 
480 Vodafone statement regarding GCHQ allegations. http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/
faqs_statements/vodafone_statement.html 
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comments to a UK Government review of surveillance laws, and that its comments would 
be consistent with the principles outlined in its Law Enforcement Disclosure report.481 
Lack of clarity about what is legal to disclose: At times, laws do not explicitly prohibit 
ISPs from disclosing information about surveillance and filtering, but when asked to 
clarify, authorities have made statements that conflict with existing practices. For 
example, although German law neither clearly prohibits nor allows ISPs to disclose 
such information, when Vodafone asked to confirm, authorities told it that publication 
would be against the law.482 Yet a month before Vodafone published its report, German 
telecommunications provider Deutsche Telekom483 and smaller email provider Posteo484 
had published transparency reports after having received permission from the government 
to publish ‘anonymous statistical information’.485 According to Vodafone, information 
published by other German telecommunication companies is incomplete and at risk of 
future prohibition.486
3.5 Remedy
For ISPs in jurisdictions covered by this research, potential remedy can potentially be 
provided for an individual user or an entire group of users whose right to freedom of 
expression has been infringed. Remedy can include an investigation, a public report/
explanation, the reinstatement of content or connection, or can include the provisioning of 
an alternate means through which users are able to express themselves. These examples 
demonstrate that it is possible for courts or tribunals, companies, and regulatory bodies 
to grant remedy. The form of remedy available to users depends on the jurisdiction of the 
company and the user. 
481 Peter Micek. Vodafone hears Access calls to go beyond transparency. 29 July 2014. 
 https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/07/29/vodafone-hears-access-calls-to-go-beyond-
transparency (Accessed 13 August, 2014.)
482 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Germany. op. 
cit.
483 Deutsche Telekom. Jahresbericht – Auskunft an Sicherheitsbehörden. [Annual report – Information to 
security agencies]. (In German.) 5 May 2014.  www.telekom.com/sicherheitsbehoerden (Accessed 
13 August 2014) and  Kirsten Gollatz. 20 May 2014. Deutsche Telekom’s ‘surveillance report’ builds 
on a trend. Internet Policy Review. 
 http://policyreview.info/articles/news/deutsche-telekoms-surveillance-report-builds-trend/284 
(Accessed 13 August 2014.)
484 Posteo. 5 May 2014. Transparenzbericht. [Transparency report]. (In German.) https://posteo.de/
site/transparenzbericht_2013 (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
485 Transparenzbericht. Posteo. 5 May 2014,  https://posteo.de/site/transparenzbericht_2013 
(Accessed 28 June 2014); Deutsche Telekom. Provision of information to security authorities. 12 
June 2014. 
 http://www.telekom.com/corporate-responsibility/data-protection/More+Articles/239498; and 
Posteo. Ihre schriftliche Frage Nr. 4/175 vom 17. April 2014. 29 April 2014, https://posteo.de/
Antwort_Bundesregierung.pdf 
486 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Germany. op. 
cit. 
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3.5.1 Company Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
Mechanisms for complaints and dispute resolution can potentially complement, or serve 
as an alternative to, systems for redress and remedy provided by government. Some 
governments require that companies institute private grievance and remedy mechanisms. 
Options limited to consumer complaints
Airtel India provides a mechanism for the resolution of differences arising between 
subscribers and the company. The arbitrator of these disputes will be appointed by 
Airtel India and the resolution of the dispute will be subject to the jurisdiction of the city 
where installation is opted for.487 As required by the law488, Airtel India additionally lists the 
contact information of a grievance officer in their online privacy policy,489 as well as the 
contact information of regional Appellate Authorities that individuals can contact if their 
complaints are not resolved at the nodal officer level.490 
Vodafone UK has a number of potential paths that users can follow to lodge complaints. 
For example, it is suggested that users initially submit complaints to the ‘account 
manager’ via the ‘customer complaint code,’ which offers a live helpline. Complaints 
are handled by customer care, but if not resolved within eight weeks, can be escalated 
to an independent ombudsman.491 Vodafone UK also outlines an ‘escalation route’ 
that customers are expected to exhaust before bringing legal action. Additionally, it is 
clarified that both parties are subject to the UK Data Protection Act 1998, under which 
Vodafone is a data controller. This is potentially a strong mechanism through which users 
can seek redress for breaches regarding their data.492 The General Terms and Conditions 
also specify an address for the sending of notices, and note that in the situation where 
Vodafone will suspend end users from use of the service, Vodafone will first inform the 
customer to allow for potential remedy of the alleged breach.493 Lastly, Vodafone UK 
clarifies that if there is a misrepresentation or untrue statement, the only remedy available 
to customers is through a claim for damages for breach of contract.494 
The UK also has a co-regulatory mechanism for remedy: In a 2014 Ofcom Report on the 
family friendly network level filtering services that the major fixed-line ISPs are offering the 
487 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions. section 18. op. cit. 
488 According to Rule 5(9) of the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures 
and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011, all body corporate handling sensitive 
personal information in the digital format must list the contact information of a grievance officer on 
their website. http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511(1).pdf
489 Airtel India. Privacy Policy: Feedback and Concerns. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacy-policy/
feedbak?contentIDR=c9d0f414-8cb9-4381-b122-3f3148a01b80&useDefaultText=0&useDefaultD
esc=0 
490 Airtel India. Broadband Internet Appellate Authorities.  http://www.airtel.in/applications/xm/
BroadbandInternet_AppellateAuth.jsp 
491 Vodafone UK.  Contact Us. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/contact-us/ 
492 Vodafone. General Terms. provision 17.2 http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/terms-and-
conditions/general-terms/ 
493 Vodafone. General Terms. provision 3 and 17.3. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/terms-
and-conditions/general-terms/ 
494 Vodafone. General Terms. provision 17.8. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/terms-and-
conditions/general-terms/ 
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UK, it is noted that customers and site owners can follow a process to report websites or 
content that have been incorrectly filtered – leading to a review of the categorization of 
identified content for filtering.495 
Safaricom does not provide as much detail as Vodafone UK, but does note in the Term 
and Conditions for prepaid mobile services, that all disputes must be settled by a single 
arbitrator that is agreed and appointed by both parties. Any award must be made under 
the Arbitration Act 1995 and all disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of Kenya. All 
determinations by the Arbitrator will be final and binding.496 Airtel Kenya does not mention 
a dispute resolution mechanism in their terms of service and does not appear to have a 
complaint mechanism on their website.
While filtering is not relevant for Vivo in Brazil, it is possible that users may have grievances 
related to privacy violations. While there is no publicly available information about remedy 
or grievance mechanisms offered by Vivo, Telefonica’s 2013 Sustainability Report states 
that the Group has committed to ‘examine, as a group, options for implementing relevant 
grievance mechanisms, as outlined in Principle 31 of the UN Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights’, and that Telefonica is exploring ‘this aspect’ as a member 
of the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue.497
Complaint mechanisms offered by industry organizations and regulators 
The UK Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA) offers a complaints mechanism 
through which users can issue complaints against companies that are members of ISPA 
for violation of the ISPA code of conduct.498 Additionally, the UK telecommunications 
regulator Ofcom offers a complaint mechanism for users which includes avenues for 
issuing complaints related to the safety of the user’s personal information, the recording 
of phone calls, and content that is believed to be illegal – in which users are directed to 
report content that is thought to be illegal to the Internet Watch Foundation.499 Types 
of content that are listed as examples of illegal content include: images of child sexual 
abuse, criminally obscene adult material that is hosted in the UK, and incitement to racial 
hatred that is hosted in the UK.500 
Similarly, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has developed the ‘Telecom 
Consumer Complaint Redressal Regulations, 2012’ that governs how ISPs must structure 
consumer complaint mechanisms at the organizational level and how complaints should 
be responded to (time frames etc). Complaints, including those ‘alleging that a practice 
495 Ofcom Report on Internet safety measures. Internet Service Providers: Network level filtering 
measures. 22 July 2014. 
 http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/internet_safety_measures_2.pdf 
496 Safaricom. Conditions of Use for the Safaricom Prepaid Services. http://www.safaricom.co.ke/
images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_
services.pdf 
497 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report, op. cit p. 129
498 The Internet Service Providers Association. Complaints Form. http://www.ispa.org.uk/consumers/
complaints-form/ 
499 Other issues: Scams and frauds. Ofcom. http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/complain/phone-and-
broadband-complaints/other-issues/ 
500 Ibid.
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adopted by the service provider adversely affects the interest of the consumers’ can 
also be issued to TRAI and referred by TRAI to the relevant ISP.501 TRAI also accepts 
responses from companies to present and proposed policies impacting their services. In 
a move towards protecting user privacy and freedom of expression, Airtel India in 2012 
submitted a response to regulations meant to govern and control unsolicited commercial 
communications. In the response, Airtel stressed the need for privacy legislation in India 
and argued against using any ‘artificial intelligence criterion’ for blocking text messages 
(such as imposing a numeric limit per user per hour) because it ‘would amount to 
interfering with the cherished right of freedom of speech and expression.’502 
3.5.2 Role of the Legal System and Consumer Protection Bodies
Obtaining remedy through the courts can be time-consuming and expensive in many 
countries. Little international research has been done in relation to best practices 
for consumer protection bodies in handling cases related to telecommunications. 
Nonetheless, researchers found two particularly notable examples of remedy: one 
through the courts and the other through consumer protection bodies.
Accountability through courts: In May 2011 an Egyptian Court issued a fine of $90 
million to the former President Hosni Mubarak and Vodafone, Mobinil and Etisalat. The 
ruling held that the president, the prime minister and interior minister were responsible 
for damages to the economy while the ISPs had violated the Egyptian Constitution for 
complying with a request that was not accompanied with a legally issued warrant.503 
Consumer protection mechanisms: In 2012 Airtel India was ordered by a consumer 
forum to pay a user rs.15,000 (approximately USD 300) for ‘harassing’ a customer and 
for disconnecting the call services to the user’s phone for 24 days.504 Also in 2012, Airtel 
India was fined by a Karnataka consumer forum Rs.20,000 (approximately USD 400) for 
‘deficiency in Internet service’ and causing mental agony to the complainant by incorrectly 
blocking websites and subsequently being unable to download an application.505 
501 Telecom Consumers Complaint Redressal Regulations, 2012. Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India. 5 January 2012. http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/TCCRR0012012.pdf 
502 Bharti Airtel’s response to TRAI Consultation paper (No. 13/2012) on Review of The Telecom 
Commercial Communications Customer Preference Regulation, 2010 and The draft Telecom 
Commercial Communications Customer Preference (Tenth Amendment) Regulation, 2012. http://
www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/ConsultationPaper/Document/2012090505255533740236.%20
Airtel%20response.pdf 
503 Egypt: Court fines Mubarak and Vodafone for communications blackouts. Association for Progressive 
Communications. 30 May 2011. http://www.apc.org/en/press/egypt-court-fines-mubarak-and-
vodafone-communicati (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
504 Airtel fined Rs. 15,000 for ‘harassing’ customer. Times of India. 31 August 2012. http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Airtel-fined-Rs-15000-for-harassing-customer/
articleshow/16060415.cms (Accessed 14 July 2014.)
505 Anuj Srivas. Airtel penalised for ‘torrent site’ block, legality questioned. 7 August 2012. http://www.
thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/article3738269.ece (Accessed 14 July 2014.)
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3.6 Conclusions
Across jurisdictions, stakeholders interviewed for this research highlighted the 
importance of ISPs and the fundamental role that they play in connecting users to a 
wealth of knowledge, opportunities, and possibilities for expression. Yet some users feel 
that companies need to do more to protect freedom of expression. 
For example, users in Egypt, particularly with respect to Vodafone’s cooperation with 
the Egyptian Government, have expressed the view that ISPs need to do more to resist 
governmental demands for user data.506 Safaricom in 2014 was the target of public and 
media criticism for violating users’ privacy by sending out SMS messages on behalf of 
the National Council of Churches of Kenya.507 Civil society groups such as the US-based 
Access have also criticized the company for sharing user data without consent. Access 
has called on the company to conduct a thorough human rights impact assessment and 
reform its policies affecting privacy and freedom of expression.508 Companies such as 
Vodafone have pointed out that defying government requests can pose high risk for ISPs 
– business risks as well as risks to the safety of their local employees. On the other hand, 
through compliance in some cases, companies may also risk damaging the trust of their 
users. 
A number of general observations can be drawn from this case study’s findings:
Governments and companies offer even less transparency about restrictions of 
expression made by and through ISPs than about policies and practices related 
to privacy and surveillance. The findings of this case study highlight a severe lack of 
transparency by governments and companies across a range of jurisdictions about basic 
aspects of filtering practices.  In the wake of the revelations from Edward Snowden, 
public dialogues and research initiatives have been heavily focused on the obligation 
of ISPs and governments to be transparent about privacy and surveillance requests, 
with much less emphasis on transparency of practices that directly affect internet users’ 
freedom of expresison.509 
506 Political activists attack Vodafone Egypt on Twitter. The Cairo Post. 4 January 2014. http://
thecairopost.com/news/66987/quirk_of_the_day/political-activists-attack-vodafone-egypt-on-
twitter (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
507 Njeri Wangari. CCK approved SMS Message from NCCK causes a storm with Kenyans Online. 
Afromum. 4 July 2014. http://www.afromum.com/cck-approved-sms-message-from-ncck-causes-
a-storm-with-kenyans-online/ (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
508 Ephraim Percy Kenyanito. Surveillance in a legal vacuum: Kenya considers massive new spying 
system. Access blog. 13 June 2014.  https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/06/13/surveillance-
in-a-legal-vacuum-kenya-considers-massive-new-spying-system (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
509 For example, Some projects testing ISP transparency, such as IXmaps, have developed criteria 
broadly related to the public commitment to applicable data protection law, public commitment to 
inform users about third party requests for information, transparency about frequency of third party 
requests, inclusive definitions of personal information, retention periods for personal information, 
transparency about where personal information is stored, transparency about where personal 
information is routed, visible steps to avoid U.S routing of data, and open advocacy of user privacy 
rights. For more information see: http://ixmaps.ca/transparency.php
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On surveillance, government transparency is limited and few companies speak 
up for their users. The German and UK governments publish annual reports reviewing 
the scope of government surveillance. Vodafone publishes clear policy guidelines on 
how it deals with government requests for user data. Though this is a positive, it leaves 
subscribers of the other services in the dark about how their privacy will be protected in 
the face of government or other pressures. This uncertainty is compounded by the lack 
of information on government user data requests. As of this report’s writing, Vodafone 
was the only company to report on the number of user data requests it receives from 
government agencies. The numbers of users whose information is requested is significant, 
even though no numbers about compliance are provided. Although Safaricom was 
included in the Law Enforcement Disclosure Report, Vodafone was unable to disclose the 
number of government requests because it was unable to determine whether disclosure 
would be lawful.510 
It is notable that Vodafone is also the only company covered in this research calling 
openly for greater government transparency, and for legal reforms that would enable the 
company itself to report more detail about surveillance and user data requests.
Data protection and privacy practices of companies vary widely, in tandem with 
the existence or lack of data protection laws. As described in section 2.1.2, with 
the exception of the EU’s data protection framework, data protection regimes in other 
countries studied are in a state of flux: Kenya and Brazil have data protection bills under 
varying stages of parliamentary consideration and India at the time of writing has no 
comprehensive data protection law. Research for this study showed a clear connection 
between weaker privacy laws and weaker privacy policies by ISPs. ISPs in countries with 
weaker or nascent legislation also disclosed much less information about their privacy-
related practices. Such findings underscore the need for comprehensive data protection 
laws at the national level.
It is difficult for individuals, as users and citizens, to hold companies and 
governments accountable for actions taken via ISPs that restrict users’ freedom 
of expression in a manner incompatible with international human rights standards. 
In some jurisdictions, industry regulators can offer means by which users can report 
infringing content or report ISP practices that violate their rights. In some jurisdictions, 
such as India, it appears that users can hold ISPs accountable through consumer 
tribunals. However examples from this research of redress for violations by ISPs and 
or government agencies of users’ online freedom of expression have been limited to 
monetary fines. This shows that recognition and consequence for violations is limited. 
Public commitments by some companies to international human rights principles 
are an important first step but there is a long way to go. In March 2013, a group of 
telecommunications operators and vendors including internet service providers launched 
the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of Expression and Privacy 
510 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report, op. cit. p. 78. 
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(hereafter ‘Industry Dialogue’) with a set of ‘Guiding Principles’ influenced by the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.511 Vodafone and Telefonica at the time 
of writing were among the 9 Industry Dialogue members, and their 2014 reports cited in 
this case study are billed on the ID website as a product of the companies’ commitment 
to report annually on ‘progress in implementing the principles and, as appropriate, on 
major events occurring in this regard.’512 
As discussed earlier in this case study, the Vodafone and Telefonica reports vary greatly 
in the extent to which they offer specifics about company policies and practices.  For 
example, the privacy-related practices of Telefonica’s subsidiary, Vivo, remain particularly 
opaque. Nonetheless, it is notable that these two Industry Dialogue members have made 
clear public commitments to respect user rights and to examine group-wide policies and 
practices in light of those commitments. The two non-Industry Dialogue members studied 
in this research, Bharti Airtel and Safaricom, have made no similar public commitments.513 
The Industry Dialogue is engaging in collective study of best practices in corporate 
transparency for their sector, as well as ‘how to implement operational-level grievance 
mechanisms’. Members have also acted collectively to engage with governments. As their 
first annual report states, the Industry Dialogue’s intention to ‘continue to advocate for 
greater government transparency on the use and scope of surveillance of communications 
and on actions that have the effect of restricting the content of communications, in 
keeping with our Principles.’514 
The concrete impact of such company activities and commitments on internet users 
has yet to be studied systematically, let alone measured. Nonetheless, activities of the 
Industry Dialogue member companies thus far indicate that collective action, combined 
with broader stakeholder engagement, has empowered ISPs to take steps that they had 
previously not been willing to take on their own.  Thus it seems that users in countries 
where Bharti Airtel and Safaricom operate would only stand to benefit in the long run if 
those two companies should ever join the Industry Dialogue as active and committed 
members. The Industry Dialogue would benefit further in terms of credibility by adding 
an assurance process to verify whether companies are implementing their commitments, 
overseen by a multistakeholder board, such as the third-party assessments carried out 
by the Global Network Initiative. 
511 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue ‘About’ page. http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/
about 
512 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. Guiding Principles. http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.
org/content/guiding-principles
513 Although Vodafone implies with its inclusion of Safaricom in its ‘Disclosure to Law Enforcement’ 
report that even with only 40% ownership it asserts some level of influence on Safaricom’s policies 
and practices. 
514 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. Annual Report 2014. 
 http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/sites/default/files/ID%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf 
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4. STUDY 2: SEARCH ENGINES 
Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China), Yandex (Russia) 
4.1 Introduction 
Search engines are a principal means by which Internet users find and access information. 
They are important for freedom of expression because they act as an intermediary 
between people who seek information and people who publish information on the Web in 
hopes of reaching larger audiences. As one journalist has described: they are a “shaper 
of online reality, helping determine what we see and how.”515
Most web pages on the internet are not indexed by search engines and therefore cannot 
be found in search engine results.516 Even Google, the world’s largest and most popular 
search engine, has only indexed a small percentage of the world’s web pages (estimates 
range from 0.4 to 12 per cent).517 There are three main reasons for this: a) the web pages 
have not yet been found or cannot be found by the spiders because no other websites 
link to them; b) they are “invisible” to spiders because the owners of web pages and 
online databases have chosen to block them; c) the database structure of most websites 
“hides” pages from discovery by an external spider.518 
Every search engine uses its own search algorithm, a complex mathematical formula that 
decides what results to display, and in what order, in response to a user’s specific query.519 
The algorithm’s decisions about what is most relevant to the searcher are triggered in part 
by elements in a web page’s URL, headlines on the page, and other content in the page 
itself. Those who want their content to be viewed by large audiences of search engine 
users can “optimize” their Web sites, pages and content not only so that it will be found 
and indexed, but also to maximize the probability that it will appear near the top of the 
first page of a search engine’s displayed results.520 
515 Craig Timberg. 12  May 2014. Research in India Suggests Google Search Results Can Influence 
an Election. Washington Post. The Switch blog. www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/
wp/2014/05/12/research-in-india-suggests-google-search-results-can-influence-an-election. 
(Accessed 19 April 2014.)
516 Michael K. Bergman. August, 2001. White Paper: The Deep Web: Surfacing Hidden Value. Taking 
License. Vol 7 Issue 1. http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jep/3336451.0007.104  (Accessed 19 April 
2014.)
517 Brian Proffitt. 17 June 2013. Google Is Starting War On Child Pornography, Not Ending. 
ReadWriteWeb. http://readwrite.com/2013/06/17/google-is-beginning-war-on-child-pornography-
not-ending#awesm=~oBTRHlVjKDVc11 (Accessed 14 July 2014.)
518 UC Berkeley Library. Invisible or Deep Web: What it is, How to find it, and Its inherent ambiguity. 
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/TeachingLib/Guides/Internet/InvisibleWeb.html (Accessed 19 April 
2014.)
519 See Google. Inside Search: How Search Works: Algorithms. https://www.google.com/insidesearch/
howsearchworks/algorithms.html 
520 Search Engine Optimization. Microsoft Developer Network. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/
library/ff724016(v=expression.40).aspx 
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No two search engines will produce the same results—or the same number of results—
for the same query, unless their algorithms, spiders, and indexes are identical. This is 
why, for example, if one searches for the same term on Google.com and Microsoft’s Bing.
com, on the same computer in the same location at the same time, the results will not 
be the same even if no deliberate effort has been made to restrict or manipulate results.
Freedom of expression in relation to search engines involves three potential parties: 1) 
individual internet users seeking information; 2) creators and operators of websites that 
are or potentially may be indexed by search engines; 3) the search engines themselves 
whose algorithms have been viewed by scholars and emerging jurisprudence as a kind of 
editorial process – albeit not as direct and deliberate as a media organization’s editorial 
process.521 This study examines how search engine policies and practices related to 
content restriction and content manipulation are shaped by their home jurisdictions, and 
to varying degrees by the laws and regulations of other jurisdictions.  It also analyzes how 
three different companies headquartered in three very different national contexts have 
chosen to handle challenges related to online freedom of expression.
The companies
This case study focuses on three search engines, all run by companies that provide many 
other services beyond search: 
Baidu dominates in China with 63.1 per cent market share of the world’s largest Internet 
user base of over 600 million.522 
Yandex dominates in Russia with 62 per cent market share in a country of 84.4 million 
Internet users.523
Google is the world’s dominant search engine. Its market share in the United States (with 
279.8 million Internet users524) is 67.5 per cent.525 Google’s market share is much higher in 
countries where there is no major local competitor. For example Google’s market shares 
521 Joris van Hoboken. Search Engine Freedom: On the implications of the right to freedom of 
expression for the legal governance of Web search engines. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam 
Faculty of Law, 2012. http://dare.uva.nl/document/357527  p.322
522 As of December 2013. Steven Millward. Baidu down, Qihoo up, Google dead: 2013 was a year of 
drama for China’s search engines. Tech In Asia. 7 January 2014. www.techinasia.com/how-baidu-
qihoo-google-performed-in-china-in-2013. (Accessed 21 May 2014.) However, Baidu itself claims a 
70% market share. Baidu Introduction. http://is.baidu.com 
523 As of April 2014, according to LiveInternet. See Smita Nair. Yandex sees a market share increase 
powered by its search service. Yahoo Finance. 31 March 2014. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
yandex-sees-market-share-increase-130033283.html (Accessed 21 May 2014).
524 Internet Live Stats http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ (Accessed 7 August 
2014.)
525 Craig Smith. By The Numbers: 40 Amazing Google Stats and Facts. Digital Marketing Ramblings. 
http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/by-the-numbers-a-gigantic-list-of-google-stats-and-
facts. (Accessed 21 May 2014.)
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in India and European markets are 97 per cent and 90 per cent respectively.526 Google’s 
market share in Russia is 27.6 per cent527 and a mere 1.6 per cent in China.528
China, Russia, the United States and India were chosen as focus countries where 
our researchers examined outcomes resulting from the interplay of company policy 
and practice with national legal contexts. The first three were chosen because they are 
the home markets of the three search engines. While China, Russia, and the US were 
chosen as they are the home markets of the three search engines, India was selected as 
it is a large developing nation and important market for global Internet companies, the 
common thread running through all three case studies. Where useful for the purposes of 
comparative analysis, outcomes in the European Union are also discussed.
4.2 Impact of Network Filtering on Search Engines
The freedom of expression of search engine users can be affected when a search engine 
is filtered by ISPs. If the search engine’s front page is filtered, then the service is wholly 
inaccessible to users accessing the Internet via that particular ISP or national network. It 
is also possible for the ISP to filter only specific pages of search engine results containing 
specific URLs or keywords, making the service partially usable – as long as the user is not 
searching for content that is filtered by the ISP.
The search engine operator has no control over—and plays no role in—filtering by ISPs. 
However, the nature and extent of ISP filtering in a given jurisdiction affects how search 
engines in turn carry out their own restrictions. Thus, prior to a discussion of the policies, 
practices, and implementation of restrictions by the three search engines themselves, it 
is necessary to describe the extent and nature of ISP filtering of search engines in each 
country covered in this case study. In the four jurisdictions covered by this case study, 
four different approaches to search engine filtering were identified: 
No filtering of search engines: 
In the United States, ISPs do not filter search engines at any level, although targeted 
filtering based on keywords or URLs occurs at the level of the home or institution level 
(schools, libraries, hotels, corporations, specific government agencies, etc.).529 Any 
broader restriction of search engine results is implemented by the search engine itself (as 
will be described in section 4.3). 
526 Paul Geitner. Google Moves Toward Settlement of European Antitrust Investigation. New York 
Times. 25 July 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/technology/eu-nears-settlement-of-google-
antitrust-investigation.html and Rohin Dharmakumar. Is Google Gobbling Up the Indian Internet 
Space? Forbes India. 22 July 2013. http://forbesindia.com/article/real-issue/is-google-gobbling-
up-the-indian-internet-space/35641/0 (Accessed 21 May 2014.)
527 As of April 2014. LiveInternet. www.liveinternet.ru/stat/ru/searches.html?slice=ru;period=month.
528 As of December 2013. Steven Millward, op. cit.
529 John G. Palfrey, Jr. Local Nets on a Global Network: Filtering and the Internet Governance Problem. 
THE GLOBAL FLOW OF INFORMATION, Jack Balkin, ed. Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 10-
41. p.8. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1655006. 
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Filtering of websites but not the search engines:
In Russia, since 2012 ISP’s are required to filter blacklisted websites.530 Thus if a user 
of Google or Yandex conducts a search whose results include a link to a blacklisted 
website, and if he or she clicks on that link, an error message will be displayed in place 
of the website. The message, generated by the ISP, explains that the page has been 
filtered in compliance with law. Below is an example of such a page in Russian. In English 
translation it reads: 
Dear users!
We beg your pardon, but access to the requested services is now limited.
Possible reasons for it: 
1. The network address identifying the web site on the internet is included in the ‘General 
list of domain names that include prohibited information.’ 
2. The access is limited in accordance with a court decision or other Russian legal 
norms.
Figure 3: Error message displayed for filtered website in Russia
Limited filtering of search engines:
In India, Google (or other search engines) are generally not filtered through governmental 
orders. An exception to this is the temporary ‘internet blackout’ ordered by the 
530 J.Y. Lurk no more: Internet censorship in Russia. The Economist Eastern approaches blog. 
 http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/11/internet-censorship-russia 
(Accessed 21 May 2014.)
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Government of Jammu and Kashmir in 2012 in response to violent outbreaks after the 
release of  the ‘innocence of Muslims’ YouTube film,531 during which all search engines 
and other websites were rendered inaccessible. Additionally, in 2012 the Delhi High 
Court threatened to block Google and other internet services if they did not take steps to 
monitor and remove objectionable content from their platforms.532 
Extensive filtering of overseas search engines accompanied by temporary 
disconnection from the internet:
The phenomenon of internet filtering in China has been the subject of extensive research 
and scholarly publication over the past decade.533 While it is beyond the scope of this 
case study to provide an in-depth summary of that research, it is nonetheless important to 
understand some basic characteristics of Internet filtering in China in order to understand 
how filtering affects freedom of expression for Chinese search engine users – and for 
websites aiming to reach audiences in China. 
In China blacklisted websites are filtered, as are web pages containing politically 
sensitive words or banned URLs, including pages displaying search queries and search 
results containing sensitive words. When a user tries to access a filtered URL, or a page 
containing filtered keywords or links, an error message stating “the webpage cannot be 
found” appears in his or her browser. Below is how the message appears in an Internet 
Explorer browser:
531 J&K govt orders blackout of anti-Islam film, blocks internet. Indiatoday. 21 September 2012. 
 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/jammu-and-kashmir-govt-orders-blackout-of-anti-islam-film-
blocks-internet/1/221569.html (Accessed: 16 April 2014.)
532 Filter content or face blackout, Delhi HC warns Facebook, Google. Reddiff.com. 13 January 2012. 
 http://www.rediff.com/money/slide-show/slide-show-1-tech-delhi-hc-warns-facebook-
google/20120113.htm (Accessed: 16 April 2014.)
533 See for example Jonathan Zittrain and Ben Edelman. Internet Filtering in China. IEEE Internet 
Computing March/April 2003. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/
unpan011043.pdf;  OpenNet Initiative. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study. 
https://opennet.net/studies/china; and Xueyang Xu, Z. Morley Mao, and J. Alex Halderman. Internet 
Censorship in China:
 Where Does the Filtering Occur? In Proceedings of PAM . 2011. http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/
Papers/china-censorship-pam11.pdf.
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Figure 4: “This website cannot be found” browser error in China.
No notification or explanation of the restriction is provided to the user from the ISP or 
other authorities. However – assuming that the user indeed made no errors in typing 
the URL and the link is not out of date as the error message implies – technical testing 
confirms that the appearance of this error message indicates that the webpage has in 
fact been filtered. At the same time that the browser displays this error message the 
user’s internet connection is disconnected for anywhere between several seconds to a 
few minutes. 534
All web content and services including search engines operating from outside China’s 
jurisdiction are filtered when their content passes through internet exchange points via 
which all internet traffic is routed in and out of the country – with the exception of Hong 
534 Xu, Mao, and Halderman. op. cit.  p. 137 and James Fallows. ‘The Connection Has Been Reset’. The 
Atlantic. 1 March 2008. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/-the-connection-
has-been-reset/306650/  (Accessed 22 May 2014.)
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Kong.535 If the entire search engine is blacklisted, then the entire service is inaccessible. 
If only specific keywords and URLs are programmed into the filtering blacklist, then the 
front page of the search engine is accessible but searches on certain terms will trigger 
the filters, resulting in the error page pictured above as well as a temporary disconnection 
of internet service. Such disruption makes search engines operating from outside very 
inconvenient to use in China even when their main search page is accessible.
Within China, ISP level filters are not as extensive as the filters deployed at the exchange 
points controlling international traffic.536 Websites operating from within the jurisdiction 
of China are not subject to the same degree of filtering because they carry out their own 
content restrictions in response to government requests and requirements (see section 
4.3 of this study and Study 3 for more detail). 
4.3 Measures Taken by Search Engines
In any given jurisdiction, search engine operators may restrict or manipulate content 
through any or all of the following actions:
1. remove specific pages or even entire websites from the search engine’s index;
2. program the spider not to add certain pages, entire websites, or sites containing 
certain content;
3. program the search engine’s algorithm not to deliver results for certain queries;
4. program the algorithm to favour or “weight” certain types of web pages over others;
5. influence the user’s understanding of certain search results by adding explanatory 
statements, warnings, or statements in accompanying advertising. 
As with the service providers discussed in the previous case study, search engines may 
restrict content at the request of a government authority or other external party, or may 
restrict content to enforce their own terms of service and other private rules or procedures.
Personalization: In 2005 Google started tailoring search results for all logged-in users to 
their apparent preferences and interests based on search history. In 2009 personalization 
was extended to all Google searches even if the user is logged out, based on browser 
cookie records.537 Critics have expressed concern about the effect of personalization on 
freedom of expression because it renders the same website more or less visible to different 
535 Xu, Mao, and Halderman, op. cit. pp. 133-142; also see James T. Areddy. Birds Above, Data Below: 
Where the U.S. Internet Meets China’s. The Wall Street Journal China Realtime blog. 8 July 2014. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/08/birds-above-data-below-where-the-u-s-internet-
meets-chinas/ and James T. Areddy, Paul Mozur, and Danny Yadron. From Mountains, Island, 
Secret Town, China’s Electronic Spy Shop Watches. The Wall Street Journal. 7 July 2014. http://
online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-spy-agency-has-broad-reach-1404781324. (Accessed 10 August 
2014.)  
536 Xu, Mao , and Halderman, op. cit.  
537 Personalized Search for Everyone. Google Official Blog. 4 December 2009. http://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2009/12/personalized-search-for-everyone.html (Accessed 14 September, 2014.)
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users depending on their prior browsing habits.538 The full impact of personalization on 
freedom of expression globally remains unclear. Some have argued that the issue is less 
about the degree of personalization and more about the extent to which the user is able to 
understand and control the factors affecting their own searches.539 One recent academic 
study of Google searches found that personalization varies widely depending on the 
query, and that personalization was much less measurable for queries made on Google 
when logged out.540 Personalization also occurs on Baidu and Yandex.541
4.3.1 Company policies on government requests and legal requirements 
The legal environments of the companies’ home jurisdictions heavily shape their policies 
and practices related to content restriction. 
Baidu: Content forbidden by the terms of service overlaps directly with content designated 
as illegal in China. Specifically, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Article 15 of Measures on 
the Administration of Internet Information Services, (hereafter referred to as “Measures”) 
stipulates what have come to be known as the “nine forbidden content categories” for 
Chinese online services.542
Under China’s strict liability regime described in Chapter 2, all online services including 
search engines are held liable for failing to prevent content that falls into these “forbidden 
nine categories” from appearing on their platforms. Industry representatives interviewed 
for this report confirm that companies including Baidu receive regular instructions as well 
538 Jessica Thompson. Search Personalization: Good or Bad? Advance Digital Search & Social Group. 
http://www.advancessg.com/search-personalization-good-or-bad/ (Accessed 14 September 
2014.)
539 Van Hoboken, op. cit. p. 205
540 Aniko Hannak, Balachander Krishnamurthy, David Lazer, Christo Wilson, Arash Molavi Kakhki 
and Alan Mislove. Measuring Personalization of Web Search. WWW ‘13 Proceedings of the 22nd 
international conference on World Wide Web. pp. 527-538. http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/cbw/
pdf/fp039-hannak.pdf
541 Matt McGee. Yandex Turns Up The Dial On Personalized Search. Search Engine Land. 13 May 
2013. 
 http://searchengineland.com/yandex-turns-up-the-dial-on-personalized-search-161695 (Accessed 
15 September, 2014) and Min Jiang. The Business and Politics of Search Engines: A Comparative 
Study of Baidu and Google’s Search Results of Internet Events in China. http://www.researchgate.
net/publication/256016569_The_Business_and_Politics_of_Search_Engines_A_Comparative_
Study_of_Baidu_and_Googles_Search_Results_of_Internet_Events_in_China. New Media & 
Society. 16(2). pp. 212-233.
542 Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services, http://www.net.cn/static/hosting/
fa_xinxi.htm. The “nine forbidden categories” apply to content that:  1. Opposes the fundamental 
principles determined in the Constitution; 2. Compromises State security, discloses State secrets, 
subverts State power or damages national unity; 3.Harms the dignity or interests of the State; 
4.Incites ethnic hatred or racial discrimination or damages inter-ethnic unity; 5. Sabotages State 
religious policy or propagates heretical teachings or feudal superstitions; 6.Disseminates rumors, 
disturbs social order or disrupts social stability; 7. Propagates obscenity, pornography, gambling, 
violence, murder or fear or incites the commission of crimes; 8.Insults or slanders a third party or 
infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of a third party; 9.Includes other content prohibited 
by laws or administrative regulations. For further analysis of Chinese online content regulation see: 
Anne S.Y. Cheung. The Business of Governance: China’s Legislation on Content Regulation in 
Cyberspace. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2006, v. 38, p. 1-37 
http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/38.1_2-Cheung.pdf 
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as “blacklists” from authorities specifying what content needs to be either removed or 
blocked by the service itself.543
Baidu does not limit content restrictions to its home jurisdiction: the same search results 
that it restricts in China are also restricted for users anywhere in the world.544
Yandex: As discussed in Chapter 2, several Russian laws passed between 2012 and 2014 
empower the government’s executive branch to blacklist “extremist” content, content 
deemed harmful to minors, and copyright infringing content among other content without 
requiring a court order.545 However in an interview for this report, Yandex executives 
insisted that the company does not filter or remove search results. Our researchers found 
no evidence to the contrary. In response to an e-mailed query, Yandex public relations 
manager Katerina Karnaukhova responded: 
“It is a fact and we are sad to confess that today in the Internet there are also 
materials that violate the law or ethical norms, but we still conduct our search 
all over the Internet and it is not our goal to edit or filter it. We do not block any 
information in our search results. If material is deleted from a website, it will also 
disappear from the search results.”546
It is important to note that for content on other services beyond its search platform 
Yandex executives told our researchers in an interview that the company does receive 
and comply with content removal requests for other services such as video and photo 
hosting. 
Google: The company’s global reach has led it to adopt policies and practices that are 
both global but also sufficiently flexible so that the company can reach Internet users 
living in a vast array of different policy and legal contexts.
As a member of the Global Network Initiative, Google has made a commitment to interpret 
content removal demands from authorized authorities as narrowly as possible, and to 
challenge demands that appear incongruous with relevant law.547 Google publishes 
information about its process for evaluating and responding to government and private 
543 Interviewee wished to remain anonymous, date and location not disclosed for that purpose.
544 See Baidu is charged in U.S. for its online censorship. The Wall Street Journal. 19 May 2011. 
http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20110519/tec143847.asp (Accessed 16 June 2014) and Baidu and Chinese 
government are sued in New York for online censorship. 19 May 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/
zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2011/05/110519_baidu_lawsuit.shtml (Accessed 16 June 2014.)
545 Decree #1101 of the Government of the Russian Federation dated October 26, 2012. ‘On the 
Uniform Automated Information System of the Russian Internet Blacklist.’ English translation 
at: http://eais.rkn.gov.ru/docs.eng/1101.pdf; also see Courtney Weaver and Charles Clover, 
Russia’s ‘internet blacklist’ sparks fears. FT.com. 11 July 2012. (Accessed 16 June, 2014) and 
Russian federal law 292521-6. Russian text at: http://www.copyright.ru/ru/library/zakonoproekti/
pravovoe_regulirovanie_in/zakon_292521-6/; also see Monika Emert and Frederic Dubois. Russia: 
controversial anti-piracy law comes into force. Internet Policy Review. 1 August 2013. http://
policyreview.info/articles/news/russia-controversial-anti-piracy-law-comes-force/185 (Accessed 16 
June 2014.) 
546 E-mail exchange with researcher Tatiana Indina, April 2014.
547 Global Network Initiative Implementation Guidelines. 
 https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php 
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demands to remove or filter content.548 The company’s “Transparency Report” (discussed 
in greater detail below and in the “Transparency” section 4.5 of this case study) indicates 
that it challenges or refuses to comply with a significant percentage of government 
requests around the world.549 When it complies with a government request to restrict 
a piece of content in one jurisdiction, the content is restricted from view only in the 
jurisdiction where the request was made, unless the content also happens to violate the 
company’s terms of service.550 (In the case of European court decisions meant to apply to 
the entire European Union such as the ‘right to be forgotten’ case discussed later in this 
study, Google has interpreted this commitment to apply to its online properties across 
the EU but not beyond.) Child pornography, illegal in all jurisdictions, is one category of 
content that Google voluntarily and proactively removes from its search results without 
waiting for government requests.551
4.3.2 Self-regulation
Of the three search engines studied in this report, only Google uses its terms of service 
and internal policies to restrict a significant amount of content not prohibited by law. 
This is particularly true in the United States where the law restricts relatively little speech 
compared in comparison with the rest of the world. While some Google services such 
as YouTube and Google+ do not allow pornography, “graphic or gratuitous violence,” 
and “hate speech,” (though Blogger allows certain “adult content”),552 Google considers 
its search engine to be its “least restrictive” of expression “because search results are 
a reflection of the content of the web.”553 Still, it does restrict and manipulate content 
globally in accordance with its terms of service and other internal policies. Examples 
include:
Sensitive personal information: Google excludes sensitive personal information such as 
‘sensitive government ID numbers, bank account and credit card numbers, and images 
548 Controversial content and free expression on the web: a refresher. Official Google Blog. 19 April 
2010. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/controversial-content-and-free.html (Accessed 16 
June 2014.)
549 Google Transparency Report. Requests to Remove Content. From Government. Summary of All 
Requests. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/ 
550 Google Transparency Report. Turkey. http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
government/TR/ For example in the January-June 2013 reporting period: “We received 1,126 
requests from government agencies to remove a total of 1,345 items from Blogger, Google+, 
and Web Search that the agencies claimed were in violation of law 5651. We removed 188 items 
that violated our product policies.” Also see: Jeff Landale. Google transparency report sheds light 
on internet threats. 6 December 2012. https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2012/12/06/google-
transparency-report-sheds-light-on-internet-threats (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
551 Ben Rooney. Microsoft, Google Join To Battle Child Porn. Wall Street Journal. 18 November 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB40001424052702304439804579205874211710440 
(Accessed 15 April, 2014.)
552 “We do allow adult content on Blogger, including images or videos that contain nudity or sexual 
activity. But, please mark your blog as ‘adult’ in your Blogger settings. Otherwise, we may put it 
behind a ‘mature content’ interstitial.” Google. Blogger Content Policy. https://www.blogger.com/
content.g?hl=en (Accessed 4 May 2014.)
553 Rachel Whetstone. Controversial Content and Free Expression on the Web: A Refresher. Official 
Google blog. 19 April 2010. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/controversial-content-and-
free.html. (Accessed 4 May 2014.)
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of signatures’554 when users file removal requests.555 However, Google refuses such 
requests when it ‘believe[s] someone is attempting to abuse these policies to remove 
other information from our results’.556 
Penalties for prohibited search engine optimization techniques: Google penalizes 
websites that attempt to appear higher in search results by manipulating their website 
code or paying for links in a way that violates Google’s search engine optimization 
policies. Several websites of reputable brands have been punished for this,557 including 
WordPress,558 the Washington Post,559 the BBC560 and Rap Genius.561
Spam and malware: Google search automatically, through algorithms and manual 
“demotion” of spam pages, penalizes pages that contain irrelevant content just to 
appear higher in ranking.562 Google proactively shields users from spam and malware 
by displaying prominent warnings (‘The Website Ahead Contains Malware!’) when users 
click on bad links.563 Yandex also protects its users by placing a warning message in 
search results next to websites that contain harmful code.564
Security of websites: As part of an effort to encourage website owners to strengthen 
their security practices, in August 2014 Google announced that its search algorithms 
would favor websites that use HTTPS encryption by default, thus shielding the user’s 
554 Google. Inside Search – Policies. https://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/policies.
html 
555 Google. Search Help – Removal Policies. 
 https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en (Accessed 1 July 2014); and 
Sheily Chhabria. ‘Protecting Consumers From Identity Theft and Scams’. Google Public Policy 
Blog. 5 March 2014. http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2014/03/protecting-consumers-from-
identity.html (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
556 Google. Search Help – Removal Policies. 
 https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en 
557 Danny Sullivan. 10 Big Brands That Were Penalized By Google, From Rap Genius To The BBC. 
Marketing Land. 12 February 2014. http://marketingland.com/10-big-brands-that-were-penalized-
by-google-69646 (Accessed 2 May 2014.)
558 Andy Baio. Wordpress Website’s Search Engine Spam. Waxy blog. 30 March 2005. http://waxy.
org/2005/03/wordpress_websi (Accessed 1 July 2014.); and Matt Mullenweg. A Response. 1 April 
2005. http://ma.tt/2005/04/a-response (Accessed 1 July 2014.) 
559 Shawn Smith. Google takes Washington Post, news sites and popular blogs down a notch. New 
Media Bytes. 24 October 2007. www.newmediabytes.com/2007/10/24/google-takes-washington-
post-news-sites-and-popular-blogs-down-a-notch (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
560 Barry Schwartz. Google Penalized One Article On BBC’s Web Site. Search Engine Land. 18 March 
2013. 
 http://searchengineland.com/google-penalized-one-article-on-bbcs-web-site-151954 (Accessed 
29 April 2014.)
561 Lydia Laurenson. Google, Censorship, and Salesmanship: The Epic Smackdown of RapGenius. 
Medium: Futures Exchange. 22 January 2014. https://medium.com/futures-exchange/
b0c49f6853ca (Accessed 3 May 2014.); Leslie Kaufman. Google Penalizes Rap Genius for Gaming 
Search Rank. New York Times. 26 December 2013. www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/business/
media/google-penalizes-rap-genius-for-gaming-search-rank.html (Accessed 3 May 2014.)
562 Google. Inside Search – Fighting Spam. https://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/
fighting-spam.html (Accessed 3 May 2014.)
563 Sheily Chhabria. Protecting Consumers From Identity Theft and Scams. Google Public Policy Blog. 
5 March 2014. http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2014/03/protecting-consumers-from-
identity.html (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
564 Yandex. Identifying potentially harmful sites.  http://help.yandex.com/search/beware/harmful-sites.
xml 
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activity on the website from interception (although a web browser as well as tracking 
cookies may still record and transmit information about websites visited).565
4.3.3 Features particular to search engines
In addition to the main search results, all three search engines studied include other 
features unique to search engines that can be subject to manipulation or restriction in 
distinct ways:
Search query prediction: Google, Baidu, and Yandex all offer a feature known as 
“autocomplete” or “word completion” which automatically generates suggested word 
combinations after the user types in the first letters or words of a search. All three services 
exclude certain words and phrases from this function. Baidu and Yandex exclude 
predictions that would lead the users to content that is illegal under Chinese or Russian 
law, respectively.566 Google excludes the same categories of content that it restricts on 
its social media platforms as well as “predictions about activities that could result in real-
world physical harm”, such as human trafficking; sale of drugs, weapons or other illegal 
goods and services; and “illegal and dangerous activities, like assault and suicide.”567
Search-word related advertising: All three search engines studied display advertising 
alongside relevant search terms. Baidu and Yandex apply domestic legal standards.568 
Google restricts a broader range of content than U.S. law requires for its AdWords service 
that displays advertisements alongside search results linked to particular words. For 
example, speech that constitutes “attempts to revise history against the interests of a 
protected group” is constitutionally protected in the United States but is prohibited in 
Google Adwords because it is illegal elsewhere. Google cites legal regulations alongside 
its goal “to ensure a positive user experience, and to protect Google’s brand” as reasons 
for its global restrictions on hate speech in AdWords.569
Parental controls: Google’s SafeSearch feature allows users to voluntarily choose settings 
that filter adult content (regardless whether it is legal or illegal in their home jurisdiction) 
from search results. Google maintains a manually curated “whitelist” for misidentified 
websites (such as essex.edu, for example) to prevent them from being classified as 
565 Google to prioritise secure sites. 7 August 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28687513; 
and HTTPS as a ranking signal. Google Webmaster Central Blog. 6 August 2014.  http://
googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2014/08/https-as-ranking-signal.html (14 August 2014.)
566 The application of autocomplete in a Baidu search box. Baidu Alliance User Experience Center. 
http://ueo.baidu.com/?p=2325 (Accessed 16 June 2014.) This guidance specifies that ‘Baidu 
Suggest will filter politics and pornography’. Also see Yandex corporate principles. http://company.
yandex.ru/rules
567 Yandex corporate principles, op. cit.. And Yandex code of corporate ethics. http://company.yandex.
ru/rules/code/ 
568 For example, search ‘free vpn’ on Baidu, there will be little advertising along the right side of search 
results. Above the results, there is a warning: ‘According to relevant laws and policies, part of the 
search results is not shown.’ Experiment conducted by the report’s China researcher. 30 June 2014. 
Also see Yandex corporate principles and Yandex code of corporate ethics, op. cit.  
569 Google Advertising Policies support. Offensive or inappropriate content.  https://support.google.
com/adwordspolicy/answer/175902?hl=en&ref_topic=1626336  
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pornography.570 In some jurisdictions Google turns on SafeSearch by default.571 Yandex 
offers a similar optional service called ‘family search’. By default Yandex filters adult 
content that is not specifically sought (no adult content will appear when simply entering 
general terms like ‘videos’), though this ‘moderate’ filter setting can also be disabled.572 
4.3.4 Implementation in national context
China 
Baidu displays a mix of compromise and pragmatism in the face of strict liability combined 
with broad laws and regulations. Baidu’s algorithm is programmed to block results 
containing words and phrases that appear on the government blacklists, along with entire 
websites that the company is instructed to remove from its search database. The volume 
and nature of government requests is not officially disclosed. However, some overseas-
based websites573 and news media574 have obtained and published lists of sensitive 
words and topics that companies have received. In 2009 the U.S.-based website China 
Digital Times published a set of documents leaked by a Baidu employee.575 Based on an 
analysis of these leaked materials combined with stakeholder interviews, the restricted 
words, phrases, and Web addresses can be divided into the following categories:
• Names of the Chinese high leadership
• Protests and dissident movements 
• Events, places and people deemed politically sensitive
• Foreign websites and organizations blocked at the network level
• Other (pornography, etc.)
Researchers have found that most of the instructions to remove or block specific content 
from search results are communicated on a “just in time” basis: as warranted by breaking 
570 Google. Inside Search – Policies. op. cit. 
571 Testing conducted by the report’s China researcher confirmed that SafeSearch feature could not be 
deactivated on Google.com.hk. 30 June 2014.
572 Yandex. Filtering adult content. http://help.yandex.com/search/beware/adult-filter.xml More 
elaborate Russian explanation at http://company.yandex.ru/rules/filtration.
573 Censorship of keywords in China. Greatfire.org. https://en.greatfire.org/search/keywords. Berkeley-
based China Digital Times operates an Open-Sourced Research on Blacklisted Search Keywords 
on Sina Weibo, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/category/%E7%BD%91%E6%83%85%E9%8
0%8F%E8%A7%86/%E6%95%8F%E6%84%9F%E8%AF%8D%E5%BA%93/.
574 Keywords Used to Filter Web Content. Washington Post, 18 February 2006, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/18/AR2006021800554html/ (Accessed 25 
June 2014.)
575 Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked (1) (Updated). China Digital Times. 
30 April 2009. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-
document-leaked/; Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked (2). China Digital 
Times. 29 April 2009.  
 https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-document-
leaked-2/ ; Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked (3). China Digital Times. 
28 April 2009.  http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-
document-leaked-3/ (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
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news and other “sudden incidents”- accidents, natural disasters, corruption scandals, 
etc. - that may trigger strong responses from Chinese “netizens.” Such restrictions are 
often limited to a specific period of time rather than permanent.576 One lawyer interviewed 
for this report who has been involved with cases involving online content observed that 
authorities increasingly communicate instructions by phone instead of in writing.577 
According to one industry executive, Baidu would seem sometimes to ignore requests 
from local government authorities whose concerns and priorities are not shared by central 
authorities. While it reportedly pro-actively restricts content known to be a concern to 
central authorities, Baidu seems likely to wait for a government demand rather than pro-
actively remove “relatively obscure” politically sensitive information, particularly around 
emerging incidents in remote locations far from Beijing.
Despite the frequent and often extensive demands placed on companies to restrict 
content, even a domestic critic of the government’s approach to regulating the Internet 
described search engines like Baidu as a “positive force” for freedom of expression. 
“There is some space for information to be spread before the supervising departments 
catch up and tag it as sensitive,” one entrepreneur and industry veteran said in an 
interview. “After all, the Internet companies are private businesses. So in order to attract 
clicks, they do their best to provide fast and objective information.” 578
Since 2010, Google no longer operates a search service within Chinese jurisdiction and 
no longer complies with Chinese government requests to restrict search results.579 As of 
early August 2014 the front page of Google search, including google.com and its Hong 
Kong-based search engine google.com.hk, was filtered in China.580 
576 Internet censorship listed: how does each country compare? The Guardian. 16 April 2014. 
 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2012/apr/16/internet-censorship-country-list 
(Accessed 26 June 2014.) 
577 Interviewee wished to remain anonymous, date and location not disclosed for that purpose.
578 Interviewee wished to remain anonymous, date and location not disclosed for that purpose.
579 After short revival, Google service disruptions in China return. Reuters. 11 July 2012. 
  http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/google-china-idINKBN0FF1DO20140711 (Accessed 10 
July.)
580 Abby Liu. Just Google It? Not In China, Where Google Remains Blocked. 18 June 2014.
 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/06/18/china-google-censorship-tiannamen-block/ (Accessed 
10 July.)
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BOX: Google Search in China, 2006-2010
In January 2006 Google launched a search engine operated from within China, Google.cn. Between 2006 and 
2010 Google.cn was not subject to network-level filtering because it complied with government requirements 
to restrict its search results. This enabled Google to compete more effectively for Chinese users with Baidu, 
whose search results are rarely subject to ISP-level filtering because the company restricts its search results 
in accordance with government instructions. Then in early 2010, in the wake of a large-scale cyber-attack, 
Google’s U.S.-based management decided to re-locate Google.cn to Hong Kong, whose legal system is 
separate from the rest of China. After the relocation, China-based users of Google.cn experienced frequent 
outages triggered by the network-level filtering of search results containing sensitive words. This resulted in 
a sharp drop in Google’s market share, and corresponding boost to Baidu’s market share.  Then in June 2014, 
Google search became almost completely inaccessible to Chinese users with the exception of Hong Kong and 
remained so at the time of this report’s writing.
India 
Google receives and responds to numerous requests for the removal of search results 
in response to governmental and law enforcement requests as well as court orders. At 
times, Google restricts access to content based on these requests. For example, in 2012 
Google restricted access to the film “Innocence of Muslims” in India as well as a number 
of other countries.584 Also in 2012, Google received a court order for the removal of 247 
search results linking to websites that allegedly violated individuals’ privacy. Google did 
not remove the search results as the relationship between the results and the court order 
were unclear.585 Between January and June 2012, based on court orders Google removed 
360 search results linking to webpages containing adult content that allegedly violated 
individuals’ privacy.586 According to Google’s Transparency Report, the types of content 
that have been requested for removal since July 2010 in India include: defamation, 
religious offense, privacy and security, impersonation, adult content, hate speech, 
bullying/harassment, copyright, government criticism, national security, geographical 
dispute, and information that falls in the category of ‘other’.
In the January to June 2013 transparency reporting period, requests for removal of 
defamatory content from the Google search platform were at their highest, with requests 
for removal of content that constituted impersonation, adult content, and religious offense 
following. For the same reporting period, requests for removal of content on Google’s 
581 Google to censor China Web searches. 24 January 2006. CNet.com. http://news.cnet.com/
Google-to-censor-China-Web-searches/2100-1028_3-6030784.html (Accessed 16 June 2014.)
582 Google angers China by shifting service to Hong Kong. 23 March 2010. The Guardian. 
 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/mar/23/google-china-censorship-hong-kong 
(Accessed 16 July 2014.)
583 Google Losing Ground in China. 31 March 2011. The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052748704530204576234693138486996 (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
584 Google Transparency Report. India- Requests to remove content. Government Requests. July – 
December 2012. 
 http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?p=2012-12 
585 Google Transparency Report. India- Requests to remove content. Government Requests. July – 
December 2012. 
 http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?p=2012-12 
586 Google Transparency Report. India- Requests to remove content. Government Requests. January 
– June 2012. http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?p=2012-06 
113
image search included adult content, defamatory content, and content impacting 
individual privacy and security. On the Google web search autocomplete, defamatory 
content was affected the most.587 This is in contrast to the July - December 2012 reporting 
period, where Google web search received the highest number of removal requests for 
content infringing on privacy and security.588 
Russia 
As noted in the previous section, Yandex executives claim that the search engine does 
not restrict search results because illegal websites are already filtered by the ISPs.  In 
April 2014, the Duma passed the so-called “blogger law,” requiring bloggers with more 
than 3,000 visitors per day to register with the government as media. Such “popular 
bloggers” would also be required to use their real names and adhere to mass media 
regulations. In response, Yandex shut down a feature of its blog search that displayed 
ratings and readership figures, claiming that the numbers were not entirely accurate.589 
This step served to shield popular bloggers who did not register.  
Google reports that it removes some search results at the request of the Russian 
government, documenting what requests it has received and complied with through its 
Transparency Report.  (which will be discussed in greater detail in the “Transparency” 
section of this case study). For the January to June 2013 reporting period, Google 
received one court order and three other orders categorized as “executive, police etc” 
to remove four results. The company complied with all four orders, three of which were 
related to “suicide promotion,” a content category prohibited under Russian law, while 
the fourth request was unspecified. In 2012 Google received and complied with one 
request described as being related to “national security” and two requests described 
also as “suicide promotion.” 590 
In Russia, both Yandex and Google lobbied against the Antipiracy law (Bill No 292521), 
passed in 2013, that makes it illegal to spread content in a way that violates copyright.591 
Both companies oppose the law in its current form because it maximizes opportunities 
for accidental over-blocking which affects websites that are not infringing copyright or 
otherwise illegal. Google advocates that Russia should adopt a DMCA-style “notice and 
takedown” approach (despite its noted flaws in the United States, as discussed below), 
whereby the party whose copyright is infringed directly notifies the company hosting the 
content of the infringement. Industry interviewees told our researchers that Google is 
587 Google Transparency Report. India - Requests to Remove Content. Summary of All Requests. 
Government Requests.  January – June 2013. 
 http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/ 
588 Google Transparency Report. India - Requests to Remove Content. Government Requests. 
Product Breakdown. January – June 2012. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
government/IN/?metric=compliance&by=product&p=2012-12 
589 «Яндекс» закрыл рейтинг популярности блогеров [Yandex has closed popularity blogger 
ratings] Lenta.ru, April 18, 2014, http://rt.com/politics/155580-russia-internet-blogger-bill/http://
lenta.ru/news/2014/04/18/blogi1/ 
590 Google Transparency Report. Russia. Requests to Remove Content. Government Requests. By 
Product. January-June 2013. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/
RU/?by=product (Accesssed 28 June 2014.)
591 Russian federal law 292521-6. op. cit. 
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appealing to copyright owners in Russia to take their complaints directly to the company 
hosting the content in order to avoid government involvement that could lead to broader 
filtering. Yandex representatives, on the other hand, stated in interviews that the company 
chooses not to act as a mediator for online content issues, including copyright issues.
In July 2014 the Russian parliament enacted a new law requiring foreign internet companies 
to store personal data of Russian users within the country. The law originally set an 
implementation deadline of January 1, 2016 but in September the parliament moved the 
deadline to January 1, 2015.592  The law has been interpreted in the international media to 
mean that foreign intermediaries might be filtered by Russian ISPs if they fail to comply. 
Since it is possible to provide search service without collecting any user data, it remains 
unclear how Google search will be affected by this law. (Other Google services such as 
GMail and YouTube which do store large quantities of user data and content as part of 
their core services, seemed more likely as of this writing to be affected, although those 
services are not within the scope of this study.)593
The United States
Most of the instances in which Google restricts search results globally are to comply with 
copyright law. In fact, copyright takedown notices are responsible for 95 per cent of the 
takedown requests Google receives for search results, and it complies with 97 per cent of 
them.594 However, critics point out that the DMCA copyright takedown system in the U.S. 
(discussed in the “Intermediary liability” section of Chapter 2) incentivizes search engines 
to promptly remove content rather than question requests, because the penalties for the 
search engine can be astronomical: up to $150,000 per infringement.595 This can have a 
negative impact on freedom of expression because the DMCA system makes it easy for 
those who want content to be removed from the Internet to abuse the system by claiming 
copyright infringement.596 
592 Sergei Blagov. Russia Seeks New ‘Impossible’ Deadline For Server Localization of Jan. 1, 2015. 
Bloomberg. 8 September 2014. 
 http://www.bna.com/russia-seeks-new-n17179894570/ (Accessed 2 October 2014.)
593 Paul Sonne and Olga Razumovskaya. Russia Steps Up New Law to Control Foreign Internet 
Companies. The Wall Street Journal. 24 September 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/
russia-steps-up-new-law-to-control-foreign-internet-companies-1411574920?cb=logg
ed0.07114209281280637 (Accessed 2 October 2014.)
594 How Google Fights Piracy. September 2013. p. 16. https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/file/
d/0BwxyRPFduTN2dVFqYml5UENUeUE/edit 
595 Mitch Stoltz. To Safeguard the Public Domain (and the Public Interest), Fix Copyright’s Crazy 
Penalties. EFF Deeplinks blog. 18 January 2014. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/safeguard-
public-domain-and-public-interest-fix-copyrights-crazy-penalties (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
596 Daniel Seng. The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices. 
20 March 2014. Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2411915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411915; Also see Takedown Hall 
of Shame. Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://www.eff.org/takedowns (Accessed 9 August 
2014.)
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sGoogle says that it receives “inaccurate or unjustified copyright removal requests 
for search results that clearly do not link to infringing content,” noting that it does not 
comply with such requests. In 2012 Google’s Fred von Lohmann wrote: “We’ve also 
seen baseless copyright removal requests being used for anticompetitive purposes, 
or to remove content unfavorable to a particular person or company from our search 
results.”597 Google sometimes takes a stand against the requests. For example in 2013, 
Google refused to remove from its search results “The Pirate Bay” home page - the Pirate 
Bay website’s individual pages may infringe copyright, but the home page itself does not 
host any copyright-infringing content.598 
In 2012, Google’s algorithms were reprogrammed to support the DMCA system: The 
company announced websites that receive high numbers of “valid copyright removal 
notices…may appear lower in our results.” The purpose, according to an official Google 
blog post, is to “help users find legitimate, quality sources of content more easily.”599600601
BOX: Impact of domestic website restrictions on global search 
In 2012, the software engineer and writer David Auerbach wrote of problems caused by algorithms that “do 
not arise from malicious intent, but from expediency and happenstance.”600 Companies that operate search 
engines are learning that applying an inherently apolitical mathematical algorithm to a heavily manipulated 
and filtered corpus of websites can be harmful to freedom of expression. 
In early 2014 the activist group GreatFire accused Microsoft Bing of extending its Chinese-language content 
restriction practices required for its operation inside China to users located in other jurisdictions where 
the same laws and requirements do not apply. The activists pointed to a comparison of Google’s Chinese 
language search results for terms considered politically sensitive in China, versus Bing’s Chinese-language 
search results – in both instances when the search is conducted from jurisdictions such as the United States 
and the UK. While Google’s results contained content from many web pages that are filtered or otherwise 
inaccessible in China, Bing’s results contained mainly content from websites created and operated from 
within China – and which are therefore subject to Chinese laws and regulations. Microsoft responded that it 
“does not apply China’s legal requirements to searches conducted outside of China.”601
597 Fred von Lohmann. Transparency for Copyright Removals in Search. Official Google Blog. 24 
May 2012. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/transparency-for-copyright-removals-in.html 
(Accessed 9 August 2014.)
598 Ernesto Van Der Sar. Google Refuses to Move the Pirate Bay Homepage. TorrentFreak blog. 9 
September 2013. 
 http://torrentfreak.com/google-refuses-to-remove-the-pirate-bay-homepage-130909 (Accessed 2 
April 2014.)
599 An update to our search algorithms. Google Inside Search blog. 8 October 2012. http://insidesearch.
blogspot.com/2012/08/an-update-to-our-search-algorithms.html  (Accessed 2 April 2014.)
600 David Auerbach. The Stupidity of Computers. Issue 13: Machine Politics. Winter 2012. 
 http://nplusonemag.com/issue-13/essays/stupidity-of-computers/ (Accessed 2 April 2014.)
601 Microsoft, Bing Censor Chinese Search Results System Error. The Guardian. 12 February 2014. 
www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/12/microsoft-bing-censor-chinese-search-results-
system-error (Accessed 9 April 2014.)
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602 603
In the opinion of one member of this report’s research team who has studied the issue of search engines and 
freedom of expression over the past decade, the problem is more likely due to the fact that search ranking 
relies on calculating inbound links as well as user “click through” rates to a website. Due to the massive 
size of the Chinese internet (618 million users as of December 2013),602 incoming links and click-throughs 
for the websites that rank highly on Chinese search engines are orders of magnitude greater than click-
throughs for websites popular with the West. The number of people clicking through to simplified Chinese 
language websites based outside of China - particularly if they are filtered within the country - is inevitably, 
and substantially, lower.
It appears that Google’s search algorithm was adjusted to compensate for this imbalance created by 
jurisdiction-specific filtering, but as of early 2014, Bing’s had not.603 This incident speaks to an emerging 
challenge to freedom of expression and access to information on search engines—content restriction within 
a large country has the potential to affect speakers of that country’s primary language regardless of where 
they live. This can apparently be prevented only if the search engine operator identifies and compensates 
for lower click-through rates and inbound links that are intrinsically a feature of websites that are filtered.
4.3.5 Europe and the “Right to Be Forgotten”
As many of the examples in this case study have illustrated, search engines—even when 
operating in legal environments where freedom of expression receives strong protection 
— are not entirely neutral arbiters of information. Adjustments are made globally to the 
search algorithm in order to protect users from spam and malware or identity theft, to 
protect children from sexual exploitation, and to comply with intellectual property law. 
Many more adjustments are made in response to private and government requests in 
specific jurisdictions around the world. The role of search engines now faces a further 
set of challenges in Europe – and potentially around the world – with the European Court 
of Justice’s May 13, 2014 ruling, establishing the “right to be forgotten” throughout the 
European Union.
A previous UNESCO report, published in 2012, highlighted the inherent tensions between 
privacy and freedom of expression.604 One of many potential tensions is between the 
individual’s desire to eliminate negative information about him or herself from the Internet 
and the right of others to receive and impart information.605 On 13 May 2014, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in the case Google Spain v AEPD, brought 
against Google by a Spanish man who argued that an auction notice of his repossessed 
602 According to a January 2014 report by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). www.
cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201401/P020140116395418429515.pdf; Steven  Millward. 
16 January 2001. China Now Has Half a Billion Mobile Web Users, 618 Million Total Internet Users. 
Tech in Asia. 
 www.techinasia.com/cnnic-china-500-million-mobile-web-users-and-618-internet-users-2013 
(Accessed 9 April 2014.)
603 Rebecca MacKinnon. 14 February 2014.  Where is Microsoft Bing’s Transparency Report? The 
Guardian. 
 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/14/micorsoft-bing-china-censorship-
transparency (Accessed 9 April 2014.)
604 Mendel et. al., op. cit. p. 97-104.
605 Global Network Initiative. 15 May 2014.  EU Court ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Threatens 
Freedom of Expression. http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/eu-court-%E2%80%98right-
be-forgotten%E2%80%99-ruling-threatens-freedom-expression 
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home appearing in Google’s search results constituted a violation of his right to privacy. 
606 According to the court’s ruling, Internet users in Europe now have the right to 
demand that search engines remove links to web pages about them that are ‘inadequate, 
irrelevant or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing’.607 Furthermore, the 
individual’s right to privacy overrides ‘as a general rule’ the public’s interest in finding 
information. At the same time, the public interest may be preponderant, for example in 
the cases of public figures.608
The ruling came under heavy criticism from free expression groups such as Article 19, the 
Committee to Protect Journalists and Index on Censorship, who warned that excessive 
enforcement of privacy rights can impinge on press freedom.609 This position aligns with 
one that recognises that press freedom represents the right to use free expression to 
communicate with the wider public, and that while removing links to content does not 
per se violate the original expression, it eliminates much of the significance of publishing 
in the digital age. 
Other digital rights advocates argued that media coverage and the free expression 
community overreacted. For example, Joe McNamee, director of the European Digital 
Rights Initiative, pointed out that contrary to some press reports Google had ‘not been 
asked to delete data’, merely block the link from appearing in search results for searches 
on the name of the person in question.’610 Some also pointed out that the search engine 
operator is given a great deal of discretion in responding to individual requests, and is not 
compelled to remove any results prior to a court ruling. Jef Ausloos of the University of 
Leuven said that upon closer inspection ‘much of the wording seems to be very nuanced 
and limited in scope’.611 
606 Europe’s top court: people have right to be forgotten on Internet. Reuters. 13 May 2014.  http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/eu-google-dataprotection-idUSL6N0NZ23Q20140513 
(Accessed 14 July 2014.)
607 Read original CJEU ruling at Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González [2014] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131; For additional commentary see David Streitfeld. ‘European Court 
Lets Users Erase Records on Web’. New York Times. 14 May 2014. www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/
technology/google-should-erase-web-links-to-some-personal-data-europes-highest-court-says.
html (Accessed 24 June 2014.) 
608 CJEU ruling, op. cit. 
609 Geoffrey King. EU ‘right to be forgotten’ ruling will corrupt history. Committee to Protect Journalists. 
4 June 2014. http://cpj.org/blog/2014/06/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-will-corrupt-histo.php; 
Index urges court to rethink ruling on “right to be forgotten”. Index on Censorship. 30 May 2014. 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/05/index-urges-court-rethink-ruling-right-forgotten/; 
Gabrielle Guillemin A right to be forgotten? EU Court sets worrying precedent for free speech. 14 
May 2014. http://www.article19.org/join-the-debate.php/146/view/ (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
610 Joe McNamee. Google’s right to be forgotten – industrial scale misinformation? European Digital 
Rights Initiative. 9 June 2014. http://edri.org/forgotten (Accessed 24 June 2014.) McNamee 
links to the following two articles; Victoria Espinel. ‘Coming Together to Combat Online Piracy 
and Counterfeiting’. White House Office of Management and Budget’s ‘OMBlog’. 15 July 2013. 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/15/coming-together-combat-online-piracy-and-counterfeiting 
(Accessed 24 June 2014.); and Bad Google DMCA Takedown Is Hurting Us, Hosting Site Says. 
TorrentFreak. 30 March 2014. https://torrentfreak.com/bad-google-dmca-takedown-is-hurting-us-
hosting-site-says-140330 (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
611 Jef Ausloos. 13 May 2014. European Court Rules against Google, in Favour of Right to be 
Forgotten. London School of Economics and Political Science. Media Policy Blog. http://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/05/13/european-court-rules-against-google-in-favour-of-right-to-
be-forgotten (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
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By the end of May 2014, Google came up with a ‘rudimentary framework’ for compliance 
with the ruling and to cover itself from subsequent cases based on the ruling. It created 
a public web page612 through which users based in Europe could request that their 
names be decoupled from certain search results.613 The removals would only take place 
on Google search websites specific to the European Union (google.co.uk or google.
co.de, for example) and would remain visible on the global search engine, Google.com. 
A notification that such removals had taken place would appear on the search results 
page.614 
As a member of the Global Network Initiative, Google faced the need to reconcile 
compliance with the ruling with its GNI commitments to be transparent about how content 
is restricted, as well as to interpret official requests around content restriction as narrowly 
as possible.615  On 11 July 2014 Google reported that it had received 70,000 restriction 
requests covering 250,000 websites since mid-May.  The requests were being reviewed 
manually, and the company had also instituted a policy of notifying websites when 
one of their pages was removed.616 The Guardian newspaper was one of the first news 
organizations to receive notifications that links to some of its stories had been removed 
from its search results in the EU.617 Wikipedia’s founder Jimmy Wales condemned the 
process as “censorship” after his organization received notice that several links to 
Wikipedia content had been removed in compliance with requests from people who were 
the subject of that content.618 
Google also set up an advisory council to investigate how it should balance privacy and 
freedom of expression. Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer David Drummond 
wrote that while some requests were clearly illegitimate, like politicians seeking to cover 
up prior misdeeds, one could sympathize with many others: 
…from the man who asked that we not show a news article saying he had been 
questioned in connection with a crime (he’s able to demonstrate that he was 
never charged) to the mother who requested that we remove news articles for 
612 Google. Search removal request under European Data Protection law. https://support.google.com/
legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
613 Mark Scott. 18 June 2014.  Google Ready to Comply With “Right to Be Forgotten” Rules in Europe. 
New York Times. http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/google-ready-to-comply-with-right-to-
be-forgotten-rules-in-europe (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
614 Danny Sullivan. 30 May 2014. How Google’s New “Right To Be Forgotten” Form Works: An Explainer. 
Search Engine Land. http://searchengineland.com/google-right-to-be-forgotten-form-192837 
(Accessed 24 June 2014.)
615 Global Network Initiative Implementation Guidelines. Freedom of Expression. 
 http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php#29 and Global Network 
Initiative Principles. Freedom of Expression. http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.
php#18 
616 Searching for the right balance. Google Official Blog. 11 July 2014. http://googleblog.blogspot.
com/2014/07/searching-for-right-balance.html 
617 James Ball. 10 July 2014.  Google admits to errors over Guardian ‘right to be forgotten’ link 
deletions. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/10/google-admits-
errors-guardian-right-to-be-forgotten-deletions (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
618 Alex Hern. 6 August 2014. Wikipedia swears to fight ‘censorship’ of ‘right to be forgotten’ ruling. 
The Guardian. 
 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/06/wikipedia-censorship-right-to-be-forgotten-
ruling (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
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her daughter’s name as she had been the victim of abuse. It’s a complex issue, 
with no easy answers.619
In the third quarter of 2014, the company was scheduled to hold public consultation 
sessions across Europe, and had also published an online questionnaire seeking public 
comment.620 Questions included: “What is the nature and delineation of a public figure’s 
right to privacy?” and “How should we differentiate content in the public interest from 
content that is not?” and “Does the public have a right to information about the nature, 
volume, and outcome of removal requests made to search engines?”621
Meanwhile, as of June 2014, it appeared that the CJEU ruling might effect similar changes 
around the world. For example, privacy regulators attending the Asia Pacific Privacy 
Authorities (APPA) forum on 17–18 June 2014 in Seoul, Korea, discussed the possibility of 
‘engaging with Google and other search engines’ and said that they would be publishing 
a report with recommendations on this topic by the next APPA meeting in December.622 
The implications of implementing similar rules in other jurisdictions began to come under 
debate. For example, in an editorial in a local newspaper, Prof. Park Kyung-Sin of Korea 
University Law School expressed concern that legislation of the right to be forgotten this 
could grant broad license to national authorities to censor online content.623
4.4 Data retention, collection, and surveillance
The retention of user data by search engines combined with heightened knowledge 
about government surveillance practices appears to have affected the public’s trust in 
search engines. An analysis of publicly available Google (Search) Trends data before and 
after June 2013 (when former NSA contractor Edward Snowden began to release his 
revelations about U.S. government surveillance via Internet intermediaries) sought to find 
“empirical evidence of a chilling effect on users’ willingness to enter [sensitive] search 
terms.”624 They examined search traffic data for 282 terms in 11 countries that included 
China and Russia (but not India).625 Nine out of eleven countries exhibited a decrease 
in search traffic for terms that were rated as “likely to get you in trouble with the U.S. 
619 Searching for the right balance. op cit.  
620 Lance Whitney. 30 July 2014. Google seeks public opinion on ‘right to be forgotten’. CNet. 
 http://www.cnet.com/news/google-seeks-public-opinion-on-right-to-be-forgotten/ (Accessed 14 
August 2014.)
621 Google. Formal request for public comment and evidence. https://services.google.com/fb/forms/
advisorycouncilcomments/ 
622 Asia Pacific Privacy Authorities. 41st APPA Forum – Communiqué. www.appaforum.org/resources/
communiques/41stforum.html (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
623 Park Kyung-Sin. 8 August 2014. A ‘surveillance’ right to be forgotten. Hangyerye
 http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/650266.html (Accessed 10 August 2014.) With thanks 
to Jae Yeon Kim for bringing this article’s to the authors’ attention.
624 Alex Marthews and Catherine Tucker. 24 March 2014. Government Surveillance and Search 
Behavior. SSRN. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412564.
625 According to the United States and its top ten international trading partners according to the 
U.S. Census for the 2012–13 trading year. These were, in order, Canada, China, Mexico, Japan, 
Germany, South Korea, the UK, France, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia. Tucker and Marthews op. cit. p.3.
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government,” but an increase for terms “not likely to get you in trouble.” In the United 
States, the magnitude of this drop was 2.2 per cent.626
As noted earlier, in the United States, the PEN American Center survey of 520 American 
writers found a chilling effect.627  Even before the surveillance revelations, a February 
2012 Pew Internet & American Life survey found that Americans were not only “anxious 
about the collection of personal information by search engines,” but 62 per cent of them 
also did “not know how to limit the information that is collected about them.”628
Similar surveys have not been conducted in Russia and China that would provide 
parallel data about levels of public understanding of data retention and collection by 
search engines, or levels of public awareness about the nature and extent of government 
surveillance. Nonetheless the studies cited above do indicate that at least in some 
societies, awareness of the lack of privacy and existence of some level of pervasive 
surveillance can have a chilling impact on search engine users’ freedom of expression.
Concerns about data collection by search engines (and other online services) have 
prompted the rise of alternatives that claim not to track or store users’ digital data.
4.4.1 Company policies and practices
General Privacy Policies 
All three companies have privacy policies with varying degrees of specificity. Of the three, 
only Google is subject to regular third-party privacy audits, in accordance with a 2011 
ruling by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.629 
Google’s Privacy Policy (unified for all of the company’s services) states that it collects 
“log information,” including “details of how you used our service, such as your search 
queries.”630 This information also includes user IP addresses, hardware information of 
the mobile device they may be searching from (if applicable) and “cookies that may 
uniquely identify your browser or your Google Account.” This is done, the company 
says, to provide, maintain, protect and improve its services, to develop new services, “to 
protect Google and our users,” and “to offer you tailored content - like giving you more 
relevant search results and ads.”631 The Yandex privacy policy is called a ‘Confidentiality 
Policy,’ and describes what kinds of data the company collects and for what purpose. 
626 Excepting Saudi Arabia and South Korea. See Tucker and Marthews, op. cit. p.14.
627 PEN American Center. Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives Writers to Self-Censor. November 
2013. 
 www.pen-international.org/read-pen-american-centres-report-chilling-effects-nsa-surveillance-
drives-writers-to-self-censor (Accessed 2 May 2014.)
628 Kristen Purcell, Joanna Brenner, and Lee Rainie. 9 March 2012. Search Engine Use 2012. Pew 
Internet & American Life Project. www.pewinternet.org/2012/03/09/search-engine-use-2012.
629 Federal Trade Commission. 30 March 2011. FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles 
Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network. http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-
charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz 
630 Google. Privacy Policy. Privacy & Terms. https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/
631 Google. Key Terms. Privacy & Terms. https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/key-terms/
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Yandex says it gathers such information necessary for reasons including development 
of new services, to improve quality of service and for targeted advertisements.632 In its 
Privacy Policy Baidu states that it collects users’ personal information, log information, 
equipment information, cookies and anonymous identifiers. It explains the purpose of 
gathering information and promises to store and process the information anonymously.633
Data Retention 
Google does not disclose how long it retains user data or what data is “anonymized” 
(de-linked from data that would enable re-identification of the user).634 While Google logs 
search history by default, users can delete their history manually by accessing Google 
Dashboard. Users can also disable logging of their Web browsing history when logged 
in.635 Like Google, Yandex also provides users with the option to delete their Web history 
or opt out of the storage of their Web history.636 Company executives at Yandex have 
stated publicly that user data will be stored for at least three months, although that 
information was not found on the company’s own website.637 Baidu does not offer a 
similar feature to delete search history, and makes no commitment about a time limit for 
storing such information.638
Security and encryption 
In March 2014 Google announced that it was implementing encryption by default for 
all web searches worldwide.639 Such encryption limits the ability for third parties to 
inconspicuously intercept search terms entered by the user. However, Google notes 
that “when you visit another website from the Google search results page, that website 
may be able to identify what site you came from or the search terms that you used.”640 
Yandex offers encrypted search on Yandex.com but not Yandex.ru. Baidu does not offer 
encrypted search.
Disclosure of User Data to Government Authorities 
Yandex company representatives have stated that the company does not share user 
information with third parties with the exception of government security services, who 
are required to produce a court order.641 At the same time, however, Internet companies 
632 Yandex. Privacy Policy. Art. 2.2. https://legal.yandex.ru/confidential.
633 Baidu Statement of Privacy Protection. http://www.baidu.com/duty/yinsiquan.html. 
634 Google Privacy Policy. op. cit.  
635 Google. About Google Search History. 
 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/54068?hl=en&ref_topic=14148 
636 Yandex. How long are the files stored? FAQ. http://help.yandex.ru/disk/faq.xml#time 
637 http://searchengines.guru/showthread.php?t=856569 
638 Baidu Statement of Privacy Protection. http://www.baidu.com/duty/yinsiquan.html. 
639 Craig Timberg and Jia Lynn Yang. 12 March 2014. Google is encrypting search globally. That’s bad 
for the NSA and China’s censors. Washington Post The Switch blog. www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/12/google-is-encrypting-search-worldwide-thats-bad-for-the-nsa-
and-china (Accessed 5 May  2014.)
640 Google. Search Help – SSL Search. https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/173733?hl=en 
641 Internet companies will be obliged to keep almost all user data.  Forbes (Russian) 3 June 2014. 
http://www.forbes.ru/news/259055-internet-kompanii-obyazhut-khranit-pochti-vse-dannye-o-
polzovatelyakh (Accessed 10 July 2014.)
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operating in Russia are required to participate in the Law Enforcement Support System, 
known by its Russian acronym, SORM. Data interception equipment is installed within 
company facilities. According to Privacy International, the most recently upgraded 
version of SORM “gathers information from all communication media, and offers long-
term storage (three years), providing access to all user data.”642 Thus it is unnecessary for 
security services to request the information because they may already have direct access 
to it. If this is not through Yandex directly then it may be via Russian ISPs. At the time of 
writing, user activity on Yandex.ru was not encrypted.  
Among the list of circumstances under which user information might be disclosed Baidu 
includes when “the disclosure is required by laws, regulations, legal proceedings, and 
government authorities.”643 
Google publishes a transparency report, (to be discussed in more detail in the next 
section of this case study) that includes global data about “User Data Requests” from 
governments around the world. From December 31, 2010 to December 31, 2013, the 
number of requests Google received from governments for user data pertaining to all 
Google services doubled. The percentage of requests that the company complied with 
during that same three-year period has steadily declined from 76 per cent to 64 per 
cent.644
4.4.2 Implementation in national context
In the 2014 “Who Has Your Back” report by the US-based Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF) evaluating U.S. companies on policies and practices related to US government 
user data requests and surveillance,645 Google was awarded full points in all six possible 
categories: 1) The company requires a warrant before providing content to U.S. law 
enforcement; 2) It informs users in the US whenever legally possible before information 
is disclosed to requesting authorities; 3) It publishes a Transparency Report (see below); 
4) It publishes ‘law enforcement guides’ explaining how the company evaluates and 
responds to US law enforcement requests; 5) It “fights for user privacy” in the US courts; 
6) and it opposes mass surveillance as a member of the Reform Government Surveillance 
Coalition, which advocates that “governments should limit surveillance to specific, known 
users for lawful purposes, and should not undertake bulk data collection of Internet 
communications.”646 
642 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan. 4 March 2013. Lawful interception: the Russian approach. 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/lawful-interception-the-russian-approach (Accessed 15 
July 2014.)
643 Baidu Statement of Privacy Protection, http://www.baidu.com/duty/yinsiquan.html. 
644 Requests for User Information. Google Transparency Report. 
 http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/ 
645 Who Has Your Back? 2014. Protecting Your Data From Government Requests. Electronic Frontier 
Foundation. https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2014
646 Reform Government Surveillance. Global Government Surveillance Reform. 
 https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/
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Similar scorecards on Baidu or Yandex have not been produced by civil society or research 
organizations in their respective home countries. According to the EFF six-point criteria, 
Yandex would receive one point out of six as the company:  it requires a warrant before 
handing over user data to law enforcement. Yandex has publicly advocated against laws 
such as the Antipiracy Law that it believes harm freedom of expression online,647 but there 
is no publicly available information about the company lobbying in regard to government 
surveillance practices. Based on information available to this report’s researchers, Baidu 
would score zero out of six. Note that this conclusion does not necessarily reflect the 
intent of the companies themselves, given that they operate in legal and regulatory 
environments where a full score is not possible.
4.5 Transparency
Members of the Global Network Initiative, specifically commit to “respect and protect the 
freedom of expression of their users” in the course of responding to government requests 
to remove content or hand over user data.648 They also commit to be held accountable to 
this commitment. There are two components of public accountability for GNI members: 
“independent assessment and evaluation” of whether the companies are upholding their 
commitment to the GNI principles, and also “transparency with the public.”649   Two years 
after the GNI’s official launch with three company members (Google, Microsoft, and 
Yahoo), the practice of what has come to be called “transparency reporting” began to 
emerge.
4.5.1 Company practices
In 2010 Google was the first Internet company in the world to publish a semi-annual 
“Transparency Report” including data about the number of government requests that 
it receives for content restriction as well as the hand-over of user data.650 Since 2010 
the company has also included the percentage of requests it has complied with in each 
country. In the “Requests to remove content” section, data includes court orders related 
to cases of defamation brought by individuals.651 It also includes data about removal or 
filtering requests received from copyright holders.652 
647 Halia Pavliva. 11 July 2014. Internet Censorship Law Triggers Yandex Tumble. Bloomberg. 
  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-11/internet-censorship-law-triggers-yandex-tumble-
russia-overnight.html (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
648 Global Network Initiative Principles. Freedom of Expression. http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/
principles/index.php#18 
649 Global Network Initiative Principles. Governance, Accountability, and Transparency. http://
globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php#22 
650 Greater transparency around government requests. Google Official Blog. 20 April 2010. http://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/greater-transparency-around-government.html 
651 Requests to Remove Content. From Governments. Google Transparency Report. https://www.
google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/ 
652 Requests to Remove Content. Due to Copyright. Google Transparency Report. https://www.google.
com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/?hl=en 
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When search results are removed in response to government or copyright holder demands, 
a notice describing the number of results removed and the reasons for their removal is 
displayed to users (see figure 5 below) and a copy of the request to the independent non-
profit organization ChillingEffects.org, which archives and publishes the request (see box 
below for more about the Chilling Effects database).653 When possible the company also 
contacts the website’s owners.654
Figure 5: Google notification that content has been removed from search 
results. 
655656
BOX:  ChillingEffects.org, a third party clearing house for take-down 
notices
Founded in 2001, the Chilling Effects database hosted by Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society 
collects and analyzes legal complaints and requests for removal of online materials. The purpose, according 
to the project’s website, is to help scholars study ‘the prevalence of legal threats and let Internet users 
see the source of content removals.’655 In 2002, Google started submitting cease-and-desist letters that it 
received to Chilling Effects. Since then, several other companies including Twittter (see Chapter 5) have 
chosen to use the project as a neutral third-party host for take-down requests received around the world. The 
database now includes millions of notices and the project publishes regular analyses of trends in the volume 
and types of notices received.656 Below is a screenshot of one copyright notice recently received by Google.
653 DtecNet DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse. 12 March 2013. 
www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=841442.
654 Google. How Google Fights Piracy. September 2013. p.16. 
 https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2dVFqYml5UENUeUE/edit 
655 Chilling Effects. https://www.chillingeffects.org
656 About. Chilling Effects. https://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/about; and for example Huge Volume 
Increases and Updates to Google Transparency Report. Chilling Effects Blog. 13 December 2012. 
https://www.chillingeffects.org/blog_entries/585
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Figure 6: Example of a take-down notice received by Google and 
published at Chillingeffects.org657
Baidu does notify users about its process for copyright holders to request removal of 
infringing content.658 Also, in the case of specific searches containing results that have 
been removed, Baidu displays a notice at the top of the page announcing: “In accordance 
with relevant laws and regulations, some search results do not appear.” 
The company does not publish information about its process for evaluating and 
responding to government demands. It does not publish data about government requests 
for content removal or restriction, or about the number of copyright takedown requests 
received or complied with. The law makes it difficult for Baidu to be more transparent, 
as Google’s experience in China demonstrates. When Google operated its local Google.
cn search engine within the jurisdiction of China until early 2010, its transparency report 
omitted government request data for China. Google explained that data about censorship 
657 DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google. Digimarc on behalf of Pearson Education, Inc. Chilling 
Effects. 25 September 2014. https://www.chillingeffects.org/notices/2050759#
658 Baidu. Rights Protection Statement. http://www.baidu.com/duty/right.html 
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demands are considered state secrets in China and therefore reporting them would be 
illegal.659 It would be similarly illegal for Baidu to report data on Chinese government 
requests. However, it is worth noting that as Baidu expands into other markets outside 
of China, particularly in Asia,660 it does not face the same legal barrier to publishing data 
about requests made by other governments in other jurisdictions. 
Yandex does not publish any information about its process for evaluating and responding 
to government or private demands to remove content. (As mentioned previously, Yandex 
claims that it does not remove search engine results although it does remove content from 
other services not covered by this study.) Unlike in China where it would be a violation 
of law to provide the type of detail found in Google-style “Transparency reports,” our 
researchers were unable to identify any specific Russian law that would prevent Yandex or 
other Russian Internet companies from publishing statistics about what is being removed, 
or what volume of requests they receive and what percentage they are complying with. 
Nor did company representatives explain to our researchers why they do not produce 
such information, beyond stating that there is no such tradition in Russia.
4.5.2 Transparency in context
India provides an example of how civil society in some countries has begun to use data 
from Google’s transparency report to hold governments accountable for their practices. 
In 2011, researchers from the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society sent a 
“right to information” request to the Department of Information Technology (DIT), now 
the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY), asking for more 
information about the number of orders issued by the government for website blocking 
in India.661 They then compared the government’s responses to the data published in 
Google’s transparency report data on Indian government requests made between January 
and June 2011, and found that the government had disclosed making substantially fewer 
requests to Google than Google reported having received from the government. CIS 
researchers concluded: “Either the DIT is not providing us all the relevant information on 
blocking, or it is not following the law.”662
It also appears that lack of transparency can affect public trust in search engines in some 
countries. In China, a lack of transparency about the nature and volume of government 
restriction requests makes it easier for Chinese users to suspect corruption and foul 
play. In 2008 Baidu faced widespread accusations in the media and online that it had 
manipulated search results about the company Sanlu, which had been implicated in a 
659 Requests to Remove Content. From Governments. China. Google Transparency Report. https://
www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/CN/ 
660 Asina Pornwasin. Baidu poised for big push into Thailand. 15 October 2013.  http://www.
nationmultimedia.com/technology/Baidu-poised-for-big-push-into-Thailand-30217048.html 
(Accessed 25 July 2014.) 
661 Text of DIT’s Response to Second RTI on Website Blocking. The Centre for Internet & Society. 
27 October 2011. http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking 
662 Ibid. 
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scandal over tainted milk powder.663 Bloggers and members of several online fora accused 
the company Baidu of burying negative stories about Sanlu at the company’s request.664 
Eventually Baidu acknowledged that it had been approached by representatives of the 
dairy industry offering to pay if the company downplayed certain types of search results, 
but insisted that it had “flat out refused” to do so.665 
In 2012 Baidu fired four employees for allegedly taking bribes to remove content from 
one of its websites after three of the four were arrested.666 In March 2014, the state-
sponsored Beijing News reported that Beijing police had detained “at least 10 people” 
including Baidu employees for allegedly “abusing their positions to delete online posts 
in return for money.” The article cited “several cases since 2012” in which Beijing police 
“exposed a profit chain connected to a web censor at the Beijing Municipal Public 
Security Bureau.”667  One industry source interviewed for this report said, “There are a lot 
of companies focusing on deleting specific search results,” adding, “it’s a business now.” 
According to legal experts interviewed for this report, China’s courts have dismissed 
efforts by plaintiffs seeking redress or reinstatement when content that they believed was 
actually legal was removed for unknown reasons. One interviewee expressed concern 
that China’s online information environment is shaped not only by government officials 
but also by private sector elites.668
4.6 Remedy
There are two potential parties whose freedom of expression rights might be affected by 
search engines: internet users broadly, and also the creators and operators of websites 
including individuals with personal blogs and websites, civil society organizations, and 
news organizations. Other parties can and do have grievances related to other rights – 
such as content creators concerned about links to file-sharing sites. This section focuses 
on remedy and grievance mechanisms related only to freedom of expression and not on 
mechanisms addressing other rights.
663 Baidu announcement: Never agreed to block Sanlu negative news. Sina Tech. 13 Sep 2008. 
 http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2008-09-13/15472456026.shtml. 
664 Liu Hongbo: Baidu’s brainwash, Southern Metropolitan News, 3 May 2010, 
 http://tech.163.com/10/0503/09/65OIDEBF000915BF.html (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
665 Kidney Stone Gate: Baidu Denies Censoring Search Results. ChinaSMACK. 17 September 2008.
 http://www.chinasmack.com/2008/stories/kidney-stone-gate-baidu-denies-censoring-search-
results.html (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
666 Cao Yin. Baidu fires four for deleting posts. China Daily. 8 August 2012.  http://usa.chinadaily.
com.cn/business/2012-08/08/content_15650874.htm and Baidu Employees Fired and Arrested for 
Taking Bribes to Delete Content. PCWorld. 6 August 2012. http://www.pcworld.com/article/260498/
baidu_employees_fired_and_arrested_for_taking_bribes_to_delete_content.html (Accessed 15 
April 2014.)
667 Baidu staff, web censor profited by deleting unfavorable posts. Beijing News. 26 March 2014. 
 http://www.bjd.com.cn/10beijingnews/metro/201403/26/t20140326_6474269.html (Accessed 15 
April 2014.)
668 Interviews conducted with sources who wish to remain anonymous; thus date of interviews and 
identities of interviewees are not disclosed.
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None of the search engines studied have complaints, grievance or remedy mechanisms 
that can be used by internet users who believe that their freedom of expression has been 
violated due to the way in which a search engine governs its content. 
Google does have a mechanism for website owners to challenge removal under the 
DMCA of links to their websites.669 Since the company began to implement the European 
“right to be forgotten” ruling, Google has reinstated links to some news articles that were 
originally restricted.670 However the process for handling appeals for reinstatement is not 
clear. Prior to the roll-out of Google’s new “right to be forgotten” web form in the wake of 
the EU court ruling, none of the search engines studied have provided mechanisms for 
users to seek remedy if they believe that their privacy rights have been harmed by search 
results. 
While Europeans have successfully used the courts to seek remedy for alleged privacy 
violations by a search engine, plaintiffs in the countries studied have not been successful 
in using courts to obtain remedy for search engines’ restriction of their websites. Most 
recently, in 2013 some U.S.-based users of Baidu filed a lawsuit against the company, 
claiming that Baidu’s restriction of content that is not illegal outside of China constituted 
a violation of their freedom of expression. A United States District Judge dismissed the 
case against Baidu on the grounds that a search engine’s algorithms are protected by the 
First Amendment.671
4.8 Conclusions
This case study has highlighted how search engine policies and practices related to 
content restriction and content manipulation are shaped by their home jurisdictions, and 
to varying degrees by the laws and regulations of other jurisdictions.  It has also illustrated 
how three different companies headquartered in three very different national contexts 
have chosen to handle challenges related to freedom of expression of their users. Key 
findings include:
Differences in ISP filtering regimes have a strong influence on how, and to what 
extent, search engines restrict their own search results. For example, due to 
substantial differences in the technical and legal characteristics of filtering in Russia and 
China, Yandex and Baidu have very different restriction practices, and Google has taken 
different approaches to the two markets (remaining in Russia as of August 2014 but 
removing its operations from China since 2010).
669 Removing Content from Google. https://support.google.com/legal/troubleshooter/1114905?hl=en
#ts=1115655,1614942,1727155,1115847 
670 Dave Lee. 4 July 2014. Google reinstates ‘forgotten’ links after pressure. BBC News. 
 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28157607 (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
671 U.S. Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Chinese Search Engine. Reuters. 28 March 2014.
 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/business/us-judge-dismisses-lawsuit-against-chinese-
search-engine.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
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The stricter the liability regime in a given jurisdiction, the more likely the content will 
be removed either proactively by the company or upon request without challenge. 
China falls on one end of the spectrum of strict liability and proactive content restriction. 
But one can also see how the “notice and takedown” system for protecting copyright in 
the United States can lead to restrictions of legitimate content that a court would likely 
find it within the search engine’s right to display, if the company does not take a strong 
position in favor of users’ rights.
While content restriction takes place on search engines at the request of authorities, 
it also happens for other reasons in all jurisdictions, including for reasons that the 
search engines deem to be in the users’ or the public’s interest. This contradicts 
a widespread public perception that search engines are neutral arbiters of information. 
Some consensus among companies and freedom of expression advocates has emerged 
on best practice by search engines in handling government demands and take down 
requests from a freedom of expression standpoint, as evidenced by the Global Network 
Initiative’s principles and implementation guidelines. However there is no clear consensus 
across stakeholders about how search engines should respect freedom of expression in 
the course of algorithmic design and other content restrictions unrelated to government 
requests.
Transparency by companies as well as governments plays a crucial role in fostering 
public trust in a search engine’s practices and in ensuring that freedom of expression 
is not restricted for illegitimate or accidental reasons. The situations discussed in this 
case study highlight a variety of examples of why it is important that governments be 
transparent to their citizens about restriction demands being made on search engines 
as well as the network-level filtering measures that have a direct impact upon them. It is 
equally important that companies be transparent to users about what is being removed 
at government or others’ request and why. 
Privacy concerns are growing but only one of the three companies studied – Google 
– has addressed these concerns in a public and forthright way. Google has vocally 
criticized the U.S. government’s mass surveillance practices and has been openly 
lobbying to change them. Neither Baidu nor Yandex have taken similar stands in the 
face of their governments’ surveillance practices. However, many users expect that the 
companies they rely upon to find information and have their own content found, should be 
more forthcoming in regard to rights-linked information. This covers as much information 
about data collection, storage and sharing practices as the law allows, and protecting 
data to the greatest extent possible within the realities of their legal and political contexts. 
Stakeholder engagement, commitment to principles, and remedy frameworks 
are important for global intermediaries in addressing tensions between freedom 
of expression and other rights, as well as difficult regulatory situations. Google’s 
commitment to the Global Network Initiative since the organization’s launch in 2008, and 
contribution to the development of the GNI’s principles since 2006, has strengthened the 
company’s ability to respect freedom of expression and contest government requests 
that it and many human rights advocates believe its terms of service are not consistent 
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with human rights norms. However on other freedom of expression and privacy-related 
issues not related to government demands, there is no principled framework and no 
global stakeholder consensus upon which such a framework might eventually be built.
131
5. STUDY 3: SOCIAL 
NETWORKING PLATFORMS 
Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt), Twitter (USA, Kenya) Weibo (China), iWiW.
hu (Hungary)
5.1 Introduction
Online social networks play a vital role in social interactions and expression, providing 
a platform that allows for the democratization of publishing content and information.672 
By enabling the sharing and aggregation of user-generated content, social networks 
are seen by some to transform ‘traditionally passive audiences into active information 
producers,’673 providing new tools with the potential for citizens to hold governments 
accountable.674
Social networking companies, like most Internet companies that offer services free 
of payment, make their profit by targeting advertising to their customers. Third party 
companies buy advertisements to appear on social networks because they expect these 
services to be able to identify potential buyers from within their user pool through data 
collection and processing. Therefore, users ‘pay’ for the free services they use with their 
personal information and their privacy. The platforms evolve as their companies develop 
new ways for users to create and share data.
Social networks have also increased the visibility and reach of some traditional news 
media, for example, through the ‘retweeting’ or relaying a microblog to one’s connections 
or the public, thereby disseminating information vastly quicker than conventional means. 
In China, as one Weibo user pointed out, ‘Weibo acts as a source of information and an 
amplifier. So much has been amplified; so many problems are brought to the public’.675 A 
Chinese news service has cited a poll in which 70 per cent of the Chinese public thinks 
672 Grabowicz PA, Ramasco JJ, Moro E, Pujol JM, Eguiluz VM. 2012. Social Features of Online 
Networks: The Strength of Intermediary Ties in Online Social Media. PLoS ONE, Vol. 7, No. 1. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0029358 (Accessed 10 July 2014.)
673 Yik Chan Chin. August 2013. Regulating social media. Regulating life (and lives). RJR 33 Online, 
p. 4. http://journalism.hkbu.edu.hk/doc/Regulating_social-Media.pdf (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
674 The 2012 Sina Weibo Media Report released on January 2013 by People’s Daily Online explained 
that ‘the relatively free atmosphere and the tremendous expression space of Weibo have greatly 
promoted the openness and transparency of information. Its fission-like communication effect 
increases the supervision by public opinion . . . Netizens have gained a consciousness of rights, 
got encouraged to protect their rights by open and legal means.’ 2012 Sina Weibo Media Report, 
January 2013, (Accessed 11 August 2014.) 
 http://www.wenming.cn/xwcb_pd/cmcy/201301/P020130123314840012552.pdf.
675 Weibo Opinion Leaders’ Observation of China. 25 November 2010. Time Weekly. 
 www.time-weekly.com/story/2010-11-25/421.html. (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
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that online expression ‘will become a new avenue for China’s democratic development’.676 
A representative from an Egyptian NGO has noted that, as people use social media ‘to 
call for marches or protests, and other political events . . . they [become] an outlet for the 
people to express their impressions and what is on their minds’.677
Many legal systems consider social networks as ‘content hosts’, because users create 
content on their platforms, and third parties are allowed to post and share information.678 
Because they allow private content to be publicly shared, social networks blur the 
line separating the public and private spheres, raising questions about appropriate 
expectations for expression on such platforms – i.e. should expression on Facebook be 
treated the same as expression in a news article or a blog?679 
Due to the scope and impact of user-generated expression and activity on social 
networks it is not easy for a company to balance a commitment to free expression, legal 
compliance, and user expectations as well as the fiduciary duty as companies to make 
profits.680 This study examines the policies and practices of several social networking 
platforms in a range of national contexts. It finds that the ability of social networking 
platforms to respect users’ freedom of expression is heavily influenced by national legal 
and regulatory contexts, particularly by the context of a company’s home country. At the 
same time, the cases analyzed clearly show that companies have many options available 
to them in terms of how they manage and design their platforms. These choices have a 
critical impact on users’ freedom of expression. 
The Companies Studied:
Facebook (www.facebook.com). Facebook is a US-based social network founded in 
2004. As of March 2014, the company had 1.28 billion monthly active users– of which 81.2 
per cent were located outside of North America.681 It allows registered users to maintain 
a personal profile through which users can share personal and contact information, 
photos, articles and location statuses; to communicate with other users via private or 
public messages; to search and ‘friend’ other users, whom they may ‘tag’ in photos 
or location updates; and to join groups and interact with other members. Facebook is 
available on the world wide web as well as through dedicated applications on a number 
676 China’s Sina Weibo microblog nears identity deadline. 12 March 2012. BBC News. 
 www.bbc.com/news/technology-17337252 (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
677 Emad Mubarak, Executive Director, Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. Interview 
with Sara Alsherif. Cairo, Egypt, 22 April, 2014.
678 Internet intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability. Article 19. 2013. p. 6. 
 http://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf
679 Tarleton Gillespie. 2010. The Politics of ‘Platforms’. New Media & Society, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 
347–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444809342738 (Accessed 4 August 2014.) The legislative 
strategy of platforms (here: YouTube) as a middle way of being ‘rewarded for facilitating expression 
but not liable for its excesses’ (p. 356); on the one hand highlighting the crucial role of their services 
for ‘unfettered circulation of information’, for some other reasons downplaying their role as ‘merely 
in intermediary, to limit its liability for the users’ activity’ (p. 356).
680 Sean Rintel. 5 January 2014. A thin blue line: how Facebook deals with controversial content. 
 http://theconversation.com/a-thin-blue-line-how-facebook-deals-with-controversial-
content-19966 (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
681 Facebook. Newsroom – Statistics. http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info 
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of mobile operating systems.682 For this study, Facebook’s operations were examined in 
Brazil, Egypt, Germany, India and the United States.
Twitter (www.twitter.com) Twitter is a US-based micro-blogging platform founded in 
2006. As of June 2014, it had 271million monthly active users who send 500 million 
messages (called ‘Tweets’) a day. Seventy-seven per cent of Twitter’s users live outside 
of the United States.683 Twitter allows registered users to exchange messages of 140 (or 
fewer) characters through the Twitter website, mobile application(s) or SMS. Users can 
forward such messages by ‘retweeting’ them. Users can also search for and ‘follow’ other 
users, and even unregistered people can read users’ Tweets, as long as the users have 
kept their profile public (the default setting).684 Twitter is accessible on the world wide web 
and via multiple mobile applications. Tweets can be organized via hashtags (the hash 
sign # followed by a word or phrase), allowing users to group related posts together. If a 
hashtag receives high volumes of ‘retweets’ it is termed to be ‘trending’.685 Twitter does 
not ‘require real name use, email verification, or identity authentication’.686 Twitter was 
studied primarily in the United States and Kenya.
Weibo (www.weibo.com) Weibo, is a Chinese micro-blogging platform founded in 2009 
that was spun off from Sina, its original parent company, prior to its public listing of 
shares in the United States in April 2014.687  As of June 2014 it boasted 156 million 
monthly active users.688 Users have personal profiles, post 140-character messages 
(called weibo, which literally means ‘microblog’ in Chinese) and comment under other 
weibo, a key feature that provides a ‘simple way for Chinese people and organizations to 
publicly express themselves in real time’.689 For this report, Weibo was studied in China.
iWiW (formerly www.iwiw.hu) iWiW (‘international who is who’) is a now-defunct Hungarian 
social network that closed operations in July 2014 due to its diminishing user base.690 It 
was founded in April 2002 as wiw.hu (‘who is who’),691 and became iWiW in October 
2005, when it unsuccessfully tried to expand and began offering its platform in multiple 
682 For more information about Facebook products, see Facebook. Newsroom – Products. http://
newsroom.fb.com/products 
683 Twitter. About Twitter. https://about.twitter.com/company 
684 Twitter. Help Center. About public and protected Tweets. https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016-
about-public-and-protected-tweets (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
685 About Twitter op. cit.
686 Twitter. Guidelines for Law Enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/articles/41949-guidelines-for-
law-enforcement#5 
687 Sina Corporation. About Sina. http://corp.sina.com.cn/eng/sina_intr_eng.htm. Kaylene Hong. 28 
March 2014.  China’s Twitter’ Sina Weibo drops ‘Sina’ from its name as it prepares to list in the 
US. The Next Web. http://thenextweb.com/asia/2014/03/28/chinas-twitter-sina-weibo-drops-sina-
from-its-name-as-it-prepares-to-list-in-the-us (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
688 Xinhua08.com. 15 August 2014. Weibo Monthly Active Users Exceed 156 million [in Chinese]. 
http://news.xinhua08.com/a/20140815/1371610.shtml (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
689 Weibo Corporation. November 2014. Form 6-K to the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Posted at http://ir.weibo.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=253076&p=irol-sec 
690 iWiW, The Hungarian Social Network Closes After 12 Years of Success. 19 May 2014. Daily News 
Hungary. http://dailynewshungary.com/iwiw-the-hungarian-social-network-closes-after-12-years-
of-success (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
691 Anikó Imre. May 2009. National intimacy and post-socialist networking. European Journal of Cultural 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 219–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1367549409102428 (Accessed 25 
June 2014.)
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languages.692 In April 2006 it was acquired by T-Online, Magyar Telekom’s business unit,693 
and in 2008 iWiW merged with Origo.hu.694 Until 2011 it was invitation-only.695 In January 
2013 it had 4.7 million registered users.696 For this report, iWiW was studied in Hungary.
Social networks are popular around the world but they are used differently in different 
cultural and political contexts.697 Facebook and Twitter are two of the most popular social 
networks with broad international user bases, and thus a study of these services can shed 
light on freedom of expression issues in a transnational environment. iWiW and Weibo are 
primarily domestic operations. Weibo is especially interesting because the Chinse social-
media market is highly competitive yet insulated from foreign competition.698 iWiW was 
chosen for this study (prior to being closed down) because it represents a domestic social 
networking service trying to compete in a local linguistic and cultural context against 
global competitors.
5.2 Impact of ISP filtering on social networking platforms
As discussed in Chapter 3, governments can require ISPs to filter social networking 
platforms by blocking access either to the entire website, or to specific content, groups 
or pages. Such filtering can also take place at national internet exchange points as 
described in the previous case studies.
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (owned by Google) are reported by local internet 
users to have been consistently filtered in China for a long period of time, rendering 
them completely inaccessible to Chinese internet users unless special circumvention 
technology is used.699 (For a full discussion and definition of network-level filtering, please 
see Study 1.) Other countries, including Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, have also filtered these 
social networking platforms for varying periods of time.700 
692 Adam Straub. 14 April 2012. Miért nem az iWiW lett a Facebook? [Why not have a Facebook 
iWiW?].  Origo. (In Hungarian.) www.origo.hu/techbazis/20120412-tizeves-az-iwiw-interju-varady-
zsolttal-a-kozossegi-szajt.html (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
693 Magyar Telekom. 28 April 2006. T-Online gains control of iWiW. 
 www.telekom.hu/static/sw/download/WIW28April_eng.pdf (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
694 Borbála Tóth. 5 January 2012. Mapping Digital Media: Hungary. Open Society Foundations. p. 42. 
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-hungary-20120216.pdf 
695 Blase Ur and Yang Wang. Online social networks in a Post-Soviet state: How Hungarians protect 
and share on Facebook. Paper presented at iConference ‘12, February 7–10, Toronto (Canada). 
2012. http://www.blaseur.com/papers/ur_wang_iconference12_hungary.pdf. 
696 Unsocial network: the rise and fall of iWiW. Budapest Business Journal. 7 January 2013.  www.
bbj.hu/business/unsocial-network-the-rise-and-fall-of-iwiw_64418 (Accessed 6 April 2014); Átlépte 
a 4 milliót az iWiW felhasználók száma! [iWiW crosses the 4 million number!]. PenzCentrum.
hu. (In Hungarian.) www.penzcentrum.hu/vasarlas/atlepte_a_4_milliot_az_iwiw_felhasznalok_
szama.1015273.html
697 Pew Global. Social Networking popular across globe. Pew Research Global Attitutes Project. 12 
December 2012. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/12/12/social-networking-popular-across-globe/ 
(Accessed 28 July 2014.)
698 Loretta Chao and Josh Chin. China Eases Crackdown on Internet. op.cit.
699 Freedom House. Freedom on the Net 2013. China 
 www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/china 
700 Dana Liebelson. 28 March 2014. MAP: Here Are the Countries That Block Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube. Mother Jones. www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/turkey-facebook-youtube-
twitter-blocked (Accessed 7 August 2014.)
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Companies that operate social networking platforms have no control over actions by 
governments and ISPs to filter them.  Some have spoken out against network-level 
filtering in general, as Facebook, Twitter, and Google have done.701 However, companies 
do exercise control over their terms of service and also respond to government requests 
to remove content or deactivate accounts on their own platforms. Companies’ decisions 
about such platform-level restrictions may in turn affect whether or not governments 
choose to filter at the network level. 
Governments restrict social networks via network-level filtering under several circumstances:
Differences in norms of the jurisdictions: Unlike ISPs, social networks – as well as search 
engines discussed in the previous case study - do not require a physical presence in a 
country in order to reach users in it. However some governments use the threat of network 
level filtering in an effort to compel companies to comply with their laws.
For example, in 2011 the Delhi High Court asked Facebook (along with Google) to ‘develop 
a mechanism to monitor and remove offensive and objectionable material’ and threatened 
to filter them ‘like China’ if they did not comply.702 As previously mentioned in Study 1, in 
2013, a Brazilian judge ordered Facebook to remove content about a fight between two 
neighbours and threatened to block Facebook if it refused. The judge reportedly viewed the 
company’s intransigence as an insult to Brazil’s sovereignty. Facebook did not comply and 
the threat was not carried out.703
To prevent political unrest and preserve national unity: From July 2009-May 2010, 
the Chinese government implemented a network shutdown in the northwestern province 
of Xinjiang in response to unrest.704 Since then, Facebook and Twitter have been filtered 
nationwide and cannot be accessed without the use of special circumvention technology.
In 2011, the Egyptian government filtered Facebook and Twitter, prior to shutting down 
internet access across the country for approximately one week. In this instance, filtering of 
Facebook and Twitter was not permanent and inconsistently implemented as access was 
intermittently available when internet service itself was available.705
701 For example, Facebook and Twitter spoke out against the internet ban that took place in Egypt 
in 2011. For more information see: Google, Facebook and Twitter speak out against Egypt’s 
Internet ban. AFP via France24. 2 February 2011. http://www.france24.com/en/20110202-google-
facebook-twitter-egypt-internet-ban-mubarak/ (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
702 Facebook and Google remove ‘offensive’ India content. 6 February 2012. BBC. 
 www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-16903765 (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
703 Rafael Sabarai. 3 October 2013. Briga de Vizinho pode tirar Facebook do ar no Brasil. [Neighbor 
fights can take air in Brazil Facebook]. Veja. http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/vida-digital/acao-judicial-
pode-deixar-facebook-fora-do-ar-no-brasil (Accessed 8 April 2014.)
704 Edward Wong. 15 May 2010. After Long Ban, Western China Is Back Online. New York Times. 
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/world/asia/15china.html (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
705 Confusion over Egyptian blocks on web protest tools. 26 January 2011. BBC News. accessed 
13 July 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12291982; At a glance. Twitter. 1 January 2011 
– 28 February 2011. Herdict. http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth;jsessionid=92376A04145A8
1FEAED45F53F0858298#!fs=2633&fc=EG&fed=02/28/2011&fsd=01/01/2011 (Accessed 13 July 
2014); At a glance. Facebook. 1 January 2011 – 28 February 2011. Herdict. 
 http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth;jsessionid=92376A04145A81FEAED45F53F0858298#!fs=
2633&fc=EG&fed=02/28/2011&fl=&fs=2245&fsd=01/01/2011 (Accessed 13 July 2014.)
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Real-time need to control to and maintain public order: Governments issue orders for 
the network-level filtering of social networking platforms when there is a perceived need 
to maintain public order. One example cited in Study 1 occurred in India in 2012 when 
the government, responding to threats of ethnic and sectarian violence following unrest 
in the northeast, ordered ISPs to filter pages on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter that 
featured inflammatory content and requested that the companies remove content and block 
accounts).706
5.3 Content removal and account deactivation 
While social networking platforms can be the target of ISP-level filtering over which they 
have no direct control as described above, social networks do have their own mechanisms 
to block or otherwise restrict user content. This section discusses such mechanisms and 
the different contexts in which they are deployed.
Social networking platforms generally require users to create an account – i.e. a username 
and password – in order to share content. Operators of the platforms can restrict content 
that users share on the platform in several ways: deleting content; blocking it from view for 
users in specific jurisdictions; or shutting down – deactivating - the accounts of users who 
post certain content. These actions may be taken as a self-regulatory measure to enforce 
private rules, or in compliance with government requests and other legal requirements such 
as responding to court orders in civil cases. The table below provides an overview of the 
different modes through which these actions occur, reasons, and affected parties.
Table 3: Key factors affecting content restriction by social networking 
platforms:
Reason for restriction:
Content violates 
terms of 
service?
Modes of  
implementation: Who is affected:
• government requests
• law-based requests (e.g. 
copyright takedown 
notices, court orders in 
civil cases) 
• self-regulation on 
own initiative (terms 
of service and other 
enforcement of private 
rules)
• user reporting (on other 
users’ violations of 
terms of service)
• possibly
• possibly
• Usually
• Usually
• complete removal of specific 
content
• blocking of specific content 
for a specific user group or 
jurisdiction (content remains 
accessible to others)
• automated (pro-active) 
filtering of pre-identified types 
of content
• all users
• only users in a particular 
jurisdiction
• only specific user groups 
(for example by age)
706 Vikas SN. 22 August 2012. #IndiaBlocks: Airtel Blocks Youtu.be Short URL, Proxy & Domain 
Marketplace Sites. MediaNama. www.medianama.com/2012/08/223-indiablocks-airtel-blocks-
youtu-be-short-url-proxy-domain-marketplace-sites (Accessed 4 August 2014.) 
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The next two sub-sections will examine company policies related to these different modes 
of restriction, as well as their implementation in the context of jurisdictions covered by 
this case study.
5.3.1 Government requests and legal requirements
Company Policies
Facebook and Twitter, with large user bases outside their home jurisdictions, may act to 
restrict content in response to lawful requests from governments. 
Child sexual abuse images are the only type of illegal content that Facebook and Twitter 
pro-actively monitor and remove without first having received a government request, 
court order, or copyright takedown notice. In 2011, Facebook was the first company to 
employ Microsoft’s PhotoDNA, which can identify known child sexual abuse photos 99.7 
per cent of the time.707 Twitter has used it since 2013.708 
Both companies publicly explain their policies for responding to all other restriction 
requests from authorized authorities in their home jurisdiction and around the world.709 In 
cases where the content in question does not violate the companies’ terms of service and 
is not illegal in the United States, Facebook and Twitter may use a jurisdiction-specific 
restriction mechanism: content is restricted only to users in jurisdictions where it found 
to be infringing according to local law and where governments have made specific lawful 
requests.710 This way, content remains accessible to users outside the jurisdiction where 
the law compels its restriction.
Weibo does not have a public policy dedicated to content restriction requests from 
authorized authorities, but a leaked Sina internal document appeared to highlight a direct 
‘backdoor’ access to Weibo’s servers, which reportedly allows officials to filter keywords 
707 Riva Richmond. 19 May 2011. Facebook’s New Way to Combat Child Pornography. New York 
Times. http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/facebook-to-combat-child-porn-using-
microsofts-technology (Accessed 5 August 2014); Nick Eaton. 19 May 2011. Facebook deploys 
Microsoft tool to fight child pornography. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. http://blog.seattlepi.com/
microsoft/2011/05/19/facebook-deploys-microsoft-tool-to-fight-child-pornography (Accessed 5 
August 2014); Bill Harmon. 19 May 2011. 500 million friends against child exploitation. The Official 
Microsoft Blog. http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2011/05/19/500-million-friends-against-child-
exploitation (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
708 Charles Arthur. 22 July 2013. Twitter to introduce PhotoDNA system to block child abuse images. 
The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/22/twitter-photodna-child-abuse 
(Accessed 5 August 2014.)
709 Twitter. Guidelines for law enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/
topics/238-report-a-violation/articles/41949-guidelines-for-law-enforcement#11 Facebook. Safety 
Center. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities. https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/
law/guidelines  
710 Facebook restricts content on a reactive basis and on receipt of requests from governments, law 
enforcement and nongovernmental organizations. Facebook. Government requests report. FAQs. 
https://govtrequests.facebook.com/faq/ and Facebook. Government requests report. About the 
report. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/about Twitter restricts content on a reactive basis and 
on receipt of ‘a valid and properly scoped request from an authorized entity’. Twitter. Help Center. 
Country Withheld Content. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169222-country-withheld-content 
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and delete content without having to go through the company.711 iWiW did not have 
publicly available guidelines on dealing with governmental requests to restrict content, 
and was not available for comment.
Implementation in national context
All of the social networking platforms studied in this research are affected by law in their 
home jurisdiction as well as by law in other countries where they actively market their 
service to users. It is important to note however that governments have less leverage 
over social networking services that do not have offices or employees physically located 
in their jurisdiction. Laws related to intermediary liability (see Chapter 2) in the home 
jurisdiction, as well as in other jurisdictions where the platforms have high commercial 
interest, appear to have particularly strong influence on how companies shape their 
content restriction policies and practices. 
In cases where a social networking platform is completely filtered at the network level 
for a long period of time in a given jurisdiction, the company must decide whether or 
not to concede to that country’s legal requirements in order to possibly get the filter 
removed and thus restoring restore access to that market.712 In the case of China, neither 
Facebook nor Twitter has made that concession.713 
China’s ‘blanket liability’ regime for intermediaries means that social networking platforms 
are responsible for all content – even that which is user-generated and which the company 
is not aware of. SinaWeibo seems the only company studied in this research that is known 
to proactively monitor user content (other than child abuse images), because it needs 
to comply with Chinese law and the demands of regulators. In China’s strict regulatory 
environment, there is no public evidence of Weibo contesting government requests 
for content restriction. Details of Weibo’s implementation will be discussed later in this 
section.
There is no evidence of iWiW having challenged government requests in Hungary, but this 
may be because the government had not issued takedown requests; there is insufficient 
public information available to know for sure.
The US-based Facebook and Twitter are broadly exempt from liability for third-party 
content under US law – Section 230 of the CDA (see Chapter 2) – which specifically 
711 Sophie Beach. 11 March 2013. Beyond censors’ reach, free expression thrives, to a point. 
Challenged in China: The shifting dynamics of censorship and control. Committee to Protect 
Journalists. 
 https://www.cpj.org/reports/2013/03/challenged-china-media-censorship-weibo-expression.php 
(Accessed 10 August 2014.)
712 Gibran Ashraf. Two years on, no light at the end of the tunnel for YouTube. 18 September 2014. 
The Express Tribune. http://tribune.com.pk/story/763869/two-years-on-no-light-at-the-end-of-the-
tunnel-for-youtube/ (Accessed 3 October 2014.)
713 Censors in China keep mainlanders in dark about Hong Kong protests. 29 September 2014. The 
Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-censors-in-china-keep-mainlanders-
in-dark-about-hong-kong-protests-20140929-story.html (Accessed 3 October 2014.)
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maintains that intermediaries do not have to monitor user content.714 This serves as the 
baseline for the companies’ policies related to government requests and other legal 
compliance requirements at home and around the world.
Intermediaries do receive many copyright-related takedown requests in accordance with 
copyright laws. Because Facebook and Twitter are headquartered in the United States 
they delete content globally in compliance with DMCA takedown requests. (see Chapter 
2 for a discussion of the DMCA). Facebook and Twitter have different mechanisms to 
receive these requests.715 (The Transparency and Remedy sections of this case study 
will describe how users are notified of requests and takedowns, as well mechanisms for 
appeal.) 
Practices of Facebook and Twitter in context: 
As will be discussed in greater detail later in the ‘Transparency’ section of this case study, 
of the social networking platforms studied, only Facebook and Twitter publish information 
about the volume and type of requests received by governments as part of what the 
industry has come to call ‘transparency reports’. Their data show that requests and 
companies’ compliance rates vary widely from country to country – and also between 
companies – thus shedding light not only on different legal regimes but also illuminating 
some basic characteristics of these companies’ policies and practices in relation to 
government requests.
The following table lists the number of items restricted by Facebook in response to 
government requests (but not court orders in civil cases or copyright takedowns) between 
July-December 2013 in all jurisdictions covered by all three case studies in this report. It 
also includes some basic information about the reason for restriction as disclosed by the 
company. (Countries where no requests were made are omitted.)
714 Roxanne E. Christ, Jeanne S. Berges and Shannon C. Trevino. July 2007. Social Networking Sites: 
To Monitor or Not to Monitor Users and Their Content? Intellectual Property and Technology Law 
Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, p. 2. 
 www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/social-networking-monitoring-content-texas-case 
715 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (i)(1)(A). Legal Information Institute. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512 
(Accessed 11 August 2014); James Gibson. 12 July 2011. The DMCA and Repeat Infringers. The 
Media Institute. www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2011/071211.php (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
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Table 4:  Facebook content restricted at government request,  
July-December 2013716
Brazil 0* “We restricted content in Brazil in response to requests related to defamation and 
orders in civil cases. We have not reported defamation or civil claims in this report. 
We may include these sorts of requests in future reports.”
Germany 84 “We restricted access in Germany to a number of pieces of content reported under 
local laws prohibiting Holocaust denial.”
India 4,765 “…reported primarily by law enforcement officials and the India Computer 
Emergency Response Team under local laws prohibiting criticism of a religion or 
the state.”
Russia 4 “We restricted access in Russia to a number of pieces of content reported by the 
Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies 
and Mass Communications under local laws prohibiting access to certain forms of 
drug-use and self-harm.”
UK 3 “We restricted access to content in the UK in response to a small number of court 
injunctions.”
The next table contains Twitter’s similar but more detailed breakdown of restrictions made 
in response to government requests and court orders during the same time period, in 
jurisdictions covered by this report. (Countries where no requests were made are omitted.)
Table 5: Twitter content restricted at government request July-December 
2013717
Country Removal 
requests - 
Court Orders
Removal 
requests - 
Gov’t agency, 
police, other
Percentage 
where some 
content 
withheld
Accounts 
specified
Accounts 
withheld
Tweets 
withheld
Brazil 11 1 33% 50 2 26
Germany 1 1 0% <10 0 0
India 2 6 13% 54 0 13
Russia 0 14 64% 14 1 9
UK 1 8 0% <10 0 0
USA 2 6 0% 11 0 0
Because Facebook does not publish data about the number of requests versus the 
number honored, it is not clear how Facebook’s compliance rate may or may not differ 
from Twitter’s. Twitter for its part does not shed light on the reasons for requests or what 
type of subject matter they relate to. The nature of the services is also sufficiently different 
that a direct comparison may have limited meaning.  Nonetheless these numbers help to 
shed some light (even if still murky) on how companies respond to government requests 
716 Facebook. Government Requests Report. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/
717 Twitter Transparency Report. Removal Requests. July 1 – December 31, 2013. https://transparency.
twitter.com/removal-requests/2013/jul-dec 
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differently in different jurisdictions – and which governments tend to make the most 
requests. 
Twitter’s data shows that, in the countries covered by this report, the company chose 
not to comply with a large percentage of government restriction requests it received in 
the second half of 2013. This indicates that, in a substantial number of cases, Twitter 
apparently determined that either a) the request itself was not in full compliance with 
the law where the request was made; b) its lawyers determined that the content was not 
infringing in that jurisdiction, or c) that the company otherwise had a legal right in that 
particular context to decline. 
During the same reporting period, Twitter received the highest number of requests from 
Brazil and Russia. Facebook also restricted some content in Russia for the same period 
in compliance with “local laws prohibiting access to certain forms of drug-use and 
self-harm.” Twitter specifies that most of its requests from Brazil came as court orders. 
Facebook clarifies that while it received no government agency requests in Brazil for that 
period, it did restrict content in Brazil due to defamation and orders in civil cases, even 
though the company did not provide data on those restrictions. 
Another significant data point is the high number of restrictions Facebook carried out 
at the request of the Indian government - 4,765. This is by far the highest number of 
restrictions Facebook carried out in any jurisdiction. The high number reflects the legal 
and regulatory environment of India, discussed in Chapter 2, in which intermediaries have 
considerable liability for user content and government has the legal authority to require 
removal of broad categories of content. The company nonetheless makes an effort to 
limit such restrictions so that the content remains visible in other jurisdictions where it 
is not illegal. For example, in 2012 Facebook complied with a court order and restricted 
‘objectionable’ material cited as causing communal unrest in India, but maintained public 
visibility for the content when viewed from IP addresses not located in India.718
Both Twitter and Facebook restrict content in Germany. In its first implementations of 
its ‘Country Withheld Content policy’ in 2012, Twitter blocked access to the account 
of a white supremacist organization to users in Germany, upon request from German 
law enforcement.719 In that case, because the user’s entire account was targeted for 
restriction by authorized authorities in a single country, Twitter did not delete the account, 
but instead restricted access to the account for German users only.720 Twitter is the only 
718 Note: this order was from the Delhi High Court that targeted Facebook, Yahoo, Orkut and 21 other 
internet companies for hosting ‘objectionable’ content. For more information see: BBC, Facebook 
and Google remove ‘offensive’ India content. 6 February 2012. BBC. www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-india-16903765 (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
719 Twitter Transparency Report. Removal requests. July 1 – December 31, 2012. https://transparency.
twitter.com/removal-requests/2012/jul-dec 
720 Freedom House Foundation (ed.). Freedom on the Net Report - Germany 2013. http://www.
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/germany; Kate Connolly. 18 October 2012. Twitter 
blocks neo-Nazi account in Germany. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/
oct/18/twitter-block-neo-nazi-account (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
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company in this study that reports account restrictions (as opposed to content restriction) 
due to government requests.721 
Figure 7: Screenshot of the blocked account of a German far-right group 
when  accessed from a German IP address.722
Figure 8: Screenshot of the same account accessed from a US IP address. 
The account holders stopped using it after it was blocked in Germany.723
Even with jurisdictional blocking, companies do not accept all requests. In March 2014, a 
Brazilian court ordered Facebook to delete the Page of Eduardo Campos, a presidential 
candidate in the 2014 elections. As of this writing the page is still accessible in Brazil.724 
721 Twitter Transparency Report. Information requests. July 1 – December 31, 2013. https://transparency.
twitter.com/information-requests/2013/jul-dec; Twitter Transparency Report. Information requests. 
January 1 – June 30, 2013. https://transparency.twitter.com/removal-requests/2013/jan-jun 
722 Screenshot 22 July 2014. https://twitter.com/hannoverticker
723 Screenshot 22 July 2014. https://twitter.com/hannoverticker
724 Correio Popular. 5 March 2014. TSE manda retirar site ‘Eduardo Campos Presidente’. http://correio.
rac.com.br/_conteudo/2014/03/capa/nacional/158198-tse-manda-retirar-site-eduardo-campos-
presidente.html (Accessed 8 April 2014). Yet as of date the page is still accessible on Facebook 
- See page on facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/eduardocampospresidente/?ref=br_tf. 
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BOX:  jurisdictional blocking in other countries
There are a few other prominent examples from outside of the case study countries worth mentioning, as 
they help highlight other key dimensions to jurisdictional blocking. In France, Twitter blocked specific Tweets 
containing the hashtags #UnBonJuif (‘a good Jew’) and #UnJuifMort (‘a dead Jew’), upon request of a French 
Jewish student group. Twitter explained, ‘Based on local law, we withheld access to some, but not all, of 
the reported Tweets in France’.725 In Turkey, Twitter acknowledged problematic aspects of having to comply 
with local law to block content locally when it complied with a request to block an account that accused a 
former Turkish government minister of corruption.726 This move happened at the same time that Twitter was 
temporarily blocked in Turkey after Twitter users had posted information accusing government figures of 
corruption.727 Civil society advocacy groups have criticized Twitter for too easily using jurisdictional blocking. 
It temporarily blocked ‘blasphemous’ content in Pakistan and a right-wing Ukrainian group’s Twitter account 
in Russia.728 Twitter denied Russian assertions that it had blocked further accounts alleged to be extremist.729
As will be discussed further in section 5.3.2, Facebook and Twitter also remove content 
and deactivate accounts to enforce their own terms of service, separate from what the 
law requires. Both companies have mechanisms through which any individual can flag 
a piece of content or user account for violating Facebook’s Community Standards and 
Twitter’s equivalent, called ‘The Twitter rules’. 
Industry sources confirmed to this report’s researchers that authorities of some 
governments sometimes also seek to have content restricted via the companies’ own 
self-regulatory mechanisms, rather than make formal requests through official channels 
following legally specified process. As of this writing, neither company has included in its 
transparency reports any data about the extent to which governments in various countries 
use the companies’ own self-regulatory mechanisms designed for individuals to report 
content that violates the terms of service. (Notably, Google’s transparency report does 
include information about content that governments have sought to have removed from 
725 Twitter removes French anti-Semitic Tweets. BBC News. 19 October 2012. http://www.bbc.com/
news/technology-20004671 (Accessed 16 July 2014.); François Delerue. The French Twitter Case: 
A Difficult Equilibrium between Freedom of Expression. Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review. vol. 10 (November 2013) pp. 193-197. 
 http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5444/1/2042-2947-1-SM.pdf.
726 Vijaya Gadde. 26 March 2014. Challenging the access ban in Turkey Wednesday. Twitter Blog. 
https://blog.twitter.com/2014/challenging-the-access-ban-in-turkey (Accessed 8 August 2014); 
Sam Schechner and Ayla Albayrak. 26 March 2014. Twitter Keeps Up Turkey Fight but Blocks 
an Account. Wall Street Journal. Digits. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/26/twitter-keeps-up-
turkey-fight-but-blocks-an-account (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
727 Officials in Turkey ‘lift Twitter ban. BBC News. 3 April 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-26873603 (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
728 Robert Mackey. 18 June 2014. Twitter Restores Access to ‘Blasphemous’ Tweets in Pakistan. New 
York Times. 
 http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/twitter-restores-access-to-blasphemous-tweets-in-
pakistan (Accessed 4 July 2014); Activists fight Twitter censorship in Pakistan with #TwitterTheocracy. 
11 June 2014. Al Jazeera. http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201406111324-0023825 (Accessed 
28 July 2014.)
729 Robert Mackey. 18 June 2014. Twitter Restores Access to ‘Blasphemous’ Tweets in Pakistan. New 
York Times. http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/twitter-restores-access-to-blasphemous-
tweets-in-pakistan (Accessed 4 July 2014); Ilya Khrennikov and Sarah Frier. 24 June 2014. Twitter 
Denies Blocking Extremist Accounts in Russia. Bloomberg. www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-
23/russia-says-twitter-to-block-extremists-such-as-ukraine-group.html (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
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its video sharing service, YouTube, and which the company agreed to remove because it 
violated the platform’s terms. However YouTube was not covered in this study.)
Practices of Weibo in context:  
China is the only country in this case study that requires intermediaries to proactively 
monitor user content. In China, if too much of the information users share on social 
media platforms falls into the ‘nine forbidden content categories’ (see Chapter 2), the 
company can have its operating licenses revoked.730 Failure to comply satisfactorily with 
government requirements can have serious consequences: during an anti-pornography 
crackdown in April 2014 the government revoked Sina’s publishing and media distribution 
licenses.731 As such Weibo’s terms of service – as with all internet intermediaries in China 
– closely mirror the legal requirements imposed by the Chinese government and Weibo 
proactively monitors and deletes content in order to retain its operating licenses.732 
According to a Carnegie Mellon study of Weibo, about 16 per cent of all messages are 
deleted.733 Reuters has reported that within an average 24 hour period Weibo’s staff 
must process and make decisions about three million Weibo posts.734 The China Digital 
Times, a project housed at the University of California Berkeley, has a long-term project 
to track Weibo’s list of sensitive words. Researchers have found that the addition of new 
words and terms into the company’s list of sensitive words appeared to be correlated 
with political and social events. Researchers also found that the list apparently also 
contained a large number of homophones and similar expressions in order to limit access 
to information about particular controversies. For instance, in January 2014, ‘Xi’, Chinese 
730 Article 35, Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services (Deliberation Draft). 7 
June 2012. sina.com. 
 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-06-07/135924552816.shtml (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
731 Michael Martina. 25 April 2014. Sina shares fall after China strips its licence in web porn crackdown. 
Reuters. 
 www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/china-internet-sina-idUSL3N0NG4EG20140424 (Accessed 
4 August 2014.) –are there no other sources for this but Western? 
732 Since the second half of year 2011, China Digital Times has been running an independent test 
aiming at the keywords that are blocked in Sina Weibo search and publish the test results from 
time to time. On October 17 of the same year, the project started to collect clues from the public 
and named itself as the open-source project of sensitive words in Sina Weibo’s search. This project 
now publishes a open list of banned words in Sina Weibo’s search, which records more than one 
thousand words and expressions that were or are blocked. See http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese
/%E6%96%B0%E6%B5%AA%E5%BE%AE%E5%8D%9A%E6%90%9C%E7%B4%A2%E6%95
%8F%E6%84%9F%E8%AF%8D%E5%88%97%E8%A1%A8/.
733 David Bamman, Brendan O’Connor and Noah Smith. March 2012. Censorship and deletion practices 
in Chinese social media. First Monday, Vol. 17, No. 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v17i3.3943 
(Accessed 5 August 2014); Allen Yu. 23 March 2012. Carnegie Mellon Study on Censorship and 
Deletion Practices in Chinese Social Media. Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society 
Blog. http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/03/carnegie-mellon-study-censorship-and-deletion-
practices-chinese-social-media (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
734 Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. 11 September 2013. At Sina Weibo’s censorship hub, China’s Little 
Brothers cleanse online chatter. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-china-
internet-idUSBRE98A18Z20130912 (Accessed 12 September 2014.)
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President Xi Jinping’s surname, Xi, appeared to have been filtered when it was combined 
with expressions such as ‘publicity stunt’, ‘sensationalism’ and ‘playacting’.735 
Chinese social networking platforms use a variety of other methods to comply with 
government censorship requirements. Keyword blocking is the most popular. Weibo 
maintains a blacklist of keywords that users are unable to use in their posts. For example 
the screenshot below illustrates a case in which the user attempted to post an item 
mentioning the “New Citizen Movement.” A message appeared stating: ‘Sorry, this post 
is not suitable for public display’.
In other instances, terms might trigger a program that flags the post it for editorial review 
before it can be published. In some cases, censors can leave the post visible to the 
author but block its visibility to others, thus not alerting users to the fact that a post is 
being restricted.736
Terms or user names can also be blocked from appearing in the platform’s search function, 
for instance, a search for a the name of the artist Ai Weiwei, is met with a message that 
says: ‘In accordance with relevant laws and regulations, the search results for “Ai Weiwei” 
do not appear’.
Sometimes specific features can be temporarily disabled: In March 2012 authorities 
reportedly instructed Sina Weibo to disable commenting – its liveliest and most popular 
feature – for three days.737 Chinese authorities and social networking platform operators 
can be extremely specific about the granularity of some restrictions.  This granularity 
can be geographic; for example, after the July 2012 Beijing floods, Beijing-based Weibo 
users searching for ‘Beijing’ reported to see only users whose handles included the word 
‘Beijing’ – but no posts about the floods.738 
Despite the heavy restrictions, some argue that Weibo remains an outlet for controversial 
expression even if for short periods of time. One employee pointed out that news does 
often get out in the several minutes before something is deleted.739 
735 This project now publishes an open list of banned words in Weibo’s search, which records more 
than one thousand words and expressions that were or are blocked. For test results, refer to this 
continuously updated document “新浪微博搜索敏感词列表（更新中）Sensitive Sina Weibo 
Search Terms (Updating)”, Google Docs, accessed 16 July 2014, 
 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Aqe87wrWj9w_dFpJWjZoM19BNkFfV2JrWS1p
MEtYcEE#gid=0. 
736 Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. At Sina Weibo’s censorship hub, China’s Little Brothers cleanse 
online chatter. op. cit.; Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations (Trial). Sina Weibo. 8 
May 2012.  http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/sina-weibo-community-
management-regulations-trial (Accessed 7 August 2014.)
737 Loretta Chao and Josh Chin. 2 April 2012. China Eases Crackdown on Internet. op. cit.
738 Coincidence? Sina Weibo’s Curious Breakdown. 27 July 2012. Wall Street Journal China Real 
Time Blog. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/07/27/coincidence-sina-weibos-curious-
breakdown (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
739 Interviewee agreed to be held on condition of anonymity. Threfore name, time and location of 
interview have been withheld. 
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5.3.2 Company Self-regulation
Companies reserve the right to restrict content from the platform that violates their terms of 
service.740 All social networking platforms prohibit some content in their terms of service741 
or easier-to-understand guidelines like the ‘Facebook Community Standards’742 or ‘The 
Twitter Rules’.743  In addition to prohibiting content that is illegal in their home jurisdictions, 
many restrict access to content that may be legally protected speech (especially in the 
US) but which the company has chosen to disallow: Such content generally includes 
categories such as adult pornography, nudity, hate speech, harassment, impersonation, 
and private information like someone’s credit card or government ID number.744  Facebook 
users with ‘Pages’ (as opposed to personal profiles) have the option to filter common 
profanity or self-selected words.745 iWiW, for example, prohibits usernames that contain 
a public figure’s name.746
Account restrictions
All companies reserve the right to revoke certain privileges, suspend or terminate user 
accounts at their discretion without prior notice.747 This can happen in response to any 
of the reporting mechanisms described below. However, some Facebook and Twitter 
policies hint that summary account terminations are rare; Twitter explains it ‘will make 
reasonable efforts to notify you’ by email or the next time users log in.748 Weibo may warn 
the user or summarily suspend or terminate the account.749 
In countries where laws restrict broad categories of speech, companies’ terms of service 
reflect the legal regime. Weibo’s ‘Community Convention Administrative Regulations’ 
prohibits content that criticizes the government.750 
740 https://twitter.com/tos, Sina Weibo – http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/guiding. , iWiW - 
http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasi-feltetele
741 Facebook Terms https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms; Twitter terms of service.  https://twitter.
com/tos; Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations. http://service.account.weibo.com/
roles/guiding (for translation see http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/
sina-weibo-community-management-regulations-trial/) ; iWiW Tems of Service. http://iwiw.hu/i/
felhasznalasi-feltetele
742 Facebook. Community Standards. https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards 
743 Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities: ‘You will not use Facebook to do anything 
unlawful, misleading, malicious, or discriminatory.’ Twitter. The Twitter Rules. https://support.twitter.
com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules 
744 The Twitter Rules: ‘You may not use our service for any unlawful purposes or in furtherance of 
illegal activities. International users agree to comply with all local laws regarding online conduct and 
acceptable content.’ 
745 Facebook. Desktop Help. How can I proactively moderate content posted on my Page? 
 https://www.facebook.com/help/131671940241729.
746 iWiW terms of service, Felhasználási Feltételek. http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasi-feltetelek
747 iWiW reserves the right to, at the company’s discretion, terminate and remove content for a number 
of additional reasons. For more information see: terms of service. Felhasználási Feltételek. 
 http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasi-feltetelek; https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules; 
Facebook Terms, op. cit. 
748 Twitter terms of service op. cit.
749 Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/
guiding; Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. op. cit. 
750 Sina Weibo Community Regulations. op. cit.
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Most social networking platforms including those covered by this research have 
automated mechanisms to detect spam.751 However, sometimes these computer 
programs unsupervised by humans can make mistakes when the user’s actions or the 
content of their postings display patterns common to spam. For example in 2012, a 
journalist’s comment on Facebook was mistakenly flagged as spam.752  On Twitter, spam 
can must be reported by a user clicking on a Tweet from the alleged spammer’s profile. 
Reporting mechanisms
Companies allow people to report either content or individual users that are abusive, or 
that otherwise violates terms of service. The companies evaluate these reports and have 
an internal process for deciding whether and how to take action if warranted.
Facebook offers forms to users, as well as to those who do not have an account, to 
report different types of violations including abuse, nudity, and the potential spreading 
of private information.753 Facebook specifies that reported content is reviewed manually, 
and if the content in question violates the company’s ‘Community Standards’, it will 
remove it from the platform for all jurisdictions.754 Facebook has outsourced much of 
the process of manually reviewing reported content,755 although sources knowledgeable 
about Facebook’s operations have said that the outsourced company sends difficult 
cases back to Facebook staff for further review.756 Users who report a violation can track 
how their report is being handled through a Support Dashboard.757 Facebook also uses a 
‘social reporting’ mechanism that allows users to reach out to trusted friends to help them 
resolve issues. For example, when one user posts unflattering or false information or 
pictures about another, the subject can make a direct removal request to the person who 
751 Facebook. Desktop Help. Spam.https://www.facebook.com/help/287137088110949;  Twitter. 
Help Center . Reporting spam on Twitter. https://support.twitter.com/articles/64986-reporting-
spam-on-twitter. 
752 Christina DesMarais. 6 May 2012. Facebook Spam Filter Catches Some By Surprise. TechHive. 
www.techhive.com/article/255101/facebook_and_spam_not_everything_is_relevant.html 
(Accessed 29 July 2014); Emil Protalinski. 5 May 2012. Facebook blames Scoble snafu on spam 
false positive. ZDNet. www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-blames-scoble-snafu-on-spam-
false-positive/12589.
753 Facebook. Desktop Help. Report a Violation. https://www.facebook.com/help/263149623790594.
754 Sean Rintel. A thin blue line: how Facebook deals with controversial content. 5 January 2014. 
 http://theconversation.com/a-thin-blue-line-how-facebook-deals-with-controversial-
content-19966 (Accessed 16 July 2014); Facebook. What Happens After You Click ‘Report’. 19 
June 2012. https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/what-happens-after-you-click-
report/432670926753695.
755 Note: in the past this role was outsourced to a company called oDesk as reported in the source in 
this footnote. According to an industry source speaking on condition of non-attribution, Facebook 
no longer works with oDesk although it is known to work with another other company performing 
the same function. Details about any new outsourcing arrangements are not publicly available. 
Adrian Chen. Inside Facebook’s Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where ‘Camel Toes’ are 
More Offensive Than ‘Crushed Heads. Gawker. 16 February 2012, http://gawker.com/5885836/
facebook-releases-new-content-guidelines-now-allows-bodily-fluids. 
756 Details of interview omitted on the requests of the interviewees.
757 Facebook. More Transparency in Reporting. 26 April 2012, https://www.facebook.com/notes/
facebook-safety/more-transparency-in-reporting/397890383565083.
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posted the content. Or one user can use a special form to reach out to a friend requesting 
help in countering harassment by a third user:758
Figure 9: Example of a Facebook form seeking a friend’s help in 
countering harassment, as provided by the company to users
Reporting mechanisms can be useful in addressing abusive behaviour and content, but 
oftentimes people misuse the reporting mechanism merely to report content that they 
do not like. Facebook has been accused of removing activists’ pages for reasons that 
were not clear to the creators of the page.759 Facebook claims that ‘number of times 
something is reported doesn’t determine whether or not it’s removed’,760 but some activist 
groups have alleged that mass abuse reporting by apparent government agents in some 
countries has led to content removal.761
758 Facebook. Details on Social Reporting. 10 March 2011. https://www.facebook.com/notes/
facebook-safety/details-on-social-reporting/196124227075034
759 Shiv Malik. 29 April 2011. Facebook accused of removing activists’ pages. The Guardian. http://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/apr/29/facebook-accused-removing-activists-pages 
(Accessed 10 August 2014.)
760 Facebook. About Facebook’s Security & Warnings Systems. https://www.facebook.com/
help/408181689281891 (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
761 Vietnam Blocks Dissident Facebook Pages Through Fake Abuse Reports. 21 July 2014. Radio Free 
Asia. www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/facebook-07212014182948.html (Accessed 4 August 
2014)
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Twitter has also has mechanisms allowing users to report content via web forms.762 It details 
how to report the various violations on one web page titled “how to report violations’.763 
One may report Tweets and Twitter account holders for impersonation, trademarks, 
harassment, and self-harm. Users can also ‘report an ad’: Twitter advertisements are not 
allowed to promote ‘illegal products, services, or content’.764 Some advertisements are 
restricted by geography: In Brazil the company prohibits any advertising related to political 
campaigning.765 Below is an image of the reporting mechanism for advertisements:
Figure 11: Twitter’s form to report advertisements that violate the 
company’s rules
Similarly, Weibo has a reporting mechanism through which users can report posts, 
comments and private messages that they believe are abusive or infringing of company 
policy. Weibo users are encouraged to use the ‘report abuse’ function for ‘false 
information’, especially if it concerns natural disasters, and information that may have 
been exaggerated to gain attention.766
Prior to its closure, iWiW also had online forms for reporting abuse.767 
Company enforcement 
Companies explain how they enforce their rules for user behavior and acceptable content 
to varying degrees. Some companies provide very specific examples, whereas others use 
imprecise language that allows companies to exercise discretion. 
762 Twitter Help Center. How to report violations. https://support.twitter.com/articles/15789
763 Twitter. How to report violations. https://support.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/
topics/238-report-a-violation/articles/15789-how-to-report-violations 
764 Twitter. Help Center. Twitter Ads Policies. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169693-twitter-ads-
policies
765 Twitter. Advertiser policies: Political campaigning. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20170492 
766 Sina Corp. Help Center: Report Abuse. http://help.sina.com.cn/comquestiondetail/view/1045 
767 Deutsche Telekom AG. Implementation Questionnaire. Principles for the Safer Use of Connected 
Devices and Online Services by Children and Young People in the EU. ICT Coalition. 11 October 
2013. p. 11-12. 
 http://www.ictcoalition.eu/gallery/ICT%20Principles_Compliance%20Report%20Deutsche%20
Telekom%20Group%20080114-08012014021423.pdf. 
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Facebook can mete out tiered punishments; e.g. if someone sends repeatedly sends 
spam, Facebook may block just the messaging features for that user.768  It does commit 
to notifying users the next time they log in.769 Twitter posts a clear notification that 
an account has been suspended – even for users who are merely trying to view the 
suspended account. The below screenshot taken in August 2014 is an example: 
When an account is found to violate the company’s terms, it is removed globally from 
the platform. For example, in the wake of the 2013 Westgate Mall terror attack in Kenya, 
Twitter suspended a number of accounts belonging to a Somali militant group for 
spreading content that was abusive and violent in nature.770 In this case, the decision 
to suspend the accounts was based on a determination that they violated Twitter’s own 
rules. Such cases do not appear in Twitter’s transparency reports because the company 
only publishes data about content removals that are made in response to formal 
government requests or court orders. In other words, the company does not publish data 
about content removed for violating its ‘Twitter rules’ – presumably, even if that content 
was brought to the company’s attention by a government authority using the company’s 
self-regulatory mechanism for reporting ‘Twitter rules’ violations.
In 2007, iWiW deleted the profile of Magyar Gárda, a Hungarian right-wing paramilitary 
group, because it violated iWiW’s rule that only allows natural persons – i.e. no 
organizations – to create accounts. It also received hundreds of user complaints about 
the profile’s ‘propagandistic nature’, which also violated its terms.771 Gárda supporters 
alleged cried ‘double standards’, pointing to the ‘many political organisations’ on iWiW, 
including ‘the openly communist Munkáspárt [Hungarian Workers’ Party]’.772
768 Facebook Desktop Help. Why does Facebook limit the use of certain features and what are the 
limits?
 https://www.facebook.com/help/177066345680802
769 Facebook. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms
770 Bernard Oginga. 22 September 2013. Al Shabaab twitter acount shut down after Kenyan attack. 
Standard Digital. www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000094048&story_title=al-shabaab-
twitter-account-shut (Accessed 7 April 2014); Hamza Mohamed. Al-Shabab in long-running battle 
with Twitter. Aljazeera. 18 Dec 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/al-
shabab-long-running-battle-with-twitter-2013121711271555968.html (Accessed 7 April 2014.)
771 See Magyar Gárda profile deleted by iWiW. Népszabadság Online 28 august 2007 (Törölte 
az iWiW a Magyar Gárda adatlapját). [translation]. (In Hungarian.) http://nol.hu/archivum/
archiv-462071-265440; Magyar Gárda deleted from iWiW. Index. 28 August 2007 (Törölték a 
Magyar Gárdát az iWiW-ről), available at: http://index.hu/bulvar/iwiwgarda372/; Magyar Gárda 
kicked off, Fodor Gábor allowed to stay on iWiW Heti Válasz. 28 August 2007. http://hetivalasz.
hu/migr_lt_cikk_gy_ujtu/a-magyar-garda-ropult-fodor-gabor-viszont-maradhatott-az-iwiw-en-
16827/?cikk_ertekel=1&ertekeles=3 (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
772 The Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) has been object of cenzorship on iwiw.hu. Ex-homár Blog. 28 
August 2007.  http://ex-homar.blogspot.com/2007/08/hungarian-guard-magyar-grda-has-been.
html (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
151
In 2012 Weibo enacted ‘Community Management Regulations’ announcing that users 
would be recruited to form a committee773 that votes on how to deal with reported 
content.774 Weibo deletes accounts belonging to the worst violators of its content 
rules, which aligns closely with laws and government requirements.775 Weibo’s account 
deletions have spawned ‘reincarnation parties’ where participants create hundreds of new 
accounts.776 However reincarnation can be thwarted: Journalist Yang Haipeng’s Weibo 
account appeared to have been closed in April 2012, and while he reported repeated 
attempts to reopen it under a variety of coded user names, in each of the 65 attempts, 
accounts were ultimately closed.777 The artist Ai Weiwei also resported that he was 
repeatedly unable to register, possibly due to blocks associated with his IP addresses or 
ID numbers now required for registration.778
Violations of company terms of service are unevenly enforced. Furthermore, Facebook 
and Twitter have been known to reverse their decisions after receiving negative publicity 
for their handling of specific cases. For example, a German TV host received a notification 
stating that his post criticizing the Catholic Church’s stance on same-sex marriage 
violated community guidelines.779 As a public figure, he was able to draw attention to 
Facebook’s arbitrariness. Facebook apologized for the ‘mistake’.780 
Conversely, content is sometimes found to violate the company’s rules and deleted only 
after activists or the media call attention to it. For example, Facebook deleted the big-
game hunting photos of 19-year-old Kendall Jones after environmental activist groups 
expressed outrage. Facebook said that they violated its terms of service as ‘graphic 
773 Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations  (Trial). Unofficial translation published at China 
Copyright and Media. 8 May 2012. http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/
sina-weibo-community-management-regulations-trial (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
774 Sina Weibo Community Convention (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/gongyue; 
Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/
guiding; and Sina Weibo Community Committee System (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/
roles/zhidu.
775 Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. At Sina Weibo’s censorship hub, China’s Little Brothers cleanse 
online chatter. op. cit.
776 Bei Feng. 26 November 2012. Microblogs Have Become the Focus of Internet Censorship in China. 
Human Rights in China. www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6406 (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
777 Sophie Beach. 11 March 2013. Beyond censors’ reach, free expression thrives, to a point. 
Challenged in China: The shifting dynamics of censorship and control. Committee to Protect 
Journalists. 
 https://www.cpj.org/reports/2013/03/challenged-china-media-censorship-weibo-expression.php 
(Accessed 10 August 2014.)
778 Sui-lee Wee. 19 March 2012. Ai Weiwei says censors removed his microblog. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-china-artist-microblog-idUSBRE82I09U20120319 (Accessed 
10 August 2014.)
779 Jürgen Domian. No title. Facebook, 18 March 2013. www.facebook.com/Domian.Juergen/
posts/466265690110405 (Accessed 19 June 2014.)
780 Tina Kulow. 19 March 2013.  Was ist mit dem Post von Domian passiert? [What has happened 
to the post of Jürgen Domian?]. Public Official Facebook Statement. (In German.) https://de-de.
facebook.com/notes/tina-kulow/was-ist-mit-dem-post-von-domian-passiert/625428644149658. 
(Accessed 19 June 2014.) 
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images shared for sadistic effect or to celebrate or glorify violence’.781 In May 2013, 
Facebook temporarily banned certain violent videos, and then quietly reversed its 
decision in July. A video of a woman being beheaded by members of an organized crime 
cartel in Mexico only entered public consciousness when BBC wrote about it in October. 
Facebook first declined to remove the video, but later reversed its position due to public 
and political pressure.782
Both Facebook and Twitter have in recent years grown more transparent about how 
they repond to government requests for content restriction made through formal legal 
channels or other official, legally binding processes. However as several examples in 
this section and the previous section show, both companies are much more opaque 
about their internal decision-making processes around how and when their own rules are 
enforced. 
5.4 Privacy
Social networks are veritable treasure troves of private information, revealing everything 
from political preferences to sexual orientation. Users implicitly entrust social networks 
with personal data. Governments for their part make requests for private user information 
in the pursuit of civil, criminal, and even national security investigations. 
5.4.1 Company policies
All companies examined in this case study have privacy policies of some form that explain 
how user information is used, but the policies are rarely straightforward or comprehensive.
Weibo does not have a privacy policy per se but several provisions of its Community 
Regulations address privacy;783 its parent, Sina, also has a privacy statement. The 
statement discusses the personally identifiable information that the company collects and 
provides individuals the option to opt out of receiving information from the company.784 
781 Chris Taylor. 7 July 2014. Facebook: Here’s Why We Deleted Cheerleader’s Hunting Pics. Mashable. 
http://mashable.com/2014/07/07/facebook-kendall-jones (Accessed 11 August 2014); Charlotte 
Allen. In defense of Texas huntress and conservationist Kendall Jones. Los Angeles Times. 16 July 
2014. 
 www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-kendall-jones-texas-hunter-cheerleader-20140716-
story.html (Accessed 11 August 2014); Molly Wharton. 9 July 2014.  Hunting Photos Glorify 
Violence, but ‘Kill Kendall Jones’ Facebook Page Apparently Doesn’t. National Review Online. www.
nationalreview.com/corner/382355/hunting-photos-glorify-violence-kill-kendall-jones-facebook-
page-apparently-doesnt (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
782 Will Grant. 3 November 2013. Facebook beheading video: Who was Mexico’s Jane Doe? BBC 
News Magazine. www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24772724 (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
783 Sina Weibo terms of service http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/guiding (Accessible only after 
login.) 
784 Sina Corp. About Sina: Privacy. http://corp.sina.com.cn/chn/sina_priv.html 
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Facebook decided to call its privacy policy a ‘Data Use Policy’ (DUP) in a September 
2011 update.785 Facebook is unique in this study in promising users a seven-day period to 
comment on proposed changes to its DUP on the dedicated ‘Site Governance Page’.786 
Twitter’s Privacy Policy explains that when ‘material’ changes to the policy are made, 
users will receive a @Twitter update or email.787
iWiW’s privacy policy provided notice to users of changes to the policy. Users accept the 
modifications of the privacy policies by logging into the service after the modifications 
had entered entry into force.788
Data Retention
Companies studied do not offer much information about data retention. Weibo does not 
provide any information. Facebook is vague: it stores data ‘for as long as it is necessary 
to provide products and services to you and others’ – typically ‘until your account is 
deleted’.789 Twitter explains that ‘log data’ – i.e. metadata – is deleted or anonymized 
after 18 months at the latest.790 iWiW stated that data was retained for as long as the 
user is a member, with user content like status updates and photos ‘displayed’ to the 
user’s contacts for 14 days and stored at most for 21 days, while metadata is stored for 
six days.791 
Disclosure of User Data
Facebook and Twitter have policies that describe how they respond to government 
requests for user data. Facebook and Twitter, unless legally restricted, notify the user if 
an authorized authority requested user account information.792 
Weibo’s parent Sina states that it may be required by law to disclose personal information 
under several circumstances: (1) compliance with legal notices or applicable legal 
785 Laurie Segall. 23 March 2012. Facebook strips ‘privacy’ from new ‘data use’ policy explainer. CNN 
Money. http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/22/technology/facebook-privacy-changes (Accessed 
9 August 2014); Facebook. Data Use Policy. Last updated 15 November 2013. https://www.
facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (Accessed 9 August 2014.)
786 Facebook. Data Use Policy: Some other things you need to know. https://www.facebook.com/
about/privacy/other 
787 Twitter Privacy Policy. https://twitter.com/privacy
788 
789 Facebook. Information we receive and how it is used. https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/
your-info. 
790 ‘We receive Log Data when you interact with our Services, for example, when you visit our websites, 
sign into our Services, interact with our email notifications, use your Twitter account to authenticate 
to a third-party website or application, or visit a third-party website that includes a Twitter button 
or widget. Twitter uses Log Data to provide our Services and to measure, customize, and improve 
them. If not already done earlier, for example, as provided below for Widget Data, we will either 
delete Log Data or remove any common account identifiers, such as your username, full IP address, 
or email address, after 18 months.’ Twitter Privacy Policy. last updated 21 October 2013. https://
twitter.com/privacy (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
791 iWiW Privacy Policy. Adatkezelési szabályzat. http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat , art. 9A, 9E, 
9F.
792 Twitter. Help Center. Guidelines for Law Enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/entries/41949; 
Facebook. Safety Center. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities. https://www.facebook.com/
safety/groups/law/guidelines 
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procedures; (2) protection of the rights or property of users; (3) In an emergency situation, 
in order to protect personal or public safety.793 
iWiW did not describe in any detail how it responded to government and other lawful 
requests for user data. The company did mention in its privacy policy that it did not need 
user consent in instances of data transfer mandated by law, and gave no mention of any 
procedure for notifying users after the transfer had taken place.794
Real-name requirements
The UN Special Rapportueur for Freedom of Expression and the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights have both flagged the importance of anonymity, as linked to the right to 
privacy, for the exercise and protection of human rights in the internet age. Many social 
networking platforms, but not all, require that users sign up with their real names and 
inforce such policies to varying degrees and in a variety of ways.
Twitter is the only company examined without a real-name policy; it only asks for an 
email at registration. Facebook, iWiW and Weibo require real names for various reasons. 
Chinese law compels Weibo to verify identities.795 iWiW required that users register with 
their genuine first and last names and reserved the right to ask users to verify personal 
information.
Facebook states that a real name policy ‘leads to greater accountability and a safer and 
more trusted environment’.796  It has enforced this policy with varying degrees of effort and 
consistency over time. The deactivation of prominent pseudonymous accounts has made 
media waves, especially when the accounts of celebrities including the author Salman 
Rushdie were deleted. As of August 2014, Facebook stated that it allows persistent 
pseudonyms (e.g. Snoop Dogg) but uses an algorithm to verify what it deems patently 
false names.797 Furthermore, people who want to change their names are required to 
submit proof of identification.798 
793 Sina Corp. About Sina: Privacy. http://corp.sina.com.cn/chn/sina_priv.html 
794 iWiW Privacy Policy. Adatkezelési szabályzat. http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat , art. 8H.
795 XinhuaNet. February 10, 2012. ‘Four questions’ about Weibo real name policy (original source: 
People’s Daily Overseas Edition) [in Chinese]. 
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2012-02/10/c_111507519.htm (Accessed 9 August 2014.)  
796 Somini Sengupta. 15 November 2011. Rushdie Wins Facebook Fight Over Identity. New York Times.
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/technology/hiding-or-using-your-name-online-and-who-decides.
html?pagewanted=all (Accessed 9 August 2014.)
797 Facebook. Desktop Help – Get Started on Facebook – Signing Up. My name was rejected during 
signup. https://www.facebook.com/help/212848065405122 
798 Facebook. Desktop Help: Changing Your Name. 
 www.facebook.com/help/contact/245617802141709 
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Although Facebook promises to ‘permanently delete your ID from [its] servers’ after 
confirming that you are indeed using your real name,799 there is no way for the user to 
verify this. One mitigating factor is that users may submit two IDs of lesser value – e.g. 
bus cards, magazine subscription stubs, yearbook photos – instead of driver’s licenses 
or passports.800
Account settings
Default settings have significant privacy ramifications because human beings are subject 
to ‘default bias’.801 As regulatory scholar Cass Sunstein put it, ‘defaults are powerful 
influences of choice, even when the stakes are high’.802
Although it is primarily a public-facing network, Twitter does allow users to tweet privately 
to a select group of followers (protected Tweets cannot be retweeted, nor can they show 
up in searches).803 Accounts on Twitter and Weibo are set to public by default.
Facebook has experimented with default settings. At the time of writing, users had the 
option to choose whether to share content publicly, to their ‘networks’ or only to friends. 
799 Facebook. Desktop Help: What happens to my ID after I upload it? https://www.facebook.com/
help/155050237914643 
800 Facebook. Desktop Help: What types of ID do you accept? https://www.facebook.com/
help/159096464162185 
801 Cass Sunstein. December 2013. Deciding by Default. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162, 
No. 1. p. 14. http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=penn_
law_review 
802 Eric J. Johnson, Steven Bellman and Gerald L. Lohse. 2002. Defaults, Framing, and Privacy: Why 
Opting In–Opting Out. Marketing Letters, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 13–14. https://www0.gsb.columbia.
edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/1173/defaults_framing_and_privacy.pdf 
803 Twitter Help Center. About Public And Protected Tweets. https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016-
about-public-and-protected-tweets
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In December 2009, Facebook changed the default setting to ‘public’, while announcing in 
a press release that granular privacy options heralded a ‘new standard in user control’.804 
In May 2014, however, Facebook changed the default setting for new users back to 
‘sharing with friends’.805 
Facebook users’ names, gender, profile pictures, background (‘cover’) photos and 
networks are always visible to everyone.806 On iWiW, name, nickname, country, town and 
gender were always public.807 Pictures were visible to friends of friends.808 Also, users 
were required to choose a location from a drop-down menu at registration, though this 
was not verified and could easily be changed.809 
Facebook, iWiW and Weibo allow users to choose whether search engines can index 
their accounts; all public Twitter accounts are open to be indexed.810 Weibo users are not 
given the option to make their account visible only to confirmed followers, but users can 
disable comments and block specific users.811 
5.4.2 Implementation in national context
The following section examines the outcomes produced by specific company policies 
and practices relating to data collection, retention, and sharing with third parties, in the 
context of particular regulatory and legal environments. 
Data protection and privacy enforcement
Facebook has faced legal action over ‘deceptive’ privacy policies. In 2011, the US 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fined Facebook for first telling users they could keep 
804 Facebook Asks More Than 350 Million Users Around the World To Personalize Their Privacy. 
Facebook Newsroom. 9 December 2009. http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2009/12/facebook-asks-
more-than-350-million-users-around-the-world-to-personalize-their-privacy (Accessed 8 August 
2014); Ryan Singel. 9 December 2009. Public Posting Now the Default on Facebook. Wired. www.
wired.com/2009/12/facebook-privacy-update (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
805 Making It Easier to Share With Who You Want. Facebook Newsroom. 22 May 2014. 
 http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/05/making-it-easier-to-share-with-who-you-want (Accessed 
8 August 2014);   
806 Facebook. Desktop Help. What’s considered public information? https://www.facebook.com/
help/167709519956542 
807 Blase Ur and Yang Wang. Online social networks in a Post-Soviet state. op. cit.; iWiW Privacy Policy, 
Adatkezelési szabályzat, available at http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat, art. 7a, 7c, 7d.
808 iWiW Privacy Policy, Adatkezelési szabályzat, available at http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat, 
art. 7d; iWiW terms of service, Felhasználási Feltételek, available at http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasi-
feltetelek.
809 Balázs Lengyel, Attila Varga, Bence Ságvári and Ákos Jakobi. 26 January 2013. Distance dead 
or alive Online Social Networks from a geography perspective. SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2207352 
810 Facebook Desktop Help. Appearing in Search Engine Results. https://www.facebook.com/
help/392235220834308; Privacy policy of Origo Média és Kommunikációs Szolgáltató Zrt., operator 
of iWiW.hu community website. iWiW, Adatkezelési szabályzat. http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-
szabalyzat, art. 8G, 9G (cached copy at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache
:PxnvWuqUMKkJ:iwiw.hu/pages/misc/privacy.jsp+&cd=2&hl=nl&ct=clnk accessed July 25, 2014); 
Sina FAQ. Can Weibo Be Private? http://help.sina.com.cn/comquestiondetail/view/990/.
811 Weibo has introduced a ‘blacklist’ function. 2 December 2009. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/
blog_61ecce970100gh66.html.
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information private but then changing privacy settings and causing information to be 
made public inadvertently.812 
The sheer amount of public content available on Facebook has given rise to companies 
like Geo Listening, which monitors ‘public posts on social networks’ like Facebook and 
Twitter to provide schools with information about their students in order to deter bullying, 
depression, self-harm, substance abuse and truancy.813
In 2014, a Berlin court ruled that several clauses of Facebook’s privacy policy and terms 
of service violate German law.814 The German data protection authority initiated an inquiry 
into facial recognition technology and raised concerns about the fact that Facebook did 
not notify users that facial recognition technology is being used. It also raised concerns 
over the potential misuse of the company’s massive biometrics database. The German 
Data Protection Authority also held that Facebook should delete all facial recognition data 
already collected, and, at least, obtain consent.815 In mid-2014, Max Schrems, a 26-year-
old Austrian law student, launched a class action suit against Facebook. As of August 
2014, his action had attracted 25,000 users worldwide. Schrems claims that Graph 
Search and data sharing by widgets on external websites violate EU privacy laws.816
Despite such concerns in Europe, users in countries such as Hungary are even less 
happy with the local alternaties; interviews with Hungarians who have used both social 
networks said that they generally trusted Facebook but perceived iWiW’s privacy policies 
as deficient and ‘unprofessional’.817
Legal implications of real-name requirements
Facebook’s real-name policy has been the subject of government investigations. In 
Germany, Schleswig-Holstein’s Data Protection Commissioner argued that Facebook 
had violated the Telemedia Act, which allows internet users to be anonymous or 
812 Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep Privacy Promises. 
Federal Trade Commission. 29 November 2011. http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep
813 Geo Listening Monitoring Service Privacy Policy. last updated 10 October 2013. http://geolistening.
com/privacy-policy (Accessed 8 August 2014); Stephen Ceasar. 14 September 2013. Glendale 
district says social media monitoring is for student safety. Los Angeles Times. www.latimes.com/
local/la-me-glendale-social-media-20130915-story.html (Accessed 8 August 2014); Geo Listening. 
FAQs, under ‘Can you explain privacy and social networks?’ https://geolistening.com/faq
814 Facebook subject to German data protection rules, says Berlin court. Out-law.com. 26 February 
2014. http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/february/facebook-subject-to-german-data-
protection-rules-says-berlin-court (Accessed 25 July 2014.); Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband 
[Federation of German Consumer Organizations]. Key Statements on the Judgment by the Court 
of Appeal of 01/24/2014, Ref. No. 5 U 42/12. 24 January 2014. http://www.vzbv.de/cps/rde/xbcr/
vzbv/key-statements-vzbv-facebook-2014-01-24.pdf 
815 Jakob Jung. 16 August 2012. Facebook must destroy facial recognition data – or get users’ 
approval, Germany decides. ZDNet. www.zdnet.com/facebook-must-destroy-facial-recognition-
data-or-get-users-approval-germany-decides-7000002720 (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
816 Facebook privacy challenge attracts 25,000 users. BBC News. 6 August 2014. www.bbc.com/
news/technology-28677667 (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
817 Blase Ur and Yang Wang. Online social networks in a Post-Soviet state. op cit. 
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pseudonymous, though a higher court reversed the decision on procedural grounds.818 
The Facebook policy led to the deactivation of activist accounts and pages during Egypt’s 
Arab Spring protests in 2011.819
Weibo is now legally required to confirm the identities of its 500 million users, a challenging 
task it has been unable to complete, which it acknowledges as a risk in its IPO prospectus: 
‘our noncompliance exposes us to potentially severe penalty’.820
Contesting government requests for user data 
There are no known cases of iWiW and Weibo contesting government demands for 
user data. Facebook, on the other hand, has challenged some government requests. 
According to data published by the company, between July-December 2013 it complied 
with 29 per cent of user data requests from Hungary.821 The table below provides an 
overview of government requests received as well as the company’s compliance rate for 
all countries studied in this report.
Table 6: Facebook’s rate of compliance with government requests for user 
data in jurisdictions studied in this report
Requests Accounts specified Compliance rate
Brazil 1,165 1,651 33.82%
Egypt 6 6 0%
Germany 1,687 1,950 37.88%
Hungary 38 51 28.95%
India 3,598 4,711 53.56%
Kenya – – –
Russia 1 1 0%
UK 1,906 2,277 71.30%
USA 12,598 18,715 81.02%
818 Loek Essers. 23 April 2013.  Facebook Can Keep its Real Name Policy, German Appellate Court 
Decides. CIO Magazine. www.cio.com/article/2386497/facebook/facebook-can-keep-its-real-
name-policy--german-appellate-court-decides.html (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
819 Wessel van Rensburg. Wael Ghonim was admin of Khaled Said Facebook page. Kameraad Mhambi. 
7 February 2011. http://mhambi.com/2011/02/ghonim-was-admin-of-khaledsaid-facebook-page 
(Accessed 9 July 2014); Mike Giglio ElShaheed: The Mysterious ‘Anonymous’ Behind Egypt’s 
Revolt. Newsweek. 30 January 2011. (updated 2 February 2011)
http://www.newsweek.com/elshaheed-mysterious-anonymous-behind-egypts-revolt-66697 (Accesssed 
9 July 2014); Adrian Chen. 5 February 2011.Why Facebook Should Do More to Help Egypt’s 
Protesters. Gawker. http://gawker.com/5752904/why-facebook-should-do-more-to-help-egypts-
protesters (Accesssed 9 July 2014.) 
820 Form F-1 Registration Statement as filed with the Securities Exchange Commission 
by Weibo Corporation. March 14, 2014. p. 37. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1595761/000119312514100237/d652805df1.htm 
821 Facebook. Government requests report. Hungary. July-December 2013. https://govtrequests.
facebook.com/country/Hungary/2013-H2 
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On user data requests, the numbers in the table above demonstrate that Facebook did 
not comply with all requests received.  
Twitter describes itself as the ‘free speech wing of the free speech party’ and has cultivated 
a reputation for challenging government requests.822 In 2011, it convinced a US judge to 
lift a gag order, allowing it to notify three WikiLeaks affiliates that their account information 
had been passed to US national security authorities following an official order.823 In 2012, 
it failed in its efforts to challenge a law enforcement request to turn over the information 
of an Occupy Wall Street protester.824 Twitter contested a subpoena in France but was 
ordered by a French court to turn over information on anti-Semitic accounts.825
Companies more often make at least some data available upon receiving government 
requests in the United States than in the other countries researched. This is primarily 
because the companies are headquartered in the United States, and wherever possible 
ask other governments to use the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process to 
channel user data requests through the US government.826
Official penalties against users
Users can be penalized for their online expression, and thus the potential for liability and 
harassment can lead to self-censorship. Social networking platforms generally remain 
silent when users’ publicly shared information results in penalties by governments, even 
when the penalty is not in line with international standards for legitimate limitation of 
expression. Companies may be required to take action as part of the penalty such as 
removal of the user’s content, as discussed in the previous sections. 
In China, individuals are liable for their posts on social media. In March 2012, the 
government launched a ‘spring breeze’ campaign targeting trade in illicit goods, drugs, 
822 Amir Efrati. Twitter CEO Costolo on Apple, Privacy, Free Speech and Google; Far From IPO. 18 
October 2011.  
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/10/18/twitter-ceo-costolo-on-apple-privacy-free-speech-and-google-
far-from-ipo/ (Accessed 29 April 2014.)
823 Mathew Ingram. 18 October 2011. For Twitter, Free Speech Matters – Not Real Names. GigaOm. 
http://gigaom.com/2011/10/18/for-twitter-free-speech-is-what-matters-not-real-names (Accessed 
9 April 2014); Paul Sonne. 10 January 2011. U.S. Asks Twitter for WikiLeaks Data. Wall Street 
Journal. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487044827045760720817882515
62 (Accessed 29 April 2014.)
824 Russ Buettner. 2 July 2012. Judge Orders Twitter to Release Protester’s Messages. New York 
Times. http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/judge-orders-twitter-to-release-protesters-
messages (Accessed 10 August 2014); Somini Sengupta. 3 September 2012. Twitter’s Free 
Speech Defender. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/technology/twitter-chief-
lawyer-alexander-macgillivray-defender-free-speech.html (Accessed 4 August 2014); Shira Ovide. 
4 August 2013. For Twitter, Free Speech Is a High-Wire Act. Wall Street Journal. http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323997004578643883120559180 (Accessed 8 April 
2013).
825 Angelique Chrisafis. 12 July 2013. Twitter gives data to French authorities after spate of antisemitic 
tweets. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/12/twitter-data-french-
antisemitic-tweets (Accessed 9 August 2014); Somini Sengupta. 13 July 2013. Twitter Yields to 
Pressure in Hate Case in France. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/technology/
twitter-yields-to-pressure-in-hate-case-in-france.html (Accessed 9 August 2014.)
826 For more about the MLAT process see Google’s MLAT page at https://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess/ and also a resource page published by Access 
at https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/01/09/mlat-a-four-letter-word-in-need-of-reform
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human and organs, as well as privacy breaches. As a result, 1,065 suspects were arrested 
and 200,000 messages were deleted.827
In India, numerous arrests have taken place under section 66A of the IT Act 2000, which 
criminalizes a range of online content including offensive content.828 Yet a number of 
these arrests have been criticized in the media as being a violation of rights in relation to 
speech that was not illegal in many commentators’ view. For example, in 2012, two Air 
India employees were arrested in Mumbai and jailed for 12 days after posting derogatory 
comments on Facebook about city-wide commemorations of the death of the leader of 
a religious political party.829
In the United States, a user of both Facebook and Twitter was arrested and charged for 
posting information on the social networks that were perceived as terrorist threats.830 He 
was an 18-year-old high school student and aspiring rapper who posted controversial 
lyrics on Facebook that could – in the opinion of some, depending on the context – be 
construed as announcing a plan for an attack on a city. He was released by a grand jury.831
5.5 Transparency
This section examines the policies and practices of companies related to transparency, 
building on information about transparency reports and other practices already discussed 
in previous sections.
5.5.1 Transparency about government and lawful requests
As mentioned earlier in this study, both Facebook and Twitter publish data sets that 
have come to be known as ‘transparency reports’. Section 5.3.1 included a comparative 
analysis of data published by Facebook and Twitter about government requests to restrict 
user content. 
Facebook’s ‘Government Request Report’ first disclosed information about content 
restriction in April 2014 (its previous report only disclosed user data requests).832
827 “Beijing arrests 1,000 in Internet crime crackdown”, ChinaDaily, 31 March 2012, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-03/31/content_14962187.htm. 
828 Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008. Section 66A.
829 Shipla Jamkhandikar. 19 November 2012. No criticism please, we are Indians. Reuters: India Insight. 
http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2012/11/19/no-criticism-please-we-are-indians and Saurabh Gupta. 
2 December 2012. Facebook row: Mumbai Police book man whose complaint led to Air India 
employees’ arrests. NDTV. www.ndtv.com/article/india/facebook-row-mumbai-police-book-man-
whose-complaint-led-to-air-india-employees-arrests-299898 (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
830 Craig Malisow. 12 February 2014. A Young Man’s Violent Threat on Facebook Lands Him in Jail, 
and Limbo. Houston Press. www.houstonpress.com/2014-02-13/news/justin-carter-facebook/full/ 
(Accessed 11 April 2014.) 
831 Eric Randall. The Methuen Teen Rapper Was Released from Jail. Boston. 7 June 2013. www.
bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2013/06/07/the-methuen-teen-rapper-was-released-from-jail 
(Accessed 11 April 2014.)
832 Facebook Government Requests Report. About the Reports. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/
about.
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As described in section 5.3.1, Facebook only reports the number of government requests 
that it complied with but does not report on the total number of government requests 
received. It also does not include court orders or copyright takedown notices in its figures. 
As reflected in section 5.4.2, Facebook’s transparency report provides much more detail 
about government requests for user data – including information about compliance 
rate and request types – than its very basic and incomplete information about content 
restriction requests.  
Twitter has disclosed content removal requests since its first transparency report in 
2012. In addition to what Facebook discloses, Twitter’s report also includes compliance 
rate, content withheld as well as copyright takedown notices.833 Twitter also distinguishes 
itself from Facebook in transparency about content restriction by publishing copies of 
the content restriction and takedown requests it receives to the Chilling Effects website 
(see Study 2 for a discussion of Chilling Effects).834 For its reporting on government data 
requests Twitter also provides details on types of requests and compliance rate, as well 
as data about information disclosed to authorities during emergencies.835 
The two US-based companies face constraints on what their home government 
will permit them to report. The US government does not permit US companies to be 
completely transparent about National Security Letters and FISA court orders.836 With the 
NSA revelations, transparency mechanisms have become a point of debate. The issue is 
to understand the scope of how users’ privacy is affected at a time when companies have 
publicly expressed concern about how erosion of user trust in the internet diminishes its 
commercial value.837 A number of US companies including Facebook have negotiated an 
agreement with the US Government that allows them to report requests with a one-year 
delay and in broad ranges, not exact numbers of requests received. Twitter was also a 
part of that coalition but has signalled its dissatisfaction with the arrangement, arguing 
that ‘these ranges do not provide meaningful or sufficient transparency’.838 
833 For more information about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act see legal summaries in Chapter 2. 
834 ‘Chilling Effects’ is a website that allows recipients of ‘cease and desist’ notices to submit the notice 
to the site and receive information about their legal rights. For more information about Twitter’s 
practice of sharing information with ‘Chilling Effects’ see: https://transparency.twitter.com/removal-
requests/2013/jul-dec. For more information about ‘Chilling Effects’ see: http://www.chillingeffects.
org. Information about instances of Twitter being blocked is from Herdict.com and includes 
information from China and Iran – two countries where Twitter is was blocked at the time of writing. 
Twitter Transparency Report. Additional information. https://transparency.twitter.com/additional-
information 
835 Twitter clarifies that the company evaluates ‘emergency disclosure requests’ on a case by case 
basis as per US law and if the company has good faith to believe that there is an emergency 
involving the danger or death or serious physical injury to a person. For more information see: 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/41949#12. 
836 Karen Gullo. 7 October 2014.   Twitter Sues U.S. Over Transparency on National Security. 
Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-07/twitter-sues-u-s-over-transparency-
on-national-security.html (Accessed 25 July 2014.)
837 Seth Rosenblatt. 8 October 2014. US spying scandal will ‘break the Internet,’ says Google’s 
Schmidt. CNet. 
http://www.cnet.com/news/us-spying-scandal-will-break-the-internet-says-googles-schmidt/ (Accessed 
9 October 2014.)
838 Jeremy Kessel. 6 February 2014. Fighting for more #transparency. Twitter Blog. https://blog.twitter.
com/2014/fighting-for-more-transparency (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
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Weibo does not publish a transparency report because government requests fall under 
China’s State Secrets Law. Due to legal constraints, it appears that the offline and online 
media rarely mention state-level restrictions of content.839
iWiW did not publish any type of transparency report before its operations closed down. 
5.5.2 Transparency about self-regulation
While Facebook and Twitter have taken efforts at increasing transparency about how 
they handle government and lawful requests, they share much less information with 
users or the public at large about how they enforce their own terms of service. None 
of the companies studied provide information on content they have restricted based 
on company policy, or any statistics about external reporting on violations of company 
rules. As previously noted in earlier sections, government authorities in many countries 
may avail themselves of mechanisms for reporting terms of service violations, but no 
data about the number, source, or subject matter has been reported by either of these 
companies. In fact, Facebook explicitly states in that it excludes from its government 
requests report, ‘government requests to remove content that violates Facebook’s 
Community Standards, such as child exploitation material’.840
While all social networks list content they prohibit, none of the companies studied 
has provided much public information about procedures for evaluating content. 
Industry sources have described internal rules and procedures for evaluating content 
in conversations with concerned stakeholders, held on condition of non-attribution, but 
such processes are generally not made public.841 It is usually through anecdotal evidence 
via news reports that the public learns about specific examples.
5.5.3 User notification
Companies are inconsistent in informing users when they restrict their content or hand 
over their user data. If content is removed due to a copyright violation, both Twitter and 
Facebook are legally required under the DMCA to notify the user and provide information 
on how to file a counter-notice.842 Furthermore, both companies commit to inform users 
839 Mitchell A. Silk and Jillian S. Ashley. 1 January 2011. Understanding China’s State Secrets Laws. 
China Business Review. www.chinabusinessreview.com/understanding-chinas-state-secrets-laws 
(Accessed 10 August 2014); Beina Xu. 12 February 2014. Media Censorship in China. Council on 
Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515. (Accessed 4 August 2014); 
Shi Shan. 10 July 2014.  China’s Media Ban on Reporting of State Secrets ‘Too Vague’. Radio Free 
Asia. www.rfa.org/english/news/china/vague-07102014155503.html (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
840 Facebook. Government requests report. FAQ. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/faq
841 oDesk. Abuse Standards 6.2 - Operation Manual. http://www.scribd.com/gawker/d/81877124-
Abuse-Standards-6-2-Operation-Manual (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
842 Twitter. Transparency Report. Copyright notices. July-December 2013. https://transparency.twitter.
com/copyright-notices/2013/jul-dec; Facebook. Desktop Help. What happens when Facebook 
acts on a claim that I have infringed someone’s copyright? Can I file a counter-notice? https://www.
facebook.com/help/365111110185763.
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about about requests for their data, unless the situation is an emergency or the company 
is legally prohibited to do so.843
For content that Facebook removes to enforce its own Community Standards and 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (SRR), the company commits to forewarn 
people,844 but Twitter does not clarify if it does the same for content that violates its 
terms.845 If it implements a foreign content restriction request, Twitter notifies the public 
about the restriction through a ‘Tweet withheld’ notice, which it also uses for copyright-
related takedowns:846
As mentioned previously, Twitter only restricts accounts in the jurisdiction whose 
authorities made a valid request. In such cases it displays the following notification:
Facebook displays a more generic message such as the following from July 2014:
The text in the above message could mean many things and it is unknown which one 
applies to a particular situation. 
When content is restricted on Weibo, other users trying to access the post are notified: 
‘I’m sorry, this post has been deleted. For more information, go to [link provided].’
843 Twitter. Help Center. Guidelines for Law Enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/entries/41949; 
Facebook. Safety Center. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities. https://www.facebook.com/
safety/groups/law/guidelines. 
844 Facebook. Desktop Help. About Facebook’s Security & Warning Systems. https://www.facebook.
com/help/365194763546571/.
845 Twitter. Help Center. Twitter media policy.https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169199-twitter-
media-policy; Help Center. The Twitter Rules https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-
rules ; terms of service. 25 June 2012. https://twitter.com/tos.
846 Twitter. Help Center. Country Witheld Content. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169222-
country-withheld-content 
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Weibo has been reported by users to ‘camouflage’ messages so they remain visible only 
to the author, causing some authors to be unaware that their content was restricted.847 
When Weibo deleted dissident artist Ai Weiwei’s account, it was replaced with a message 
that read: ‘Error. Invalid Weibo user’.848
5.6 Remedy
None of the companies investigated offer a clear path to remedy for users who face image 
or text removal or functional restrictions, such as the user’s inability to upload photos. 
Facebook may remove pages (which tend to belong to businesses and organizations that 
may buy advertisements) for alleged spam violations, but users have options to appeal.849 
In one of the countries studied, the law does require some form of grievance mechanism: 
India’s Intermediary Guidelines require intermediaries to have ‘grievance officers’ to 
whom users may address privacy concerns and harassment claims.850 
Facebook recommends using the help center’s web forms, but Indian users can contact a 
grievance officer via email or postal mail (this information is not displayed to users outside 
of India).851 Twitter has a grievance officer whose contact information is visible to users 
outside India.852 
For suspended accounts, both Twitter and Facebook do offer an appeal option. When 
accounts are disabled for reasons of violating Facebook’s Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, users can send an appeal through a specific form. There is no information 
about how long it will take for a request to be processed, what the decision-making 
procedure is, or the severity of violations that would trigger an account suspension.853 
Twitter’s information page is also short on such information but explains more about how 
to appeal.854 One exception is copyright, as US copyright law (the DMCA) requires Twitter 
847 Oiwan Lam. 18 March 2013. China: Researchers Uncover Microblog Filtering Mechanisms. http://
advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/03/18/china-researchers-uncover-microblog-filtering-
mechanisms (Accessed 25 July 2014); Some behaviors of deleting Weibo message secretly have been 
found and made public by users. http://weibo.com/1221117947/zdHIw7sCK?mod=weibotime.
848 Sui-lee Wee. 19 March 2012. Ai Weiwei says censors removed his microblog. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-china-artist-microblog-idUSBRE82I09U20120319 (Accessed 
10 August 2014.)
849 Facebook. Desktop Help: Managing a Page. Why are there limits on my Facebook Page? https://
www.facebook.com/help/348805468517220 
850 Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011, 11 April 2011. http://deity.gov.
in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR314E_10511(1).pdf, §11; Display grievance officer’s name, 
contact: HC to Google, FB. Hindustan Times. 23 August 2013. www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/newdelhi/display-grievance-officer-s-name-contact-hc-to-google-fb/article1-1111939.aspx 
(Accessed 27 July 2014.)
851 Facebook. Desktop Help. Contact Your Grievance Officer. https://www.facebook.com/
help/253918971400132 . 
852 Twitter. Help Center. Grievance Officer – India. https://support.twitter.com/groups/57-safety-
security/topics/275-handle-issues-online/articles/20171602-grievance-officer-india.
853 Facebook Desktop Help. My Personal Account was Disabled. https://www.facebook.com/help/
contact/260749603972907. 
854 Twitter. Help Center. My account is suspended. https://support.twitter.com/articles/15790-my-
account-is-suspended.
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and Facebook to notify the original content uploader and inform them about counter-
notices.855 It is unclear what sort of paths to remedy iWiW offered, if any.
Figure 11: Screen shot of form that users can use to appeal Facebook 
account suspensions.856
855 Facebook. Desktop Help. What happens when Facebook acts on a claim that I have 
infringed someone’s copyright? Can I file a counter-notice? https://www.facebook.com/
help/365111110185763; Twitter. Help Center. Copyright and DMCA policy. https://support.twitter.
com/articles/15795-copyright-and-dmca-policy. 
856 Screen shot 27 July 2014. Facebook. Desktop Help. My Personal Account was Disabled. https://
www.facebook.com/help/contact/260749603972907.
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Weibo does not offer a direct appeal option or a web form; instead, users are encouraged 
to email the company and to indicate if they 1) disagree about administrators’ operations; 
2) are dissatisfied with administrators’ responses after communication; 3) have questions 
relating to other administrative matters.857 
On Weibo sparse information about remedies has meant largely having to rely on 
anecdotal evidence. Content restriction seems to be inconsistent. For example, blogger 
and free speech advocate Isaac Mao had his account closed in June 2012 after he 
criticized China’s space program. Sina was reported to have told him he had no recourse 
to appeal because the order had been given by ‘relevant authorities’, and was outside 
the company’s control.858 Author Zhang Yaojie’s Weibo account was closed in September 
2012. Following months of unsuccessfully navigating the online complaint system, 
Zhang sued Sina in January 2013 for a refund of his monthly 10 yuan ($1.61) premium 
membership fee and account reinstatement.859 Court delays lasted months, and at the 
time of writing no action seemed to have been taken.860
5.7 Conclusions
In analyzing the interplay between intermediaries’ policy and practice and specific 
national regulatory and legal contexts, the research shows that companies are better 
able to maximize respect for internet users’ rights in jurisdictions where laws are relatively 
compatible with international human rights norms regarding freedom of expression 
and privacy. The legal context of the country in which a company is headquartered is 
particularly important for the respect of user rights. Companies whose home governments 
do not inhibit such efforts have made strides in transparency and accountability in terms 
of how they handle government demands.
Yet the research also clearly shows that freedom of expression can be strongly influenced 
in a positive or negative direction by companies’ own rules, processes and mechanisms 
on matters including terms of service enforcement, user privacy and identity. Companies 
are much less transparent and accountable with the public on these matters.
In general the research conducted for this study of Facebook, Twitter, Weibo and iWiW 
points to the following conclusions:
Government actions against social network users may limit space for expression. 
Facing fines or even arrests, users are sometimes penalized by some governments for 
their online expression. A lack of clarity on what expression is and is not allowed, and 
857 Sina Help. Complaints to a Weibo Manager. http://help.sina.com.cn/comquestiondetail/view/1077
858 Sophie Beach. 11 March 2013. Challenged in China. CPJ.org. http://cpj.org/reports/2013/03/
challenged-china-media-censorship-weibo-expression.php (Accessed 12 Sepbember 2014.)
859 Josh Ong. 24 January 2013. Chinese scholar sues Sina over Weibo microblog account closure. 
http://thenextweb.com/asia/2013/01/24/chinese-scholar-sues-sina-over-weibo-microblog-
account-closure/
860 Zhang Yaojie. 1 May 2013. Please carry out the right to ‘hashly criticize’. My1510. http://www.
my1510.cn/article.php?id=96400; Phone interview with Mr. Zhang and e-mail interview with his 
lawyer, Wang Zhenyu, 15 April 2014.
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restrictive policies can lead to self-censorship by users. Companies that operate social 
networking platforms can help by being clear and transparent with users about their 
content restriction practices, privacy settings, and data sharing policies. Companies can 
also support individuals targeted in cases where penalties are not in line with international 
human rights standards.
In some circumstances, companies can contest or decline removal requests. 
Establishing guidelines and ‘best practice’ standards helps. As is evident in Twitter’s 
transparency report, social networks do not necessarily comply with all requests for 
content removals; in fact Twitter has only complied with 11 per cent of such requests. 
This shows that social networks do have operating space to challenge content restriction 
requests. It may be easier to resist pressures from countries other than the network’s 
home jurisdiction, but even within the home country, some companies do not comply 
with all requests. Of the four social networks profiled here, only two (Twitter, Facebook) 
publish their criteria, if not the actual process, for dealing with content removal requests 
from governments and/or third parties. Such published policies help users understand 
in what circumstances their content may be removed by external request, and can 
give companies a clearer framework to contest content removal demands that are not 
consistent with due process or international human rights
Social networks are inconsistently transparent on government removal requests. 
Only two of the four social networking platforms studied (Twitter and Facebook) provide 
information about government requests, shedding an important light on how law 
is enforced on their platforms. Twitter also shares the content removal request itself, 
where possible, with the ‘Chilling Effects’ website and notifies the public via messages 
on the platform when content is restricted based on request by a government. Across 
jurisdictions studied in this research, governments are not fully transparent about the 
nature and scope of content restriction and requests for user data on social media 
platforms.
Some social networks do not always explain how they share user data with 
authorities and others. Two of the four companies studied (Facebook, Twitter) have 
published policy guidelines on how they respond to user data requests from both foreign 
and domestic authorized bodies. Users of the other services are not informed how their 
privacy will be protected in the face of requests by governments or others.
None of the companies in this case study publish data on self-regulatory restrictions 
– e.g. how many accounts were disabled for impersonation, how many accounts of repeat 
infringers were terminated, etc. With social networking platforms increasingly becoming a 
central platform to individuals’ online expression, there is a strong interest among users 
and stakeholders in having rules and enforcement processes that are clear, predictable 
and to some degree, independently monitored. The absence of such accountability 
detracts from intermediaries’ credibility and legitimacy as platforms for users’ freedom 
of expression. 
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Users’ vulnerability places special responsibility on social networks to protect 
users’ privacy. With the significant amount of personal information available through 
social network use, social networks carry a special responsibility to respect users’ right 
to privacy. Lack of privacy protection may stifle individuals’ expression.
“Real name” policies require flexible implementation in order to avoid negative 
impacts on users’ freedom of expression. Real-name requirements may have a serious 
chilling effect on speech. China legally requires social networks to verify their users’ 
identities, but this is not the case in most jurisdictions. The authors recommend that 
companies consider the privacy and free expression ramifications of implementing a real-
name policy (or enter the market of a country with such laws) by conducting a human 
rights impact assessment. 
There is a need for stronger global principles and guidelines for remedy and 
transparency in self-regulation. The Global Network Initiative’s principles on freedom 
of expression and privacy and accompanying implementation guidelines have provided 
strong guidance, supported by a range of stakeholders, not only for GNI companies but 
for internet intermediaries more broadly. GNI’s guidelines for companies on transparency 
and process for handling government requests, grounded in international human rights 
norms, have had an impact on company practices all three intermediary types studied 
in this report. However this study highlights the glaring absence of similar principles, 
guidelines and standards for companies’ self-regulatory practices, including terms of 
service enforcement. Given the lack of transparency and consistency in how companies 
enforce their terms of service and other private rules, and given the impact of such 
enforcement of internet users’ freedom of expression, there is a clear need for the 
development of guidelines and ‘best practice’ standards for intermediaries’ own rules on 
user expression. 
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6. GENDER
Among the 81 countries covered by the World Wide Web Foundation’s 2013 Web Index, 
only half of had national policies addressing gender equality online. The authors of the 
2013 Web Index report point out that a “Lack of political and policy focus is compounded 
by failure to collect gender-disaggregated statistics.” As a result, ‘the ways in which 
gender affects Web access and use are still poorly understood’.861 This chapter begins 
with a brief overview of the issue of basic internet access for women in relation to men, 
followed by an examination of how content restriction in some countries has affected 
womens’ access to health information and gender-related discourse. The final section 
discusses issues related to pernicious harassment targeting women and how it that 
affects womens’ freedom of expression online by chilling their participation in the digital 
information society more broadly.
6.1 Access to the internet
The extent to which internet empowers women cannot be underestimated and has been 
highlighted by several reports that point to opportunities for empowerment, including, 
gender equality, and economic benefits to women. Yet globally there is a significant 
gender divide in broadband access between men and women. Factors affecting women’s 
access to broadband include educational and income gaps, and that these factors are 
more acute for women in developing countries versus women in developed countries.862 
For example, in 2013 Google India found that though India houses over 200 million 
internet users, only 60 million of these online users are women.863 
Similarly, penetration of internet was 32 per cent for women in Egypt with 41 per cent of 
the Egyptian women not being interested in the internet and another 23 per cent feeling 
that they do not need access to the internet. Of this group, 22 per cent do not use the 
internet due to fear that friends or family would disapprove or that it is not appropriate 
to use the internet.864 In Brazil, 47 per cent of active internet users are women. In Kenya, 
861 Anne Jellema and Karin Alexander. 22 November 2013. 2013 Web Index Report. Geneva, World 
Wide Web Foundation, p. 20. http://thewebindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Web-Index-
Annual-Report-2013-FINAL.pdf 
862 Broadband Commission Working Group on Broadband and Gender. September 2013. Doubling 
Digital Opportunities: Enhancing the Inclusion of Women & Girls in the Information Society. Geneva, 
International Telecommunications Union. www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/working-
groups/bb-doubling-digital-2013.pdf ; Intel Corporation and Dalberg Global Development Advisors. 
2012. Women and the Web: Bridging the Internet Gap and Creating New Global Opportunities in 
Low and Middle-Income Countries. www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/
pdf/women-and-the-web.pdf 
863 The Economic Times. 20 November 2013. Google India aims to bring 50 million women online. 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-11-20/news/44284934_1_google-india-
internet-new-campaign-aims (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
864 Intel’s ‘Women and the Web’ report highlights online habits in Egypt, Uganda. 13 January 2014. 
oAfrica. www.oafrica.com/statistics/intels-women-and-the-web-report-highlights-online-habits-in-
egypt-uganda (Accessed 31 July 2014.)
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fewer than 28 per cent of citizens had internet access in 2013. The lack of access and 
adequate internet infrastructure affects low-income rural areas the most, and women 
most severely. Further, a study conducted in 2013 demonstrated that only 8 per cent of 
respondents used the internet to access news.865 In contrast, in 2013 in the UK 84 per 
cent of women over 16 years old had access to the internet.866 Also seen is a growing 
trend of women increasingly accessing internet through smart phones. In Germany a 
study found that the use of smartphones by German women increased by over 60 per 
cent in 2013, while use by men increased only by 35 per cent.867 Policy interventions that 
states can take to overcome the gender gap include expanding access to affordable 
platforms, developing national plans to allow for increased broadband penetration, and 
addressing market constraints that impact the affordability of internet platforms.868
6.2 Gender and content restriction
In some countries, women’s rights advocates are demanding broader restrictions on 
pornographic and ‘obscene’ content online, arguing that there is a connection between 
the online viewing of such materials and violence against women.869 In connection with 
this, the ISP case study (Chapter 3) describes debates in India and the UK on whether 
and how to institute ISP filtering. 
In some countries, laws meant to curb pornography are also used to stamp out other 
content. The Chinese Government, for example, periodically announces months-long 
campaigns to rid the Chinese internet of pornography and ‘vulgarities’ that are ‘violating 
865 Victoria Rocío Cunto, Moses Osani and Hannah Smothers. 2013. Empowerment Through Internet 
Access: Promoting Women’s Rights with Social Media. Salzburg Academy on Media and Global 
Change. www.salzburg.umd.edu/unesco/empowerment-through-internet-access (Accessed 28 
July 2014.)
866 UK Government. 19 February 2014. Internet Access Quarterly Update, 2013 Q4. Office for National 
Statistics. www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-
300202#tab-all-tables 
867 comScore. 14 March 2013. 2013 Future in Focus – Digitales Deutschland. www.comscore.com/
ger/Insights/Presentations_and_Whitepapers/2013/2013_Future_in_Focus_Digitales_Deutschland 
(Accessed 30 May 2014.)
868 Broadband Commission Working Group on Broadband and Gender. September 2013. Doubling 
Digital Opportunities: Enhancing the Inclusion of Women & Girls in the Information Society. Geneva, 
International Telecommunications Union. www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/working-
groups/bb-doubling-digital-2013.pdf; Intel Corporation and Dalberg Global Development Advisors. 
2012. Women and the Web: Bridging the Internet Gap and Creating New Global Opportunities in 
Low and Middle-Income Countries. www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/
pdf/women-and-the-web.pdf 
869 Mary Eberstadt and Mary Anne Layden. 2010. The Social Costs of Pornography: A Statement 
of Findings and Recommendations. Princeton, N.J., The Witherspoon Institute; Catharine A. 
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. 1988. Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women’s 
Equality. Minneapolis, Organizing Against Pornography; Milton Diamond. 1999. The Effects of 
Pornography: an international perspective. James Elias, Veronica Diehl Elias, Vern L. Bullough, 
Gwen Brewer, Jeffrey J. Douglas and Will Jarvis (eds). Porn 101: Eroticism, Pornography, and the 
First Amendment. Amherst, N.Y., Prometheus Books.
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public morality and harming the physical and mental health of youth’.870 During one of 
these campaigns in 2009, the Beijing Communications Administration shut down ‘Bullog’, 
a popular blogging community due to ‘harmful comments on current affairs’.871 Baidu and 
Google were also on a list of target websites required to clean up their content.872 Another 
campaign launched in April 2014 targeted amateur online romance stories, many of which 
were ‘slash fiction’, or male same-sex romances written for female audiences (a similar 
crusade in 2012 landed approximately 20 women in jail for up to 18 months.)873 Although 
some officials praised this as the coming of ‘rule of law in the virtual world’,874 some 
experts have argued for an amendment to the definition of ‘online pornography’ in order 
to avoid restricting freedom of expression.875 
Our research team found that content related to women’s rights and medical information 
is generally not restricted by Internet companies including search engines. However 
companies continue to struggle for the right balance in relation to broad laws that can be 
subject to a wide range of possible interpretation. For example, in November 2013 the 
Gender Studies Group of Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) posted 17 photos 
on social network Renren.com. On each photo, there was a female student holding a 
whiteboard and expressing her idea about sex with title starting with “My vagina says”. 
Organizers and participants said their activity was inspired by Eve Ensler’s feminist play, 
The Vagina Monologues.876 The BFSU students provoked hot debate on the Chinese 
870 Chris Buckley. 5 January 2009. China targets big websites in Internet crackdown. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2009/01/05/us-china-internet-idUSTRE5040F120090105 (Accessed 31 July 
2014); China Internet Illegal Information Report Centre. 5 January 2009. State Council Information 
Office and Other Six Ministries Carry Out Special Campaign against Internet Vulgarities. http://
net.china.com.cn/ywdt/txt/2009-01/05/content_2668979.htm (Accessed 28 July 2014); Michael 
Wines. 12 March 2009. A Dirty Pun Tweaks China’s Online Censors. New York Times. www.nytimes.
com/2009/03/12/world/asia/12beast.html (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
871 Tania Branigan and Jemima Kiss. 13 January 2009. China closes 90 websites as internet crackdown 
intensifies. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/media/2009/jan/13/china-internet-censorship 
(Accessed 28 July 2014); Anita Chang. 9 January 2009. Edgy China blog site shut amid Internet 
porn sweep. Fox News. www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2009Jan09/0,4675,ASChinaPor
nography,00.html (Accessed 31 July 2014); Wang Xiao. 28 February 2007. The Story Behind One 
of China’s Largest Blogging Communities. The Blog Herald. www.blogherald.com/2007/02/28/the-
story-behind-one-of-chinas-largest-blogging-communities (1 August 2014.)
872 People’s Daily Online: The First List Of Websites Under Exposure During the National Campaign 
against Internet Vulgarities, January 5, 2009, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/8622333.
html. 
873 Alia. 16 April 2014. Slash fiction falls victim to China’s latest crackdown on online porn. Offbeat 
China Blog. http://offbeatchina.com/slash-fiction-falls-victim-to-chinas-latest-crackdown-on-
online-porn (Accessed 1 August 2014); Liu. 17 May 2012. ‘扫黄打非’办：耽美小说网负责人获
刑1年半. [‘Pornography’: slash fiction network executives jailed for a year and a half]. China Youth 
Daily. (In Chinese.) http://news.china.com/focus/zhengzhidisu/11115954/20120517/17201391.
html (Accessed 1 August 2014); Kevin Tang. 22 April 2014. Inside China’s Insane Witch Hunt For 
Slash Fiction Writers. BuzzFeed. www.buzzfeed.com/kevintang/inside-chinas-insane-witch-hunt-
for-slash-fiction-writers (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
874 Xinhua. 16 April 2014. Porn crackdown crucial to cyber development: experts. Global Times. www.
globaltimes.cn/content/854927.shtml (Accessed 31 July 2014.)
875 Abby Liu. 3 May 2014. China’s Anti-Pornography Crackdown Nets Much More Than Porn. Global 
Voices. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/05/03/chinas-anti-pornography-crackdown-nets-
much-more-than-porn (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
876 NetEase: Beijing Foreign Studies University Girls Posted Bold Photos to Express Bravely Their 
Opinions about Sex, “The Vagina’s Way” Became a Hit, November 7, 2013, http://henan.163.
com/13/1107/23/9D4606BU022701R8.html.
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Internet not only about female sexuality but also about whether it should or should not be 
publicly expressed by young women. 
In this context it is interesting to note that a search for the word “vagina” on Baidu yields 
a first page full of medical and encyclopedia web pages. However as of August 2014 on 
Google.com.hk, the word “vagina” was blocked by the site’s SafeSearch feature.877 Users 
from the rest of China outside Hong Kong are not allowed to shut down this feature.
Thus in this particular case, Baidu was found to be less restrictive than Google.
Social networks’ treatment of female nudity has also been a huge point of contention. 
Facebook’s ban on breastfeeding drew user outcry.878 After a campaign by womens’ 
advocacy groups called #FreeTheNipple, Facebook clarified its nudity policy and decided 
to allow breastfeeding photos on Facebook.879
The examples above illustrate how women’s ability to access and disseminate information 
and ideas about sexuality can be stifled by restrictions, and how legislation whose 
purpose includes protection of women can be appropriated for other purposes. However 
as the following section will show, some women can also feel that their rights have been 
violated when intermediaries fail to restrict content that has been posted on the Internet 
with the express intention of harming them. 
6.3 Gender-based harassment
Forms of harassment that can take place via social media platforms include stalking, 
hate speech via graphics or text, cyber mobbing,880 revenge porn,881 unwanted sexual 
attention and sexual coercion. Indeed, harassment has become so pervasive for ‘adults 
who are active members of at least one social network’ that Zurich Insurance Group is 
offering a yearly ‘Cybermobbing Insurance’ plan for CHF 149 (approximately $165) for 
those who seek protection from being ‘defamed, harassed or even coerced by other 
people via electronic channels’.882
877 Experiment conducted by the report’s China researcher, June 30, 2014.
878 Mariya Yefremova. 14 April 2013. In Support of an ‘Explicit Material’ Prompt on Facebook. Huffington 
Post. 
 www.huffingtonpost.com/mariya-yefremova/in-support-of-an-explicit_b_3076354.html (Accessed 
10 August 2014.)
879 Kashmira Gander. 12 June 2014. #FreeTheNipple: Facebook allows breast feeding photos in 
change to nudity and pornography policy. The Independent. www.independent.co.uk/life-style/
health-and-families/health-news/freethenipple-facebook-allows-breast-feeding-photos-in-change-
to-nudity-and-pornography-policy-9532695.html (Accessed 4 August 2014); Facebook. Desktop 
Help. Does Facebook allow photos of mothers breastfeeding? https://www.facebook.com/
help/340974655932193.
880 Cyber mobbing includes defamation, harassment and coercion that takes place over the internet, in 
chat rooms, instant messaging and mobile communications.
881 Revenge porn is sexually explicit material that is shared online without the consent of the individual.
882 Cybermobbing Insurance. Zurich Insurance Group. www.zurich.ch/en/private-customers/liability-
and-legal/cybermobbing-versicherung#im-detail (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
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6.3.1 Regulation 
Because of the ease with which harassment and threats can take place via social media 
platforms, debates have arisen around the responsibility of intermediares to help prevent 
and address harassment. New regulations are also being drafted in many countries to 
address the problem. Researchers for this report found that some countries do not have 
legislation explicitly addressing online sexual harassment. Others have broad provisions 
that could potentially encompass online sexual harassment, while others have developed 
more specific laws.883
In the United States, the Violence Against Women Act penalizes someone who 
‘utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or communication 
ensues, without disclosing his identity and with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or 
harass any person at the called number or who receives communications’ with fines 
or imprisonment.884  Germany is considering expanding penal sanctions against online 
harrassment with a particular focus on incidents that take place on social networks, and 
also to make it easier for victims to report incidents to the police.885 In Brazil, as a result 
of online harassment, the Marco Civil da Internet includes Article 21 which holds content 
providers liable if they do not remove, after being notified, videos and photos containing 
nudity and sex posted without the individual’s consent. In this case there is no need for 
judicial notification. It is an exception to the ‘judicial notice-and-takedown’ framework 
established by the Marco Civil (as discussed in more detail in the intermediary liability 
section in Chapter 2).886 In June 2014, the Egyptian Government criminalized sexual or 
883 Examples: For Kenya see s. 29 of the Kenya Information and Communication Act. For India, a 
number of sections of the Indian Penal Code can be used to address online sexual harassment, 
including: IPC section 509: Addresses ‘insulting the modesty and intruding on the privacy’ of 
women, IPC Section 507: Criminal intimidation via anonymous communication, IPC Section 354A: 
Addresses online and offline sexual harassment, IPC Section 354C: Addresses voyeurism, IPC 
Section 354D: Addresses stalking including cyber stalking, Information Technology Act section 66A: 
can be used to address cyber-stalking and sexual harassment.
884 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(C). At its passage, the statute stirred significant controversy given its 
inclusion of the term ‘annoy’ because the term might capture a wide range of anonymous internet 
banter that falls short of cyber-stalking. Naomi Harlin Goodno. 2007. Cyberstalking, a New Crime: 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws. Missouri Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 1, 
pp. 125–197. http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3985&context=mlr; 
Daniel J. Solove. 9 January 2006. Response to Kaimipono D. Wenger. 9 January 2006. Annoy 
someone online (anonymously); go to jail. Concurring Opinions. www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2006/01/annoy_someone_o.html/comment-page-1#comment-61010 (29 July 
2014.) Courts have responded to this controversy, finding that although the statute might have 
unconstitutional applications, it would not warrant facial invalidation on vagueness or overbreadth 
grounds. United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2006). http://caselaw.findlaw.
com/us-11th-circuit/1467437.html (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
885 Bundesregierung. 13 December 2013. Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen 
CDU, CSU und SPD [Making Germany’s Future: Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and 
SPD]. Berlin, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, p. 147. (In German.) www.
bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-koalitionsvertrag.pdf;jsessionid=3B
84643BFC5B2B3D59DBDD25CFA31216.s4t1?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
886 Ronaldo Lemos, Director, Center for Technology and Society, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) 
School of Law. Interview with Celina Beatriz Mendes de Almeida. Personal interview. Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, 10 April 2014.
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pornographic suggestions or hints through words, signs, or acts as part of new legislation 
addressing the problem of sexual harassment in society more broadly.887 
A specific category of online harassment increasingly discussed by policymakers and 
gender rights advocates is called ‘revenge porn’. Perpetrators are often bitter ex-spouses 
or partners, or online ‘trolls’ who upload ‘nude or sexually explicit photographs or videos 
of people online without their consent, even if the photograph itself was taken with 
consent’.888 In an interview Brazilian Congressman Alessandro Molon, who served as the 
rapporteur of the Marco Civil,889 observed that ‘revenge porn’ has become ‘increasingly 
frequent’ in Brazil – hence the public support for special provisions in the Marco Civil.890 
Israel was the first country to ban revenge porn, in January 2014.891 As of June 2014, 
Japan892 and Canada893 were also working on measures to address revenge porn. The US-
based Cyber Civil Rights Initiative’s ‘End Revenge Porn’ campaign seeks to criminalize 
revenge porn – at the time of writing, US victims were only entitled to civil remedies.894 
But in May 2014, Arizona became the first state to classify revenge porn as a felony.895 
Revenge porn also afflicts emerging economies. In China, victims have turned to the 
courts, invoking the Article 36 of China’s Tort Liability Law.896 Two different articles of 
China’s Criminal Law have been applied in these cases and in 2009 a man who posted 
887 Patrick Kingsley. 6 June 2014. Egypt criminalises sexual harassment for first time. The Guardian. 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/06/egypt-criminalises-sexual-harassment (Accessed 28 
July 2014.)
888 National Conference of State Legislatures, “State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation,” last updated April 
30, 2014, www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-revenge-
porn-legislation.aspx (May 5, 2014).
889 Geoffrey King. 6 May 2014. The Marco Civil da Internet. Joel Simon (ed). Halftime for the Brazilian 
press: Will justice prevail over censorship and violence? New York, Committee to Protect Journalists, 
pp. 31–35. https://cpj.org/reports/brazil2014-english.pdf 
890 Congressman Alessandro Molon, Rapporteur of the Marco Civil da Internet. Interview with Celina 
Beatriz Mendes de Almeida. Personal interview. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 17 April 2014.
891 Sam Frizell. 7 January 2014. Israel Bans ‘Revenge Porn’. Time. http://world.time.com/2014/01/07/
israel-bans-revenge-porn (Accessed 25 April 2014.)
892 Julian Ryall. 23 January 2014. Japan Plans to Crack Down on ‘Revenge Porn’ with New Legislation. 
South China Morning Post. www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1411867/japan-plans-crack-down-
revenge-porn-new-legislation (Accessed 3 May 2014.)
893 Daniel Proussalidis. 20 November 2013. Cyberbullies Face 5 Years in Jail Under New Law. The 
Toronto Sun. www.torontosun.com/2013/11/20/cyberbullies-face-5-years-in-jail-under-new-law 
(Accessed 4 May 2014.)
894 Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. About Us. www.cybercivilrights.org/about (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
895 David Schwartz. 1 May 2014. Arizona Governor Signs Legislation to Discourage ‘Revenge Porn’. 
Reuters. 
 www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/us-usa-arizona-revengeporn-idUSBREA4000T20140501 
(Accessed 5 May 2014.)
896 Article 36 ‘establishes the right of an injured party to proceed against an ISP that uses the Internet 
to infringe upon the civil rights and interests of another person, or that is aware that users are 
utilizing the ISP network to commit a tort and yet fails to take necessary measures (such as deletion, 
screening or disconnection) or fails to take necessary measures after receiving notice from an injured 
party and by this failure enlarges the damages.’ John V. Grobowski and Yiqiang Li. 1 February 2010. 
Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China. Faegre Baker Daniels LLP. www.faegrebd.
com/10911 (Accessed 30 July 2014); Peter Neumann and Calvin Ding. 1 March 2010. China’s New 
Tort Law: Dawn of the Product Liability Era. China Business Review. www.chinabusinessreview.
com/chinas-new-tort-law-dawn-of-the-product-liability-era (Accessed 30 July 2014); Government 
of China. 10 January 2010. English Translation of the Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
WIPO. www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182630 (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
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nude photos of his ex-girlfriend online was sentenced to prison for two years.897 In July 
2010, a Shanghai court ordered Baidu to display, for a period of three days, a public 
apology to a woman whose ex-boyfriend had disseminated naked photos of her online. 
Upon losing the case, Baidu assigned 200 employees to ‘manually filter and delete related 
search results’. At a court hearing in October 2009, Baidu stated that it was merely a 
search engine and that it bore no responsibility for publishing the images.898 
6.3.2 Policies and practices of intermediaries
Negative media coverage and pressure from civil society groups have prompted some 
intermediaries to proactively implement mechanisms to prevent and respond to sexual 
harassment. For example, the social networking services Sina Weibo, Facebook and 
Twitter prohibit harassment and allow users to report abuse.899 Responsiveness and 
enforcement, however, vary depending on the degree of company commitment and 
attention to the issue, public pressure, and legal enforcement. As elaborated later in 
this study, in one example of how public pressure has prompted companies to change 
policies, in the United States the hashtag #FBRape persuaded advertisers to withdraw 
ads from Facebook, prompting it to take stricter enforcement.900 
In a 2014 study examining how Facebook, Twitter and YouTube handle violence against 
women, the Association for Progressive Communication concluded that while company 
approaches to violence against women differ, and the companies “have made some effort 
to respond to user concerns,” nonetheless “they do not do enough.”901 The study, titled 
“Internet intermediaries and violence against women online” identified four over-arching 
themes and trends emerging from their in-depth examination of the three companies. 
First, the study found a ‘reluctance to engage directly with technology-related violence 
against women, until it becomes a public relations issue.’ Specifically, neither Twitter 
nor Facebook had taken what APC considered to be ‘genuine’ or ‘concrete’ steps to 
897 Man Who Posted Ex-Girlfriend’s Nude Photos Online Was Sentenced To Prison For Two Years. 
10 December 2009. New Express. http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2009-12-10/015019226383.
shtml (Accessed 29 July 2014); Man Who Disseminated Ex-Girlfriend’s Nude Photos Committed 
the Crime to Insult. 14 October 2009. Yangcheng Evening News. www.ycwb.com/epaper/ycwb/
html/2009-10/14/content_620274.htm (Accessed 29 July 2014.)
898 Peng Pu. 2 July 2010. First sex photo case won in court. Global Times. www.globaltimes.cn/
content/547661.shtml (Accessed 31 July 2014); Qian Tao. 2011. Intermediary Liability of Website 
Operators in Privacy Cases in China. Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 5, 
No. 1, pp. 113–14. http://mujlt.law.muni.cz/storage/1327951355_sb_09-tao.pdf (Accessed 31 July 
2014.)
899 Yuki Noguchi. 13 December 2013. Twitter Critics Say It’s Not Sensitive Enough To Cyberbullying. 
NPR ‘All Tech Considered’. www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/12/13/250802010/twitter-
critics-say-its-not-sensitive-enough-to-cyberbullying (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
900 Laura Stampler, “Facebook Will Block Photos Celebrating Rape Following Ad Boycott”, Business 
Insider, 28 May 2013, accessed 28 July 2014, www.businessinsider.com/facebook-fbrape-ad-
boycott-2013-5.
901 Carly Nyst. End violence: Women’s rights and safety online project – Internet intermediaries and 
violence against women online. Executive summary and findings’. Association for Progressive 
Communications (APC). July 2014. http://www.genderit.org/sites/default/upload/flow-cnyst-
summary-formatted.pdf 
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‘promote women’s rights and specifically address violence against women until public 
scandals and resulting high-profile campaigns emerged in respect of the intermediary.’902 
Second, the study identified a “lack of transparency around reporting and redress 
processes.” Specifically: 
The primary challenge encountered by the researchers when conducting this 
study was the lack of available information about the reporting and redress 
processes available to victims of technology-related violence. Facebook 
provides the most information online about its reporting processes, but there 
remain serious gaps in information about the way complaints are dealt with, 
and the tests/thresholds applied. Twitter provides very little information about 
reporting processes but significant information about the circumstances under 
which it will cooperate with law enforcement; this should be contrasted with 
YouTube, which provides no information about law enforcement cooperation.903 
Third, the study found a widespread failure by the three companies “to engage with 
the perspectives of non-North American/European women.” The report points out that 
“Facebook and Twitter both claim to interact with women’s rights groups, but do not 
appear to have any formal relations with women’s rights groups outside of Europe and 
North America.” APC researchers concluded it was impossible to tell ‘whether they have 
an appreciation for international human rights and national legal framewoks regarding 
violence against women.’904
Fourth, the study found that while the companies all make statements in support of free 
speech, “none of the companies makes a public commitment to human rights standards 
or to the promotion of rights” and “none of the available policies explicitly address 
gender-related violence or harassment nor take a strong stance on respect for diversity 
or for women’s rights.”905 
Despite these problems the study did identify several positive developments. Both 
Twitter and Facebook had ‘shown a willingness to opening a diologue with the women’s 
rights community’. All three companies have ‘progressively simplified their reporting 
mechanisms, ensuring that content can be reported at its source.’ APC also flagged 
some proactive steps by Google’s YouTube:
YouTube has been trialling a new system called the YouTube Deputy Program, 
in which certain users, with a history of accurate reporting of offensive or 
otherwise inappropriate content, are invited to have more robust flagging 
tools, allowing them to flag content in bulk. YouTube has started to invite 
some organisations to trial the system, with the thinking that some groups may 
have specialised knowledge or expertise that may help them flag. There is a 
possibility that this system could be opened up to local women’s organisations 
902 Nyst, op. cit. p.3.
903 Ibid.
904 Nyst, op. cit.p.4.
905 Ibid.
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or the like. This would allow stakeholder groups to take proactive steps to 
eradicate technology-related violence against women.906
The APC report calls on internet intermediaries to balance their commitment to freedom 
of expression with other human rights ‘such as that to be free from discrimination and 
violence’. 
Indeed, it can sometimes be difficult to pinpoint where free expression stops and 
victimization begins. In June 2014, for example, YouTube drew criticism from the Egyptian 
Government for refusing to take down a video recording the mass rape of a 19-year-old 
woman at President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s inauguration. In response, YouTube said that it 
‘always remove[s] videos entirely where there is a privacy complaint and an individual is 
clearly identifiable’ (emphasis added), noting that in this case the attack’s ‘newsworthiness’ 
contributed to the company’s decision to allow blurred videos concealing the victim’s 
identity. WITNESS, a nonprofit that seeks to use citizen videos documenting abuse to 
effect change, applauded YouTube’s ‘nuanced stance’.907 YouTube also requires users 
wishing to view the video to vouch they are 18 years old or older.908 
As the APC report pointed out, sometimes companies come up with mechanisms 
to report abuse only after being subject to strong public criticism. After stonewalling 
women’s rights advocates when they reported misogynistic pages glorifying date rape and 
domestic violence,909 Facebook finally took action. For example, a group called Women, 
Action and the Media and the Everyday Sexism Project had to send thousands of emails 
to companies that advertise on Facebook; after Nissan and several smaller companies 
threatened to withdraw advertising, Facebook finally admitted that its ‘systems to identify 
and remove hate speech have failed to work as effectively as we would like, particularly 
around issues of gender-based hate’.910
At the same time, just as social media platforms are spaces where women or men face 
sexual and gender-based harassment, social media platforms also enable activists to 
906 Nyst, op. cit. p.5
907 Madeleine Bair. 25 June 2014. Consent, Privacy, and A Video of Sexual Assault. WITNESS Blog. 
http://blog.witness.org/2014/06/consent-privacy-video-sexual-assault (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
908 David Clark Scott. 14 June 2014. Why YouTube won’t remove Egyptian sexual assault video. 
Christian Science Monitor. www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2014/0614/Why-YouTube-
won-t-remove-Egyptian-sexual-assault-video (Accessed 28 July 2014); Lizzie Dearden. 14 June 
2014. YouTube refuses Egypt’s request to remove footage of Tahrir Square sexual assault. The 
Independent. 
 www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/youtube-refuses-egypts-request-to-remove-footage-
of-tahrir-square-sexual-assault-9537086.html (Accessed 28 July 2014); Madeleine Bair. 25 June 
2014. Consent, Privacy, and A Video of Sexual Assault. WITNESS Blog. http://blog.witness.
org/2014/06/consent-privacy-video-sexual-assault (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
909 Women, Action and The Media. 27 May 2013. Examples of Gender-Based Hate Speech on 
Facebook. 
 www.womenactionmedia.org/examples-of-gender-based-hate-speech-on-facebook (Accessed 31 
July 2014.)
910 Marne Levine. 28 May 2013. Controversial, Harmful and Hateful Speech on Facebook. Facebook 
Safety. www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-and-hateful-speech-on-
facebook/574430655911054 (Accessed 30 July 2014); Tanzina Vega. 29 May 2013. Facebook 
Says It Failed to Bar Posts With Hate Speech. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/
business/media/facebook-says-it-failed-to-stop-misogynous-pages.html (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
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fight harassment and raise awareness. In some cases these campaigns have succeeded 
in bringing national attention to the issues at hand and motivated political and policy-level 
change. This includes the 2012 campaign in Germany that resulted in a national debate, 
but which started on Twitter under the hashtag #aufschrei (German for ‘outcry’) through 
which individuals would tweet about everyday sexism against women.911 Similarly, in 
Kenya, the hashtag #SGBVJusticeKE on Twitter seeks to highlight the public interest case 
where eight survivors of sexual violence during the post-election violence in 2007 have 
brought a constitutional complaint against the Attorney General and five other senior 
government officials.912 
6.4 Conclusion
The previous chapter on social networking platforms found that global companies 
like Twitter and Facebook are much less transparent and accountable about how 
they enforce their terms of service than they are about how they handle government 
requests. The APC study cited in this chapter reinforces the need for greater dialogue 
and communication with all stakeholders about how social networking platforms develop 
and enforce their rules. Companies need to work more closely with users, human rights 
advocates of all kinds (including those advocating for gender rights as well as freedom of 
expression rights) and governments if the problem of online gender-based violence is to 
be addressed in a manner that also upholds and protects online freedom of expression. 
Indeed, the problem of online gender-based violence underscores the urgent need for a 
multistakeholder process to develop principles, standards, and ‘best practice’ guidelines 
for how social networking platforms should communicate with and listen to users about 
development and enforcement of their terms of service. 
911 Axel Maireder and Stephan Schlögl. 17 February 2014. 24 Hours of an #outcry: The Networked 
Publics of a Socio-Political Debate. European Journal of Communication, Vol. 29, forthcoming, 
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/axel.maireder/php/wordpress/wp-content/MairederSchloeg
l_24HoursOfAnOutcry_PrePrint.pdf; Silke Wünsch. 26 January 2013. Anti-sexism Twitter 
campaign gains momentum. Deutsche Welle. www.dw.de/anti-sexism-twitter-campaign-gains-
momentum/a-16552842 (Accessed 28 July 2014); Melissa Eddy and Chris Cottrell. 29 January 
2013. German Politician’s Remark Stirs Outcry Over Sexism. New York Times. www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/29/world/europe/29iht-germany29.html (Accessed 28 July 2014.) 
912 ICJ Kenya. 26 March 2013. Hearing of the PEV Sexual Gender Based Violence case begins in 
Court. Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists. www.icj-kenya.org/index.php/
media-centre/news/596-hearing-of-the-pev-sexual-gender-based-violence-case-begins-in-court 
(Accessed 31 July 2014.)
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7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
As an international intergovernmental organization that operates with a global remit and 
promotes values that are universal, UNESCO has proposed a conceptual framework of 
Internet “universality.”913 Respect for four core principles is a precondition for the Internet 
to be universal: (i) human rights; (ii) openness; (iii) accessibility; and (iv) multistakeholder 
participation. The four can be summarized by the mnemonic R – O – A – M (Rights-based, 
Open, Accessible, Multistakeholder driven).914 This report’s research findings highlight 
key challenges for realizing the first principle, human rights.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, this report builds on the UN Guiding Principles 
for business and human rights, according to which states have a primary duty to protect 
human rights, businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights, and both spheres 
have a role in providing remedy to those whose rights are violated. 
The case studies in this report highlight the difficulties that internet intermediaries face in 
maximizing respect for users’ right to freedom of expression when states do not uphold 
their own duty to protect. The cases above highlight ways in which all states have room for 
improvement. However it is also clear from the case studies that Internet intermediaries 
have considerable power to influence outcomes affecting internet users’ freedom of 
expression even when the legal and regulatory environment is not fully supportive of that 
aim.
7.1 State duty to protect
Part of the state’s duty to protect human rights includes facilitating and supporting 
intermediaries’ respect for freedom of expression.  This report’s findings illustrate how, to 
varying degrees, policies, laws, and regulations are not well aligned with that particular 
aspect of the state’s duty to protect human rights. Issues identified in the case studies 
included:
1. The characteristics of intermediary liability regimes or lack thereof, as well as the 
regulatory objectives of the regimes (as elaborated in Chapter 2) affect intermediaries’ 
ability to respect freedom of expression. Limiting the liability of intermediaries for 
content published or transmitted by third parties is essential to the flourishing of 
internet services that facilitate expression. 
913 UNESCO Universality. op. cit. 
914 Feedback sought for UNESCO’s research on the Internet. UNESCO Communication and Information. 
7 March 2014. 
 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/news-and-in-focus-
articles/all-news/news/open_consultation_on_unesco_new_concept_internet_universality
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2. Laws, policies, and regulations requiring intermediaries to carry out content 
restriction, blocking, and filtering in many jurisdictions are not sufficiently 
compatible with international human rights standards for freedom of expression. 
3. Laws, policies, and practices related to government surveillance and data collection 
from intermediaries, when insufficiently compatible with human rights norms, impede 
intermediaries’ ability to adequtely protect users’ privacy.
4. Licensing agreements can affect intermediaries’ ability to respect freedom of 
expression. This applies to ISPs in all countries studied and social networks and 
search engines in some countries.
5. Whereas due process generally requires that legal enforcement and decision-making 
are transparent and publicly accessible, governments are frequently opaque about 
requests to companies for content restriction, the handover of user data, and other 
surveillance requirements. This makes it difficult for the public to hold governments 
and companies appropriately accountable when users’ right to freedom of expression 
is unduly restricted—either directly, or indirectly through the compromise of user 
privacy. 
7.2 Responsibility of business to respect
Companies’ own policies and practices affect Internet users’ freedom of expression 
both positively and negatively. The case studies examined terms of service enforcement, 
identity policies, transparency practices, the extent to which companies are willing or 
able to contest government requests, and policies related to privacy, data retention and 
data protection. Key findings are as follows:
1. Transparency on content restrictions: (All three types of intermediaries) Companies 
studied in this report can offer transparency about how they decide to filter, remove, 
or otherwise restrict content either in response to requests from governments or third 
parties, or in the course of enforcing and their own terms of service. Tranparency 
includes giving notice where content is restricted to those trying to access it, as well 
as notifying those publishing the content. Companies can offer comprehensive or 
aggregated overviews of content restriction requests and the company’s compliance 
with them. Despite the recent “transparency reporting” trend by some companies, 
companies performed inconsistently in terms of what they choose to reveal and 
how the information is communicated. There is a further lack of transparency by 
companies about many aspects of their processes, particularly how they enforce 
terms of service and respond to private requests.
2. Ability to contest content restriction demands: Throughout the case studies it 
became evident that companies may not follow through on all government or other 
official demands to restrict content. Companies with clear policies and practices on 
handling content restriction requests are able to contest and minimize the impact 
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of local laws and regulations that fail to meet international standards for legitimate 
limitations.  
3. Self-regulation and terms of service enforcement: Internal decisions agreements 
among companies - particularly by social media companies - to restrict certain types 
of content, to enforce of their own private rules, are often welcomed by governments 
as a way to handle problems before they escalate into matters for the courts and law 
enforcement. At the same time, these rulemaking and enforcement processes lack 
transparency or independent oversight mechanisms that would help to ensure that 
they are not subject to errors and abuses. In summary, the roles may be distinguished 
as follows:
• Internet Service Providers: terms of service for ISPs in all countries studied are 
specific to each jurisdiction in which they operate and these generally ban illegal 
activity on their services. Some ISPs in some countries work through self-regulatory 
frameworks or take instructions from non-governmental bodies to identify illegal 
content or activity. 
• Search engines: Of the three search engines studied, the terms of service of 
Yandex (Russia) and Baidu (China) restrict what is required by law. Only Google 
(U.S.) restricts substantial categories of content in its terms of service and internal 
policies extending beyond what is required by law becaues its home jurisdiction has 
relatively few legal restrictions on expression.
• Social networking platforms: Weibo (China) forbids all content that is illegal under 
Chinese law which itself is broad enough that wide categories of political and 
religious speech have recently been identified as illegal by Chinese authorities. 
iWiW (Hungary) forbade content that was also forbidden by the law as well as other 
categories of content such “vulgar” or “obscene” speech and “overt” or “covert” 
advertising. The terms of service of Twitter and Facebook (U.S.) both globally restrict 
(to varying extents) a range of content categories not illegal in the U.S. In certain 
other jurisdictions they sometimes carry out targeted restriction of content in those 
jurisdictions where government requests identify the content as infringing. 
Governments also use the terms of service abuse reporting mechanisms to flag content 
which may or may not be illegal, but that violates the companies’ own rules. Also, users 
in most countries studied reported incidents in which measures were taken against 
content that did not appear to violate the terms, or in which the terms were enforced in 
an excessively literal way (e.g., deletion of breastfeeding-promotion pages and pictures) 
resulting in a negative impact on freedom of expression, and often without adequate 
means for appeal (see also Access to remedy below).
4. Privacy policies, data retention and data protection: (Applies to all three types of 
intermediaries studied here, especially ISPs and social networks) Companies in all 
three case studies collected similar types of data, although policies about retention 
and third party sharing differed widely, as did the extent to which companies inform 
users about whether policies exist and what they are. The majority of companies did 
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not clearly explain how they handle government requests for user data, nor did they 
offer information on actual requests for user data or compliance with those requests 
(the researched social networks stood out more positively in this regard). While law 
was a contributing factor to some of these differences, differences between the same 
service type in the same jurisdiction indicate other company-specific factors at play. 
5. Identity policies: (All three types of intermediaries studied here, especially ISPs and 
social networks). Whether users are allowed to use a service or create an account 
without having their account linked to their government-issued identity, or without 
having to use their real name, impacts users’ freedom of expression in many 
jurisdictions studied.
7.3 Access to remedy 
Remedy is the third central pillar of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, placing an obligation on governments and companies to provide individuals 
access to effective remedy. This area is where both governments and companies have 
much room for improvement. Across intermediary types, across jurisdictions and across 
the types of restriction, individuals whose content or publishing access is restricted as 
well as individuals who wish to access such content had inconsistent, limited, or no 
effective recourse to appeal restriction decisions, whether in response to government 
orders, third party requests or in accordance with company policy. While some 
companies have recently increased efforts to provide appeal and grievance mechanisms 
and communicate their existence to users, researchers identified examples of rules being 
inconsistently enforced and enforced in a manner also not consistent with the principles 
of due process. 
7.4 Issues of concern
Company policies and practices can combine with jurisdictional contexts to produce 
outcomes that have a negative impact on freedom of expression. All three case studies 
identified several common categories of issues: 
• Necessity and proportionality in content restriction: Over-broad law and heavy 
liability regimes cause intermediaries to over-comply with government requests in 
ways that compromise users’ right to freedom of expression, or broadly restrict 
content in anticipation of government demands, even if demands are never received 
and if the content could potentially be found legitimate even in a domestic court of 
law.
• The Internet’s transnational nature places particular limits on the operating 
space for intermediaries: Intermediaries can be subject to different legal norms, 
and are sometimes at risk of an all-out ban by authorities disagreeing with particular 
content shared via the services. Internet services at times resist such pressures by 
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closer cooperation with governments or sometimes by blocking content only in the 
jurisdiction in question, or sometimes by wholescale deletion of said content.
• Variety of actors involved creates uncertainty about permitted content: 
Companies decide to allow or ban certain content based on their internal policies, 
as well as being influenced by legal obligations following court rulings, governmental 
orders, civil claims, instructions by third parties, monitoring groups with which the 
intermediary cooperates, and others. This myriad of actors involved, compounded 
by ambiguity of legal frameworks, often makes it unclear for individual users what 
content is permitted, who decides on allowed content, and how, and the potential 
consequences of their expression. 
• Gender Issues: The existence and nature of company policies dealing with 
speech related to sexual harassment, gender-based violence and exploitation or 
objectification of women are uneven, even across the same intermediary type and 
jurisdiction. Companies in all three case studies had in place mechanisms allowing 
users to report abuse. These mechanisms could be used for legitimate purposes, 
including reporting sexual harassment, but at the same time some stakeholders 
expressed concerns that the same mechanisms could also be used to abuse users’ 
legitimate freedom of expression rights.
7.5 Intermediaries and Internet Governance 
In 2005, the UN Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) defined “Internet 
governance” as “the development and application by Governments, the private sector 
and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-
making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.”915 
Thus while the term “Internet governance” is often used in the media and public debates 
in a narrow sense to describe the technical policymaking and coordination functions of 
organizations such as the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), the concept was originally conceived to encompass a broader set of processes 
for determining policies and practices that shape the Internet’s functioning at all layers.
The policy role of internet intermediaries – and policies affecting their operations – is a 
form of Internet governance broadly defined.916 It is therefore useful to situate this report’s 
findings in the context of global debates over core principles for internet policymaking 
that have a direct impact on intermediaries. 
The annual Internet Governance forum (IGF), whose creation was mandated by the 
2005 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, provides a platform for stakeholders to 
debate the full range of issues surrounding the Internet’s governance, albeit without a 
915 Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance. Château de Bossey. June 2015. http://www.
wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf 
916 Laura DeNardis. August 2013. Internet Points of Control as Global Governance. Internet Governance 
Papers. No.2. Centre for International Governance Innovation. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/
default/files/no2_3.pdf
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mandate to set policy.917  A number “dynamic coalitions” were formed to support on-
going work related to a range of concerns related to the information society918 leading 
to the emergence in 2008 of the multistakeholder Internet Rights and Principles (IRP) 
Dynamic Coalition.919 The IRP developed a Charter of Human Rights and Principles for 
the Internet,920 with a set of ten core principles launched in 2011 including principles 
on freedom of expression and privacy.921 Notably, this development work preceded the 
release of the first report by UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression Frank La 
Rue in 2011 and the Human Rights Council’s first resolution on the Internet and human 
rights in 2012, the content of which was discussed in greater detail at the beginning of 
this report’s introductory chapter. 
In February 2014 the European Commission submitted a report to the European Parliament 
on Internet policy and governance, proposing an approach to developing principles 
for global Internet policy and governance. This approach built on the Tunis agenda of 
2005 and is represented by the acronym, COMPACT: “the Internet as a space of Civic 
responsibilities, One unfragmented resource governed via a Multistakeholder approach 
to Promote democracy and human rights, based on a sound technological Architecture 
that engenders  Confidence and facilitates a  Transparent governance both of the 
underlying Internet infrastructure and of the services which run on top of it”.922 Since Tunis, 
the document states, “there has been a proliferation of Internet governance principles in 
various fora but in most cases each one supported by a limited set of stakeholders, 
or limited in geographical scope.” The COMPACT principles, the Commission argued, 
have the potential to support “a process leading towards a more broadly supported 
and coherent set of principles for Internet governance [that] would be helpful in finding 
common ground.”923
In April 2014 the Brazilian government convened an international multistakeholder 
conference called “NETmundial” to discuss “Internet governance principles” and a 
“roadmap for the future evolution of the Internet Governance system.”924 Negotiations 
among governments, industry, civil society and the technical community produced 
a “multistakeholder statement” whose commitments on free expression and privacy 
principles went beyond previous commitments agreed by UN member states at the World 
917 APC Internet Rights Charter. last updated November 2006. http://www.apc.org/en/node/5677/.
918 Wolfgang Benedek, Veronika Bauer, and Matthias C. Ketteman eds.,  Internet Governance and the 
Information Society: Global Perspectives and European Dimensions, (Utrecht: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2008), p. 37. 
919 The IRP coalition. Internet Rights & Principles Coalition website. http://internetrightsandprinciples.
org/site/about/.
920 Internet Rights & Principles Charter. http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/wpcharter/. 
921 IRP campaigns: 10 Internet Rights & Principles. 
 http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/campaign/. 
922 Internet Policy and Governance  Europe’s role in shaping the future of Internet Governance. 12 
February 2014. The European Commission. COM(2014) 72 final. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2014:0072:FIN:EN:PDF
923 Ibid. p.4
924 Dilma Rousseff. 23 April 2014. Opening Speech. NETmundial. http://netmundial.br/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/NETMundial-23April2014-Dilma-Rousseff-Opening-Speech-en.pdf and 
NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement. 24 April 2014. 
 http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf. 
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Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis in 2015.925 Notably, its clauses on 
freedom of expression, association and access to information reinforced the emerging 
international consensus – discussed in detail in this report’s introductory chapter – that 
offline rights should be equally protected online. There was much less consensus around 
sections relating to intermediary liability and online privacy. As the case study findings of 
this report highlight, even if there appears to be stronger general consensus about the 
principle of freedom of expression, governments and companies still have a long way to 
go when it comes to translating such consensus into actual practice.
The September 2014 IGF in Istanbul saw the launch of a new Dynamic Coalition on 
“Platform Responsibility” focusing on a specific category of intermediaries, “social 
networks and other interactive online services,” to discuss “concrete and interoperable 
solutions to protect platform-users’ human rights.”926 This new Dynamic Coalition has 
similar potential to contribute to stronger norms for social networking services, search 
engines and other types of intermediaries that can be defined as ‘platforms’ for expression. 
There is a particular opportunity for this dynamic coalition to serve as a focal point for 
developing stronger human rights-based principles and accountability mechanisms for 
various emerging forms of self- and co- regulation. 
The following recommendations are offered by this report’s authors in the spirit of 
principles such as UNESCO’s ROAM formula, and the EC’s COMPACT and Netmundial, 
in the hopes of fostering further discussion and eventually building greater international 
consensus around best practices by all stakeholders.
925 Tunis Commitment. Second Phase of the WSIS (16-18 November 2005, Tunis) WSIS-05/TUNIS/
DOC/7. http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?id=2266%7C0. Also see Milton Mueler. 
27 April, 2014.  Netmundial Moves Net Governance Beyond WSIS. Internet Governance Project 
blog. http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/27/netmundial-moves-net-governance-beyond-
wsis/ (Accessed May 6, 2014.) and David Johnson. The Unanswered Questions of Netmundial. 
Internet Governance Project Blog. 30 April 2014. http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/30/
the-unanswered-questions-of-netmundial/ (Accessed 6 May, 2014.)
926 Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility. ‘About’ page. http://platformresponsibility.info/?page_
id=2
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations apply in varying degrees to all stakeholders: governments, 
companies, civil society and multinational organizations. If online freedom of expression 
is to be adequately respected and protected, all of these actors must find ways to work 
together across borders to improve legal and regulatory frameworks, establish and 
implement corporate best practices, and increase awareness as well as participation 
by internet users and citizens. Rulemaking and enforcement related to online speech 
– whether carried out by governments or companies – must be compatible with and 
held accountable to international human rights norms. The recommendations below are 
offered as first steps in that direction.
1. Adequate legal frameworks and policies. 
Policy, legal, and regulatory goals affecting intermediaries must be consistent with 
universal human rights norms if states are to protect online freedom of expression and 
if companies are to respect it to the maximum degree possible. Governments need to 
ensure that legal frameworks and policies are in place to address issues arising out of 
intermediary liability and absence of liability. Legal frameworks and policies affecting 
freedom of expression and privacy should be contextually adapted without transgressing 
universal standards, be consistent with human rights norms including the right to freedom 
of expression, and contain a commitment to principles of due process and fairness. Legal 
and regulatory frameworks should also be precise and grounded in a clear understanding 
of the technology they are meant to address, removing legal uncertainty that would 
otherwise provide opportunity for abuse or for intermediaries to operate in ways that 
restrict freedom of expression for fear of liability.
In order to better inform public and private policymaking processes, there is a need 
for much more qualitative and quantitative global research on the impact of company 
policies, practices, business models, and design choices on freedom of expression. 
Comprehensive surveys of internet users around the world on how intermediaries affect 
individuals’ freedom of expression in different contexts are currently lacking. More research 
is also needed on how legal, regulatory and policy frameworks affect intermediaries’ ability 
to respect users’ rights, as well as their impact on Internet users more broadly. This study 
only begins to scratch the surface in its examination of how specific companies’ policies 
and practices affect freedom of expression in different jurisdictions. More detailed facts 
about cause-and-effect between policies, practices and outcomes are needed. These 
facts will better equip all stakeholders to refine and adjust their policies, practices, and 
strategies to maximize the protection of and respect for freedom of expression rights of 
Internet users everywhere in the world.
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2. Multistakeholder policy development. 
Laws, regulations and governmental policies, as well as corporate policies, are more 
likely to be compatible with freedom of expression if they are developed in consultation 
with all affected stakeholders – particularly those whose rights are known to be at risk 
– and take into account those interests. A genuine multistakeholder process involves all 
stakeholders potentially affected by the policy from the start, rather than simply seeking 
opinions after the basic parameters have been set and key directions already determined.
3. Transparency. 
Transparency is important to demonstrate that governance and enforcement 
actions are in compliance pre-specified principles, rules and conditions.
Greater transparency by governments about requests and requirements being placed 
on companies that have the potential to affect Internet users’ freedom of expression and 
privacy is a prerequisite for accountability in public governance of the Internet. 
Transparency by companies is a prerequisite for accountability in how intermediaries 
respond to government requests, as well as their own private “governance,” which in turn 
is necessary not only for the protection of Internet users’ freedom of expression, but for 
companies ability to earn and maintain public trust in their services.
In this context there are two kinds of transparency: qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative transparency involves governments making publicly available, the laws, legal 
interpretations, administrative procedures and other measures related to content restriction 
and surveillance. For companies, qualitative transparency involves communicating with 
users about processes for responding to government requests and for enforcing internal 
company rules and processes. Quantitative transparency refers to the publication of 
aggregate data about government requests and compliance rates, as well as other data 
that helps internet users understand what types of content are being removed under what 
auspices for what reason.
The GNI and Center for Democracy and Technology have developed the following 
transparency recommendations for governments regarding content restriction: 
• Publicly post laws authorizing orders to remove or restrict content as well as official 
legal interpretations of the law, including executive orders, legal opinions that are 
relied on by executive officials, and court orders. 
• Disclose the information about:
 { Which government agencies/bodies are legally permitted to order takedowns; 
 { The types of information by subject that can be ordered removed; 
 { The judicial, ministerial, or other oversight mechanisms required for the 
authorization of each instance of content removal;
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 { The judicial, ministerial, or independent oversight mechanisms that oversee the 
implementation of content takedowns;
 { The mechanisms for redress that victims of unlawful censorship may pursue;
 { Public disclosure of the scope of unlawful censorship and remedial and 
disciplinary actions taken.
• Permit companies to disclose the number of takedowns requests that they receive 
by number, subject matter, and specific legal authority, and how the company 
responded to the request.927
Similar transparency measures are recommended for governments in reporting both 
qualitatively and quantitatively on surveillance. Companies should disclose aggregated 
information on the number of user data and real-time surveillance requests that they 
receive, and how the company responds to them, on at least an annual basis.  Governments 
should enact legal reforms that clearly permits such transparency. Companies should 
also be able to disclose the existence and basic details about any technical requirements 
for surveillance that governments impose upon them.
4. Privacy. 
Protecting users’ right to privacy is essential for freedom to expression to flourish. 
Intermediaries should adopt best practices with respect to privacy. Intermediaries 
must also have clear and comprehensible policies in place for what information about 
users they collect and store, how they handle it, with whom they share it, and under 
what circumstances authorities may obtain access to such data. Such policies must be 
prominent and easy to access. 
For governments, policies, regulations laws, and enforcement practices affecting 
Internet users’ privacy, including data collection and surveillance for law enforcement 
purposes, should be consistent with core human rights principles outlined in this report’s 
first recommendation. The ‘International Principles on the Application of Human Rights 
to Communications Surveillance’ developed by a global coalition of civil society groups 
between late 2012 and May 2014, set forth 13 concrete principles that governments and 
companies should follow to ensure that communications surveillance is carried out in a 
manner consistent with international human rights standards.928
927 Susan Morgan and Emma Llansó. Letter to Members of the Freedom Online Coalition Working 
Group on Privacy and Transparency Online. 29 August 2014. 
928 https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text
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5. Human rights impact assessment. 
Protection of online freedom of expression will be strengthened if governments carry 
out human rights impact assessments to determine how proposed laws, regulations or 
policies may affect Internet users’ freedom of expression and/or privacy domestically and 
globally, and publish the results of those assessments.929  
Companies should also carry out human rights impact assessments to determine 
how their policies, practices, and business operations affect Internet users’ freedom 
of expression and adapt their activities accordingly with strategies to mitigate potential 
harms identified in the assessments.930 Such assessment processes should be anchored 
in robust engagement with stakeholders whose freedom of expression rights are at 
greatest risk online or those who are able to able to represent those interests, as well as 
stakeholders who harbor concerns about other human rights affected by online speech. 
Strategies to mitigate negative impact on freedom of expression can include, for example: 
a. the training of staff to enable informed decision-making on content restrictions 
based on clear and consistent criteria and process;
b. the development of a “rapid human rights impact assessment” process in 
specific circumstances when time-sensitive business decisions are being made;
c. creation of informed networks of knowledgeable stakeholders to engage with at 
key moments.931
6. Self-regulation must follow principles of due process and 
accountability, and be consistent with human rights norms. 
National laws need to strengthen due process and the adherence to international human 
rights norms to protect the rights of Internet users needs, but they are also essential 
for intermediaries’ legitimacy as custodians of online content and should be a guiding 
principle of private terms of service enforcement processes. This aligns with international 
standards that require any limitations on free expression to be specified in rule, as distinct 
from being arbitrary or retroactive. Self-regulation should further respect the principles 
of necessity, proportionality, and internationally agreed legitimate purpose. Within the 
929 See Eduardo Bertoni. Internet Regulation and the Need for “Human Rights Impact Assessments” 
(HRIA) - a Proposal for Debate in Latin America. E-Bertoni. 27 July 2012. 
 http://ebertoni.blogspot.com/2012/07/internet-regulation-and-need-for-human.html (Accessed 
September 17, 2014.)
930 For more information about human rights impact assessments see: Faris Natour and Jessica Davis 
Pluess. Conducting an Effective Human Rights Impact Assessment. March 2013.  http://www.bsr.
org/reports/BSR_Human_Rights_Impact_Assessments.pdf  and Michael A. Samway. Business, 
Human Rights and the Internet: A Framework for Implementation. in Human Dignity and the 
Future of Global Institutions. (eds. Arend and Lagon, Georgetown University Press, 2014) pp. 
309-312.
931 Legitimate and Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in Human Rights Due Diligence: Challenges 
and Solutions for ICT Companies. BSR, with CDT. September 2014. http://www.bsr.org/reports/
BSR_Rights_Holder_Engagement.pdf
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context of creating a safe user experience, content restrictions deployed by intermediaries 
should not only be as minimal as possible, but should also avoid conflict with the key 
human rights principle of non-discrimination. 
In order to identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts on users’ freedom of 
expression, intermediaries should carry out human rights impact assessments on their 
terms of service and related enforcement policies and practices. 
The Internet Society has proposed a set of principles and recommendations for self-
regulatory processes and institutions. Key recommendations include specific ways 
in which self-regulatory mechanisms should build accountantable and transparent 
practices. Balanced and proportionate rules, due process, and judicial safeguards are all 
essential. Periodic reviews should also be built into such systems: ‘All systems, including 
public ones, should be periodically reviewed and evaluated as to their effectiveness. Such 
reviews test the efficacy of policy mechanisms and their ability to provide answers to the 
issues they were originally created to address.’932  This is sound advice for traditional 
regulation as well as companies’ private rules and enforcement processes.
7. Remedy.
Internet users have the right to effective remedy when their rights are restricted or violated 
by intermediaries, by states, or by a combination of the two. It should be possible for 
people to report grievances and obtain remedy from private intermediaries as well as 
from government authorities, including national-level human rights institutions. In seeking 
remedy for restriction or violation of the right to online freedom of expression, Internet 
users should not necessarily be required to pursue legal action through the courts. 
Avenues for seeking remedies should be publicly available, known, accessible, affordable 
and capable of providing appropriate redress.933 
Depending on national context, grievance and remedy mechanisms provided by states 
may include redress mechanisms such as those provided by data protection authorities, 
national human rights institutions (such as ombudspersons), court procedures, and 
hotlines.934
Depending on the jurisdictional and operational context, grievance and remedy 
mechanisms provided by private intermediaries (and private regulatory schemes 
that they may participate in) should provide mechanisms to receive and respond to 
grievances from Internet users.  These should be accessible, secure, and linguistically 
and culturally-appropriate. The question of whether meaningful remedy is available 
to users whose freedom of expression rights have been restricted or violated should 
932 Voluntary Initiatives as a source of policy-making on the Internet. 29 July 2014. The Internet Society. 
http://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/07/voluntary-initiatives-source-policy-making-internet
933 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide 
to human rights for Internet users. (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 April 2014 
at the 1197th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). Council of Europe. p.4 https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=2184807
934 Ibid. p.1 
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be examined as part of a company’s human rights impact assessment process. 
Depending on the grievance and the harm identified, remedy might could (but need 
not necessarily) involve financial compensation. Meaningful remedy measures can also 
include acknowledgment, apology, and commitment to address the problem in the future; 
submitting to independent investigation or ongoing oversight; or participation in regional 
or sector-wide multistakeholder entities to clarify and mitigate potential restriction or 
violation of users’ rights.935
8. Public education and information, and media and information 
literacy.
The composite concept of Media and Information Literacy covers the range of 
competencies that citizens need for full participation in knowledge societies. In 
their engagement with internet intermediaries, citizens require a range of of literacies 
concerning free expression issues. Companies and governments have a role to play in 
promoting these literacies formally and informally. 
States have an obligation to provide accessible and clear information to the public so 
that Internet users can not only understand and effectively exercise their rights, but also 
recognize when their rights have been restricted, violated, or otherwise interfered with. 
State restrictions on freedom of expression must not only pursue a legitimate aim and 
comply with human rights law, but should also be made clearly known to the public.936 
Public information should also include concrete instructions on official grievance and 
remedy mechanisms.937 
Respect of Internet users’ rights by private intermediaries also requires informing and 
communicating with users about their rights as users of the service, how users’ expression 
can be restricted according to the intermediary’s terms of service, the reasons for those 
restrictions and why they are necessary, and other information necessary for a user to 
make an informed decision about whether or not to use the service.938
Educational institutions should be encouraged and incentivized to include information 
about the rights of Internet users in curricula related to human rights, civics and 
government. Media should similarly be encouraged and incentivized to include reporting 
and programming that helps to foster informed public discussion about the rights of 
Internet users, and the obligations of states and businesses to protect and respect those 
rights. 
935 Telco Remedy Plan. Access. pp 8-10. https://www.accessnow.org/telco-remedy-plan 
936 Council of Europe, op. cit. p.3
937 Ibid. p.1
938 Ibid. p.3
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9. Global accountability mechanisms
It is important that companies and governments alike make commitments to implement 
core principles of freedom of expression and privacy. In today’s globally networked digital 
environment, these principles must be implemented in a manner that is accountable 
locally as well as globally.
Examples from the consumer privacy context include: the European Union’s Binding 
Corporate Rules939 and the APEC Cross Border Privacy Rules system.940 Another 
approach to accountability for companies is through assessment and certification 
by independent multistakeholder organizations. The Global Network Initiative, a 
multistakeholder coalition, requires its members to undergo periodic assessments as 
part of an accountability mechanism for adherence to its principles and implementation 
guidelines focused on how companies handle government requests. (As noted in this 
report’s introduction, of the companies studied for this report, Google and Facebook are 
GNI members. Vodafone and Telefonica, the parent company of Vivo, are members of 
the Telecommunication Industry Dialogue, which works closely with GNI on developing 
best practice for the telecommunications industry.)  The GNI’s implementation guidelines 
and assessment do not currently include consumer privacy issues or terms of service 
enforcement, however. Other organizations and mechanisms may need to be developed 
to improve accountability and transparency in these areas if GNI is unable to include them 
in future.
As for states, a coalition of 23 governments have joined the Freedom Online Coalition, in 
which member nations agree to work together to advance ‘free expression, association, 
assembly, and privacy online – worldwide.’941 In April 2014 the coalition’s members issued 
the ‘Tallinn Declaration’, a set of ‘Recommendations for Freedom Online.’ 942 Among 
those recommendations three are particularly relevant to this report: 
• Dedicate ourselves, in conducting our own activities, to respect our human rights 
obligations, as well as the principles of the rule of law, legitimate purpose, non-
arbitrariness, effective oversight, and transparency, and call upon others to do the 
same,
• Reaffirm support for an open and interoperable internet, noting that strong cyber 
security and secure and stable communication are critical to maintaining confidence 
and trust in the internet, and key to safeguarding human rights and realising the 
internet’s economic, social and cultural benefits, 
• Call upon governments worldwide to promote transparency and independent, 
effective domestic oversight related to electronic surveillance, use of content take-
939 Overview on Binding Corporate Rules. Data Protection. European Commission. http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-transfers/binding-corporate-rules/index_en.htm
940 APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System http://www.cbprs.org/ 
941 Freedom Online Coalition. https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/
942 Recommendations for Freedom Online. Adopted in Tallinn, Estonia on April 28, 2014 by 
Ministers of the Freedom Online Coalition.  https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/FOC-recommendations-consensus.pdf
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down notices, limitations or restrictions on online content or user access and other 
similar measures, while committing ourselves to do the same,
Three multi-stakeholder working groups have been set up. The coalition holds an annual 
conference to which representatives from companies and civil society are invited. However 
it remains to be seen whether any mechanisms will emerge through which governments 
can be benchmarked and held accountable by gobal stakeholders on the extent to which 
they have lived up to the above recommendations. Internet intermediaries will be hard 
pressed to fully live up to their responsibility to respect human rights unless governments 
fulfill their own duty to protect human rights including freedom of expression and privacy 
online.
This study has been focused on three types of Internet intermediaries, assessing their role 
in fostering freedom of expression. The research is not intended to be a representative or 
static sample of actors, but rather to extrapolate more general insights. Its aim has been 
to assist all stakeholders, and not least the intermediaries themselves, to identify how, 
through the gatekeeping capacity inherent in mediating Internet content can be optimised 
for freedom of expression and the right to privacy. In this way, internet intermediaries 
and the companies that operate them can contribute to the evolution of what UNESCO 
calls knowledge societies, which in turn are central to building democracy, sustainable 
development and peace around the world. 
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Glossary
Algorithm: ‘A set of ordered steps for solving a problem, such as a mathematical formula 
or the instructions in a program.’943
Anonymity: The ability to ‘access and impart information, and to communicate securely, 
without having to be identified.’944
Bandwidth: ‘The transmission capacity of an electronic pathway such as a communications 
line, computer bus or computer channel. Digital bandwidth is the number of pulses per 
second measured in bits per second (bps). For example, Ethernet transmits at different 
speeds, including 10 Mbps [Megabits per second], 100 Mbps and 1000 Mbps’945 
Blog: ‘A website, usually maintained by a person with regular entries of commentary, 
descriptions of happenings, graphics or video. The ability of readers to leave comments 
in an interactive format is an important part of many blogs.’946
Cloud computing: ‘[A] way of delivering applications, services or content remotely to 
end users, rather than requiring them to hold data, software or applications on their own 
devices.’947 
Content: ‘On the Internet, content is any information that is available for retrieval by 
the user, including Web pages, images, music, audio, white papers, driver and software 
downloads as well as training, educational and reference materials.’948
Cookie: ‘A small text file (up to 4KB) created by a Web site you visit that is stored on 
your computer either temporarily for that session only or permanently on the hard disk 
(persistent cookie). Cookies provide a way for the Web site to recognize you and keep 
track of your preferences.’949
Data Packet: “[A] unit of data made into a single package that travels along a given 
network path. Data packets are used in Internet Protocol (IP) transmissions for data that 
navigates the Web, and in other kinds of networks.’950
943 ‘Definition of: algorithm’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. 
 http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/37649/algorithm (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
944 Frank La Rue. 17 April 2013. (A/HRC/23/40) Op. Cit. p. 13. 
945 ‘Definition of: bandwidth’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia, 
 http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/38401/bandwidth (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
946 William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law and Victoria Nash. 2011. Op Cit. p. 82. 
947 UNCTAD. 2013. Information Economy Report 2013: The Cloud Economy and Developing Countries. 
Switzerland, UN Publications, p. 4. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ier2013_en.pdf 
948 ‘Definition of: content’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/40264/content (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
949 ‘Definition of: cookie’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/40334/cookie (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
950 ‘Data Packet’. Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/definition/6751/data-packet 
(Accessed 24 October 2014.)
196
Data Protection: Standards that ‘place conditions on the collection, use and storage of 
personal data (rules governing data controllers), give certain rights to the individuals to 
whom the data relates (data subjects), and provide for a system of oversight to ensure 
respect for the rules and to address breaches.’951
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI): ‘A technology which permits access providers to open 
each “packet” of Internet data sent or received on its network in order to assess where it 
is coming from, who it is going to and the nature of the file, if it is not encrypted.’952
Domain Name: ‘[A]n Internet resource name that is universally understood by Web 
servers and online organizations and provides all pertinent destination information. To 
access an organization’s Web-based services, website users must know the precise 
domain name.’953
Email: A portmanteau of ‘electronic mail’ referring to the ‘transmission of text messages 
from sender to recipient…Users can send a mail message to a single recipient or to 
multiple users’ and can attach and transmit computer files in the message.954
Encryption: ‘A process that takes a message and makes it unreadable except to a person 
who knows how to “decrypt” it back into a readable form.’955
Hashtag: ‘A means of providing a common topic identifier in text and chat messages so 
they can be searched as a group. Commonly used in tweets, the hashtag uses a number 
sign (#) prefix followed by text. Hashtags can be created and used to identify anything, 
including people, businesses, organizations, sports teams, political parties, hobbies, 
events, philosophies, moods, rants and raves.’956
Internet: ‘[A] large network made up of smaller networks…The global Internet comprises 
nearly a billion Web, e-mail and related servers in more than 100 countries. Originally 
developed for the U.S. military, it became widely used for academic and commercial 
research, with access to unpublished data and journals on many subjects. Today, the 
“Net” is the world’s largest source of information on every subject known to humankind.’957
Internet filtering: ‘A government, an ISP [Internet Service Provider], a company or a 
parent can install software, either on a personal computer at home or on a server in an 
organization, that restricts content to users. A filter can screen particular words, e-mail 
951 Toby Mendel, Andrew Puddephatt, Ben Wagner, Dixie Hawtin, and Natalia Torres. 2012. Op. Cit. 
p. 64. 
952 Joe McNamee. January 2011. Op Cit. p. 3. 
953 ‘Domain Name’. Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/definition/1327/domain-name 
(Accessed 25 October 2014.)
954 “Definition of: e-mail’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/42233/e-mail (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
955 ‘Encryption’. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Surveillance Self-Defense project. https://ssd.eff.org/
en/glossary/encryption (Accessed 24 October 2014). 
956 ‘Definition of: hashtag’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/60984/hashtag (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
957 ‘Definition of: internet”. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/45184/internet (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
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addresses, Web sites or other addresses and be used for example, if a country wishes to 
prevent users within its borders from seeing a particular news site online.’958
IP address: ‘Each device connected to the Internet has a unique number [called an IP 
address] that allows it to communicate with other devices.’959 When a device connects 
with a Web site or online server, its IP address is usually visible. It is possible to determine 
information such as approximate location or ISP using an IP address.960
KB: Acronym for Kilobyte, a measurement of data. One KB equals 1,024 bytes. Text-
based files, such as emails or documents, consist of thousands of bytes and are often 
measured in KB. Audio, image, and video files are much larger and contain millions of 
bytes. They are measured in MB (Megabytes, or about one million bytes).961
Keyword: ‘A word used in a text search.’ Also, a ‘word in a text document that is used in 
an index to best describe the contents of the document.962 Filtering software often uses 
keywords to determine what content or websites to block.
Malware: A combination of ‘malicious software’ referring to ‘[s]oftware ‘designed to 
damage computers or computer systems, such as by installing a computer virus.’ 963
Metadata: (also known as “data about data”) and includes ‘everything about a piece of 
information, apart from the information itself. So the content of a message is not metadata, 
but who sent it, when, where from, and to whom, are all examples of metadata…[M]
etadata can often reveal a great deal, and will often need to be protected as carefully as 
the data it describes.’964  
MMS: An acronym for Multimedia Messaging Service, MMS is an ‘enhancement to the 
SMS text messaging service that enables images, audio and video files to be transmitted 
with the text message to a cellphone.’965
Net Neutrality: The principle that ISPs should treat all data equally and not prioritize data 
or services for any reason – including commercial and political ones.966
958 William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law and Victoria Nash. 2011. Op. Cit, p. 84. 
959 Joe McNamee. January 2011. Op. Cit. p. 3. 
960 ‘IP Address’. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Surveillance Self Defense project. 
 https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/ip-address (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
961  ‘What units of measurement are used for data storage?’ TechTerms.com Help Center. http://www.
techterms.com/help/data_storage_units_of_measurement (Accessed 26 October 2014.); ‘Kilobytes 
Megabytes Gigabytes’. CS101, Stanford University. https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs101/bits-
gigabytes.html 
962 ‘Definition of: keyword”. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. 
 http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/45808/keyword (Accessed 25 October 2014.) 
963 William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law and Victoria Nash. 2011. Op. Cit. p. 84. 
964 ‘Metadata’. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Surveillance Self Defense project. https://ssd.eff.org/en/
glossary/metadata (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
965 ‘Definition of: MMS’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. 
 http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/47123/mms (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
966 Barbara van Schewick. 6 May 2014. The Case for Rebooting the Network-Neutrality Debate. The 
Atlantic. 
 http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-rebooting-the-network-
neutrality-debate/361809/ (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
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Network Level: When telecommunications access providers or ISPs perform a given 
action, that action occurs at the network level. These actions may not change what 
content is available on the World Wide Web, but they affect what users can access online. 
Network-level actions that can restrict free expression include filtering, shutting down 
service, or deliberately slowing service. 
Portal: ‘[A]ny commonly used website serving as an entry point to the Internet, usually 
with many links to a wide variety of information, data, resources and services.’967
Post: ‘To place an entry on a blog or social networking site or to place a new or revised 
page on a Web site.’968 An entry on a blog or social networking site is also called a post.
Platform Level: When applications such as search engines, social network sites, or web 
hosting providers perform a given action, that action occurs at the platform level.  These 
actions can affect what content is available online as well as what content users can 
access. Platform-level actions that can restrict free expression include deleting content, 
blocking content from view, or deactivating user accounts. 
Pseudonym: ‘[A] name used in place of one’s given (or “real”) name. Examples of 
pseudonyms in the computer world include usernames and handles, which are frequently 
used when accessing websites or posting comments. A pseudonym may also be known 
as a false name.’969
Search engine optimization: ‘Designing a Web site so that search engines find the 
pages easily and index them. The goal is to have a page rank as high up on the results 
list as possible...Search engine optimization (SEO) includes the choice of keywords used 
in the text paragraphs and the placement of those words on the page, both visible and 
hidden inside meta tags.’970
SMS: An acronym for Short Messaging Service, SMS is the ‘common text messaging 
service available on cellphones and other handheld devices.’971
SIM Card: Short for subscriber identity module card, a SIM card ‘is a portable memory 
chip used in GSM [Global Standard for Mobiles] phones. It is a crucial component in 
mobile telecommunications as it identifies and stores the telephone number and connects 
the cellphone to the mobile carrier’s network.”972
967 ‘Portal (Internet)’. Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/definition/13077/portal-
internet (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
968 ‘Definition of: Post’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/49542/post (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
969 ‘Pseudyonym (nym)’. Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/definition/1707/
pseudonym-nym (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
970 ‘Definition of: search engine optimization’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia/term/50995/search-engine-optimization (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
971 ‘Definition of: SMS’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/51563/sms (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
972 ‘Subscriber Identity Module Card (SIM Card).’ Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/
definition/23747/subscriber-identity-module-card-sim-card (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
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Social media: ‘[A] catch-all term for a variety of Internet applications that allow users to 
create content and interact with each other. This interaction can take many forms, but 
some common types include:
• Sharing links to interesting content produced by third parties
• Public updates to a profile, including information on current activities and even 
location data
• Sharing photos, videos and posts
• Commenting on the photos, posts, updates, videos and links shared by others’973
Spam: Unsolicited and bulk communications. Most spam is in the form of email, but 
it can also be posted to online chat rooms, message boards, and comments sections. 
Spam’s costs come from the cost to human attention and the large amount of network 
bandwidth it consumes.
Spider: ‘Also known as a “crawler,” “robot” (bot) and “intelligent agent,” a spider is a 
program that searches for information on the Web. Spiders are widely used by Web 
search engines to index all the pages on a site by following the links from page to page. 
The search engine summarizes the content and adds the links to [its index]. Spiders are 
also used to locate Web pages that sell a particular product or to find blogs that have 
opinions about a product.’974
Telecommunications: ‘[T]he exchange of information by electronic and electrical means 
over a significant distance. A complete telecommunication arrangement is made up of two 
or more stations equipped with transmitter and receiver devices…Telecommunications 
devices include telephones, telegraph, radio, microwave communication arrangements, 
fiber optics, satellites and the Internet.’975
URL: An acronym for Uniform Resource Locator, a URL is the ‘address that defines the 
route to a file on an Internet server (Web server, mail server, etc.). URLs are typed into a 
Web browser to access Web pages and files, and URLs are embedded within the pages 
themselves as links.’976
Web hosting: Making a Web site available on the Internet. A Web site contains pages 
of information stored in a Web server, which is a computer running Web server software 
connected to the Internet…Small [organizations] typically use a third party to host their 
site; however, sites with minimal traffic can share a single server with other low-traffic 
973 ‘Social Media’. Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/definition/4837/social-media 
(Accessed 25 October 2014.)
974 ‘Definition of: spider’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. 
 http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/51860/spider (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
975 ‘Telecommunications’. Techopedia Dictionary. 
 http://www.techopedia.com/definition/5570/telecommunications (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
976 ‘Definition of URL’. PC World Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/53516/url 
(Accessed 25 October 2014.)
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customers. In contrast, Web sites for large [organizations] may require dozens, hundreds 
or even thousands of Web servers.977
World Wide Web: ‘An Internet-based system that enables an individual or a company 
to publish itself to the entire world, except to countries or locations that prohibit the free 
interchange of information.’978 
977 ‘Definition of: Web hosting’. PC World Encyclopedia. 
 http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/54305/web-hosting (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
978 ‘Definition of; World Wide Web’. PC World Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/54867/world-wide-web (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
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